Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus

The Moderating Effect of Governance Mechanisms

Mohamed Elmagrhi, Collins Ntim, Yan Wang, Hussein Abdou, Alaa Zalata

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper first employs principal component analysis technique to develop and introduce an alternative UK corporate governance disclosure index to the US-centric ones. Second, we then investigate whether this new corporate governance disclosure index can determine the level of executive pay (including CEOs, CFOs, and all executive directors) in UK listed firms, and consequently ascertain whether the governance mechanisms can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Employing data on corporate governance, executive pay and performance from 2008 to 2013, we find that, on average, better-governed firms, tend to pay their executives lower compared with their poorly-governed counterparts. Additionally, our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is generally positive, but improves in firms with high corporate governance quality, implying that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is contingent on the quality of internal governance structures. We interpret our findings within the predictions of optimal contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages32
JournalEuropean Management Review
Early online date14 Oct 2018
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 14 Oct 2018

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Governance mechanisms
Moderating effect
Corporate governance
Disclosure
Pay-for-performance
Executive pay
Disclosure index
Prediction
Chief executive officer
Managerial power
Internal governance
Contracting
Principal component analysis
Governance structure

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper first employs principal component analysis technique to develop and introduce an alternative UK corporate governance disclosure index to the US-centric ones. Second, we then investigate whether this new corporate governance disclosure index can determine the level of executive pay (including CEOs, CFOs, and all executive directors) in UK listed firms, and consequently ascertain whether the governance mechanisms can moderate the pay-for-performance sensitivity. Employing data on corporate governance, executive pay and performance from 2008 to 2013, we find that, on average, better-governed firms, tend to pay their executives lower compared with their poorly-governed counterparts. Additionally, our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is generally positive, but improves in firms with high corporate governance quality, implying that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is contingent on the quality of internal governance structures. We interpret our findings within the predictions of optimal contracting theory and managerial power hypothesis.",
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Corporate Governance Disclosure Index–Executive Pay Nexus : The Moderating Effect of Governance Mechanisms. / Elmagrhi, Mohamed; Ntim, Collins; Wang, Yan; Abdou, Hussein; Zalata, Alaa.

In: European Management Review, 14.10.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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