Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper studies the characteristics and the effects of a tax imposed by a local government on the land used to create new tourists' accommodations. First, a dynamic policy game between a monopolist in a tourist area and a local government is considered. In each period the former has to decide the size of land undergoing development, whereas the latter has to choose the tax to levy on each newly developed area unit. Linear Perfect Markov strategies are derived for both the non-cooperative and the public monopoly case. In equilibrium, a public monopoly would develop land more rapidly than a private monopoly. Furthermore, the more the monopolist discounts the future, the more the long run use of the natural resource is reduced. Second, the properties of the tax are studied considering an oligopolistic market structure. The tax alone does not lead to the socially optimal level of land use. However, its combined effect with another policy instrument such as a quota, induces the optimal level of resource use.

LanguageEnglish
Pages343-359
Number of pages17
JournalEnvironmental and Resource Economics
Volume26
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2003
Externally publishedYes

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monopoly
tourism
local government
resource use
natural resource
land use
market
tax
taxation
Taxation
Tax
Tourism
Monopoly
land
effect
public
Local government
Tourists
Monopolist

Cite this

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Pigouvian Taxation in Tourism. / Piga, Claudio A G.

In: Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3, 01.11.2003, p. 343-359.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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