Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

Reza Montasari, Richard Hill, Amin Hosseinian-far, Farshad Montaseri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?”, currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)294-320
Number of pages27
JournalInternational Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics
Volume11
Issue number3
Early online date10 Apr 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2019

Fingerprint

hardware
Hardware
compromise
vulnerability
threat
resources
Side channel attack

Cite this

@article{2fe19cf2d93a411981d9e390ecdba36a,
title = "Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware",
abstract = "There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?”, currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.",
keywords = "Channel attacks, Countermeasures, Digital investigations, Hardware attacks, Side channels, Timing attacks",
author = "Reza Montasari and Richard Hill and Amin Hosseinian-far and Farshad Montaseri",
year = "2019",
month = "7",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1504/IJESDF.2019.10020551",
language = "English",
volume = "11",
pages = "294--320",
journal = "International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics",
issn = "1751-911X",
publisher = "Inderscience Enterprises Ltd",
number = "3",

}

Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware. / Montasari, Reza; Hill, Richard; Hosseinian-far, Amin; Montaseri, Farshad.

In: International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics, Vol. 11, No. 3, 01.07.2019, p. 294-320.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Countermeasures for timing-based side-channel attacks against shared, modern computing hardware

AU - Montasari, Reza

AU - Hill, Richard

AU - Hosseinian-far, Amin

AU - Montaseri, Farshad

PY - 2019/7/1

Y1 - 2019/7/1

N2 - There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?”, currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.

AB - There are several vulnerabilities in computing systems hardware that can be exploited by attackers to carry out devastating Microarchitectural Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks against these systems and as a result compromise the security of the users of such systems. By exploiting Microarchitectural resources, adversaries can potentially launch different variants of Timing Attacks, for instance, to leak sensitive information through timing. In view of these security threats against computing hardware, in a recent study, titled “Are Timing-Based Side-Channel Attacks Feasible in Shared, Modern Computing Hardware?”, currently undergoing the review process, we presented and analysed several such attacks. This extended study proceeds to build upon our recent study in question. To this end, we analyse the existing countermeasures against Timing Attacks and propose new strategies in dealing with such attacks.

KW - Channel attacks

KW - Countermeasures

KW - Digital investigations

KW - Hardware attacks

KW - Side channels

KW - Timing attacks

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85068333253&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1504/IJESDF.2019.10020551

DO - 10.1504/IJESDF.2019.10020551

M3 - Article

VL - 11

SP - 294

EP - 320

JO - International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics

JF - International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics

SN - 1751-911X

IS - 3

ER -