Executive incentive schemes in initial public offerings: The effects of multiple-agency conflicts and corporate governance

Deborah Allcock, Igor Filatotchev

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

32 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Combining a behavioral agency perspective with research on multiple-agency conflicts, this article examines factors affecting the implementation of equity-based incentive schemes in initial public offerings (IPOs). With a unique sample of U.K. IPO companies between the years 1998 and 2002, it shows that conditional (performance-related) incentive schemes are negatively associated with share ownership and board power of the IPO’s founding directors. However, the retained ownership of venture capital firms is positively associated with the probability of conditional incentive schemes. Board independence weakly effects on the toughness of executive compensation. The article’s interesting findings suggest a number of avenues for a future analysis of the governance development process in threshold firms.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)663-686
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Management
Volume36
Issue number3
Early online date17 Mar 2009
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 May 2010

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