

1 **How decision-makers' sense and state of power induce** 2 **propensity to take financial risks**

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19 **Ethical approval:** All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in
20 accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and/or national research committee
21 and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical
22 standards. The Ethics Board of the Faculty of Psychology University of Warsaw approved the
23 studies.

24 **Informed consent:** Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included
25 in the studies.

26 **Data and Original Materials Availability Statement:** The complete datasets can be found
27 at the Open Science Framework (OSF):

28 The original materials for both studies can be found in Supplementary Materials.

29

30 **ABSTRACT**

31 We present two studies ($N_1 = 104$, and $N_2 = 359$) investigating how sense of power (trait) and
32 state of power affect participants' risky financial decisions in the domains of investment and
33 gambling. Moreover, we explored whether a situationally induced state of power moderates the
34 relationship between sense of power (trait) and propensity to take financial risks. The studies
35 demonstrated that the level of sense of power was positively associated with the riskiness of
36 investment portfolios and gambling choices. A similar pattern was observed when a state of
37 power/powerlessness was situationally induced: participants in high-power conditions took
38 greater investment and gambling risks than did those in low-power conditions. Importantly, we
39 found an interaction between trait and state power. For participants in the high-power condition,
40 there was a positive relationship between sense of power and propensity to take financial risks.
41 In contrast, there was no such relationship for those in the low-power condition.

42

43

44 **Keywords:**

45 power, financial risk, investment, gambling

46

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49

50 **Introduction**

51 Power is often defined as asymmetric control over valued resources in social relations
52 (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). A number of studies indicate that greater power fosters risk-taking
53 behaviors in various situations, such as negotiations (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Magee et al.,
54 2007), taking a card in a game of blackjack (Galinsky et al., 2003) engaging in unprotected sex
55 (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), marital infidelity (Lammers et al., 2011), and food consumption
56 (Kim et al., 2018). However, little is known about the way differences in power influence risky
57 personal financial choices, and it is not clear whether people in positions of power and people
58 lacking power differ in terms of their preferred financial risk-levels or whether they invest their
59 money in different ways (e.g., by choosing financial instruments with different levels of risk).
60 The greater propensity of powerful people to take risks has been demonstrated only on the
61 corporate level. Specifically, studies have demonstrated that power held by CEOs is positively
62 related to excessive and unmanaged risk-taking in a firm; for example, misconduct of banks
63 (Altunbaş et al., 2018), the decision to pursue a strategy of specializing in subprime lending,
64 which poses a high risk of default (Lewellyn & Muller-Kahle, 2012), or risk taken by banks
65 (Altunbaş et al., 2020). However, there is a great difference between the way business and
66 personal finances are managed. Thus, results about power wielded by CEOs cannot simply be
67 assumed to be true for investment choices on an individual level. Moreover, the results obtained
68 in other risk-taking domains do not necessarily translate to the financial domain because
69 people's propensity to take risks is not consistent across all decision domains (Hanoch, Johnson,
70 & Wilke, 2006; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002) and might differ even across different financial
71 domains (Vlaev, Kusev, Stewart, Aldrovandi, & Chater, 2010).

72 Individual variation in one's perceived ability to influence other people is considered an
73 individual difference (trait) variable (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012). At the same time, a
74 plethora of research has demonstrated that power is also a psychological state, and that feelings
75 of power or powerlessness can be activated by a number of factors (see Rucker, Galinsky, &
76 Dubois, 2012 for a review). Situational cues to the possession of power create a sense of power,
77 which in turn produces a range of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological consequences (see
78 Galinsky, Rucker, & Magee, 2015 for a further review of the psychology and consequences of
79 power).

80 It is important to note that people can find themselves under the joint influence of both
81 state and trait power. However, such situations are seldom considered in research. Few existing
82 studies have demonstrated that the pattern of interactions between sense of power and power
83 manifested as a state is not straightforward (Chen, Langner, & Mendoza-Denton, 2009; Strelan,

84 Weick, & Vasiljevic, 2014). Thus, little is known about the way such an interaction might
85 influence the making of risky financial decisions. Nevertheless, some assumptions can be made
86 based on research that focuses on the interaction between situationally induced power and other
87 traits. This research indicates that individuals exhibiting power act more in line with their
88 dispositional tendencies than do individuals lacking power (Bargh & Raymond, 1995; Chen et
89 al., 2001; Côté et al., 2011). If this pattern of results were also to occur for situational power
90 and power understood as a trait, people with an experimentally heightened state of power would
91 act in line with their levels of power as a trait, whereas an experimentally induced lack of power
92 would lead a person to make decisions similar to those made by people characterized by lower
93 power (as a trait).

94 The current article focuses on how people's levels of power influence their risky
95 financial decisions in two domains: investment decisions and gambling. We treat power as an
96 individual difference (trait) characteristic and also experimentally induce power as a state.
97 Moreover, we explore the interaction effect between these two variables on participants'
98 propensity to take financial risks. The results of our two studies demonstrate that power is a
99 significant predictor of risky financial decisions. One's level of sense of power (trait) is
100 positively related to risk choices in both investment and gambling tasks. A similar pattern was
101 observed when states of power/powerlessness were situationally induced: participants in high-
102 power conditions took greater investment and gambling risks than did those in low-power
103 conditions. Importantly, interactions between trait and state power were observed. For people
104 in the high-power condition, there was a positive relationship between sense of power and
105 propensity to take financial risks. In contrast, there was no such relationship for people in the
106 low-power condition. This suggests that when people find themselves in a position of having
107 little power, their sense of power does not influence their subsequent decisions in the manner
108 that has been demonstrated in previous studies.

109

110 *1.1 Hypotheses and the current studies*

111 Drawing on previous research, we expect individuals exhibiting power to behave in a
112 riskier manner in financial contexts than those with less power, and that this will be the case for
113 both trait and state power. Accordingly, there is evidence that powerful and powerless people
114 differ in their propensity to make risky financial choices, especially considering their
115 differences with respect to rewards and punishments (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). Moreover,
116 studies indicate that power generally increases the tendency for people to make risky decisions

117 in various life domains (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006) and powerful people tend to be optimistic
118 in their risk assessments (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006), overconfident (Fast et al., 2012), and
119 have the illusion of control over outcomes (Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2009).

120 Finally, based on research demonstrating that powerful individuals act more in line with
121 their dispositional tendencies than individuals who lack power (Bargh & Raymond, 1995; Chen
122 et al., 2001; Côté et al., 2011), we predict that people in a state of power will act in line with
123 their trait power. In this group, we expect that increasing levels of trait power will be related to
124 a greater propensity to take financial risks. Conversely, for the group of participants with an
125 experimentally induced lack of power, we expect that there will not be such a relationship.
126 Specifically, we anticipate that the financial risk preferences of participants in this group will
127 be similar to those of people with lower levels of trait power.

128 The studies were conducted using the online Polish ARIADNA participant panel, which
129 has over 110,000 active adult panel members. E-mail invitations were sent to potential
130 participants, diverse in terms of their age, gender, and level of education. Each email contained
131 a unique link to the study that worked only once and only for the particular panel member.
132 When the participant clicked on the link, they were transferred to ARIADNA's research
133 platform and, after reading the information about the study and giving informed consent, the
134 participant started the study. Participants who took part in the first study were not invited to the
135 second study and were therefore unable to take part in it.

136 Respondents were awarded points for participating that they could later exchange for
137 rewards from a pool of several hundred products offered by the platform running the panel.
138 Additionally, extra points were awarded to participants depending on their choices during
139 gambling tasks. Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The Ethics Board of the
140 University of Warsaw's Faculty of Psychology approved both studies. In both studies,
141 collection of data was not continued after data analysis commenced. We declare that we have
142 reported all implemented experimental conditions and disclosed all measured variables. We
143 have also reported all the studies we have performed on the research question of this paper.

144 **2 Study 1. Sense of power and propensity to take financial risks**

145 *2.1 Study aim*

146 Study 1 aimed to examine whether sense of power is positively related to people's propensity
147 to take two types of financial risk: investment and gambling risks.

148 2.2 Method

149 2.2.1 Participants

150 A total of 104 Polish working adults (53 female and 51 male; aged 19–64 years, $M = 37.18$
151 years, $SD = 9.49$) took part in the study.¹

152 2.2.2 Materials and procedure

153 **Sense of power.** Participants' sense of power was measured using the Generalized Sense of
154 Power Scale (Anderson, John, & Keltner, 2012), on which participants were asked to report
155 their generalized beliefs about the power they have in their relationships with others. The Scale
156 was translated into Polish using the translation/back-translation procedure in accordance with
157 WHO guidelines (Whodas 2.0 Translation Package, n.d). We decided to use 5-point scales
158 because the panelists who took part in the study were used to online studies with 5-point scales,
159 Krosnick and Presser (2010) found very similar effects for 5-point and 7-point scales, and the
160 Generalized Sense of Power Scale has been previously successfully implemented with 5-point
161 scales (also by one of the authors of the scale: van Kleef, Oveis, Homan, van der Löwe, &
162 Keltner, 2015). Participants were asked to rate their agreement with eight statements such as
163 “In my relationships with others I can get others to do what I want” on a scale from 1 (*strongly*
164 *disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Four items were reverse coded and responses were averaged to
165 create an indicator of each participant's sense of power ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 0.52$, Cronbach's alpha
166 = .767).

167
168 **Propensity to take financial risks**

169 **Propensity to take gambling risks (the lottery task).** The lottery choice task proposed by Holt
170 and Laury (2002) was used as a measure of participants' propensity to take gambling risks.
171 Participants were asked to make ten choices between paired lotteries (Lottery A and Lottery B).
172 In each pair, the potential payoffs for Lottery A (PLN 10 = USD 2.5 or PLN 8 = USD 2) were
173 less variable than those for Lottery B (PLN 19.25 = USD 4.8 or PLN 0.5 = USD 0.13). Thus,
174 Lottery B was the risky option. The probability of the high-payoff outcome increased in both
175 lotteries, starting with $p = 0.1$ and ending with $p = 1$. The index of risky gambling choices was

¹ To establish appropriate sample sizes, a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). This showed that, given $\alpha = .05$ and 0.80 power, a sample size of 77 participants would be sufficient to detect medium effects ($f^2 = 0.15$) in a regression model with 3 predictor variables. We aimed to exceed this number by at least 30% based on the results of our previous studies (Sekścińska, Rudzińska-Wojciechowska, & Jaworska, 2021) in which, on average, 33.5% of participants were excluded from analysis because of multiple switching points and and/or choosing dominated options in the lottery task (2002).

176 defined as the sum of Lottery B options ($M = 4.45$, $SD = 3.03$). This task was incentivized:
177 participants were informed that a computer would draw one of the 10 chosen lotteries (for each
178 participant individually) at the end of the study, and then throw a virtual 10-sided dice to
179 determine the lottery result. Participants' incentives were paid according to this outcome as an
180 additional reward for participation (this procedure has previously been successfully used by
181 Sekścińska, Rudzinska-Wojciechowska, & Jaworska, 2021)

182 In this task, rational participants should either have no switching point or only one
183 switching point in their choices between Lotteries A and B. Moreover, in the last choice, the
184 higher outcome of each gamble is drawn with certainty; thus, Lottery A is a dominated option
185 and should not be chosen by a rational decision maker. Participants with multiple switching
186 points and participants choosing dominated options were excluded from the analyses (see
187 Charness, Gneezy, & Imas, 2013). However, we also analyzed the whole dataset (the
188 description of analyses and related statistics are presented in Supplementary Materials part 1).
189 Including participants with multiple switching points and who chose the dominated option did
190 not make a difference to the results.

191 **Propensity to take investment risks** (the investment portfolio task; Sekścińska, Jaworska, &
192 Rudzinska-Wojciechowska, 2021; Sekścińska, Maison, & Trzcińska, 2016). Propensity to take
193 investment risks was measured by the percentage of stocks included by participants in a
194 hypothetical investment portfolio. First, participants read information about the levels of
195 riskiness and potential profitability of bonds, balanced mutual funds, and stocks. Subsequently,
196 they were asked to create an investment portfolio by dividing a total of PLN 10,000 (\$2500)
197 between these three types of investment (balanced mutual funds involved investing 50% in
198 stocks and 50% in bonds). The following formula, reflecting the percentage of stocks in each
199 portfolio, was used: $0 \times \text{percentage allocated to bonds} + 0.5 \times \text{percentage allocated to mutual}$
200 $\text{funds} + 1 \times \text{percentage allocated to stocks}$. This resulted in scores ranging from 0 to 100 ($M =$
201 26.37 , $SD = 4.17$).

202 **Procedure.** In order to control for any undesired order effects, the Generalized Sense of Power
203 Scale, the investment portfolio task, and the lottery task were presented to the participants in

204 random order.² At the end of the study, all participants were informed about the results of the
 205 lottery.

206 *2.3 Results and discussion*

207 Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations) and zero-order correlations for the
 208 analyzed variables are presented in Table 1.

209

210 Table 1.

211 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's *r* correlations (Study 1)

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations			
			2	3	4	5
1. Propensity to take gambling risks	4.36	2.65	.178	.258*	-.025	.016
2. Propensity to take investment risks	49.43 %	24.93 %		.197*	.022	-.059
3. Sense of power	3.30	0.52			-.008	.123
4. Age	37.18	9.49				-.142
5. Sex	M: 51 (49%) F: 53 (51%)					

212 Note: Sex was coded as 1 for female and 0 for male; **p* < .05, ***p* < .01, ****p* < .001

213

214 *2.3.1 Sense of power and propensity to take gambling risks*

215 Five participants were excluded from the analyses presented below due to multiple switching
 216 points and/or making dominated choices in the lottery task.


217 Analysis of the frequency distribution of propensity to take gambling risks showed the
 218 existence of censoring in the data (see Figure 1) and a positively skewed distribution, with 23
 219 participants obtaining the minimum (one B choice) score. Accordingly, we employed a left-
 220 censored regression model in which participants' propensity to take gambling risks was

² One-way ANOVA showed no differences in terms of general sense of power ($F[5,98] = 0.121, p = .99$), propensity to take investment risks ($F[5,98] = 0.942, p = .46$), or propensity to take gambling risks ($F[5,98] = 0.729, p = .60$) between participants who completed the research tools in each of the possible orders.

221 regressed on sense of power (with a score of 1 as the lower limit). The tested model exhibited
222 a significantly better fit than a model containing no predictor variables, with sense of power
223 being a significant positive predictor of propensity to take financial risks (Table 2). For each
224 unit increase in sense of power there was a 1.43 (β) point increase in predicted values of
225 propensity to take gambling risks. After introducing demographic variables (age and sex), the
226 model was not significantly better than the one containing no predictor variables, with neither
227 age nor sex being significantly predictive and sense of power remaining as a significant positive
228 predictor ($\beta = 1.45$; Table 2). Similar results were obtained for the whole sample for which data
229 were collected ($N = 104$). Specifically, the model with sense of power as the only predictor was
230 significant, with sense of power being a positive predictor of propensity to take financial risks.
231 Moreover, the model with demographic variables being controlled was not significantly more
232 predictive than the initial one and showed sense of power as the only and positive significant
233 predictor. See part 1 of the Supplementary Materials for related statistics.

234

235 Figure 1. Propensity to take financial risks in the lottery task – frequencies (Study 1)



236

237

238 Table 2.

239 Predictors of propensity to take gambling risks (Study 1)

	Step 1	Step 2
Sense of power	1.43 (0.62)*	1.45 (0.62)*
Sex		-0.16 (0.67)
Age		-0.03 (0.04)
Intercept	-0.66 (2.07)	0.40 (2.46)
Observations	99	99
<i>Pseudo R</i> ²	.01	.01
<i>LR</i> χ^2	5.28*	5.93

240 Note: The table presents the β values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded as 1
241 for female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

242 2.3.2 *Sense of power and propensity to take investment risks*

243 The extent to which sense of power can be used to predict propensity to take investment risks
244 was examined with a hierarchical multiple regression analysis (see Table 2) in which the
245 riskiness of the created portfolios was the dependent variable. Sense of power was entered as a
246 predictor in the first step, and then the roles of demographic variables (age and sex) were
247 controlled by entering these variables into the model in the second step of the analysis.

248 The results of the first step showed a significant role of sense of power: more powerful
249 people were more prone to build riskier investment portfolios. Although significant, the model
250 for the first step only explained 4% of the variance in portfolio riskiness, $F(1,102) = 4.12$; $p =$
251 $.045$. After entering sex and age in the second step of the analysis, sense of power was still a
252 significant predictor ($p = .038$), but neither of the two demographic variables was significantly
253 predictive and the overall model was not significantly predictive after the second step, $F(3,100)$
254 $= 1.61$; $p = .192$.

255

256

257

258

259 Table 3.

260 Predictors of propensity to take investment risks (Study 1)

	Step 1	Step 2
Sense of power	9.42* (4.64)	9.91* (4.70)
Sex		-4.13 (4.94)
Age		0.03 (0.26)
Intercept	18.39 (15.48)	72.90 (515.18)
Observations	104	104
R^2	.04	.05

261 Note: The table presents the B values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded as 1
262 for female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

263

264 2.4 Summary of the results

265 Study 1 demonstrated that sense of power was positively related to financial risk-taking
266 propensity in both the investment and gambling domains. However, the demographic variables
267 were not predictive of outcomes in either domain when sense of power was controlled.

268 3 Study 2. The moderating role of power as a state in the relationship between sense of 269 power and risky financial decisions.

270 3.1 Study aim

271 Study 2 aimed to explore whether the relationship between participants' sense of power and
272 their propensity to take financial risks is moderated by situationally induced states of
273 power/lack of power.

274

275 3.2 Method

276 3.2.1 Participants

277 A total of 359 Polish working adults (200 female and 159 male; aged 20–65 years, $M = 38.95$
278 years, $SD = 11.03$) took part in the study. A sensitivity analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
279 Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that, given $\alpha = 0.05$ and an assumed power of 0.80, a sample
280 size of 359 participants would be sufficient to detect a small effect ($f^2 = 0.028$) in a regression
281 model with 3 predictor variables.³

282 3.2.2 Materials and procedure

283 **Sense of power** was measured as in Study 1 ($M = 3.29$, $SD = 0.62$; Cronbach's alpha = .845).

284

285 **Propensity to take financial risks**

286 **Propensity to take gambling risks** (the lottery task) was measured as in Study 1 ($M = 5.40$,
287 $SD = 2.70$); the procedure that determined participants' incentives was also identical. Mirroring
288 Study 1, participants with multiple switching points and who chose dominated options were
289 excluded from the analyses, but the whole dataset was also analyzed (see Supplementary
290 Materials part 2 for description of the analyses and related statistics). The results showed that
291 the inclusion of the participants with multiple switching points and who chose the dominated
292 option did not make a difference to the results.

293 **Propensity to take investment risks** (the investment portfolio task) was measured analogously
294 to Study 1 ($M = 39.36$, $SD = 24.08$).

295 **Power as a state: experimental manipulation.** States of having power or lacking power were
296 induced using scenarios prepared specifically for the study. States of having power were
297 induced by putting participants in a position that allowed them to evaluate and reward other
298 people's work. States of lacking power were induced by putting participants in the position of
299 being the subject of such an evaluation. The effectiveness of the experimental procedure was

³ To establish appropriate sample sizes, a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). This showed that, given $\alpha = .05$ and 0.80 power, a sample size of 318 participants for the study would be sufficient to detect small to medium effects ($f = 0.175$) in ANOVA. According to Cohen's (1988) guidelines, $f \geq 0.1$ and $f \geq 0.25$ represent small and medium effect sizes respectively. We assumed a value of $f = 0.175$ as this is the mid-point of the small to medium effect size range. As in Study 1, we took into account possible exclusions based on performance on the lottery task (Holt & Laury, 2002), but based on the results of Study 1, we increased the sample size by 10%. Finally, the required sample was 349. However, ultimately, we conducted regression analysis on the data from Study 2 because ANOVA requires a continuous independent variable to be divided into categories, resulting in a loss of resolution in data.

300 pretested in a separate pilot study – see Supplementary Materials part 3 for the procedure and
301 results of this study.

302 **State of having power.** At the beginning of the procedure, participants in the powerful
303 state group were informed that panelists belonging to the same research panel had been given
304 a creative task the previous week. The creative task involved participants writing three valid
305 sentences in which they had to use three provided words in such a way that it was difficult to
306 guess which word had been provided. Then, they were asked to evaluate the performance on
307 this task of another panelist (three sentences with three hidden words) and to decide whether to
308 award this panelist with extra points.

309 **State of lacking power.** Simultaneously, participants in the lack of power group were
310 informed that they would be asked to perform a creative task at the end of the study and that
311 another panelist would be asked to evaluate their performance and decide whether to reward
312 them. Participants were informed that the sentences would be used in future studies and that
313 their level of performance on the task would be rewarded with extra points exchangeable for
314 rewards from the pool of several hundred products offered by the platform running the panel.
315 Then the participants were presented with the same three sentences that participants from the
316 powerful group evaluated (ostensibly so that they could understand the task better). At the end
317 of the procedure, these participants were asked to write their own three sentences. The exact
318 wording of the experimental manipulation can be found in part 4 of the Supplementary
319 Materials.

320 **Procedure.** The study was conducted in two waves. In the first wave, participants completed
321 the Sense of Power Scale. The second wave occurred a few days later. Here, participants were
322 randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions (either a state of power or lack of
323 power) and subsequently subjected to the experimental manipulation. Participants then
324 completed the investment portfolio and lottery tasks in a rotated order. After this, participants
325 in the lack of power group were asked to perform the creative task. At the end of the data
326 collection phase of the study, all participants were informed about the outcome of the
327 incentivized lottery task and paid according to their performance.

328 3.3 *Results and discussion*

329 The research questions were tested using multiple regression analyses. The sense of power and
330 age variables were mean-centered, and the state of power and sex variables were dummy coded
331 (state of power: 1 – power condition, 0 – lack of power condition; sex: 1 – female, 0 – male).

332 Descriptive statistics for each variable and zero-order correlations between variables are
 333 presented in Table 4 and Table 5.

334

335 Table 4.

336 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's *r* correlations in total sample (Study 2)

	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations			
			2	3	4	5
1. Sense of power	3.28	0.62	.168**	.227**	.031	<.001
2. Propensity to take gambling risks	5.40	2.70		-.029	-.103	.024
3. Propensity to take investment risks	39.36%	24.08%			-.060	.062
4. Age	38.95	11.03				-.195**
5. Sex	M: 159 (44.3%) F: 200 (55.7%)					

337 **p*<.05, ***p* < .01, ****p*<.001

338 Table 5.

339 Descriptive statistics and Pearson's *r* correlations in experimental groups (Study 2)

	State of power group					State of lacking power group						
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations				<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Zero-order correlations			
			2	3	4	5			2	3	4	5
1. Sense of power	3.27	0.67	.292**	.344**	-.056	.011	3.29	0.57	-.002	.077	.144	-.014
2. Propensity to take gambling risks	5.78	2.87		-.098	-.196**	.070	5.00	2.46		.007	-.024	-.024
3. Propensity to take investment risks	43.22%	25.13%			-.082	.041	35.26%	22.26%			-.073	.098
4. Age	39.99	11.00				-.129	37.85	10.98				-.263**
5. Sex	M: 84 (45.4%) F: 101 (54.6%)						M: 75 (43.1%) F: 99 (56.9%)					

340 **p*<.05, ***p* < .01, ****p*<.001

341 3.3.1 *The moderating role of power as a state in the relationship between sense of power and*
342 *propensity to take gambling risks*

343 A total of 29 participants were excluded from the analyses due to multiple switching points and
344 having made dominated choices in the lottery task.

345 To analyze the moderating role of power as a state on the relationship between sense of
346 power and propensity to take gambling risks, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was
347 conducted, with sex and age controlled (see Table 6). In the first model, sense of power and
348 state of power variables were introduced as predictors. The obtained model was significant,
349 explained 6% of variance of propensity to take gambling risk, $F(2,327) = 11.052, p < .001$, and
350 showed positive significant roles of both sense of power and state of power. People with a
351 greater sense of power chose more risky options than those with less sense of power. Moreover,
352 people who experienced a state of power also chose more risky options than those who
353 experienced a lack of power. In the second model, all predictor variables, apart from a state of
354 power x sense of power interaction term, were introduced. In this model, positive roles of sense
355 of power and state of power remained significant, but the roles of the two demographic variables
356 were nonsignificant. Overall, the model with sense of power, state of power, sex, and age as
357 predictor variables was significant and explained 7% of variance of propensity to take gambling
358 risks, $F(4,325) = 5.813, p < .001$. In the third model, the sense of power x state of power
359 interaction term was introduced, $F(5,324) = 6.465, p < .001, F_{change}(1,324) = 8.532, p = .004$.
360 In this model, state of power remained significantly predictive, while a significant effect of
361 sense of power was not observed. Additionally, the interaction effect was significant: people
362 with a greater sense of power made more risky choices if they experienced a state of having
363 power, $\beta = 1.22, p < .001$, while there was no difference in the number of risky choices made
364 between people differing in their levels of sense of power when they experienced a lack of
365 power, $\beta = -0.01, p = .967$. Furthermore, the results revealed that participants' risk behavior
366 was significantly different between experimental groups for people with high, $t(354) = 4.00, p$
367 $< .001$, and medium, $t(354) = 2.87, p < .01$, levels of sense of power. However, the difference
368 between experimental groups among people with low levels of sense of power was statistically
369 nonsignificant, $t(354) = 0.02, p = .99^4$.

⁴ The level of sense of power was recoded into three groups based on the distribution of results. The division was made as follows: low level – people in the range below -1SD; medium level – people in the range between -1SD and +1SD; high level – people in the range above +1SD.

370 Similar results related to the role of sense of power and state of power were obtained for
371 the whole sample for which data were collected ($N = 359$). Three analogous models to those
372 conducted for the reduced sample were built. All the models were significant. In the first model,
373 sense of power and state of power had positive roles. In the second model, the significant
374 positive predictive roles of both power-related variables remained significant, age had a positive
375 role, and no significant role of sex was observed. Furthermore, in the third model, where the
376 sense of power by state of power interaction term was introduced, state of power and age
377 remained significantly predictive, and the interaction effect was also significant – see the part
378 2 of the Supplementary Materials for related statistics.

379

380

381 Table 6.

382 Predictors of propensity to take gambling risks (Study 2)

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Sense of power	0.74*** (0.20)	0.74*** (0.20)	0.01 (0.32)
State of power	0.78** (0.26)	0.81** (0.26)	0.80** (0.26)
Sex		0.12 (0.26)	0.12 (0.26)
Age		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Sense of power x State of power			1.21** (0.41)
Intercept	2.96 (0.70)	-18.62 (23.77)	-8.58 (23.77)
Observations	330	330	330
R^2	.06	.07	.09

383 Note: The table presents the B values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded as 1
384 for female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

385

386 3.3.2 *The moderating role of power as a state in the relationship between sense of power and* 387 *propensity to take investment risks*

388 In a further hierarchical regression analysis, propensity to take investment risks was regressed
389 on sense of power, state of power, age, sex, and a sense of power x state of power interaction
390 term (see Table 6). In Model 1, only sense of power and state of power were introduced as
391 predictors. The model was significant, $F(2,356) = 15.52$, $p < .001$, and the roles of both
392 predictors were significant. Participants who experienced a state of having power tended to
393 build more risky investment portfolios than those who experienced a state of lacking power.
394 Moreover, sense of power correlated positively with risky investment portfolio choices.

395 Model 2, which included sense of power, state of power, sex and age as predictors, was similar
396 to Model 1: significant positive main effects of sense of power and state of power were
397 observed. There were no significant main effects for any of the demographic variables. This
398 model explained 9% of the variance in portfolio riskiness, $F(4,354) = 8.74$, $p < .001$. After

399 introducing the interaction term in Model 3, sense of power remained significantly predictive,
400 and, while none of the single predictor variables were significantly predictive, the hypothesized
401 interaction between sense of power and state of power was observed. This regression model
402 was significant and explained 10% of the variance in portfolio riskiness, $F(5,353) = 8.17, p <$
403 $.001$. Among participants who experienced a state of power, sense of power was positively
404 associated with the creation of more risky portfolios, $\beta = 1273.31, p < .001$. In contrast, for
405 participants experiencing a lack of power, there was no relationship between sense of power
406 and riskiness of portfolios, $\beta = 341.38, p = .267$.

407 Moreover, the results revealed that participants' portfolio riskiness was significantly different
408 between state of power conditions for people with high – $M_{state\ of\ power} = 49.07, SD_{state\ of\ power} =$
409 $27.97, M_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 35.05, SD_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 18.25, t(354) = 4.00, p < .001$ – and
410 medium – $M_{state\ of\ power} = 41.73, SD_{state\ of\ power} = 20.20, M_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 37.30, SD_{state\ of\ lacking}$
411 $power = 23.88, t(354) = 2.87, p < .01$ – levels of sense of power. Among those participants,
412 individuals in a state of power made more risky decisions than those in a state of lack of power.
413 Furthermore, the difference between experimental groups among people with low levels of
414 sense of power was statistically nonsignificant, $M_{state\ of\ power} = 33.03, SD_{state\ of\ power} = 22.19, M_{state}$
415 $of\ lacking\ power} = 30.60, SD_{state\ of\ lacking\ power} = 18.25, t(354) = 0.02, p = .99$.⁵
416

⁵ The level of sense of power was recoded into three groups based on the distribution of results. The division was made as follows: low level – people in the range below –1SD; medium level – people in the range between –1SD and +1SD; high level – people in the range above +1SD.

417 Table 7.

418 Predictors of propensity to take investment risks (Study 2)

	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Sense of power	8.88*** (1.96)	8.97*** (1.96)	3.41 (3.07)
State of power	8.15*** (2.25)	8.56*** (2.45)	8.48*** (2.44)
Sex		2.45 (2.50)	2.52 (2.49)
Age		-0.16 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)
Sense of power x State of power			9.32* (3.98)
Intercept	6.04 (6.70)	4.14 (6.82)	-247.83 (225.56)
Observations	359	359	359
R^2	.08	.09	.10

419 Note: The table presents the *B* values with standard errors in parentheses. Sex was coded 1 for
420 female and 0 for male. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

421 3.4 Summary of the results

422 The results of Study 2 showed that a situationally induced state of power led to participants'
423 having a greater propensity to take investment and gambling risks. Moreover, the results
424 revealed that the role of sense of power depends on the state of power in both financial risk-
425 taking domains. Among people in a situation of power, there was a positive relationship
426 between sense of power and propensity to take investment and gambling risks. In contrast, for
427 people in situation in which someone else had power over them, there was no relationship
428 between sense of power and the propensity to take financial risks. Demographic variables were
429 not related to outcomes for either type of financial choice.

430 4 General discussion

431 These studies demonstrated that both sense of power and state of power/powerlessness
432 are significant predictors of risky financial decisions. When a state of power/powerlessness was

433 situationally induced, participants in high-power conditions took greater investment and
434 gambling risks than did those in low-power conditions. Moreover, the role of sense of power in
435 explaining risky financial decisions was significant and positive, apart from in conditions of
436 lack of power. The results of Study 1 demonstrated that sense of power is positively related to
437 personal risky financial choices in both investment and gambling tasks. These results make a
438 further contribution to existing theoretical and empirical research by showing that an elevated
439 sense of power affects personal risky choices in financial domains and offers a conceptual
440 replication of previous findings, showing that individuals with higher levels of power tend to
441 be riskier in their decisions than people with a lower sense of power.

442 The second study examined whether the link between sense of power and propensity to
443 take financial risks could be modified by situationally induced states of high
444 power/powerlessness. For people in the high-power condition, there was a positive relationship
445 between sense of power and propensity to take financial risks. In contrast, there was no such
446 relationship for people in the low-power condition. This suggests that when people find
447 themselves in a position of having little power, their sense of power does not influence their
448 decisions in the manner that has been demonstrated in previous studies. Such results correspond
449 well with the small but growing body of research indicating that a person's chronic traits can
450 interact with situationally activated corresponding states (Haws, Bearden, & Dholakia, 2012;
451 Jain, Desai, & Mao, 2007).

452 The results also indicated that participants with low levels of sense of power (trait) did
453 not differ in their willingness to take risks, regardless of the power condition. Accordingly,
454 having (or lacking) power did not impact participants' risk choices. Moreover, the results
455 revealed that people with medium and high levels of sense of power tended to make more risky
456 financial choices when they were in position of power compared to when they lacked power.
457 This result might be explained by the Active Self (Wheeler et al., 2007). This framework
458 distinguishes chronic self-concept, which refers to those characteristics of the self that reside in
459 one's long-term memory, from active self-concept, which concerns the self-concept
460 information that is currently accessible and used to guide behavior. The latter can shift in
461 response to external inputs, such as priming or decision context (Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay,
462 2010). According to the Active Self of Wheeler et al., assimilative behavioral change is
463 increased by individual features enhancing assimilative change in the active self-concept, and
464 is decreased by features that decrease assimilative change in the active self-concept. Moreover,
465 these prime-to-behavior effects are moderated by features that affect usage of the (changed)
466 self-concept in guiding behavior (Wheeler et al., 2007). Accordingly, it is plausible that the

467 observed effect of power manipulation on participants with medium and high levels of sense of
468 power resulted from the presence of trait power in their self-concept. Moreover, it is also
469 plausible that the lack of effect of the power manipulation on participants with low sense of
470 power resulted from the non-presence of trait power in their self-concept. Future research could
471 explore these possibilities.

472

473 *4.1 Limitations and strengths*

474 Despite our studies' interesting findings, there are some limitations. For example, investment
475 choices (unlike gambling choices) were based on participants' declarations of their intentions,
476 rather than observations of real-life behaviors. However, hypothetical scenarios are widely used
477 in research on the propensity to take risks (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and there is an
478 abundance of evidence that people's responses to hypothetical scenarios predict actual behavior
479 (Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 1999). That said, it is
480 worth emphasizing that the second dependent variable – choices in a lottery – was measured
481 using a non-deceptive, incentivized risk-taking task. The results for the two measures were
482 analogous, even though the correlation between them was low ($r = .178$, see Table 1). This
483 shows that similar effects might be demonstrated using hypothetical or self-reported measures
484 and behavioral ones (see also: Locey, Jones, & Rachlin, 2011). Secondly, it provides further
485 indication that risk appetite in the financial domain is, indeed, domain dependent and confirms
486 the need to use fine-grained measures to understand the complexities of financial choices.

487 The present studies have several theoretical implications. For example, the results
488 contribute to our understanding of risky financial decision making by identifying individual
489 differences that can induce participants' propensity to take financial risks. To the best of our
490 knowledge, the role of power (both chronic and situational) in the making of gambling and
491 personal investment choices has not been investigated previously. Notably, the present work is
492 also one of only a few attempts to explore the joint influence of sense of power and situationally
493 induced state of power, and our findings extend the vast literature on power by demonstrating
494 the interplay between these two conceptions of power.

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