Corporate governance and executive remuneration: A contingency framework

Igor Filatotchev, Deborah Allcock

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

33 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

By integrating organizational and institutional theories, this paper develops a contingency approach to executive remuneration and assesses its effectiveness in different organizational and institutional contexts. Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principal-agent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outcomes. We suggest a framework that examines executive compensation in terms of its organizational contexts and potential complementarities/substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive compensation policy such as “soft law” and “hard law.”
LanguageEnglish
Pages20-33
Number of pages14
JournalAcademy of Management Perspectives
Volume24
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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Executive remuneration
Contingency
Executive compensation
Corporate governance
Organizational context
Institutional theory
Compensation policy
Contingency approach
Institutional context
Complementarity
Substitution effect
Organizational theory
Incentives
Soft law

Cite this

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Corporate governance and executive remuneration : A contingency framework. / Filatotchev, Igor; Allcock, Deborah.

In: Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2010, p. 20-33.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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