TY - JOUR
T1 - Managerial conservatism and corporate policies
AU - Duong, Kiet
AU - Banti, Chiara
AU - Instefjord, Norvald
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 Elsevier B.V.
Copyright:
Copyright 2021 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/6/1
Y1 - 2021/6/1
N2 - This paper investigates how conservative managers make corporate decisions. Motivated by psychology research, we use handwritten signatures (i.e., emotionally restraint disclosure styles) as a proxy for CEO conservatism. We find that firms with conservative CEOs engage more with safer investments (capital expenditures), engage less with risky policies (Research & Development expenses and debt financing), hold more cash, are less likely to pay cash dividends, and more likely to use stock repurchase schemes. We use the same proxy for CFO conservatism. We find that CFO conservatism is a better determinant than CEO conservatism for cash holding and financing policies, but the reverse is true for investment policies. Conservative CFOs prefer long-term debt to short-term debt.
AB - This paper investigates how conservative managers make corporate decisions. Motivated by psychology research, we use handwritten signatures (i.e., emotionally restraint disclosure styles) as a proxy for CEO conservatism. We find that firms with conservative CEOs engage more with safer investments (capital expenditures), engage less with risky policies (Research & Development expenses and debt financing), hold more cash, are less likely to pay cash dividends, and more likely to use stock repurchase schemes. We use the same proxy for CFO conservatism. We find that CFO conservatism is a better determinant than CEO conservatism for cash holding and financing policies, but the reverse is true for investment policies. Conservative CFOs prefer long-term debt to short-term debt.
KW - CEO conservatism
KW - CFO conservatism
KW - Corporate policies
KW - Signature style
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85106966652&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101973
DO - 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101973
M3 - Article
VL - 68
JO - Journal of Corporate Finance
JF - Journal of Corporate Finance
SN - 0929-1199
M1 - 101973
ER -