

**TITLE: THE POLITICS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
MINING INDUSTRY IN BURKINA FASO**

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Abstract

This paper examines the non-market strategy of a multinational corporation in an institutionally weak country, specifically focusing on its corporate social responsibility. Theoretically, the paper argues that the motives and outcomes of corporate social responsibility could facilitate corporate political activity, in the presence of weak institutions. Using interview data collected from a company operating in the gold mining sector in Burkina Faso, the paper provides interesting insights into ‘how’ and ‘why’ multinational corporations actually engage in corporate social responsibility in institutionally weak countries. The findings further assert that MNCs’ corporate social responsibility can be used, in such contexts, to facilitate the co-creation of institutional arrangements to mitigate operational risks

Key Words

Corporate social responsibility, corporate political activity, institutions, mining sector, Multinational Corporations.

Introduction

The non-market environment of a firm is identified as consisting of interactions which are intermediated by the public, stakeholders, the government and public institutions (Liedong et al., 2015). Firms engage in managing their non-market environment by using two main strategies (Doh et al., 2012); corporate political activity (CPA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While CPA is used by firms to manage their interactions with governments, specifically to influence public policy (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), CSR is a firm's engagement in actions which fulfil their responsibilities towards multiple stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). It consist of a firm fulfilling its "economic, legal, ethical and discretionary (philanthropic) expectations towards societal stakeholders" Carroll (1979:500).

There are noticeable differences between CPA and CSR, in terms of the tactics used and the targeted actors in the non-market environment. However, recent arguments in both fields have focused increasingly on their integrative nature (Hadani and Coombes, 2015; Hond et al., 2014; Moon and Vogel, 2008; Rehbein and Schuler, 2013; Scherer et al., 2014). Firstly, certain areas in CPA such as that of constituency building (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), business diplomacy (Saner et al., 2000) and public affairs management (Baysinger and Woodman, 1982; Berg and Holtbrügge, 2001; Griffin and Dunn, 2004; Meznar and Nigh, 1995), focused on developing long-term relationships with non-market stakeholders, can be supported in a positive manner by a firm's CSR activities (Liedong et al., 2015; Yin and Zhang, 2012). CSR is also effective in building and protecting the reputational capital of firms (Minor and Morgan, 2011; Park et al., 2014), thereby improving their corporate visibility (Hond et al., 2014). Collectively these two aspects allow firms to utilise CSR as a mechanism for improved stakeholder relations (Jamali, 2008), and for developing tighter political ties with governmental stakeholders (Shirodkar et al., 2016; Wang and Qian, 2011), thereby supporting and enabling a firm's CPA strategies. For example, empirical studies examining the tobacco industry have provided evidence of firms' providing philanthropic donations to engage in strategic relationship-building with external stakeholders such as labour unions and minority groups (McDaniel and Malone, 2009; Yang and Malone, 2008) and to neutralise opposition to their products (Fooks et al., 2013).

However, the business-government landscape has changed significantly over the past few decades due to rapid globalisation (Lawton et al., 2013) with businesses, specifically multinational corporations, having to operate in countries which have weak institutional environments such as that of Burkina Faso (the focus of this paper) (Adly, 2009). The use of CPA by multinational corporations in such countries greatly differs in both its nature and form, with institutionally weak countries compelling firm-level engagement in CPA to be more informal and flexible to meet the requirements of their countries' institutional structures (Gould and Sickner, 2008; Lawton et al., 2013). Thus, MNCs are compelled to engage more proactively with governments of institutionally weak countries, in an attempt to exert some control over their non-market environment and advance their own economic interests (Rasche, 2015).

The assumption of state-like obligations by MNCs, such as the provision of public goods (e.g. education and infrastructure) has been on the increase in recent years (Detomasi, 2015), with firm-level CSR becoming the means by which to achieve this. From the perspective of the governments in institutionally weak countries, firm-level engagement in CSR (specifically in the provision of public goods), is deeply valued (Amaeshi et al., 2006). What is less clear though is the 'role' of CSR within the broader non-market strategy in institutionally weak countries. For instance, what motives drive MNCs in institutionally weak countries to engage in CSR? Does CSR act in this context as a form of 'exchange' between business and government? i.e. giving something valued by government actors in exchange for getting favourable policies/regulations (Getz, 2002)? In effect, do MNCs use CSR to gain political advantages (Wang and Qian, 2011) thereby using CSR to *facilitate* their CPA strategy, when operating in institutionally weak countries?

In order to resolve the questions above, this study examines the CSR activities of a western multinational mining firm in Burkina Faso's gold mining industry. We aim to provide empirical data to back recent arguments in corporate responsibility research that CSR is *not* entirely altruistic (Liedong et al., 2015) but it in fact could facilitate CPA at the firm-level, providing alternate paths to a firm's economic sustainability (Beddewela, 2013, Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016; Lux et al., 2011).

The paper will begin with a review of literature pertaining to non-market strategy and that of institutional voids culminating in a conceptualisation of the key concepts. Focus will then be given to a discussion of the context, in which the study was implemented; Burkina Faso and its

gold mining sector. Following this, the methodology is outlined and the case study data presented and discussed. Finally the paper will conclude with implications, limitations and suggestions for future research.

Review of Literature

Corporate Political Activity

Corporate political activity (CPA) consist of firm efforts to influence or manage political actors (Hillman et al., 2004), with the aim of enabling positive outcomes in government policies or processes (Getz, 2001). Firms adopt a range of activities to engage in CPA, such as political campaign contributions, lobbying, relationship building with government actors, and contributing to industry and trade based advocacy (Lux et al., 2011). Hillman and Hitt (1999), advocates three main CPA strategies consisting of:- constituency building (engaging with the citizens of a country, rather than its policy makers), information strategy (influencing public policy by the provision of relevant information) and financial incentive strategy (firm-level attempts to influence public policy directly by aligning the incentives of the policy makers with the interests of the firm through financial inducements). However, collectively these CPA strategies are aimed at influencing government policies in a way that would be profitable for the firm (Getz, 1997; and Hillman et al., 2004; Shaffer, 1995). CPA is thus perceived to be an opportunistic self-interested activity which does not contain any altruistic motivations. Firms engage in CPA to gain power to exercise a form of dominance on the political arena with the objective of influencing government policies in their favour (Hond et al., 2014; Milyo et al., 2000).

Corporate Social Responsibility

CSR has been defined by Carroll (1979:500) as; encompassing “the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary (philanthropic) expectations that society has of organisations at a given point in time”. It is also recognised to consist of firm-level actions to fulfil their responsibilities towards multiple stakeholders (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001).

While the altruistic (or philanthropic), outcomes of CSR has been well established in literature (See Windsor, 2006; Schwartz and Carroll, 2003), more recent literature has highlighted the political outcomes which could occur as a result of firm-level CSR. For example, previous studies have identified that engaging in CSR enable firms to mitigate regulatory risks (Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016; Zhao, 2012) build reputations (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990)

and generate competitive advantages (Husted et al., 2015). In general, CSR activities have been identified as having the potential to assist firm-level corporate political strategies (Detomasi, 2008), thus firmly moving away from being “pigeonholed as a moral-philosophical discourse providing an ethical counterpoint to neo-classical economic theory and profit-driven forms of business economics” (Vallentin and Murillo, 2012:825).

Motives and Outcomes of Non-Market Strategy

When multinational corporations operate in countries that have a weak institutional environment, they would be compelled to use non-market strategies to ensure their economic sustainability in the country, by managing the risks posed by institutional deficiencies. Institutional voids, occur when institutional arrangements required for effective and efficient operation of organisational fields (i.e. industry sectors) is either absent, is lacking, or is weak and thus is failing to create substantive institutional stability (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Thus, institutional voids do not inexplicably indicate the presence of an institutional vacuum, rather whilst some socio-political structures supportive of the organisational field, could be in place, these may *not* be enabling efficient market operations (Mair & Marti, 2009).

CSR and CPA, as non-market strategies, would enable MNCs to interact effectively with the political institutions, non-governmental actors and local communities in these institutionally weak countries (Frynas and Stephens, 2014). Nevertheless, MNCs would also need to modify their CSR and CPA to some extent, as the extant institutional deficiencies would compel them to assume state-like obligations (i.e. provision of public goods) (Detomasi, 2015) and engage in self-regulation or even pro-actively develop public policy (Frynas and Stephens, 2014), to counter the inefficiencies created by weak socio-political institutions. Thus, to understand the ‘role’ of CSR *as an enabler of CPA*, in such a context, we need to explore ‘why’ firms would engage in CPA and CSR (i.e. their motives for engaging in non-market strategy) and ‘what’ they expect to gain from such engagement (i.e. the expected outcomes of non-market strategies). A re-focus on these critical elements; motives and outcomes, is argued to be important if one is to explore their manifestation within a weak institutional setting.

In the case of MNCs, they are in an ideal position to bridge institutional deficiencies in developing countries by engaging in the provision of public goods through their CSR activities (Detomasi, 2008). Driven by altruistic motives, MNCs could thus engage in activities which are considered to be ethical or morally correct, with an expectation that it would lead to societal

wellbeing (Brønn and Vidaver-cohen, 2009). Conversely, political motives driving non-market strategy, is supported by more instrumental reasoning (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). Firms, specifically those operating in countries with weak institutions, would either use non-market strategies to influence public policy makers (i.e. governmental actors) (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) and/or engage in self-regulation (for example in relation to CSR) in a proactive manner (Moon and Vogel, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011) to control and manage their volatile institutional environments. The strategic motives driving firm-level non-market strategy in institutionally weak countries, is enmeshed in the understanding that firms are first and foremost profit seekers and therefore, strategically choose how to reach their objectives (Rick and Williams, 2005; Mackey and Barney, 2007). By being involved in CSR and CPA activities, firms can control their socio-political environments and simultaneously boost their reputation enabling competitive advantages (Neicheisel, 1994; Sanchez, 2000).

Extant research so far has provided some interesting insights into the integrative effects of CSR and CPA; Political CSR studies, have shown that CSR can be used to further substantiate neo-liberal principles (Vallentin and Murillo, 2012), enabling a more democratic route for the business firms to legitimise its economic behaviour (Frynas and Stephens, 2014; Moon, 2002), thereby promoting self-regulation in CSR. CPA studies have shown how CPA can become a stimulus for improved stakeholder relations with non-market stakeholders (Shirodkar et al., 2018; Waddock and Smith, 2000), and can enable companies to develop tighter political ties with governmental stakeholders (Wang and Qian, 2011) and other external stakeholders such as labour unions and minority groups (Fooks et al., 2013; McDaniel and Malone, 2009; Yang and Malone, 2008). What is missing from this body of literature are studies which have examined the relationship between CSR and CPA, in institutionally weak countries, such as Burkina Faso, where firm-level implementation of CSR could in fact be used as a facilitative mechanism or an enabler for CPA . Understanding CSR and CPA within such an empirical context is most important, given the expansion in the boundaries of CSR towards the provision of public goods (Blowfield, 2005) and its implications for the further establishment of the political power of multinationals in institutionally void countries.

Conceptual Framework

In light of the literature presented above, the conceptual framework of the study (See figure 1), attempts to understand the relationship that *could* occur between CSR and CPA activities (i.e.

non-market strategy) in relation to the ‘motives’ and ‘outcomes’ driving their implementation in an institutionally weak country.

Insert Figure 1 here

The conceptual framework presented in figure 1 denotes that non-market strategy at the firm-level in an institutionally weak context, as being driven by *political* and *strategic* motives in the case of CPA and *altruistic* motives in relation to CSR. These motives result in anticipated outcomes or expectations comprising of *political advantages* and *financial stability* and *societal wellbeing* for CPA and CSR respectively. As argued above, in the literature review, as one cannot presume the replication of firm-level non-market strategy as being manifested in a similar manner within an institutionally weak context, the conceptual framework, purports that CSR could in fact *facilitate* CPA thereby enabling it to benefit from the outcomes generated by the firms societal contributions in the country.

Research Context: CSR in the Gold Mining Sector in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso is a Landlocked Sub-Saharan country with a population of about 17 million (World Bank, 2015). With the discovery of significant mineral deposits, the country’s gold exports have climbed to record levels in the past few years. This has mainly resulted in higher than expected economic growth rates, leading the West African Economic and Monetary Union countries in terms of economic growth with an average rate of 5.5%, over the last fifteen years (World Bank, 2015).

However, politically, Burkina Faso was under a hybrid regime for 27 years, which ended in a popular uprising and violent protest and pillage in October 2014. The country was under a transitioning government until December 2015. Since then, the former Prime Minister Roch Marc Christian Kabore has been elected as the President since January 2016 (BBC, 2016) (see table 1 for the country’s political history). The political instability together with pervasive socio-economic issues, have created pervasive weaknesses in the country’s institutions (BTI, 2014). These institutional voids have been identified within the mining sector as consisting of; lack of administrative procedures and systems, financial and non-financial transparency deficits, an absence of regulatory monitoring by the government, lack of mining expertise in

the public sector leading to an absence of a regulatory structure for the mining sector (REN-LAC, 2014).

Insert Table 1 here

The gold mining sector in the country consist of eight mines accounting for an estimated 75% of the economic growth in 2011, allowing the country to become Africa’s fourth largest gold producer in 2012 (BTI, 2014). This exponential expansion of gold mining in Burkina Faso, has been accrued to the consistency in discovering new mining deposits, and malleable taxation adopted to attract more foreign direct investments (FDI) (IMF, 2014). Nonetheless, the country’s socio-economic development is in a state of deterioration with it being ranked 181st on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2014.

A key reason for this degradation is the lack of a stringent regulatory framework in the country for Gold Mining, as indicated by the presence of institutional weaknesses. Under the present lax regulations, mining firms are free to manage their operations according to their own standards, with aspects related to working conditions and environmental concerns being self-regulated by the firm (Gueye, 2001). The U.S Department of State (2014) reports that the government has no history of using tax, labour, environmental, health and safety standards, or other laws and policies to impede entrance of foreign investors into the marketplace (See table 2 for the evolution of regulation and laws in Burkina mining sector). The U.S Department of State (2014) has also highlighted the issue of corruption as constituting a significant problem in the country (Bloomberg, 2005). The country is presently ranked 72 out of 176 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International, 2016).

Insert Table 2 here

Overall there are six western mining companies operating in the country, with the largest being IAMGOLD consisting of an overall production output of 100 tonnes (See table 3).

Insert Table 3 here

Mining companies in Burkina Faso have been accused of a range of irresponsible business practices: deforestation of virgin forests for mining (Megret, 2011), severe damage to the environment caused by the use of archaic mining techniques (Bloomberg, 2005), population displacement as well as the employment of child labour (All Africa, 2012) are other such practices. To somewhat counter these allegations the government has made it mandatory for mining firms to invest in developing the social infrastructure of surrounding communities (U.S Department of State, 2014). However, community agitations against mining firms has been prevalent, such as that in 2011 where the community blocked access to ESSAKANE mining company's mine asking for more mining jobs for the community (All Africa, 2012). Mining firms operating in the country are therefore compelled to maintain strong relations with the government (to benefit from lower taxation and lax regulations) as well as the mining communities to ensure the continued operation of their mines. Regardless of the above criticisms, mining companies undertake many CSR projects in Burkina Faso (See Table 4 for more details concerning mining companies' CSR activities). There are two essential ways of undertaking CSR activities in the country. Companies such as IAMGOLD has created an internal department which is in charge of the firm's CSR activities, while mining firms such as SEMAFO have established a charitable foundation; "SEMAFO Foundation" to manage their CSR activities.

Insert Table 4 here

Burkina Faso therefore, presents an interesting context to examine the ‘role’ of CSR within non-market strategy in an institutionally weak country. The country’s economic dependence upon its mining sector and the provision of public goods by mining companies has created a ‘co-dependent’ relationship between the government and the mining sector (Hilson and Maconachie, 2009; Ferguson, 2005, 2006; Hilson and Yakovleva, 2007; Horowitz, 2010 and Holden et al., 2011; Gavin et al., 2009). The 2015 mining code, and its stipulation for mining companies, to contribute 1 percent of monthly turnover excluding taxes or 1 percent of the value of extracted minerals into a local development fund, has further reaffirmed this relationship (Jean-Marie Toe, 2018). The government is also pro-actively promoting the CSR of mining companies, with plans to establish a database on the socio-economic achievements of mining companies, to capture the capacity development activities being undertaken by these companies in the country (Africa Mining, 2018). From the perspective of the mining companies, engaging in CSR in Burkina Faso is a way to simultaneously address community pressures and governmental requirements, whilst ensuring the financial sustainability of the firm by mitigating political risks (Tschakert, 2009; Hilson and Banchirigah, 2009; Siegel and Veiga, 2010; Banerjee, 2001). Nevertheless, CSR in this specific context, could become a *means* to facilitate the corporate political strategies of the mining companies, thus, moving away from its altruistic motives. Collectively, the institutional environment and socio-economic factors of Burkina Faso, provides an interesting context to explore how a western mining company engages in CSR and the ‘role’ of its CSR within its broader non-market strategy.

Method

Given the paucity of existing empirical research in our chosen area and the need to comprehend the specific context, we used an exploratory qualitative method in line with Sekeran and Bougie (2010) and Silverman (2005) to collect our data. More precisely, to be able to investigate what motives and outcomes actually underpin mining companies’ engagement in CSR in an institutionally weak country, a case-study research strategy was used (Yin, 2009) relying on a single case design.

Using purposive sampling (Silverman, 2005), we selected SEMAFO as our selected case study company. We used two criteria in this selection; first, the company had to be recognised for its engagement in CSR in Burkina Faso and second, the company’s focal CSR activities had to be related to the provision of public goods. The selected company, SEMAFO, was awarded the

prize for Corporate Social Responsibility of Mining Companies in Burkina Faso by the Groupe Redevabilité or Accountability Group for the second year in 2016 (SEMAFO, 2016). The award recognises mining firms that have successfully incorporated a social dimension into their activities, thus helping to address social inequalities. The evaluation is also based upon the adoption of ISO 26000 criteria focusing on environmental management and local development of communities by mining firms (SEMAFO Annual Report, 2016). SEMAFO is also the only mining company in the country to have established a charitable foundation; The SEMAFO Foundation established in 2008 (Foundation SEMAFO, 2016), engages in substantial investments in the provision of public goods in Burkina Faso.

Having decided upon our case study company, we next collected data from four respondent groups (see table 5 below): three mining staff members (MSMs), four government officials from the Mining Ministry (GOs), two non-governmental actors (NGOs) and four civil society actors (CSAs). We first gained access to SEMAFO by contacting the Manager responsible for CSR. We used our first interview with him to obtain information pertaining to government officials, non-governmental actors and civil societal actors, with whom the company engages with in relation to their non-market strategy implementation. As such, our governmental respondents consisted of those from different levels of the government, and our civil society actors had substantive experience in resolving community problems resulting from SEMAFO's activities.

Insert Table 5 here

We used in-depth interviews in order to explore how the selected respondents perceived SEMAFO's non-market strategies and their associated motives. This data collection approach enabled us to access these respondents' personal opinions and judgements without bias (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). We used broad themes for our interviews with three respondent groups as shown in Table 6 below, ensuring that the questions raised during our review of literature, as denoted in our conceptual framework were aligned with the interview themes. During our interviews we endeavoured to moderate informant bias by framing the interview as an exploration of each participant's experiences with engaging in CSR by avoiding leading questions or theoretically loaded language (Darendeli and Hill, 2016). In effect we made an

attempt to ensure that our participants' assessments of the firm's behaviours should not be subject to rationalization or other ex post attempts (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Insert Table 6 here

In line with Gillham (2005), during these interviews, respondents were permitted to express themselves freely in relation to the question posed, however, further on in the interviews probing questions were raised to ensure that the key themes were covered. Our interviews were conducted in French. Upon completion, we translated them into English and transcribed them as interview transcripts. The 13 interview transcripts were then coded using first-order (open coding) and second-order coding (axial coding) (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) (see table 7). The initial coding (or open coding) broadly followed main constructs indicated in the theoretical framework, thus focusing on aspects such as motives and outcomes for non-market strategy. This resulted in 07 first-order codes, which were then drawn upon to create the second-order codes. Through several iterations of axial coding (i.e. the activity of relating codes to each other) (Strauss and Corbin 2008), the first-order codes were categorised into 02 second-order codes, demonstrative of the role of CSR within non-market strategy in an institutionally weak context. Following this immersion in the data it was possible to identify an approach to CSR adopted by SEMAFO in their implementation of non-market strategy in Burkina Faso (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).

Insert Table 7 here

Case Study Findings

SEMAFO: An Overview

SEMAFO is a Canadian mining company engaged in the production of gold in West African countries such as Guinea, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. In Burkina Faso, the company operates in Mana and is also expanding its activities in Natougou (SEMAFO Annual report, 2015). The company started its operations and gold production in the country in 1993 (SEMAFO Annual Report, 2016). The company's CSR activities are closely aligned with its founder's humanitarian vision, stressing their commitment to conduct business in a way that

promotes sustainable development and the enhancement of the social welfare of the regions in which it operates in (SEMAFO Annual Report, 2016). This dual mission remains at the core of the firm and is deeply rooted in the creation of the ‘Foundation SEMAFO’ in 2008, which implements projects aimed at supporting mining communities achieve a better quality of life and sustainable livelihoods. Foundation SEMAFO has chosen to focus its activities on education, training, health and sustainable development of communities by supporting local agriculture activities and related income-generating activities (SEMAFO Annual Report, 2016). Further details of Foundation SEMAFO’s activities are provided in Table 8 below.

Insert Table 8 here

Opportunistic CSR

The analysis of the interview data resulted in an emergent theme; Opportunistic CSR (see table 7). Our understanding of *Opportunistic CSR* is that it is ‘the use of community initiatives to gain short-term or long-term political and strategic outcomes for the firm, in the absence of a formalised institutional environment to implement firm-level corporate political activities’. As presented in the conceptual framework of this study (see figure 1), we aimed to find an answer to the question of whether the outcomes of CSR activities in an institutionally weak country, facilitated its CPA. Opportunistic CSR, indicates that CSR is indeed a critical element in the non-market strategy of SEMAFO, with dynamic motives and outcomes driving its implementation in Burkina Faso. We further de-construct our understanding of Opportunistic CSR below using related data.

The data showed that SEMAFO engages in CSR to gain long-term trust from its mining communities so that the community would not disrupt its mining operations. In order to achieve this outcome, the company through Foundation SEMAFO implements a range of projects, aimed primarily at providing public goods, such as infrastructure and education.

We hope to gain the populations’ trust and respect through our CSR projects which [will] allow us to work in peace. When the local community is not satisfied, their actions can be extreme [...] For example, [we] are lucky compared to other mining companies such as True Gold, which has been vandalised by the local community because they were not satisfied [with the companies CSR projects] (MSM 02)

Foundation SEMAFO [...] carries out CSR projects in various areas such as education, health, agriculture, training of women in the local community (MSM 02).

For example, [when] some communities do not have a school and if we [build it] for them, they will acknowledge that we are a responsible firm (MSM 03)

At SEMAFO, we work with communities to build for example, schools, health centres and finance local activities, I mean festivals. We have also invested in sustainable livelihood projects for the community such as the local production of sesame and honey (MSM 01)

SEMAFO thus works in ‘partnership’ with its communities, ensuring that the CSR projects which they implement is what is needed by the communities. For SEMAFO ensuring that the mining communities are satisfied with their CSR activities is critical, specifically to ensure that there is no disruption to its mining operations.

For us [at SEMAFO] CSR helps us to meet local community expectations [...] So by practicing CSR, we can gain a form of legitimacy that allows us to operate [...] we need to work with our communities for this to happen [MSM 01]

We have to cooperate with [our] communities otherwise, [we] can be exposed to serious consequences [like] sabotage. So, we need to develop a good relationship with our communities and avoid conflict between our firm and community stakeholders [...]. Understanding what they [the communities] want from us is important for this (MSM, 02).

From the perspective of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Civil Society Actors (CSAs), SEMAFO needs to engage in CSR for two main reasons; (a) to compensate the communities displaced by the firm’s operations and (b) to ensure that these communities will continue to allow the firm to operate in the area without disruption.

The local communities in [Burkina Faso] cannot see the resolution [of their problems] by the government. So [they] turn their hopes to mining firms [like SEMAFO], with the conviction that they can help them. Consequently, [as] SEMAFO [also] need to have good relations with the local community [they] are forced to invest in that community, [to gain] their support in order to avoid any [sabotage of their operations] by the population (NGO 01).

For the company it is better to invest 10 million in social activities to gain the [support] of the population than losing 10 billion due to a [cessation] of the firm’s activities from community protests. We have seen some examples of that. There is a belief that it is the country’s political instabilities which are the main danger for mining firms but no, it is the local community, because if a company gains acceptance from the population, it can operate safely (NGO 02)

SEMFAO has to undertake some social actions to accommodate the local population's expectations in order to operate without interference [from them]. Even if, the population considers those [social] actions not enough, they [will] keep a positive opinion of the firm as they [will] hope [that] more actions [will be] are coming their way. However, some firms, such as SEMAFO and IAMGOLD, have a better image due to their high level of CSR practices compared to others. An illustration of that is, during the revolution against the government in October 2014, some mining firms were vandalized by the population, but not SEMAFO (CSA 01).

SEMAFO does not have the same level of appreciation by the communities [...] what I mean is that with the local community, SEMAFO can have a good image at the level of 50% [but] as the population still have lots of expectations that they hope will be accommodated by SEMAFO they will keep supporting it (CSA 03).

The interviews with the three Government Officials (GOs), provides insights into why SEMAFO would be compelled to use their CSR to gain support from the government. In fact the government officials we interviewed perceived CSR as an 'obligation', to the community, which SEMAFO and other mining companies operating in Burkina Faso has to fulfil their right to extract the country's mineral wealth.

First of all, mining companies like SEMAFO enter the country to make profits, [but] they cannot just come to do business. There is going to be displacement of population [due] to their mining operations. To me, CSR activities should be [about] not [just] the local community, but also [about] how the firm can benefit the [country] through diverse actions in terms of education, economic development, and building facilities for the public (GO 01).

CSR is something undertaken by all mining firms [...]. For a country like Burkina, where the population lacks water, electricity, schools and good facilities etc., [...] what CSR [should be] is different from countries such as Canada or Australia. Therefore, mining companies, like SEMFAO's CSR in Burkina should reflect those needs of the population and they have to fulfil their obligations (GO 02).

In Africa, there is a misunderstanding between CSR and obligations of the firm. The law of the country stipulates that if a mining firm, like SEMAFO displaces the population, they have to compensate them [...]. The displaced population [will] complain that the compensation is not enough, creating conflicts between firms and local populations. So [that is why] SEMAFO and other mining companies need to do CSR [so that] they can gain a positive reputation from the community (GO 03)

Our findings also show that the implementation of the firm's Opportunistic CSR strategy is influenced simultaneously by both community and governmental requirements. Government intervention in firm-level CSR in Burkina Faso is mainly due to the firm's contribution to the provision of public goods, which in a western country context, would be fulfilled by the country's government. SEMAFO engages in the provision of schools, investing in small and medium enterprises and healthcare (See table 8), mostly implemented through the collaboration with relevant governmental authorities.

Besides the fact that we have to pay taxes and all other costs resulting from having a business in a country, I can say that the relations between us and the government is more like a 'partnership' in which we [will] assist the government in [providing] social and infrastructure projects for their communities. I mean all the projects undertaken by us has to be, first, approved by the government (MSM 01)

We have a tradition of dialogue with the [government] authorities, as well as accessibility [to them]. This really helps [us] to find the best ways to allow the mining industry to develop harmoniously and contribute to the creation and distribution of wealth in the country [...] it is really an asset for Burkina (MSM 03)

[When] the minister meets all the mines in operation [...] issues are raised [about] the mobilization of resources, but also [about] the investments for the benefit of local communities. During these meetings, the Minister always encourages mining companies, [to] invest in social investments for the benefit of the communities (MSM 02)

The adoption of a mandatory contribution towards CSR as stipulated by the 2015 revised mining code, has however been critiqued by mining companies, including SEMAFO.

There is no framework that is established to frame and monitor the CSR achievements of mining companies by the government (MSM 01)

We have expressed complaints to the state (government) regarding the compulsory deduction of 1% of our turnover to feed the local mining development fund. We think this percentage is quite high, and we have also pleaded our case through the Chamber of Mines with the highest state authorities. But the authorities (government) of Burkina remains firm. The mining code that provides for this levy has remained in force and the measure is in force (MSM 02)

Currently, there are ongoing negotiations. We are pleading to be left half of the resources allocated to the Fund and the other half to be managed by the State. The Chamber of Mines is trying to make a plea in favour of the mining companies, so that we can have at least half of these funds to manage to ensure that we can always help the neighbouring (mining) communities. Our main concern is to ensure that we have a peaceful working environment for our mines (MSM 03)

From the perspective of the mining companies therefore, the CSR ‘agenda-setting’ by the government through mandatory revenue contributions, has several shortcomings specifically the non-acknowledgement of existing CSR contributions made by the mining companies and the lack of administrative mechanisms to effectively assess and monitor their revenue contributions, as well as the lack of detail pertaining to the operationalisation of the ‘local development funds’, to be created with the mining companies contributions.

CSR activities were also used by SEMAFO to mitigate the political and strategic risks arising from operating within a weak institutional context. The firm used its CSR to gain support from their local communities as well the government, with an expectation that such actions would in the long-term provide them some form of protection against unanticipated operational and political risks. Political risks, are quite high in countries such as Burkina Faso, where as discussed before, volatility in the political environment can create unexpected operational risks in the country. For SEMAFO, engaging in CSR activities together with the government and aimed at socio-economic development of the country, was a way to obtain some form of transparency in its dealings with governmental actors.

It is important for us to undertake CSR activities because it allow us strengthen our relationship with the population and the government and more particularly the government resulting from the fact that, if there is a problem, the government will intervene and resolve it for us (MSM 03)

SEMAFO’s CSR activities can effectively influence government decisions. By investing in the community infrastructure through our CSR, we are doing activities that [are] usually the government’s responsibility [...]. So the government is obliged to us to some extent (NGO 01).

The presence of ‘lobbying’ was acknowledged to occur within the mining sector, as indicated in the interview quotes below, although it was also considered to be associative of a lack of transparency at the least and allegations of corruption at the most.

There is no ‘transparent’ lobbying in our country. Lobbying is hidden, only we are really aware of them, as we know how it works. Lobbying activities are growing due the fact that there are former ministers who became CEOs of some mining companies. So they know how to act and which doors to knock on to have advantages (GO 01)

I [would say] that mining firms, like SEMAFO have a strong influence on Burkina Faso’s government [...] They will [...] make sure that they build and create good

relations with key political actors [like] ministers, prime minister and even the president of the country. But all of this is not transparent [especially] how the company and the government engage in contract negotiations (NGO 02).

In our country, [...] the reality of the situation is that [...] it is not the company who always go to the government but it is mostly the government which comes to the mining firm, asking them to finance different projects (CS 01)

We do have lobbying [...] in Burkina. One example is, the new mining code [...] First, it was rejected and they said that it was due to mining firms' lobbying, then the code was accepted and mining firms said that it was due to NGOs' lobbying [...] so yes there is lobbying but we cannot see it (NGO, 01)

Mining companies siphon off government officials [...] Many government officials and skilled staff have migrated to mining companies. This has weakened the state's capacity in the sector, but allowed the companies to benefit from their knowledge and connections (NGO, 02)

Thus, the presence of institutional weaknesses in the country, and within the mining sector more specifically, has enabled mining companies such as SEMAFO to become key players in the country, specifically through the development of both formal and informal political ties with key government actors. For example, Africa Mining (2018), affirms the involvement of several politicians in the mining sector in Burkina Faso, such as that of Mr Tertuis Zongo a former Burkinabe Prime Minister (2007-2011) who was a Director of SEMAFO since 2012. This strong relationship between the government and the mining sector is also reaffirmed by regular high-level meetings with key mining company CEOs (as represented by the Chamber of Mines), including that of SEMAFO with the President of Burkina Faso, aimed at improving the competitiveness of the sector and socio-economic investments by the companies.

As indicated through the enactment of a stringent mining code in 2015, that abolishes a previous 10 percent tax break on mining company profits and obliges firms to pay into a local development fund, civil society activism, together with non-governmental actor pressures, have further complicated the institutional context, which mining companies such as SEMAFO has to operate in (see quotes below)

The corruption in the mining sector has existed for a long time. We have been working to minimise it since the people's uprising (in 2014) because civil society leaders have become very demanding and no longer tolerate corruption in the mining sector. We are not yet at the stage of zero corruption, but it is still minimised at the top of the state. But mining companies know that civil society is very vigilant right now and is monitoring their behaviour as well as the behaviour of the authorities on mining issues, everyone is paying attention now (CS 04)

What is a bit of a shame is that the mining reform has not been driven by a real political will, so that there is no defender of the mining fund in our current authorities. We civil society organisations have pushed for the establishment of this fund, while the government authorities were lagging behind, trying to pull us back [...] It was very difficult to obtain the establishment of the Mining Development Fund in the mining code. The mining companies have even made pleas with the (government) to obtain the rereading of the mining code [...] if we are not vigilant, the public authorities risk undermining the mining code (NGO 01)

In summary, our findings indicate that while mining companies such as SEMAFO is proactively utilizing their CSR activities to mitigate political and operational risks, the presence of institutional weaknesses, makes this process more volatile and complex, due to the interventions by other institutional actors, such as NGOs and Civil Society Actors. However, it is also evident that in the case of SEMAFO, the company does use its CSR to facilitate two of the three CPA strategies, that of *constituency building*, where CSR is used as mechanism to build strong relationships with salient constituents; the government and mining communities and *financial incentive strategy*, where the company uses its investments in CSR to garner favourable public policy changes from the government, for example, efforts to undermine the enactment of the mining code in 2015. Interestingly, our findings do not provide evidence of the use of CSR to facilitate *information strategy*, indicative of the presence of institutional weaknesses, which propel firms such as SEMAFO to engage in informal institutional arrangements, as seen above.

Discussion and Conclusion

The existing literature in non-market strategy have long argued that CSR and CPA have different motives and outcomes. For multinational corporations operating in institutionally weak countries, such as that of Burkina Faso, managing non-market stakeholders is of critical importance. It is so because these non-market actors, consisting of the public, stakeholders, government, the media, and other public institutions, create the institutional context – i.e. rules of the game – in which they have to operate in (Liedong et al., 2015). The evidence presented in this paper clearly highlights that when multinational corporations operate in such countries, their key priority is to ensure that they *proactively create* the institutional framework which is needed for them to operate successfully in that country. Where the industry in question, has controversial aspects, such as environmental degradation, social displacement, and governance

deficits, as that of the gold mining sector in Burkina Faso, *enabling* a stable institutional environment becomes even more important.

Our findings provide insights into how MNCs operating in such an institutionally weak context, utilise their CSR activities to engender institutional frameworks conducive to them.

First, they do so by exploiting the developmental promise of CSR. As we have found in our study, mining firms *can* and *do* contribute to the socio-economic development of mining communities, effectively adopting the role of a quasi-government, by providing various infrastructure, such as roads, hospitals and schools. This reaffirms that the CSR activities of multinational corporations has the potential to tackle country development issues not only in terms of resolving the role of business in society (Newell and Frynas, 2007; Frynas, 2008), but also ensuring that they fulfil at least to some extent the prevalent gaps in social provision and governance in developing countries (Dobers and Halme, 2009). Nevertheless, literature is also quite adamant that for the developmental promise of CSR to succeed, businesses have to act as *non-market player*, where it engages in poverty alleviation projects aimed at providing water, health and education or basic infrastructure. However, our findings show that this is *not* the case in reality (at least in the context of our study), and that MNCs use their CSR activities in the non-market, to ensure sustainability of their market activities. In doing so the *agenda* for their CSR activities are decided not upon the country's developmental needs, but on the needs of mining community leaders and/or governmental officials, as the *motives* for these CSR activities is instrumental rather than altruistic, with an obvious political and/or strategic outcome for the firm (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012).

Secondly, our findings show that multinational corporations *are* using their CSR activities to facilitate their corporate political activities which (at least within the context of our study), enables them to *legitimise* their relationships with governmental actors (Anastasiadis, 2014). However, our findings also show that rather than using CSR activities to enable CPA strategies such as financial incentive strategy and constituency building strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999), multinational corporations could engender strategic responses such as the avoidance and/or defiance of governmental policy changes (See Oliver, 1991). In Oliver's (1991) typology of five strategic responses to non-market pressures, the strategies of *avoidance* and *defiance* are used by organisations to either circumvent and/or reject institutional pressures. In our findings we see evidence for this, in Burkina Faso where mining companies have developed

strong reciprocal partnerships with the government, where they assist the government's infrastructure development projects, as part of their CSR activities. This transfer of public functions of the government to private companies, have been reciprocated by the country's government through a liberalisation of the country's mining sector (Luning, 2008). Szablowski (2007) reports that liberalisation include service delivery and also rule setting and implementation. Given the weak enforcement of legislation and widespread corruption in the country, mining companies typically self-regulate themselves. By helping the government in its socio-economic developmental projects, mining firms' objective is to win support from policy-makers, effectively preventing future implementation of more stringent mining regulations by the government. For example, the new Mining Code enacted in 2015, which replaced mining regulations extant in Burkina Faso for 12 years, required a political regime change for its implementation as it has more stringent requirements related to mining companies' social investment in the country (Lieutenant, 2015). This also bears a close resemblance to Fooks et al's (2013) identification of 'neutralization' and 'pre-empting' strategies, which assist MNCs in managing political influences on their business, further indicating the utilisation of CSR as part of a firm's political strategy.

Thus, by aligning their CSR with the development agenda of the government and by using CSR to develop a co-dependent relationship with the government, MNCs operating in institutionally weak countries (such as that of Burkina Faso), engage in creating an institutional framework most conducive for their firms' economic sustainability. In this regard, the presence of institutional voids, and the challenging socio-economic circumstances of the country act as assistive mechanisms.

This paper, of course, has several limitations. Most particularly, it is non-generalizable beyond the context in which the data has been collected, as is common to case study research (Yin, 2009). It also provides data collected during a specific time period, which may not be indicative of the fluid nature of organisational responses and institutional pressures within a country (Lawrence, 2011). Future research should thus aim to capture the complexities inherent to an integration of CSR and CPA practices of MNCs' operating in developing countries, ideally through longitudinal case studies (Chapple & Moon, 2007). Further comparative studies, investigating firm-level motives for engaging in CSR within the context of CPA, focusing on MNCs operating in both developing and developed countries could enable us to examine the differences in the CSR within non-market strategy.

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
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework



Key: Facilitation 

Table 1 : Political history of Burkina Faso

Years	Key Political Events
1960	Independence of the country with Maurice Yameogo as president.
1966	Yameogo toppled in a military coup led by Sangoule Lamizana.
1980	President Lamizana is ousted in coup led by Saye Zerbo.
1982	Saye Zerbo is overthrown in a coup led by Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo.
1983	Capt Thomas Sankara takes power from Mr Ouedraogo in an internal power struggle. He adopts radical left-wing policies.
1987	Thomas Sankara ousted and killed in a coup led by his close aide, Blaise Compaore.
1990	Compaore introduces limited democratic reforms, and be the first elected democratically in 1991.
2014	Mass protests against proposed constitutional changes to allow the president another five years in power turn into a mass uprising that drives President Compaore from office, and transitional government was created to run the country with elections proposed for the end of next year.
2015	Former prime minister Roch Marc Christian Kaboré wins presidential election, comfortably beating former Economy and Finance Minister Zéphirin Diabré, ending the military reign in the country

Source: BBC news (2016)

Table 2: Background and Evolution of Laws and Regulations in Burkina Faso mining sector

Period	Changes in Regulations and Laws
Before Independence of 1960	The mining sites were regulated by customary laws, which is a decree passed on October 1922 by the colonial administration, mainly based on artisanal mining.
From 1960 to 1991	No additional legislation was passed relating to the mining industry. The mining sites were regulated by specific regulations depending on their nature and location.
From 1991 to 2000	Since 1991, the Government has been committed to a structural reform policy with the aim to encourage socio-economic development through the promotion of private initiatives. The first mining code was adopted in October 1997 based on international examples of best practices.
June 2015	A new mining code enacting reforms in the mining sector, which integrate transparency and accountability by both mining companies the government was passed into law

Sources: Gueye (2001); U.S Department of State (2014); Lieutenant (2015)

Table 3: Overview of Western Mining MNCs in Burkina Faso

Company	Ownership	Nature of the resource	Duration of the operations	Income 2014 (\$ millions)	Employees (national and non-national)	Production expected
I am Gold (Essakane)	Canada 90%	Gold	12 years	468	1967	100 tonne
Semafo Burkina (Mana)	Canada 90%	Gold	9 years	289	790	35 tonne
Avocet mining (SMB)	British 90%	Gold	10 years	110	788	22.5 tonne
Societe des Mines de Taparko (Somita)	Russia 90%	Gold	8 years	141	760	35 tonne
Endeavour (BMC)	Canada 90%	Gold	7 years	67	383	25 tonne
Bissa Gold	Russia 90%	Gold	9 years	318	456	34.3 tonne

Source: <http://www.iamgold.com>; <http://www.semafo.com>; <http://www.avocetmining.com>; <http://www.nordgold.com>; <https://www.endeavourmining.com>

Table 4: CSR projects and contributions of Gold Mining companies in Burkina Faso (2014)

Key CSR projects of mining companies	I am Gold (Essakane)	Semafo	Nordgold	Roxgold Sanu	Nantou Mining
Education and Training	\$7 million for the project “developing the capacities of youth” to provide better vocational training for over 600,000 youth during the period 2011-2016 8 primary schools constructed and \$25000 awarded as scholarships in 2015	\$8 million for new housing including community infrastructure (mosques, churches, water boreholes, school) in 2017	Building and refurbishing educational infrastructure – student scholarship – supporting education etc., in 2015	\$33, 000 invested for building classrooms and training of teachers in 2016	\$45 493 invested for education and youth training (i.e. school training) in 2016
Agriculture and Sustainable development	\$38 million invested in resettlement and home repairs and a program of livelihoods restoration and compensation to communities – Promotion of agriculture – strengthen local procurement activities in 2015	4 agricultural revenue-generating projects supported by the mine – chicken farming launched in 2017	Distributing financial support to encourage agricultural activities in 2015	\$28,000 invested for livestock and pest control in 2016	<i>[No information]</i>
Community Development	\$1,6 million Investment in supply chain from mines to local companies – 2 billion invested in support in to community development project since 2014	\$1 million invested in community development activities – over 96% of job creation involving Burkina nationals in mining in 2015. \$ 730,000 invested in projects, mainly sesame and shea butter for the benefit of villages in 2015	\$1,781 million for jobs creation at all levels of group operations – Promoting opportunities to enable local start up enterprises and other community investment activities in 2015	\$42, 000 for access to electricity for health centres and schools in 2016 and \$32,000 as miscellaneous donations in 2016	\$147 000 for donations, and rehabilitation of infrastructure of the local administration in 2016
Water (or blue gold of Sahel)	\$1 billion or 11 million FCFA invested for the launch of the water and sustainable economic growth project Sahel (ECED) 2015-2019	Reduce underground water consumption 2012-2017	Installation system for potable water preparation – domestic waste water management and water treatment 2015	\$37, 000 for rehabilitation/realization of borehole, accessibility of water 2016	<i>[No information]</i>
Healthcare	21 million FCFA to support program against malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malnutrition	Maintaining malaria awareness training in 2015	Building medical infrastructure – improving ambulance system – medical equipment – anti malaria program in 2015	<i>[No information]</i>	<i>[No information]</i>

Sources: I am Gold (2018); Nordgold. (2015); EITI. (2018) ; Foundation SEMAFO (2017).

Table 5: Overview of Interviewees

Types of respondents groups	Identifier	Organisation	Duration of Interview
Mine Staff Members (MSM)	MSM 01	Manager of engineering activities	60 minutes [Focus Group]
	MSM 02	Responsible of firm activities	
	MSM 03	Responsible for firm relation to community	
Governmental Officials in the Mining Ministry (GO)	GO 01	Advisor to the Minister for mining and energy	30 minutes
	GO 02	Brigade member of the ministry of mining and energy	45 minutes
	GO 03	Assistant director of ministry of mining and energy	30 minutes
	GO 04	Secretary general of the ministry of mining and energy	35 minutes
Non-Governmental Organisation members (NGO)	NGO 01	Jeunesse D'Afrique	40 minutes
	NGO 02	Initiative for the Transparency in the Extractive Industry	45 minutes
Civil Society Actors (CSA)	CS 01	Commercial deputy	30 minutes
	CS 02	Youth committee representative	35 minutes
	CS 03	Researcher of CSR Practices in Burkina Faso	35 minutes
	CS 04	Environmental Activist	40 minutes

Source: Authors

Table 6: Study Concepts and Interview Themes

Concepts	Interview Themes	Participant Group
Understanding of CSR and CPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Firm-level CSR including understanding of CSR and activities undertaken</i> • <i>Firm-level engagement with government and contribution to development [understanding of CPA at the firm]</i> 	SEMAFO Managers
Motives for Non-Market Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Key drivers for engaging in CSR</i> • <i>Key drivers for engaging with community and government</i> 	
Outcomes of Non-Market Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Firm expectations from community and government by engaging in CSR</i> 	
Understanding of CSR and CPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Firm-Level contributions to socio-economic development</i> • <i>Government interactions with SEMAFO</i> 	Government Officials
Motives for Non-Market Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Government understanding of SEMAFO's engagement in CSR</i> 	
Outcomes of Non-Market Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Government expectations of SEMAFO's CSR activities</i> 	
Understanding of CSR and CPA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>CSR in Burkina Faso – nature and scope, SEMAFO's CSR</i> • <i>CPA in Burkina Faso – nature and scope</i> 	Non-Governmental Organisation members and Civil Society Actors
Motives for Non-Market Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>General motives for firm-level engagement in CSR (focus on SEMAFO)</i> 	
Outcomes of Non-Market Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>General expectations by firms in engaging in CSR (focus on SEMAFO)</i> 	

Table 7: Coding and Emergent Themes

Initial (First-level) Codes	Second-Order Coding (Axial Codes)	Emergent Theme
FC1: Social investment/public goods provision motive	Altruistic-Strategic Motive	<i>Opportunistic CSR</i>
FC2: Positive community relations motive		
FC3: Managing positive corporate reputation among community		
FC4: Collaboration with government for CSR	Altruistic-Political Motive	
FC5: Mandatory CSR		
FC6: CSR as ‘compensation’ for mining operations		
FC7: CSR as an ‘Insurance’ for community and government support		

Table 8: SEMAFO's Contributions to Burkina Faso

SEMAFO CSR Activities	2014	2015	2016
Provision of Public Goods	Income-generating projects, education and health infrastructure, training and charitable donations (i.e. in 2014, SEMAFO donated over \$826000 for the benefit of communities) etc.	Include projects such as provision of education, health centres etc (i.e. 2% of the company's net income is used for the purpose of community development).	Relocation of community and related compensation. In 2016, all the provisions and public goods provided to the community was aimed at strengthening and fostering their relationship with the community and the government in particular (i.e. building educational infrastructures, over 12000 children received school kits, sanitary provisions and canteen program of school).
Economic Contributions	Payment of taxes to the government and also investing in small businesses in the community, for example assisting over 800 women in the production of organic shea butter in order to earn higher income (40 tonnes exported in 2014), establishment of multi-functional platforms to promote productivity and enhance income.	Involve actions such as the payment of wages, job creation, taxes and royalties' payments to government, financial support to the community development, small business development	This involve projects in Natougou that the company has undertaken with the government of Burkina Faso (i.e. about \$8 million have been invested for the benefit of communities). In 2016, the revenue generating projects has increased to about 34% (agricultural and sesame producers were trained in co-operative matters).
Environmental contribution	Include eliminating the usage of chemicals harmful to the environment and responsible water usage; management of mine tailings and chemicals	Comprises of decreases in underground water usage, use of recycled water for operations, environmental inspection by the ministry of environment.	Includes the responsible management of the quantity and quality of water resources (i.e. in 2016, over fifty percent of the tailings of Mana mine was recycled).

Source: SEMAFO Annual Reports (2014, 2015 and 2016).