Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information with authorities concerning violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict: A UK replication study

Research output: Book/ReportCommissioned report

Abstract

The first people to suspect or know about someone becoming involved in planning acts of violent extremism will often be those closest to them: their friends, family and community insiders. However, whilst these 'intimates' have a vital role to play against potential terrorist threats and offer a first line of defence, very little is known about what reporting of the potential violent extremist involvement of an ‘intimate’ means for community members. 'Intimates' reporting is a critical blind spot in current Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)/Prevent thinking and strategy internationally.

These new findings from CREST-funded research by the University of Huddersfield and Deakin University, Australia address this evidential gap in the UK. Replicating and developing a previous Australian study, the ‘Community Reporting Thresholds’ project has used qualitative, in-depth interviews with community members (particularly young adults) and front-line professional practitioners (CT police personnel, Prevent practitioners and community organisation staff) to investigate thresholds, barriers and enablers for community members sharing concerns about the involvement on an ‘intimate’ in violent extremism.
Key findings are that community members are primarily motivated by care and concern for their intimate in considering reporting. The gravity of reporting to the police means that most community respondents would only report after a staged process, whereby they first attempt to dissuade the intimate, and also take counsel and guidance from family members, friends and trusted ‘community leaders’. Community respondents want to report to local police, not CT specialists, and to do so by face to face means. They also want support and updates after reporting through a feedback loop. Some respondents are unsure how to report, a perspective echoed by professional practitioners who see national reporting mechanisms as confusing and made more difficult by the public image of Prevent. These findings have enabled identification in the Final Report and the Executive Summary of clear strategic directions for future policy and practice consideration.
LanguageEnglish
PublisherCentre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST)
Commissioning bodyCentre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST)
Number of pages100
Publication statusPublished - 18 Sep 2017

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Cite this

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title = "Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information with authorities concerning violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict: A UK replication study",
abstract = "The first people to suspect or know about someone becoming involved in planning acts of violent extremism will often be those closest to them: their friends, family and community insiders. However, whilst these 'intimates' have a vital role to play against potential terrorist threats and offer a first line of defence, very little is known about what reporting of the potential violent extremist involvement of an ‘intimate’ means for community members. 'Intimates' reporting is a critical blind spot in current Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)/Prevent thinking and strategy internationally. These new findings from CREST-funded research by the University of Huddersfield and Deakin University, Australia address this evidential gap in the UK. Replicating and developing a previous Australian study, the ‘Community Reporting Thresholds’ project has used qualitative, in-depth interviews with community members (particularly young adults) and front-line professional practitioners (CT police personnel, Prevent practitioners and community organisation staff) to investigate thresholds, barriers and enablers for community members sharing concerns about the involvement on an ‘intimate’ in violent extremism.Key findings are that community members are primarily motivated by care and concern for their intimate in considering reporting. The gravity of reporting to the police means that most community respondents would only report after a staged process, whereby they first attempt to dissuade the intimate, and also take counsel and guidance from family members, friends and trusted ‘community leaders’. Community respondents want to report to local police, not CT specialists, and to do so by face to face means. They also want support and updates after reporting through a feedback loop. Some respondents are unsure how to report, a perspective echoed by professional practitioners who see national reporting mechanisms as confusing and made more difficult by the public image of Prevent. These findings have enabled identification in the Final Report and the Executive Summary of clear strategic directions for future policy and practice consideration.",
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Community Reporting Thresholds : Sharing information with authorities concerning violent extremist activity and involvement in foreign conflict: A UK replication study. / Thomas, Paul; Grossman, Michele; Miah, Shamim; Christmann, Kris.

Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2017. 100 p.

Research output: Book/ReportCommissioned report

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