

Cabbage, Tradition, and Bunce: Marion Donaldson and the Black Economy of the British Rag Trade in the 1970s

This article explores illicit aspects of the British rag trade in the 1970s through examination of so-called ‘cabbage’, a fundamental but hitherto obscure pillar of the hidden economy in British fashion production. Through analysis of oral, legal, and material sources it examines the ways in which the fashion company Marion Donaldson encountered ‘cabbage’, and how it negotiated with this as an integral part of doing business in the British rag trade. Hidden economies in ‘illegal but *bona fide*’ cultures of production and consumption are thus highlighted as a way of enriching our understanding of the complexities of the post-war British fashion business.

Keywords: black economy; cabbage; fashion industry; Marion Donaldson; rag trade

Introduction

Every trade has its own jargon and the fashion and clothing, or ‘rag trade’, is no different.¹ Words like ‘kipper’, for instance, mean something quite different to the fishmonger and the tailor, and so it is with ‘cabbage’, a word that crops up regularly in the course of oral historical enquiry into the rag trade, but which is largely absent from scholarly accounts of the industry.² The *Oxford English Dictionary* defines ‘cabbage’ as ‘Offcuts of cloth appropriated by tailors and dressmakers as a perk when cutting out clothes’, and records the first use of ‘cabbage’ in relation to cloth and clothing as early as 1663.³ This definition – ‘cabbage’ as offcuts – remains prominent, but it applies specifically to historic small-scale or bespoke production. The growth of mass-manufacturing in the post-war period, particularly in youth-oriented fashions as the spending power of the teenage consumer grew in the 1960s, meant that as clothing production speeded up and expanded so did the offcuts, or in the correct parlance of the trade, the ‘cabbage’.⁴ As a result, ‘cabbage’ became more than mere offcuts; instead it became a valuable commodity and some sources have even gone so far as to suggest

that an ‘illicit cabbage trade has always run parallel with the legitimate rag trade.’⁵

There is, therefore, a clear disparity between the archaic definition and understanding of ‘cabbage’ and its usage in a post-war context – rather than a ‘perk’, ‘cabbage’ became a system and the word itself went from being a noun to describe offcuts to become a verb, to ‘cabbage’ and an adjective, ‘cabbaged’.

This article considers ‘cabbage’ in the context of its impact on the Glasgow-based fashion design and manufacturing business Marion Donaldson owned by the husband and wife team, Marion and David Donaldson, and one of the most successful independent British fashion companies of the post-war period. Marion Donaldson makes a compelling case study in the history of British fashion business; not only did it remain in business and in profit from its inception in 1966 to its closure in 1999, it remained in family hands throughout, and the family-held company archive known as the Marion Donaldson Collection holds a multitude of sources that speak to the richness and complexity of the British fashion industry in the post-war period. Furthermore, both Marion and David Donaldson have recorded their own personal histories of their business and the wider fashion industry in the form of oral history interviews.⁶

Glasgow, as the home of Marion Donaldson and source of much of its manufacturing capacity, also makes for an interesting study in the context of dress and textile history. Marion Donaldson built its success on the city’s manufacturing infrastructure, and the company’s viability was, to a great extent, dependent on the fluctuating fortunes of the Glasgow rag trade which was – by any standards – extensive, and had been crucial to the city’s growth and economic prosperity since the eighteenth century.⁷

‘Cabbage’ loomed large in the history of Marion Donaldson. During an interview about fashion manufacturing and the Glasgow rag trade generally, Marion and

David Donaldson discussed ‘cabbage’ and offered an eloquent definition and description of what it meant in their experience:

Marion: ‘Cabbage’ is when the manufacturer manages to slot the pieces of pattern on to the fabric and save a couple of inches ... Now, when you’re doing like 400 or 500, 600, of one particular style, then all of a sudden these two or three inches can become quite a lot.

David: Basically, you want, say, 1000 garments. If they can get 1,100 out of that bit of material, you’ve got your 1000, they run 1,100 out of the factory, so they’ve got 100 garments to flog off, and that is ‘cabbage’.⁸

Although the word ‘cabbage’ was well-known to rag trade insiders, how it was understood could be contentious. A manufacturer might claim that ‘cabbage’ was an innocent bonus made from waste, or, as one legal adviser to the trade put it, part of the manufacturer’s “‘bunce” – by custom and tradition’, while the designer or supplier might claim ‘cabbage’ was an abuse of trust, a fraud, or an act of theft through copyright infringement.⁹ However it was understood and defined, ‘cabbage’ was a central lever of the black economy in British fashion. Yet it has remained obscure in the history of the trade as other more conspicuous and visually-spectacular manifestations of the fashion industry – for example, design and promotion – have taken precedence in both the popular imagination and the literature. Also, while the history of elite twentieth-century British fashion has been well-served by scholarly attention, the history of the rag trade remains largely overlooked.¹⁰ Partly this is because of reticence on the part of the trade itself; it is not easy to gain access to rag trade actors, nor is it easy to persuade them to speak frankly. Few scholars have the chance to ‘peek behind the silk curtain’ and see the chaos of the machinery that drives the fashion industry, with those who have attempted noting that responses were often ‘very guarded’.¹¹ This lack of access to authoritative – and importantly, candid – voices has hindered

scholarship, and has often been a difficult obstacle to overcome. As a result, much of what has been published about the rag trade has been skewed by a reliance on dramatic and unusual accounts – often focused on sweated labour and other abuses of the workforce – the ‘official’ record generated by governments or the Inland Revenue, or has been written from a non-fashion or non-business perspective.¹² In this way, the fashion industry has not always had fair representation in scholarship. The oral testimonies which have informed this research and which form the crux of this article therefore represent a precious and rare source that contribute something of value to the revision of the existing historical record. Various figures have contributed their oral testimony for this research, but the most prominent witnesses to the ‘cabbage’ system are Marion and David Donaldson and Steven Purvis, now a bespoke tailor, but from the 1970s to the 1990s, the owner of several Scottish CMT factories.

As rare as authoritative oral sources are legal records that bear witness to the hidden economy of the trade as embodied by practises like ‘cabbage’. In January 1977 a trial began at Glasgow’s Sheriff Court in which the owner of Norlynn Gowns CMT, a principal manufacturer of Marion Donaldson clothes, was accused of theft. This trial was a direct result of the Norlynn Gowns factory manufacturing ‘cabbage’ from Marion Donaldson materials and distributing it for sale around Glasgow.¹³ The transcript of the court proceedings, some of which is reproduced here, reveals much about the multi-layered complexity of the industry, as well as the ways in which the accepted systems of production in the rag trade could be an ideal vehicle for behaviours which, if not exactly illegal, were certainly far from ethical.

Any study of fashion is made richer by use of objects and other material sources, and this research has been privileged with access to two unusual ‘cabbaged’ objects, a Marion Donaldson kimono jacket of c.1976 and evening cape of c.1978.¹⁴ These bear

material witness to the ‘cabbage’ system, and embody the cultures of both the fashion business and the rag trade as they intersected in unorthodox methods of production and consumption in the post-war period. The fortunate survival of these objects as manifestations of the black economy in fashion allows for a productive analysis of the material culture of the ‘cabbage’ system and opens various avenues for further enquiry into the hidden world of the black market in British fashion in the 1970s.

By synthesising these various sources and perspectives this article offers a clear and updated definition of the term ‘cabbage’ as it was understood in the post-war British rag trade, and an explanation of how it was practised and tolerated at individual business level. It offers an analysis of ‘cabbage’ as crime and therefore discussion about the subtle differences in how the concepts of criminality and illegality were negotiated within the trade. Examining the mechanics of the black economy in the fashion industry through the lens of ‘cabbage’ adds to scholarly understanding of British fashion in the post-war period, especially at the intersection of creativity and commerce, where the artistic and business interests of designers clashed with the purely financial and pragmatic concerns of manufacturers and other rag trade sectors.

‘Cabbage’ in the Making

Profit margins in the post-war rag trade were narrower than in the bespoke tailoring or dressmaking trades of the pre-war period. As such, the cutter was one of the most important workers in any factory; the profit in a mass-manufactured garment rested almost entirely on his skill in laying the pattern in the most economical arrangement and accurate cutting of the pieces.¹⁵ As Anne Kershen has noted, ‘a good cutter not only creates the fashion garment, he determines the volume of textile usage, a significant element in the profit ratio’.¹⁶ Steven Purvis reinforced this idea of cut as profit when he described the difficulties in production faced by young fashion designers

in the 1980s, explaining that ‘cabbage’ was easy to make, especially when orders came into the factory from those with no understanding of the importance of cut and cloth:

There is a shocking ignorance on the basics of production among design graduates. It’s laughable how little they know. For example, they have no idea that the point at which the profit is made is at the layout of the fabric stage. It’s all about fabric and cut. This means that pattern cutting is an art. The designers don’t see that and they lose a lot through not paying attention to how the clothes are made up. There is a huge hidden economy in fabric in CMT, for instance, in fabric ripped off from the designers who can’t be bothered to follow up how much is actually needed to make up the orders.¹⁷

From 1966 and the start of their business, Marion and David Donaldson had been ‘learning a whole trade and language, innocently picking up terms and things’, but they were firmly initiated into the customs of the rag trade, including ‘cabbage’, when they won a contract with the national multiple retailer Richard Shops in early 1970.¹⁸ Their relationship with Richard Shops’ head buyer, Daphne Gold, was instrumental in schooling them in how the rag trade functioned at this national industrial, rather than local and small-scale, level. She was, as Marion explained, from the ‘old school’ of buyers: ‘And she was brilliant! She was terrifying! Mink coat, dark red lipstick, immaculately dressed always. And absolutely, utterly terrifying, but actually incredibly nice and incredibly kind.’¹⁹ In addition to laying down the rules about how orders should be packed and delivered, Gold discussed ‘cabbage’ with the Donaldsons, who – while they were aware of the kind of cabbage’ produced in Glasgow’s small factories which they regarded as ‘small and harmless’ – were then, even at that point, still largely unaware of the scale of ‘cabbage’ in the London trade, which functioned on an industrial scale and was generated along much cruder lines.²⁰ As David explained:

If you’ve got a small unit the amount you can earn on ‘cabbage’ is by definition limited, so it’s a bit of ... a little bit of jam in the bread and butter. It’s a bit of tax-

free cash. If you're running a big operation then you can 'cabbage' on a huge scale, right? And I think as we explained to you – this is second-hand information, but it's via Mrs Gold – she said, 'It's hard wired', as it were, 'it's essential', and she said, 'when they [big London-based manufacturers] start something there's no skill involved, they cut the "cabbage" off first'.²¹

Steven Purvis alluded to this type of 'cabbage' in interview, when he described the process of manufacture at his own CMT factories:

The kind of standard, if you're manufacturing, particularly back then, they would place an order, they would send in the fabric, and normally the thing was you got the fabric to do the job and you got 10% extra fabric to cater for flaws or miss-cutting which could happen. But once you get the job out on the floor and everybody knows what they're doing – you section it up ...you just go in in the morning, put the lights on, switch the machines on, and off they go. You can always tell a good factory, a well-run factory, because you can hear it, you can hear the rhythm of it. Really, really obvious when you can hear the rhythm of it. So ... the patterns would come, the fabric would come, the cutters with the band knife, they would just lay it all out and they would cut it all and then it would be made up, manufactured ... So 10% might end up being 30 garments depending on what it was, so it would go to the finishers and the finishers would finish it, the finishers would put washing instructions, dry cleaning instructions, labels, it was all done like that so you would then bag it and tag it and you would have it all on rails hanging up. You would count it off, their men would send the van in to pick it up, and whatever you were left with, whatever completed garments, that was 'cabbage' ... If you had a manufacturing resource there would always be 'cabbage' because you would always get your 10% extra fabric. You got 10% extra fabric, labels, lining, you know, tags, whatever, you would always get your extra 10% ... You'd just make it up, because rather than keeping it, the 10% of free fabric and stuff, you'd just run it through the machines and it comes out as garments at the other end.²²

On hearing Purvis' description of 10% margins, David Donaldson was emphatic that Purvis was describing 'cabbage':

In other words there's the open ... there's the cut of agreed 'cabbage', that's what you're really talking about. You can call it an allowance for mistakes, but what you're really talking about is a 'cabbage' allowance. You both know this is happening, they take their 10% 'cabbage' off, they take it off first according to Mrs Gold! Ha! So you've got these two levels where it is actually a bit of skill and the money is quite small and then there's the much bigger level where big productions [mean] big 'cabbage'.²³

'Cabbage', therefore, in the context of the post-war rag trade did not refer to 'offcuts' but to complete garments, and how it was made was dependent on various factors, prime among these the size of the factory and the volume of the order. Small factories offering flexible short-run production could make 'small cabbage' through the careful arrangement of pattern pieces and accurate cutting to generate excess fabric, leading to 'cabbage' that could be sold off the books, piecemeal, for cash. Large industrial factories making long or repeat runs, or those based in London (where, as David Donaldson put it, 'cabbage' 'ran the trade') would agree the cut of 'cabbage' at the point of negotiating costs and would therefore be able to make 'big cabbage' and big cash profits.²⁴

What emerges in light of this evidence is an image of a black economy in the British rag trade in which 'cabbage' was a fundamental but illicit aspect of production that was accepted at all levels in the trade and potentially very lucrative, but which was carefully hidden from outsiders – including those naïve in production economics, such as newcomers and young fashion designers resistant to understanding factory methods. As Steven Purvis emphasised, 'You know, 99 people out of 100 you would say "cabbage" and they would go, "Oh that green vegetable?" And you would go, "No, the black economy in the clothing trade".'²⁵

‘Cabbage’ as Crime

In the spring of 1975 David Donaldson received a phone call from a retailer in Kirkintilloch who was vexed to find a rival retailer selling Marion Donaldson clothes, especially since they had an exclusive agreement to be the only stockist in the town.²⁶ Perplexed, Donaldson assured the retailer that he would deal with the problem. Such was the volume of stock for sale in the illegitimate retailer, his first suspicion was not ‘cabbage’, but theft from the Marion Donaldson in-house factory. Donaldson called the police who diligently investigated the case, and discovered that the stock had not been stolen as such, but had come directly from Norlynn Gowns CMT, a valued and long-time business associate of Marion Donaldson, which was at that point manufacturing some 600 Marion Donaldson garments per week. The garments that had so vexed the Kirkintilloch retailer were not stolen, they were ‘cabbaged’ by Norlynn Gowns from that season’s Marion Donaldson order. As a large factory manufacturing thousands of Marion Donaldson garments every month, Norlynn Gowns were well-placed to make ‘big cabbage’ from their orders. The police were enthusiastic in their pursuit of the case and followed it to the end, finally arresting Alexander Selkirk, the owner of Norlynn Gowns on a charge of theft.²⁷

Selkirk’s trial began in January 1977 and the court records that document this case – although heavily redacted – reveal much about how ‘cabbage’ was understood in a legal context.²⁸ The difficulty of defining ‘cabbage’ as criminal behaviour is demonstrated in the first instance by the various hand-written additions and deletions to the trial indictment. The original indictment was as follows:

[Redacted] and [Redacted] ... the charge against you is that between 18 April 1973 and 26 March 1975, both dates inclusive, while employed as sub-contractors by Marion Donaldson Limited, Fashion Designers and Manufacturers, 27 Brown Street, Glasgow to manufacture garments on behalf of said Marion Donaldson

Limited, in the premises at 26 Gallowgate, Glasgow occupied by Norlynn Gowns, or elsewhere in Glasgow and Strathkelvin, you did steal material supplied by said Marion Donaldson Limited which you subsequently made into 319 garments which 319 garments you appropriated to your own use and did steal same material. By Authority of Her Majesty's Advocate. Procurator Fiscal.²⁹

The accused lodged objections to the wording of the indictment through their solicitor, and this is recorded on the trial record; importantly, the meaning of 'material' was an issue of some debate, as well as the word 'steal'. After some to-ing and fro-ing between the Procurator Fiscal, the solicitor for the defence, and the Sheriff, as well as some crossing out and scribbling, the indictment was amended to finally read:

... the charge against you is that between 18 April 1973 and 26 March 1975, both dates inclusive, while employed as sub-contractors by Marion Donaldson Limited, Fashion Designers and Manufacturers, 27 Brown Street, Glasgow to manufacture garments on behalf of said Marion Donaldson Limited, in the premises at 26 Gallowgate, Glasgow occupied by Norlynn Gowns, or elsewhere in Glasgow and Strathkelvin, you did ~~steal~~ with material supplied by said Marion Donaldson Limited ~~which you subsequently made into~~ make 319 garments which ~~319 garments~~ you appropriated to your own use and did steal ~~same~~ said material. By Authority of Her Majesty's Advocate. Procurator Fiscal.³⁰

Despite this wrangling over vocabulary, the wording of the indictment remains abstruse, and reveals some of the difficulties in prosecuting such an ambiguously-defined crime. Crucially, the focus of the indictment is on 'material', not garments; as already shown, while 'cabbage' is made from material, any reference to 'cabbage' in the industry is understood to refer to fully-fashioned garments – not scraps of leftover fabric. The indictment, however, is focused on the theft of material, not the theft of garments. This is clearly problematic, since stolen material in and of itself would have been unlikely to have given rise to any prosecution, while the sale of illicit finished garments could seriously damage a business' reputation and profits.

The trial lasted only three days before the accused were found not guilty on 28 January 1977 by direction of the Judge. It is unclear, because the record is incomplete through redaction, what evidence prompted this result, however, from the information available and from David Donaldson's oral testimony, it seems that the Fiscal 'over-egged the case' by pursuing a line of aggressive questioning in respect of VAT fraud and tax evasion, for which there was insufficient evidence – and which was missing from the indictment altogether.³¹ David Donaldson, who was waiting in court to take the stand as a witness for the prosecution that same day remembers that upon being dismissed from the court he asked the solicitor what had happened: '[he] said "Well, you own the fabric, but he owns the work!" Ha!'³²

Herein is the prime difficulty in any legal consideration of 'cabbage', and further confirmation of the ineffectual language of the indictment: the design, pattern, fabric, trimmings, and labels that constituted the makings of the 319 garments may have belonged to Marion Donaldson, but the cutting knives, sewing machines, and labour that actually rendered those materials into viable garments belonged to Norlynn Gowns. The 319 'cabbaged' garments in question, therefore, belonged either to Marion Donaldson and Norlynn Gowns equally, or to no one at all. For any prosecutor to effectively and successfully pursue such a complex case would have been a futile, complicated, and expensive enterprise. In any case, for the duration of the entire debacle, Marion Donaldson and Norlynn Gowns CMT were still working together – neither could afford to lose the other's business.

While its manifestation in a formal legal setting may have been unusual, disputes about 'cabbage' within the industry were not new, indeed, the confusion surrounding 'cabbage' in contractual terms was a matter of consternation even for the trade itself. Laurance Marne, the barrister and long-term legal columnist for *Drapers'*

Record, addressed this in an article that explored the concept of ownership in the ‘cabbage’ system:

For long the issue of ‘cabbage’ has been a thorny one between suppliers and their outworkers. Who owns ‘cabbage’? If you employ outworkers, are they entitled to keep the offcuts for themselves and make further garments to sell on for their own profit? Or are they stealing your property? ... There is no law which lays down the rules regarding ‘cabbage’ or any other sort of offcut. Whether the employee or the independent contractor is entitled to keep the extra material will depend upon the terms (express or implied) of the contract concerned ... If an employee or an outworker is charged with stealing ‘cabbage’ he will probably reply that he had a genuine belief that he was entitled to take the material as one of his ‘perks’.³³

As Marne makes clear, there was no law fit to govern the ‘cabbage’ system, despite its preponderance in the trade and the difficulties and misunderstandings it could engender.³⁴ The important thing was not the law as such, but the terms of the contract between the supplier and the manufacturer – to ensure cordiality in business, both suppliers and manufacturers had to be clear that there was either express (via contractual clause) or implied permission to use offcuts to make ‘cabbage’, or of course, express instructions to the reverse. So far as Marion and David Donaldson were concerned, a little ‘cabbage’ was okay; they understood it to be well-established within the trade, a tradition, and an integral part of any cordial business deal between suppliers and manufacturers – they did not see it as harmful, as long as ‘it was kept to a reasonable limit’.³⁵ In any case, as David made clear in interview, contracts were largely unwritten in the rag trade: ‘Every single garment we made there was an implicit contract, you know? I mean, nobody but nobody wrote a contract’.³⁶ In the absence, therefore, of any contractual directive that explicitly banned their manufacturers from working the ‘cabbage’ system, there was implied consent from Marion Donaldson. As to the idea of ‘cabbage’ as crime, on answering the question both David Donaldson and

Steven Purvis were keen to emphasise the differences between that which is illegal and that which is criminal:

David Donaldson: I think ... in the eyes of those involved, probably not. Both the person who's giving the work out to the subcontractor and the subcontractor see it as a victimless crime, particularly as it's so openly acknowledged, and if it's not openly acknowledged, if you get what you asked for, it's kind of like, well 'Who cares?' sort of thing ... In a sense it's sort of like, what you're doing is not giving back leftovers. And what are you going to do with these leftovers anyway? They're worth ... fabric is worthless. Almost the moment you buy it, fabric is worthless, you know? So in that sense, where's the harm? Where's the hurt? They don't look at the kind of 'Poor old Government not getting its taxation'. Nobody feels sorry for the Government! You know?³⁷

Steven Purvis: No, I mean, it was completely and utterly ... it was probably illegal but completely *bona fide* as far as everybody [was concerned]. No, it would never be regarded as a crime because it was just regarded as completely standard. Standard practice from top to bottom in the industry ... It's not theft because they've supplied it to you so you can make the garments they've ordered ... where's the theft?³⁸

'Cabbage' may not have been seen from within as criminal, but it was a central lever that powered the black economy in British fashion, and it generated more than just clothes to be flogged. The tax-free cash economy it created went some way to actually running factories, paying wages and bills and therefore implicating almost all those involved in the rag trade. Because of this, prosecutions for 'cabbage' were vanishingly rare. As David Donaldson explained,

['Cabbage' was] like a subsidy. That cash was actually making these businesses viable. You know, on paper they would look like they were marginally profitable and all the statistics that I can recollect show appalling margins in the rag trade ... But you didn't know how much was actually undeclared, so in that sense I can only assume – and it's more than likely – that ['cabbage'] was actually supporting it because it was going on on such a huge scale. And, similarly, I used to read regular

reports – again, going back to the 1970s and so on – about how incredibly low the rates of pay for machinists were, and I can remember rates which were something like two shillings an hour or something like that and I’m thinking, ‘Nobody can live on that, nobody gets paid that!’ But, you know, if you’re an investigator or anything like that everybody clams up. Because if there is illegal cash going around, everybody is involved, you know? So everybody is guilty, so nobody is going to blab!³⁹

No matter how commonplace and accepted, ‘cabbage’ was of course illegal in the eyes of the authorities. It operated in defiance of the laws governing taxation, depriving the Inland Revenue of significant income every year. The case of ‘cabbage’ in Glasgow’s Sheriff Court was an anomaly, because, as David emphasised, ‘no manufacturer in their right mind is going to sue or take action against someone for “cabbaging”, and had we known that it was “cabbage” that was involved we wouldn’t have done anything, it was a total accident’.⁴⁰ That ‘cabbage’ went on trial, however, has given valuable legal context to an otherwise hidden aspect of the British rag trade at its peak in the 1970s and shown that the nuances between illegality and criminality as these concepts were understood in the rag trade left room for a black economy in ‘cabbage’ to flourish, hidden in plain sight from outsiders and the authorities.

‘Cabbage’ on the Market

‘Cabbage’ was only profitable to manufacturers because there was already an existing retailing infrastructure and consumer base that was willing to profit, and while it may have been well-established and its criminality denied by insiders, there was still some etiquette to be observed. According to Steven Purvis, Selkirk’s arrest and subsequent trial was a direct result of his greed, and because he had disobeyed the fundamental rules of ‘cabbage’. Firstly, labels had to be removed from ‘cabbage’ before it left the factory: ‘The only stipulation was that the labels had to be cut out, not even

picked, out just cut out ... That was the way the game was played, the labels had to be cut out!'.⁴¹ Selkirk, obviously keen to make maximum money from the 'cabbaged' Marion Donaldson garments had not removed the labels; the garments were being sold as *bona fide* Marion Donaldson, making them worth more in cash terms than the same clothes with the labels cut out.

This leads naturally to speculation about the worth of 'cabbage'. The Marion Donaldson Collection holds a wide variety of archival material relating to the business, including production and sales docketts that note the wholesale and retail prices for Marion Donaldson clothes. In the mid-1970s when Norlynn Gowns was making substantial 'cabbage' from Marion Donaldson, including that seized in the case under discussion here, the typical wholesale price of a Marion Donaldson dress was around £10. On the morning the police raided the retailer in Kirkintilloch, some 319 garments were recovered, meaning that, generally speaking, the wholesale worth of that 'cabbage' was £3190.⁴² Since (in a legitimate retail context) the wholesale price is typically half the recommended retail price, in a rightful outlet the seized Marion Donaldson 'cabbage' could have been worth as much as £6380. Had Selkirk observed the rules of 'cabbage', of course, the labels would have been removed and it would have been worth far less, perhaps as much as 75% less, as Purvis explained:

If [the 'cabbage'] is a jacket that's going to sell for £60 in its rightful outlet ... okay, £80. Well, if you've got 10 of them extra, the guy that's buying 'cabbage' isn't going to give you much more than £20 a hit for them because he's got to make the profit. So that's only £200. You're not going to go to the South of France on holiday on £200!⁴³

Ordinarily, 'cabbage' was cheaper than legitimate clothing because it had to take somewhat unorthodox routes through the market to the final consumer; indeed, its distribution and retail required access to complex networks across the whole rag trade.

In London, as Stephen Purvis described, there was an entire retail network dedicated to handling and selling ‘cabbage’:

In London there was a very definite network of people because there were so many factories, small factories, there would be guys ... you could lift the phone and say ‘We’ve got 30 dresses’, or whatever, ‘are you interested?’. They’d come out and say, ‘Okay’, pay you cash, and they would take it away. At that time in London you used to come across quite a lot of ‘cabbage’ shops, no name, nothing but rails with garments from various different places – jackets, dresses, trousers, whatever. [Many were in] Kensington ... not all in Kensington, but you know, they were everywhere in London. You know, outside the British Museum there was a really well-known one ... And really, I mean, that was profit ... it was drink money to the manufacturer because you’d been paid for the job, so anything you could glean from it, I think it was normal.⁴⁴

Other routes ‘cabbage’ took to market included via factory staff who would often purchase ‘cabbage’ for their own wardrobes or for gifts at Christmas, or via market traders.⁴⁵ This was Selkirk’s second mistake. In addition to not cutting out the Marion Donaldson labels, he ignored these usual distribution routes of the ‘cabbage’ system. Instead, he sold the Marion Donaldson ‘cabbage’ to a shop whose owners believed they were buying legitimate stock; they had no idea it was ‘cabbage’ and were horrified to find out. This was also the key to his arrest, as David described in interview: ‘They said they’d bought it from Norlynn Gowns! That’s how he got caught!’⁴⁶

Selkirk’s actions in this case can only have been motivated by greed, because he was well-versed in the mechanics of the ‘cabbage’ system. In Glasgow, What Every Woman Wants was a well-known ‘cabbage’ shop and Marion Donaldson garments found their way from Norlynn Gowns’ factory to the ‘Whateverys’ shop floor more than once.⁴⁷ In a separate incident of what David Donaldson has described as ‘bad cabbaging’ Norlynn Gowns committed ‘wicked’ outright theft of fabric through

alteration of a Marion Donaldson sample pattern (although the labels were cut out in this instance).⁴⁸

Marion: We actually had been complaining to him, because there was one particular docket of things he'd made for us. It was a huge quantity of long velvet skirts and they were short, they were two inches short – and we'd already been complaining about this, and he was saying that they must have shrunk, and I knew there was no way they had shrunk! And of course, when we actually did a real check then, we realised that what he'd done was he'd actually cut two inches off the pattern! Now, that is not on! That is not on!

David: But our velvet skirts, albeit, all so short, were suddenly in What Every Woman Wants, which was on Argyle Street right beside us, it's right under your nose! What Every Woman ... they were across the road [from the Marion Donaldson office and studio], a little cabbage shop!⁴⁹

What Every Woman Wants was a chain of fashion shops in Glasgow which operated on the maxim 'nice and price'.⁵⁰ Often the clothing was fashionable, but made cheaply and sold cheaply; or, as described by David, it was 'cabbage' – good quality and well-made, but by necessity sold quickly and cheaply. The Weisfeld family grew their business from the original Argyle Street store which opened in 1972 to over 40 stores around the UK by 1990, with sales revenue exceeding £100 million per annum. They maintained that their success was built on a strategy of buying 'over-stock' from large high street chains such as Marks and Spencer and C&A Modes and selling it on for a fraction of the recommended retail price.⁵¹ While this strategy was likely to have been the dominant driver of the Weisfeld's remarkable accomplishments, that What Every Woman Wants was known within the local rag trade to have been a 'cabbage shop' suggests that its beginnings were rather less orthodox.⁵² Glasgow's thirst for fast, cheap fashion – or 'cabbage' – certainly contributed to its growth in its early days and Vera Weisfeld herself has described how they would 'get designer things and have to cut the

labels out' and how 'within the hour they were gone [sold]'.⁵³ When asked in interview about What Every Woman Wants and its reputation among manufacturers as a 'cabbage' shop Steven Purvis remembered:

Yes, absolutely, and everybody knew it. They would buy anything, they were well-known, you'd phone up and say, 'I'm whoever, Joe Bloggs, I've got a factory and we're making for "insert name", are you interested in 40 dresses, without labels, obviously?', and Whateverys would be like, 'Yes, sure, send us one up, send us a sample'. And if the price was right they would buy them and they would be on the shop floor the next week ... I would say 80% [of their business] was 'cabbage'. I mean, Whateverys fulfilled or filled a void, because you could sell it in Glasgow, send a boy round with them over his arm, wrapped in plastic. Without Whateverys you were probably going to have to call some guy in Huddersfield or Bradford or somewhere like that.⁵⁴

Retailers like What Every Woman Wants made it easier for Glasgow-based manufacturers to sell 'cabbage' locally, and therefore made it more attractive for them to make 'cabbage'; without such an easily-accessible outlet, local factories making 'cabbage' would have to access national networks for the distribution and sale of their 'cabbage', reducing its profitability.

Not every design that went to a factory to be manufactured became 'cabbage'. Only the best designs – or rather, what the manufacturer gauged to be the 'winners' in a collection would actually be turned into 'cabbage'. Often, in the 'big cabbage' system the 'cabbage' network would work in reverse, with 'cabbage' dealers (retailers) requesting specific 'cabbage' from manufacturers, as David explained:

And that's where the other loop comes in – who knows what the winners are? The retailers! ... They tip off, they get somebody coming in with a range, and they go 'No, no, no', and the guy goes, 'Well what are you looking for?', and they say, 'Well, we're looking for something like THIS, this is the sort of thing we're LOOKING for', you see? And the guy goes, 'Right, I'll be back next week', and

they bring in the knock-off. And lo and behold it's exactly what they're looking for! So they need to know ... they only want to knock-off the winners.⁵⁵

As a well-known 'cabbage' retailer, What Every Woman Wants had some influence in this way and therefore its impressive growth and subsequent national expansion could be attributed directly to its offering in 'cabbaged' garments that set its reputation as a retailer of up-to-the-minute, fashionable, well-made, and reasonably-priced women's clothing.

On the market, for those in the know, 'cabbage' was treated as the fashion industry 'equivalent of bootleg music and films', and it allowed consumers – among them rag trade workers themselves – to own garments identical in design and make to a *bona fide* designer product, for a fraction of the legitimate retail cost.⁵⁶ The unorthodox cultures of production and consumption that constituted the 'cabbage' system thus foreshadowed the subsequent growth of the cheap import sector that flooded British high streets in later decades with trendy, inexpensive clothes that imitated the designer styles that had previously only been available to those with the purchasing power to afford them.

'Cabbaged'

The material culture of the 'cabbage' system is not easy to come by – as illicit material its worth may not have been recognised by all those who purchased it, and given the lack of identifying labels it is possible much 'cabbage' has been lost. In trying to identify 'cabbage', therefore, it is essential to be sure that it conforms to the rules of the 'cabbage' system: without labels (or with labels cut out), purchased from a factory worker, a market stall, or a known 'cabbage' shop. A firm provenance is crucial, and this research has been privileged with access to two 'cabbaged' Marion Donaldson objects, both of which were manufactured in the Norlynn Gowns factory between 1976

and 1978. Their provenance is beyond doubt – they were given to Marion and David Donaldson by one of their closest friends who is, coincidentally, the daughter of Norlynn Gowns' former head machinist. The first is a kimono-style jacket (Fig. 1) and the second is an evening cape in devoré fabric (Fig. 2). Both are now part of the Marion Donaldson Collection. These objects are witness to the entirety of the 'cabbage' system; both are as beautifully made as any Marion Donaldson garment of that period and from that particular factory. Neither has a label, and their route to market was via purchase by a machinist; they were both best-sellers in their own season and represent the apotheosis of what was considered by black market actors to be a safe bet for sale in the hidden economy of British fashion in the late 1970s. Since they were made after Selkirk's arrest for 'cabbaging' in 1976, their existence demonstrates that the 'cabbage' system was endemic at Norlynn Gowns and that Selkirk was not afraid of the law in respect of 'cabbage', despite the trouble it had already caused.

They are also witness to last days of the 'cabbage' system as it had been, both at Norlynn Gowns and within the rag trade more generally. Alexander Selkirk's death in the early 1980s led to the closure of his factory. Around the same time, the introduction of CAD (computer aided design) and other new technologies in fashion manufacturing started the process that rendered the 'cabbage' system obsolete, because they enabled precise pattern-laying and cutting as calculated by a computer and executed by precision laser. This meant that suppliers' costings were far more accurate than they had been previously, and therefore the need for any 10% allowance – and the opportunity for manufacturers to make 'cabbage' in any profitable way – was removed. Of course, such technology was only affordable for the biggest companies; in 1980 the average investment required for both CAD and laser-cutting technology was around £420,000.⁵⁷ Marks and Spencer was among the first and most powerful businesses to

enthusiastically embrace these new technologies in the pursuit of obliterating the ‘cabbage’ system, as Steven Purvis explained:

Marks and Spencer were really down on the ‘cabbage’ thing, really down on it. You used to see it back then, the 1970s, early 1980s, but you see, what happened was ... as things got more ... professional, shall we say, you were getting exact [amounts] and you were being told, ‘Well that should cut out at 1m 80cm. Figure it out, because we’re not going to tell you. That’s what we know it comes out at’. But all that sort of thing started to really tighten up. Okay, you would get your 10% but it was 10% to the centimetre, it was exact ... everything was tightened up. You were getting exactly the number of labels you needed. Exactly the number of zips. ... It just became a standard in the industry, people realised that they didn’t have to give you extra.⁵⁸

Marion also remembered how Marks and Spencer had been instrumental in making the ‘cabbage’ system as difficult as possible for its manufacturers:

Marks and Spencer were literally screwing the manufacturers down so that they were making hardly anything on it ... They would employ somebody who was actually just going round the factories saying, ‘Show me this lay’, you know? And once these patterns were being laid out on paper with laser cuts and all the rest of it [they] could stop it all, just about.⁵⁹

The end of ‘cabbage’ with the tightening-up of regulations and the introduction of new technologies to the fashion factory also coincided with the deterioration of the British rag trade as a viable and productive industry. By 1979 its decline was already generating headlines in the national press, and between 1979 and 1983 the domestic production of clothing had declined by 29% while the rate of clothing imports had increased three times as fast as domestic production.⁶⁰ By 1984, the rag trade workforce had been reduced to 57% of its 1971 level, having shed some 126,000 jobs in the intervening years, and while CAD and laser cutting were prohibitively expensive at the start of the 1980s, by the end of the decade most companies had access to and were

actively using CAD technology as part of their production processes.⁶¹ These problems were compounded for those invested in the ‘cabbage’ system by the non-interventionist policies of the Conservative government who saw the rag trade as a ‘sunset industry’, and who were alone in Europe in ‘withdrawing from, rather than intervening in, assisting British industry to restructure’ partly because there was a pervading idea among that administration that the rag trade was an industry populated by ‘a load of ponces and parasites’.⁶²

‘Cabbage’ – and therefore the entire black market in British fashion – declined in tandem with the wider legitimate domestic industry because it was like a parasite that was only able to function profitably in a flourishing rag trade. As Marion explained:

Business was easy then, we didn’t actually fight [against ‘cabbage’] too much, you know? I probably should have gone over each week and said, ‘Right, show me your lay, no, measure it up’, but I didn’t because business was so easy at that time. Business was flowing.⁶³

The decline of domestic manufacturing and the rising use of manufacturing technologies in big firms such as Marks and Spencer meant that for most suppliers the cash from ‘cabbage’ that had subsidised their business was lost. It is likely that this was an important factor in the deterioration of the domestic fashion manufacturing sector and a central reason for the closure of many factories. While cheap imports have traditionally shouldered much of the blame for the decline of the British rag trade, it seems clear that the loss of ‘cabbage’ was also a contributing factor that has until now been overlooked.

If we consider the ‘cabbage’ system and how it can be defined in the context of the post-war British rag trade using the evidence presented here, then several key characteristics come to the fore that offer compelling points for an updated definition of the term and practice of ‘cabbage’. Firstly, and most importantly, ‘cabbage’ was made

by manufacturers from a supplier's offcuts or excess fabric, but unlike the archaic definition, the word 'cabbage' referred to and was understood to mean complete garments. Secondly, the 'cabbage' system constituted an illicit parallel trade in fashion production and consumption which was protected from the prying eyes of the authorities by a culture of silence and collusion from within, with all those invested in the trade also invested in its continued prosperity. It also mirrored the legitimate trade in that production and consumption of 'cabbage' was influenced by market forces and access to distribution and retail networks. On a related point, it was dependent on production economics; small factories could make 'small cabbage' by skilful cutting and sales via factory staff and market stalls, generating only 'beer money' for makers, while 'big cabbage' as produced in large factories was often generated to order and then sold in 'cabbage' shops, and was highly profitable, contributing to the very viability of the firms that produced it. The 'cabbage' system therefore, although largely hidden from the official record and absent in historiography, was a powerful driver of the black market in British fashion in the post-war period. It operated at all levels of the trade and was one of the most lucrative seams of income in the black economy, which – although illicit – contributed much to the profitability and viability of the legitimate rag trade.

¹ Despite scholarly reticence, Christopher Breward has made a convincing case for reclamation of the term 'rag trade' in the scholarly lexicon. See C. Breward, 'Fashion's Front and Back: "Rag trade" Cultures and Cultures of Consumption in Post-War London c.1945–1970', *The London Journal*, 31, no. 1 (2006), p. 37. 'Rag trade' was the term used most often, and never negatively, by interviewees during the course of this research, and is used throughout this article to describe all aspects of business related to the manufacture and distribution of clothing.

² To the fishmonger, a kipper is a smoked herring that has been split and flattened to make a ‘pair’; to the tailor a kipper is a female assistant in the workroom, so-called because they always worked in pairs. For more on the jargon of the tailoring profession see:
www.spitalfieldslife.com/2014/09/28/the-language-of-tailors. (accessed July 16 2018).

³ For the full definition and records of its use see:
www.oed.com/view/Entry/25715?rskey=KGjNBS&result=3#firstMatch (accessed August 1 2018.) The etymology of the word is the subject of some dispute. While the OED suggests that ‘cabbage’ has its roots in the word ‘garbage’ or because ‘tailors may have rolled up strips of cloth into balls which resembled heads of cabbage in appearance’, other online sources have speculated that it is related to ‘crib’ (the card game).

⁴ Report by the Clothing Economic Development Committee and Associated Independent Consultants Ltd., quoted in S. Majima, ‘Fashion and Frequency of Purchase: Womenswear Consumption in Britain, 1961–2001’, *Journal of Fashion Marketing and Management: An International Journal*, 12, no. 4 (2008), p. 504

⁵ P. Granger, *Up West: Voices from the Streets of Post-War London*, (Random House, London, 2010), p. 180.

⁶ The ‘Marion Donaldson Collection’ refers to the entire business archive of the company. This private archive includes: business and administrative accounts, photograph albums, press-cuttings and scrapbooks, marketing and advertising materials, and some 90 garments. The Collection remains in the hands of the Donaldson family and is being added to regularly (especially through recovery of Marion Donaldson garments), and as material from the author’s research is disseminated in the popular and academic presses. The oral histories upon which this research is based (18 oral history interviews in total) are held at the University of Glasgow and will be available for consultation in audio and transcript form after April 2021.

⁷ In 1966, for example, *Kelly’s Directory* for Glasgow lists 95 businesses under the category of ‘Clothing Manufacturers’, mostly comprised of Cut, Make, Trim (CMT) units. These businesses were concentrated in the east of the city centre, from the eighteenth century a

significant location in terms of textile and clothing production. For more on Glasgow's historic rag trade see: G. Taylor, 'Reminiscences of Glasgow Textile Trades', *Old Glasgow Club Transactions*, 17 April 1905; S. Chapman, 'The Innovating Entrepreneurs in the British Ready-made Clothing Industry', *Textile History*, 24, no. 1 (1993), pp. 5–25; G. Pentland, "'Betrayed by Infamous Spies'? The Commemoration of Scotland's 'Radical War' of 1820", *Past & Present*, 201, no. 1 (2008), pp. 141 – 173; A. J. Albert, 'Fit Work for Women: Sweated Homeworkers in Glasgow c. 1875–1914', in E. Gordon and E. Breitenbach (eds), *The World is Ill-divided: Women's Work in Scotland in the 19th and Early 20th Centuries* (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1990); L. Fleming, *Jewish Women in Glasgow c.1880–1950: Gender, Ethnicity and the Immigrant Experience*, unpublished thesis, University of Glasgow, (2005).

⁸ M. and D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

⁹ L. Marne, 'This is the Law: Who Owns Cabbage?', *Drapers' Record*, 12 March 1977, p. 66; *Drapers' Record*, 10 December 1977, p. iv. 'Bunce' is a colloquialism for profit.

¹⁰ There are some notable exceptions, most prominently Christopher Breward, particularly his study of rag trade cultures mentioned above. Also, P. Q. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (eds), *Reversing Industrial Decline? British Economic Policy in International Perspective* (Berg, Oxford, 1988); A. Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry* (Routledge, London, 1990); A. McRobbie, *British Fashion Design: Rag Trade or Image Industry?* (Routledge, London, 1998); I. Griffiths and N. White (eds), *The Fashion Business: Theory, Practice, Image* (Berg, Oxford, 2000); and R. L. Blaszczyk (ed.), *Producing Fashion: Commerce, Culture, and Consumers* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2009).

¹¹ John Fairchild quoted in T. Agins, *The End of Fashion: How Marketing Changed the Clothing Business Forever* (Harper Collins, New York, 2010, e-book edition), p. 26; Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry*, p. 7.

¹² See for example: C. Walkley, *The Ghost in the Looking Glass: The Victorian Seamstress* (P. Owen, London, 1981); H. Rogers, "'The Good Are Not Always Powerful, nor the Powerful Always Good': The Politics of Women's Needlework in Mid-Victorian London", *Victorian*

Studies, 40, no. 4 (1997), pp. 589–623; S. C. Blackburn, “‘No Necessary Connection with Homework’”: Gender and Sweated Labour, 1840–1909’, *Social History*, 22, no. 3 (1997), pp. 269–285; A. Godley, A. Kershen and R. Schapiro, ‘Fashion and its Impact on the Economic Development of London's East End Womenswear Industry, 1929–62: The Case of Ellis and Goldstein’, *Textile History*, 34, no. 2 (2003), pp. 214–228; or J. L. Collins, *Threads: Gender, Labor, and Power in the Global Apparel Industry* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003).

¹³ National Records of Scotland, Sheriff Court Records, SC/36/56/355.

¹⁴ Both garments are part of the Marion Donaldson Collection.

¹⁵ Cutters were equally important in previous centuries. See W. Aldrich, ‘Tailors' Cutting Manuals and the Growing Provision of Popular Clothing 1770–1870’, *Textile History*, 31, no. 2 (2000), pp. 163–201.

¹⁶ A. Kershen, ‘Morris Cohen and the Origins of the Women's Wholesale Clothing Industry in the East End’, *Textile History*, 28, no. 1 (1997), p. 43.

¹⁷ Purvis quoted in McRobbie, *British Fashion Design*, p. 118

¹⁸ M. and D. Donaldson in interview 30 March 2015.

¹⁹ M. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

²⁰ D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

²¹ D. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018.

²² S. Purvis in interview.

²³ D. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018.

²⁴ D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

²⁵ S. Purvis in interview.

²⁶ M. and D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March. 2015. Kirkintilloch is a small town on the northern periphery of Glasgow.

²⁷ M. and D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

²⁸ National Records of Scotland, Sheriff Court Records, SC/36/56/355. There is no mention of the word ‘cabbage’ anywhere in the transcript and, as such, there may be earlier cases where

‘cabbage’ has been the catalyst to similar court proceedings. Given the secretive nature of the rag trade and the lack of general knowledge about practises such as ‘cabbage’, however, it would be difficult find a similar record with such a strong provenance. Interestingly, in their issue of 11 March 1978 (p. 5), *Drapers’ Record* reported on what it claimed (incorrectly, given the evidence presented here) was the first legal prosecution for ‘cabbaging’. However, the case in question – Paula Lee Ltd. v Sara Sports – was far more clear cut in that there was a written contract that explicitly forbade ‘cabbage’. While Alexander Selkirk, owner of Norlynn Gowns is one of the accused in this case, it is not clear who his fellow accused is, although Marion and David Donaldson have suggested it could be Norlynn Gowns’ accountant.

²⁹ National Records of Scotland, Sheriff Court Records, SC/36/56/355, p. 357.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

³² Ibid.

³³ Marne, ‘This is the Law’, p. 66.

³⁴ Later, from December 1977 to March 1978 there was a flurry of editorial and correspondence about ‘cabbage’ in *Drapers’ Record*. This was largely galvanised by the actions of The Fashion Design Protection Association which was formed to offer ‘legal protection against copying, imitation or reproduction of ... designs, patterns and manufactured articles’. The Association placed an advertisement on 10 December 1977 (p. iv) which included an announcement about ‘cabbage’, stating that proceedings would be taken in the form of an Interlocutory Injunction along with a writ for damages for infringement of copyright against any business found dealing in ‘cabbage’. It is unclear how effective the Association was in its threats against the ‘cabbage’ system, and efforts to trace its activities beyond the pages of *Drapers’ Record* have thus far proved unsuccessful. *Drapers’ Record* 03 December 1977, p. 3; 10 December 1977 p. iv, p. 9; 17 December 1977, p. 8; 11 March 1978, p. 5.

³⁵ M. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

³⁶ D. Donaldson in interview, 19 July 2018.

³⁷ D. Donaldson in interview 12 June 2018.

³⁸ S. Purvis in interview.

³⁹ D. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018; Annie Phizacklea has also urged scepticism in analysis of any official records of the British rag trade because it was not uncommon to find that many companies reported losses or liquidated altogether to avoid the scrutiny of the Inland Revenue. For more on this see Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry*, pp. 79-80.

⁴⁰ D. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018.

⁴¹ S. Purvis in interview.

⁴² Using the Retail Prices Index, this equates to around £21,820 in 2018; for more details on how this figure is arrived at, see:

www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/relativevalue (accessed July 11 2018).

⁴³ S. Purvis in interview.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ D. Donaldson in interview, 19 July 2018.

⁴⁷ What Every Woman Wants was known in Glasgow affectionately as ‘Whateveryrs’.

⁴⁸ D. Donaldson in interview, 19 July 2018.

⁴⁹ M. and D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵⁰ Anon, ‘Weisfelds Mourn the Chain That Nobody Wanted’, *The Scotsman*, 23 January 2003, www.scotsman.com/news/weisfelds-mourn-the-chain-that-nobody-wanted-1-637585 (accessed January 14 2017).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² M. and D. Donaldson in interview, 30 March 2015.

⁵³ G. Kyle, ‘What Everyone Wants and the Making of a Glasgow Phenomenon’, *Glasgow Live*, 12 December 2018, <https://www.glasgowlive.co.uk/news/history/what-everyone-wants-glasgow-12137163> (accessed July 24 2019).

⁵⁴ S. Purvis in interview.

⁵⁵ D. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018.

⁵⁶ Granger, *Up West*, p. 180.

⁵⁷ Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry*, p. 56.

⁵⁸ S. Purvis in interview. For a thorough contemporary assessment of the treatment of manufacturers at the hands of Marks and Spencer, see A. F. Rainnie, 'Combined and Uneven Development in the Clothing Industry: The Effects of Competition on Accumulation', *Capital & Class*, 8, no. 1 (1984), pp. 141–156.

⁵⁹ M. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018.

⁶⁰ Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry*, p. 9.

⁶¹ J. Zeitlin, 'The Clothing Industry in Transition: International Trends and British Response', *Textile History*, 19, no. 2 (1988), p. 211; Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry* p. 56.

⁶² Phizacklea, *Unpacking the Fashion Industry*, p. 38; J. Zeitlin and P. Totterdill, 'Markets, Technology and Local Intervention: The Case of Clothing' in P. Q. Hirst and J. Zeitlin (eds), *Reversing Industrial Decline? British Economic Policy in International Perspective* (Berg, Oxford, 1988), p. 155; S. Mower, 'Denis and the Menace', *The Guardian*, 09 January 1986, p. 9.

⁶³ M. Donaldson in interview, 12 June 2018.