Preferences Induced by Accessibility

Evidence from Priming

Petko Kusev, Paul van Schaik, Silvio Aldrovandi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In one experiment, we studied risky preferences using a semantic-priming paradigm where accessibility is manipulated independently of beliefs about the frequencies of risky events. We compared the risks taken for precautionary decisions primed by relevant information (enhancing accessibility to relevant events) with those taken for unprimed decisions and decisions primed by irrelevant information. We found that both priming and the subjective frequency of beliefs independently influence decision making. The results indicate that decisions are the result of an integration of influences derived from both the description (specified probability) and experience (accessibility to pre-experiment beliefs about event frequencies and temporarily activated relevant events) of risks. People's risk preferences are influenced by the accessibility of events in memory, such that increasing accessibility causes risk aversion to a potential loss to increase. Our research findings are not anticipated by the descriptive invariance axiom of expected utility theory, which states that equivalent formulations of a choice problem give rise to the same preference order.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)250-258
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics
Volume5
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Semantics
Decision Making
Economics
Accessibility
Priming
Research
Experiment
Paradigm
Invariance
Decision making
Risk aversion
Axiom
Risk preferences
Expected utility theory

Cite this

Kusev, Petko ; van Schaik, Paul ; Aldrovandi, Silvio. / Preferences Induced by Accessibility : Evidence from Priming. In: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 5, No. 4. pp. 250-258.
@article{95bcef1b142f4b2bbf6eaf4a874285de,
title = "Preferences Induced by Accessibility: Evidence from Priming",
abstract = "In one experiment, we studied risky preferences using a semantic-priming paradigm where accessibility is manipulated independently of beliefs about the frequencies of risky events. We compared the risks taken for precautionary decisions primed by relevant information (enhancing accessibility to relevant events) with those taken for unprimed decisions and decisions primed by irrelevant information. We found that both priming and the subjective frequency of beliefs independently influence decision making. The results indicate that decisions are the result of an integration of influences derived from both the description (specified probability) and experience (accessibility to pre-experiment beliefs about event frequencies and temporarily activated relevant events) of risks. People's risk preferences are influenced by the accessibility of events in memory, such that increasing accessibility causes risk aversion to a potential loss to increase. Our research findings are not anticipated by the descriptive invariance axiom of expected utility theory, which states that equivalent formulations of a choice problem give rise to the same preference order.",
author = "Petko Kusev and {van Schaik}, Paul and Silvio Aldrovandi",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1037/a0030289",
language = "English",
volume = "5",
pages = "250--258",
journal = "Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics",
issn = "1937-321X",
publisher = "American Psychological Association Inc.",
number = "4",

}

Preferences Induced by Accessibility : Evidence from Priming. / Kusev, Petko; van Schaik, Paul; Aldrovandi, Silvio.

In: Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, Vol. 5, No. 4, 2012, p. 250-258.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

TY - JOUR

T1 - Preferences Induced by Accessibility

T2 - Evidence from Priming

AU - Kusev, Petko

AU - van Schaik, Paul

AU - Aldrovandi, Silvio

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - In one experiment, we studied risky preferences using a semantic-priming paradigm where accessibility is manipulated independently of beliefs about the frequencies of risky events. We compared the risks taken for precautionary decisions primed by relevant information (enhancing accessibility to relevant events) with those taken for unprimed decisions and decisions primed by irrelevant information. We found that both priming and the subjective frequency of beliefs independently influence decision making. The results indicate that decisions are the result of an integration of influences derived from both the description (specified probability) and experience (accessibility to pre-experiment beliefs about event frequencies and temporarily activated relevant events) of risks. People's risk preferences are influenced by the accessibility of events in memory, such that increasing accessibility causes risk aversion to a potential loss to increase. Our research findings are not anticipated by the descriptive invariance axiom of expected utility theory, which states that equivalent formulations of a choice problem give rise to the same preference order.

AB - In one experiment, we studied risky preferences using a semantic-priming paradigm where accessibility is manipulated independently of beliefs about the frequencies of risky events. We compared the risks taken for precautionary decisions primed by relevant information (enhancing accessibility to relevant events) with those taken for unprimed decisions and decisions primed by irrelevant information. We found that both priming and the subjective frequency of beliefs independently influence decision making. The results indicate that decisions are the result of an integration of influences derived from both the description (specified probability) and experience (accessibility to pre-experiment beliefs about event frequencies and temporarily activated relevant events) of risks. People's risk preferences are influenced by the accessibility of events in memory, such that increasing accessibility causes risk aversion to a potential loss to increase. Our research findings are not anticipated by the descriptive invariance axiom of expected utility theory, which states that equivalent formulations of a choice problem give rise to the same preference order.

UR - http://psycnet.apa.org/PsycARTICLES/journal/npe/5/4

U2 - 10.1037/a0030289

DO - 10.1037/a0030289

M3 - Article

VL - 5

SP - 250

EP - 258

JO - Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics

JF - Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics

SN - 1937-321X

IS - 4

ER -