Competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

35 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper develops a differential duopolistic game where price is sticky and firms can invest in market-enlarging promotional activities which have a public good nature. One finding indicates that advertising, and not output as in Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55 (1987) 1151-1164) is responsible for the higher stationary price found in the open loop equilibrium relative to the linear feedback one. That is, free-riding is more intense when firms play linear Markov feedback strategies. However, the collusive outcome can be approximated, and opportunism eliminated, if firms can engage in preplay negotiations where they select a nonlinear Markov perfect strategy for output and advertising. Achieving the collusive outcome requires (as in the Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games) the discount rate to be sufficiently small.

LanguageEnglish
Pages595-614
Number of pages20
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume18
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2000
Externally publishedYes

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Marketing
Feedback
Sticky prices
Duopoly
Opportunism
Discount rate
Nature
Differential games
Infinitely repeated games
Folk theorem
Free-riding

Cite this

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Competition in a duopoly with sticky price and advertising. / Piga, Claudio A.G.

In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 18, No. 4, 01.05.2000, p. 595-614.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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