Abstract
Gewirth’s moral philosophy is almost automatically associated with a Kantian model of agent subjectivity, and, as is well known, Hegel held entirely antithetical views in this regard. Notably, Hegel rejected Kant’s monological model of the self-sufficient, self-validating, transcendental subject, arguing that it led to a fruitless reliance upon a purely formal and infinitely interpretable Categorical Imperative. In its place, Hegel can be said to subscribe to a notion of mutually complementary subjectivity whereby individuals establish their freedom and worth in a process of ethical ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung). This can be called a dialogical model of the ethical subject and as such differs in every respect from the isolated, self-sufficient subject of Kantian philosophy that is forever alienated not only from ‘other minds’ but also from the noumenal reality of things-in-themselves. In opposition to the Kantian idea of the spontaneously active, fully formed, transcendental subject, the image of individual freedom as the by-product of a coming-together of potentially free wills is undoubtedly the substratum of Hegel’s ethical and political thought....
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Ethical Rationalism and The Law |
| Editors | Patrick Capps, Shaun Pattinson |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Bloomsbury Publishing |
| Chapter | 2 |
| Pages | 17-35 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781509909995, 9781509910007, 9781509910014 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781849467865 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 26 Jan 2017 |