Abstract
This study proposes a model to make concurrent decisions on dynamic pricing and advertising to maximise firms' profitability over an infinite time horizon in a duopoly market. To this end, the Nerlove-Arrow pricing and advertising model is designed in the presence of shifting costs in a dynamic duopolistic competition as a differential game. The Nash equilibrium solution is defined based upon a set of Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman. Four scenarios are applied for economic interpretations and the efficacy of the model.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 688-695 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Operations Research Letters |
| Volume | 49 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 29 Jul 2021 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Sept 2021 |
| Externally published | Yes |