



University of
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**Voice Fusion in Reporting the Ethiopian-Egyptian Conflict: A Combined Approach Using
Critical Discourse Analysis and Critical Stylistics**

A thesis submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Modern Languages in fulfilment of the
requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

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To my mum and dad

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Abstract

This research investigates the interplay between the reported voices in news articles reporting the Ethiopian-Egyptian conflict over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). It addresses a central research question: can the public hold the government accountable for their decisions at times of conflict? The hypothesis here is that the interplay between the reported voices which I call voice fusion (VF) affects the public's reception/perception of the officials' discourse and hence possibly their ability to hold them accountable. To investigate this question, I collected newspaper articles that report on the GERD conflict between 2010 and 2019 from Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper, an Egyptian national broadsheet that is published in English. I chose this stretch of time which covers the conflict from its beginning to examine the patterns and the effects of this voice fusion in the light of the different conflict events. Yet, for the purposes of this qualitative investigation, I focused on the news articles that cover one presidential era between 2012 and 2013. I also incorporated the Critical Stylistics approach into the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the correlation between the textual functions of the voice fusion patterns and their conceptual effects.

The research showed that VF occurs at the textual level due to two linguistic features, namely blending and prioritizing. **Blending** different speech modes in the long stretches of discourse was found to create ambiguity about the agency of some of the reported speech. Also, **prioritizing** different linguistic structures at the beginning and throughout the news articles was found to create ambiguity about the role of the reported voices (e.g., official, reporter or expert). The textual functions of both features were found to likely affect the reading experience. The ambiguity about the discourse agency in blending was found to increase the possibility of attributing the agency of some of the reported speech to certain voices yet with no linguistic proof that proves this agency which I call perceived agency. Similarly, the ambiguity about the voice role in prioritizing different information structures was found to increase the possibility of attributing the qualification of some of the reported voices to other voices yet again with no linguistic proof that proves this qualification, which I call perceived qualification. Both perceived agency and perceived qualification were found to result in perceived accountability based on which no voices can be held accountable for the information reported in these ambiguous instances.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Term
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CLS	Critical Language Study
CS	Critical Stylistics
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
MCD	Mediated Conflict Discourse
SP	Speech Presentation
TCFs	Textual-Conceptual Functions
VF	Voice Fusion

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1 Introduction

Ever since the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the Egyptian people have been troubled by many socio-political challenges on different levels. Starting from holding presidential elections, and improving the country's economic situation, continuing with water scarcity issues and the ongoing conflict with Ethiopia over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Nile River – which represents the lifeline to Egypt. Since the beginning of the conflict, various national broadsheets and media outlets have accused Ethiopia of taking advantage of the political disturbances in Egypt during the revolution to announce the beginning of the GERD construction in April 2011. The construction of the dam has been reported by many experts to have had detrimental effects on Egypt's share of the Nile water.

In 2015, the two countries along with Sudan signed an agreement of principles on the Nile River and the construction of the GERD in Ethiopia, which was hailed in the Egyptian press/media as a resolution that would put an end to what was then a 5-year-old conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt. However, the conflict did not seem to end even after signing the agreement, which raised many questions in my mind personally, e.g., was this agreement an effective resolution to this ongoing conflict or was it only hailed as such but in fact, it was not? Can the public tell the difference if this was or was not the case? The other important question that naturally followed was, what if it was not the resolution, can the public judge their governments for their management of the conflict and can they hold them accountable for their decisions?

1.1 Statement of the problem

To find answers to these questions, I initially decided to look at the discourse of the officials/ decision-makers from both countries to identify the linguistic strategies they use when approaching the conflict and how they present the resolutions they offer. I use the term 'linguistic strategy' here to refer to the most salient linguistic patterns that characterize a certain discourse. I do not use the term 'strategy' here to imply the intentionality or the deliberate planning of using these patterns. Rather, it refers to the common linguistic patterns that ordinary readers can identify at the textual level and therefore look out for in their future engagement with this discourse. My aim was to equip the public with specialists' tools and knowledge that are accessible to them to use in their future interactions with this discourse.

My main objective at the beginning was to identify the linguistic strategies used in the officials' discourse before and after the signed agreement to trace any changes in their arguments/suggested resolutions. The aim was to compare the effects/functions of these strategies on the development of the conflict over the years using the *discourse tracing* approach, which is a methodological tool used to examine processes that transform over time, such as “a change of purpose within a group or organization; the succession of a leader; the effects of a new piece of legislation or policy; differences brought on by militaristic action; relationships as they move through turning points” (LeGreco & Tracy, 2009, p. 1517). Thus, this method seemed convenient since the conflict under investigation is a prolonged one and multiple presidential eras run through it.

I encountered two challenges to this original plan; the first is related to the approach, as I realized that even though this approach may have enabled me to trace changes in the arguments/suggested resolutions in their discourse over the years, it would not have been the most suitable approach to answer the question of whether the public can tell the difference. Because a comparative analysis of data that covers a long duration of time is not something that the ordinary reader would be able to replicate or implement in their regular everyday engagement with this discourse. Thus, the results of my analysis would have not achieved my aim to equip the public with specialists' tools and knowledge that are accessible to them to use in their experience interacting with this discourse.

The other challenge is related to data collection, as it was difficult to obtain the officials' reports (i.e., the discourse of the officials reporting about the conflict) separate from media news reports (i.e., the discourse of the media representatives reporting on the conflict). Typically, officials' reports – either written or video streamed – were observed during my data collection to be found as part of the news reports about the conflict. As a result, most of the direct instances of officials' discourse were usually observed to be reproduced through media outlets (e.g., public statements, political speeches, interviews with concerned officials, etc.). Consequently, media reports in turn usually include segments of the official reporting reported on behalf of the officials as part of the content they deliver to the public.

As a result, the discourse of both entities was observed to be reported in and co-occur within the same medium of communication, which poses a challenge – not only for me as a researcher but also for the public – to be able to distinguish the officials' discourse from the discourse of other entities. Thus, I realized that in order to investigate the public's ability to judge their government's

management of the conflict and hold them accountable for what they report, I need to see what they see. Therefore, I decided to examine the officials' discourse in the medium of its occurrence and where it is usually reported and that is the news reports about this conflict. This is to investigate the language of conflict as presented to the public, with all its complexity and interrelatedness, where the discourse is not separated from its context. As Fairclough puts it "discourse analysis cannot simply focus upon the texts and talk of mediatized politics; it needs also to analyse the practices of political discourse both on the side of production, and on the side of reception/consumption" (Fairclough, 1998, pp. 150-51).

Reviewing the existing literature on the language of conflict, I found two main streams; one stream investigates the officials' discourse and media discourse separately with a clear dichotomy between the two (e.g., Taiwo and Igwebuikwe, 2015; Khosravini, 2009; Abeer, 2017; Amer, 2017). The other stream investigates the interplay between both discourses; mainly how the discourse of media can be exploited by states or governments to spread their ideologies (e.g., Fetzer and Lauerbach, 2007; Bazzi, 2009; Van Nimmen, 2018). This dichotomy between both discourses in the first stream renders a gap in this body of literature, where the patterns of the interplay between both discourses as well as its consequences are not fully investigated.

Even though this gap is partially addressed by the latter stream of research that investigates this interplay, it investigates matters of a slightly different focus to mine. It is concerned with exploring the power relations behind this interplay, specifically the hegemony of the agents of one discourse over the other. Or else, it is concerned with revealing the ideological effects of such hegemony on forming the public's opinions. In this, they examine the effect of the content of this discourse. However, my research focuses on investigating the consequences of this interplay on the public's reception of the officials' discourse. In this, I examine how the co-text and context in which this discourse is delivered affect the way the public perceives and hence consumes its content.

1.2 Aims and research questions

To investigate this discourse interplay, I examine the speech of the different reported voices in conflict news reports to identify the patterns of this interplay and the possible effects of these patterns on the public's ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions. To do so, I address and aim to answer the following questions:

1. What are the patterns of this discourse interplay in conflict news reports?
2. How do these patterns function textually and in the context of the conflict?
3. How does this interplay affect government and public power relations?

Given that the social problem under investigation in this research has to do with the effect of discourse on the distribution/maintenance of relations of power, I decided to use Fairclough's approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (1989). Thus, to investigate and identify the patterns of this discourse interplay, I decided to examine speech presentation in the textual analysis at the description stage of his model. Using Leech & Short's model (2007), I examined the modes of *speech presentation* to identify the common patterns of speech modes in which the speech of different voices in conflict reporting are presented to the public. However, during the initial phase of dataset annotation, I noticed a lack of clarity about the agency of some of the speech that is reported in the news reports, which made the annotation of many instances quite challenging.

For example, there were instances where I encountered difficulty in distinguishing what is said by which reported voice, either between the reporter and the reported voices or sometimes amongst the reported voices themselves. I decided to use the term Voice Fusion (VF) to refer to these instances where there is a lack of clarity about the discourse agency that results in difficulty to distinguish what is said by which voice of the different voices that are present in the news reports. By 'discourse agency' here I mean the attribution of agency of the speech that is reported to certain voices, and consequently, the information that is conveyed in their speech, where discourse agent is used here in this research to refer to the individual to whom we attribute the speech reported.

This observation led me to narrow down the focus of my research questions to focus specifically on this VF as one viable pattern of how the different voices in conflict news reports may interplay. Consequently, I adjusted the research questions to be:

1. What are the patterns of voice fusion in reporting conflict news?
2. How do these patterns function textually and in the context of the conflict?
3. How does this voice fusion affect power relations between governments and the public?

This modification in my research questions did not affect my choice of the theoretical framework for this research study, however, it opened space for bringing in other approaches in combination with CDA. In addition, it helped me to suggest some adaptations to the regular and common

implementations of some of the existing linguistic approaches, as will be explained in the following section.

1.3 Theory and methods

As a first step to investigate this discourse, I needed to identify a term that refers to the language that my research is set to investigate. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, there has not been an agreed-upon term to refer to the language used in reporting conflicts among the varied scholarly attempts that investigate it. Most likely, this is due to the clear dichotomy I found in the body of literature that has mostly investigated the discourse of the media and the discourse of the officials separately. I consider the absence of a unified term/definition for the language under investigation here, where both discourses interplay, to be reflective of the lack of clarity about the discourse agency where the borderlines between the speech of the different co-existing voices in news reporting are vague and blurred. I also consider the absence of such a unified definition to be reflective of the potential consequential challenge that the audience themselves may consume this discourse without much questioning to the agency of this discourse. This is the challenge that this research aims to address and highlight the significance of its investigation.

Therefore, in the coming subsections, I begin with a discussion of the need for a term to refer to the language used in reporting conflicts and its importance for the purposes of this research in section 1.3.1. Then, in section 1.3.2, I identify the theoretical framework that would enable me to investigate this discourse and account for its socio-political dimensions. I also identify the need to combine this framework with another comprehensive framework for textual analysis to answer my research questions. In section 1.3.3, I review the toolbox of this textual analysis framework and underline the tools I find the most suitable for the purposes of my research. Finally, in section 1.3.4, I outline the combined approach that I utilize in this research and review how I plan to address and answer the research question under the different stages of this approach.

1.3.1 The constitution of a new term:

I identified a need for a neutral term that would describe the language that this research is set to investigate without a pre-identified definition of agency embedded in the term (e.g., media discourse, official discourse, etc.). So, I chose a term that describes the medium through which the public usually receives the information about the conflict, in the meantime, inclusive of the

multiple intermediate voices that this medium presents and represents. I use the term Mediated Conflict Discourse (MCD) to refer to this type of discourse where the speech of the different voices, actors, and conflict stakeholders co-exist. The word ‘mediated’ here is used to refer to the mode in which the discourse of these voices is conveyed to the public. Thus, MCD comprises the presentation and representation of the narrative as well as the speech of several discourse agents; making reported speech the most salient linguistic characteristic that distinguishes this discourse.

This distinguishing characteristic of MCD was observed throughout this research to be a distinguishing characteristic of the process of knowledge sharing in reporting news. This is due to the nature of MCD being available to the public in the form of second-hand information. Therefore, in my examination of reported speech as the main characteristic of MCD, I aim to highlight its importance in understanding the nature of the process of knowledge sharing in reporting conflicts. In this case, the analysis of reported speech will not focus on the content of the speech reported, but rather on how the speech of the different voices is reported since the issue in question here is how far is the public aware of the boundaries of the speech of the agents of each discourse. This specific focus on the effects of the co-existence of these different discourses rather than investigating each discourse separately is what distinguishes this research study from the previous body of research. Because it puts focus on the effect of the presentation and representation of different discourses coming together rather than the effect of either separately.

1.3.2 The theoretical framework:

To investigate MCD and account for its socio-political dimensions as it pertains to the public’s ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions at times of conflict, I adopt a critical approach to discourse analysis. Precisely, I utilize Fairclough’s three-stage model of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), with a solid linguistic foundation. By ‘linguistic’ here I mean that I account for a number of the linguistic elements such as “the detailed structures, strategies, and functions of text and talk, including grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narrative or similar forms of verbal and paraverbal organization of communicative events” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 97).

To guarantee this solid linguistic foundation, I needed to identify a systematic textual analysis for the first stage of Fairclough’s three-stage model of CDA, i.e., the description stage where textual analysis takes place. This is to ensure the rigour of my linguistic analysis as well as to avoid the

prevailing criticism of the lack of systematicity in some CDA studies. In addition to that, I needed to account for the link between these textual features and the effect of VF (i.e., the lack of clarity about discourse agency, which causes difficulty to distinguish what is said by the different voices that are present in the news reports) in my analysis of the patterns of VF in MCD. Hence, I identified a need for a more comprehensive framework for textual analysis that would account for both the textual features as well as their possible conceptual functions.

1.3.3 A Textual-Conceptual toolbox:

Since VF that I wish to investigate is at its core a conceptual effect, I identified the need to bring Jeffries' *critical stylistics* model (2010) to this systematic linguistic framework I'm setting for my research. Jeffries' model offers a methodological approach that aims to "provide an explanation (...) of the cognitive processes which may result in readers being affected by a text's ideological structure" (Jeffries, 2010, p. 2), by offering some specific tools of analysis to get a sense of how this effect comes about. I find this model to work very well in combination with CDA similar to Van Dijk's *discourse-cognition-society triangle*, which is an approach to CDA that addresses the socio-cognitive interface of discourse analysis while maintaining "a solid 'linguistic' basis, where 'linguistic' is understood in a broad 'structural-functional' sense" (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 97).

It is worth noting here that in my utilisation of Jeffries' model I do not use the word conceptual to refer to the conceptual effect of the content that is presented to the public. Rather, I use it to refer to the conceptual effect/function of the linguistic structures and their possible consequences on the public's reception/consumption of the discourse. I found in the list of the textual-conceptual tools that Jeffries offers a good theoretical foundation to carry out this type of investigation as it assembles "the main general functions that a text has in representing reality" while providing "some means of accessing this representational practice through the linguistic features" (Jeffries, 2010, p. 14). Jeffries refers to these functions as 'textual-conceptual functions' (TCFs) or sometimes simply the 'conceptual tools', which at their core seem to answer the question of what any text is 'doing'.

Applying this model to my research, the TCF of 'presenting the speech and thoughts of other participants' seemed the most relevant to be used to investigate the conceptual function of VF and to answer my research questions. The model that Jeffries use to investigate this TCF is Short, 1996, which is the same model I decided to use from the very beginning and based on which I identified

this lack of clarity. This poses a practical question here, what is the point of using Jeffries' model in the first place?

The list of tools/functions that Jeffries offers in her model “do not equate in a one-to-one fashion with any particular lexical or grammatical feature” which accordingly does away with the regular *form-function mapping* (Jeffries, 2010, pp. 15-16). In doing so, Jeffries proposes prioritizing investigating the function that the text is doing rather than focusing on certain linguistic tool per se, since these tools may function differently based on the context or else the different linguistic features may realize the same function/textual effect. I found this proposition very useful in my investigation of speech presentation as a linguistic tool, as by focusing on how this tool functions as far as my research question is concerned, I was able to identify my own example that illustrates the lack of form-function mapping in reported speech in English.

Previous researchers have, for the most part, investigated speech presentation using Leech & Short's model (2007) which focuses on matters of *faithful* reporting in reported speech. However, for the purposes of my research, I found the need to focus on matters of discourse agency in my investigation of the same linguistic tool of speech presentation. Consequently, I re-envisioned Leech & Short's model in the light of my research focus to enable me to answer my research questions. I believe that the proposed adaptation of this existing model that I present in my research is inspired by Jeffries' proposition to prioritize looking at the function of what the text is doing. In this, I find Jeffries' model quite liberating; it helped me to approach “the linguistic features that are already well-described in very many semantico-grammatical theories and models” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 14) in a critical way. I provide more details on the usefulness of this model and how it differs from what Fairclough's model offers in the description stage in section 3.4.

In my focus on investigating the function of speech presentation in the context of MCD, I observed that some of the VF instances happen due to the effect of how the reported voices are presented, precisely when the description of the reported voice is deferred. Therefore, the other TCF that seemed relevant to the examination of reported speech in my research, based on the research question I aim to address, is ‘prioritizing’. Prioritizing is usually investigated by considering transformation and subordination as the main parts of this tool of analysis. However, when it comes to information structure as a tool that can help us identify prioritizing in texts, it has been, for the most part, examined through building upon our existing knowledge of the information structure of

the English clause. However, for the purposes of my research, I propose looking at structures larger than the sentence to include the level of complete texts, such as the structures of news reports.

The argument that I would like to put forward here by proposing the examination of such structures at the level of complete texts is as follows: if we agree that the identification of the linguistic possibilities for prioritizing some information over others happens when we compare our existing knowledge of these information structures to the information structures that are used in the discourse under investigation, then we may agree that this rule does not only apply to the structure of the English clause but it can also apply to other information structures that the readers are familiar with. Drawing a parallel between the two cases, I would argue that whilst the information structure of the English clause “generally puts new and important information into the final position in a clause so that the reader/hearer has a sense of where to look for the salient information when reading/ listening.” (Jeffries, 2010, p, 77), our general knowledge of the information structure of news reports is that it generally puts the information of the reported voice and their qualification next to the reported voices when they are quoted for the first time.

Therefore, in my investigation of prioritizing, I look specifically at the prioritization of information that has to do with the definition of the roles of the voices that are reported in the news reports, to investigate the conceptual effects of this prioritization. Precisely, how prioritization or sometimes the lack of it affects the reader’s clarity about the qualification of the reported voices as well as their clarity – throughout the reading experience – on the role of reported voices to whom the agency of the speech presented is attributed. Since this research is concerned with the public’s ability to hold their government accountable for their management of conflicts, it is crucial to explore their ability to distinguish in what capacity each voice is saying what they are reported to have said, in addition to their clarity about the agency of the speech reported.

1.3.4 The combined approach:

Here, I will summarize what has been discussed so far and explain what this combined approach with all the proposed adaptations will look like. The question that I aim to answer in my research is “Can the public judge their governments for their management of the conflict and can they hold them accountable for their decisions?”. The hypothesis is that given the nature of how the officials’ discourse about conflicts is usually found and delivered in combination with other discourses, this

interplay of discourses might affect the audience's clarity about what the officials are saying. Whilst some aspects of this discourse interplay have been addressed by other researchers, the effect of this interplay on the audience's clarity about discourse agency and the consequences of this interplay on the public's ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions remains an area that deserves further investigation.

Therefore, in my research, I investigate the mediated conflict discourse (i.e., the discourse where multiple discourse agents co-exist) to answer my research question. I explore specifically the conceptual effect of voice fusion (i.e., the lack of clarity about the discourse agency in the speech reported in the conflict news reports) to identify its textual patterns, its functions textually and in the context of the conflict, as well as its effects on the power relations between the governments and the public (i.e., their ability to hold them accountable). I use Critical Discourse Analysis as the main theoretical framework to conduct this analysis, specifically Fairclough's three-stage model of CDA in combination with Jeffries' model of Critical Stylistics (CS). Below I explain how the analysis based on both models will look in my research.

Description stage:

This stage aims to identify the patterns of this VF in the conflict news reports and the linguistic features that create these patterns. I look at how the **speech** and **attribution** of the different voices in conflict reporting are presented to the public. Firstly, I examine the modes of *speech presentation* as categorized by Leech & Short (2007) to identify the common patterns in which the speech of different discourse agents is presented. Secondly, I examine the syntactic possibilities of *prioritizing* information structures to identify the common patterns in which the attributions of the reported voices are presented.

Interpretation stage:

This stage aims to examine how these linguistic patterns (related to agency and qualification) create the conceptual effect of VF. Specifically, I examine how the speech presentation modes affect the readers' clarity about discourse agency, and how prioritizing information structures could affect their clarity about the qualification of the reported voices. Thus, I examine how the speech presentation modes in their different patterns of occurrence affect the clarity of discourse agency and therefore how this translates into a potential difficulty in identifying which of the speech presented belongs to which discourse agent. Similarly, I investigate how the patterns of

prioritizing information structures affect the clarity about the qualification of the reported voices and therefore how this translates into a potential difficulty to identify the role of the voice whose speech is presented as well as their qualification to make such statements.

Explanation stage:

This stage aims to highlight the possible consequences of this VF in the socio-political context of conflicts, specifically, how it affects the power relations between the governments and the public (i.e., their ability to hold them accountable). Therefore, the analysis I implement to answer questions 1 and 2 allows me to draw conclusions related to question 3. I aim to do so by revealing the effects of the linguistic patterns of this VF and its textual functions on the flow of the information presented to the public in conflict news, and therefore its effects on their reception and consumption of this mediated conflict discourse.

To do so, I bring together Jeffries' critical stylistics model and Fairclough's approach to Critical Discourse Analysis (1989). I use Jeffries' "specific tools of analysis to get a clear sense of how texts may influence the ideological outlook of their recipients" (2010, p. 6) against which I base my analysis that falls under Fairclough's explanation stage. It is in this stage that the different interpretations of the textual elements and their functions are placed within "the socio-political contexts in which texts are produced and read or the context in which language choices are made" (ibid). Hence, this stage bridges the gap between the linguistic and the political for the layperson.

The significance and the value that my research aims to add by the findings that would result from this type of analysis is to encourage the public to consider how this VF is not merely a linguistic feature but rather a phenomenon that is specific to a context that touches their everyday lives. It aims to help them understand the reason why they should care about the linguistic knowledge that my research would present. It also aims to help them interact more critically with reported news by asking more questions such as: what terms are presented as resolutions? And which voices are presenting them? Do these differ across the different presidential systems? Which of these terms are attributed to positive/negative descriptions? And why? What factors affect their acceptance/rejection of the suggested resolutions?

1.4 Data collection

As mentioned above, to fulfil the objective of investigating the language of conflict as presented to the public, I decided to look at the news reports that report the news of this conflict. One concern I had was the choice of newspapers as a genre for my dataset. Even though newspapers might be considered an outdated source of information in the present-day world, it remains one stream of how information is shared with the public, especially, with many of these newspapers becoming available online as the case with the newspaper that I chose for my research. Moreover, newspapers reflect the common practice that any other digital news outlets have; the discourse interplay in the speech presentation of different voices in the same place, which is the core focus of my research inquiry. Therefore, investigating this discourse interplay in newspaper articles remains relevant for my research study.

The original data collected for this research consists of newspaper articles from Al-Ahram Weekly, which is an Egyptian national broadsheet that is published weekly in the English language. The articles are collected from the decade between 2010 and 2019, which is the period that covers the conflict from its beginning up until the most recent point when I started this research. The main aim of covering this period was to investigate the linguistic strategies used by the officials/ decision-makers and the resolutions they offer to compare them across different presidential terms, as this decade covers the last year of President Mubarak's term, the interim government of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, as well as two successive presidential terms of President Morsi in 2012 – who spent only a year in the presidency – and President Al Sisi who took office in 2014 and still in presidency till the present day.

Yet, since I had decided to focus on examining the officials' discourse in the medium of its occurrence and as presented to the public, instead of comparing their arguments/suggested resolutions before and after the signed agreement, I found no urgent need for investigating such a sheer amount of data. Rather, I decided to focus on newspaper articles that cover only one presidential term. This focus helps to make it viable to present the different interpretations and functions of the text within its socio-political context and for the reader to relate to this context. Therefore, I had to choose one presidential era from the above-mentioned ones with the size of the dataset as one important consideration in mind, among other considerations (see discussion in chapter 4, Methods). Hence, I chose to focus my analysis on the newspaper articles that cover the

presidential term of President Morsi, which comprises a total of 24 articles. I found this small-sized dataset suitable for the qualitative analysis needed to answer my research questions.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

In Chapter 2, ‘Literature Review’, I provide an overview of research into the language of conflict and conflict resolution. I draw on the various lines of research in the field of linguistics that investigate the language used in conflict situations and indicate which line of research my research follows. I outline their focus, investigations, conclusions and sometimes the data they analyse, to indicate the gap this research aims to fill in the reviewed body of literature. Then, I elaborate on how I wish to develop this research line and indicate the significance of my research within this line of research. Also, I consult the findings of the studies from the Media discipline to demonstrate how the linguistic body of research interrelates with these studies. I highlight where I position my research concerning the shared social problem that is tackled in both disciplines to finally indicate how my research contributes to addressing this social problem.

In Chapter 3, ‘Theoretical Framework’, I provide an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis as the theoretical framework of analysis for my research with particular reference to the approach I adopt in this thesis, namely, Fairclough’s three-stage model of CDA (1989). I underline the reasons behind the need for a combined approach to address my research question and explain the reasons behind choosing the model of Critical Stylistics in particular. I also explain the benefits of the Critical Stylistics model to my thesis as well as in general by underlining the difference between what Jeffries offers in her model and what Fairclough offers in the textual analysis stage. I highlight how this difference helps alleviate the criticism that CDA received regarding the need for a rigorous approach to the textual analysis in the description stage.

In Chapter 4, ‘Methods’, I outline the methods for data collection, focusing on the process of sourcing and collecting the data. I detail the search terms used and the rationale behind choosing a subsection of the data collected to be the focus of my analysis. I also lay out the various stages of the dataset annotation, with details on the steps followed to annotate the dataset according to the two textual-conceptual functions outlined in chapter three. Then, I present a description of the units of analysis I used when examining the two textual functions I will be investigating in this research. Under each subsection of the dataset annotation, I outline the model I used in annotating the dataset and discuss the practical challenges that were encountered during the annotation

process. I also introduce suggested adaptations to these models to accommodate the focus of my study and the purposes of my analysis.

In Chapter 5, the first analysis chapter, ‘Who says?’, I investigate discourse agency in Mediated Conflict Discourse. Specifically, I examine the audience’s clarity about the agency of the speech reported in the news reports. I analyse the instances where there is a lack of clarity about the agency to identify the textual features that create this lack of clarity. Then, I categorize these instances into patterns based on the speech presentation modes that create the VF effect. I propose a new classification of the speech presentation modes on a cline of agency based on the clarity of the discourse agency instead of the degree of faithfulness in reporting. I also underline how this effect of VF – created by this lack of clarity about the agency of the speech reported – facilitates the uptake of different opinions by the audience without questioning the agency of their contributors and therefore results in a lack of accountability.

In Chapter 6, the second analysis chapter, ‘Says who?’, I investigate the role of the reported voices in Mediated Conflict Discourse. Specifically, I examine the audience’s clarity about the role/qualification of the voices whose speech is reported. I analyze the instances of voice attributions to investigate their degree of clarity about the role or the qualification of the reported voices. I identify the textual features of prioritizing that create this lack of clarity, and I categorize these instances into patterns based on the clarity of the attributions of the voices. I propose a cline for these levels of clarity based on the possibility for the statements of these voices to be contested. I also underline how this effect of VF – created by this lack of clarity about the role of the reported voices – facilitates the uptake of different opinions by the audience without questioning the qualification of their contributors and therefore results in a lack of accountability.

In Chapter 7, ‘Conclusion’, I conclude the investigation of this research study. I summarise the key research findings in relation to my research aims and questions. I discuss the contribution of my research and its practical implications and value both in the field of linguistics as well as for the public. I also review the limitations of the study in relation to the size and type of the dataset. I detail the caveats of my research and propose opportunities for future research that would help complement and consolidate the research that is conducted here. Finally, I summarise the findings of my analysis chapters in a diagram that demonstrates the connection between discourse agency and voice role in the investigation of the question of accountability in MCD. I conclude the chapter

with a final diagram that outlines for the lay readers the critical questions they should ask when engaging with reported news to avoid this voice fusion.

1.6 Summary

In this chapter, I stated the point of departure for exploring the co-existence of different discourses in the language used in reporting conflicts, which I call MCD. I also indicated the reasons that motivated me to carry out this research and prompted the aim to equip the public with accessible tools and knowledge to utilize when they interact with this discourse. I outlined the key differences that distinguish this research from the existing literature on the language of conflict. Namely, I delineated my focus on the effects of the co-existence of these different discourses rather than investigating each discourse separately, as well as my focus on investigating the consequences of the interplay between these discourses on the public's reception of the language used in reporting conflicts.

I outlined the theoretical frameworks I combine in this research to examine the linguistic structures of VF in the context of its occurrence in MCD to investigate their possible effect on the public's perception of the discourse. I explained that whilst some aspects of this discourse interplay have been addressed by other researchers, the effect of this interplay on the audience's clarity about discourse agency and the consequences of this interplay on the public's ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions remains an area that deserves further investigation. In the next chapter, I will review the existing literature on the language of conflict to provide the general context for the discourse under investigation in this research, where I highlight the gap that I aim to address in detail.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

As with all worrying social and global issues, conflict and its intricacies have become the focus of a range of studies in different disciplines. Since no single discipline has the privilege to exclusively investigate a specific phenomenon, scholars often compete to employ the tools and frameworks of their disciplines to demonstrate the significance of the results of their investigations. Hence, in this scholarly competition, what comes as a best practice is not to override what has been established as valid in other disciplines but to utilize it to help us take the argument a step further within our own disciplines. Thus, in this literature review, while I review the research on the language of conflict in the field of linguistics, I also consult the findings of the studies conducted in the Media discipline on the language of conflict in the news. This is to demonstrate how they interrelate and to highlight how my research builds on the recent arguments from both disciplines in tackling the research problem under investigation here.

In this chapter, I review first the body of literature in the field of linguistics. So, in section 2.2, I introduce three working definitions of language and conflict that correspond with the three aspects of inquiry observed in the existing body of literature. Then, in section 2.3, I categorize the linguistic research on language and conflict into the three aspects of inquiry, where I group the previous studies under their respective aspect based on the focus of their investigation. In section 2.4, I devise my own working definition for the discourse under investigation here based on the scope of my research, highlighting the importance of a unified/neutral term for this type of discourse. Finally, I review some of the recent research from the media discipline in section 2.5, where I also position this research in relation to both disciplines before I summarize the chapter in 2.6.

2.2 Language and Conflict: Working definitions

It is important to highlight at the outset the definitions of the two terms ‘language’ and ‘conflict’ that are relevant to the scope of my research as well as to the literature I review here. So, the two logical questions I introduce here: when we say ‘language’, what language are we talking about? And when we say ‘conflict’, how do we define it? Answering these questions would help me to chart and group the different studies from the literature I review based on their respective focus of inquiry. Since conflict is the main social/global worry that drives us to investigate the different

aspects that are involved in its occurrence, I will start with a definition of ‘conflict’ and then follow up with a definition of what aspect of language is under investigation.

For the purposes of my research, I specifically adopt Wallensteen’s definition of conflict as it provides a precise description that applies to the conflict under investigation in my study. They define ‘conflict’ as a “severe disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time” (Wallensteen, 2007, p. 14 as cited in Meyer et al., 2017, p. 4). I would also add to this Meyer et al.’s (2017) suggested supplement to this definition, i.e., conflict in this sense “does not necessarily need violent action to be observable, but can be latent, with no or few attempts to resolve the underlying issue” (p. 4). As for the body of literature that I review here, a “*catch-all*” definition of ‘conflict’ as presented by Jeffries and O’Driscoll in (Evans et al., 2019) would suffice since this body of literature addresses different types of conflicts. They define ‘conflict’ as “any situation or behaviour involving parties (individuals or groups) who are, or consider themselves to be, instrumentally, intellectually and/or emotionally opposed or simply feel antagonistic to each other.” (p. 2).

In my definition of ‘language’ here, I aim to provide three working definitions of language that correspond to the three aspects of inquiry that the researchers in the linguistics field investigate. These definitions reflect the main broad aspects I observed in the existing body of literature that investigates language and conflict. The terms I use to correspond to these aspects of the inquiry are: ‘language in conflict’, ‘language of conflict’, and ‘language about conflict’. In the coming subsections, I outline what aspect of language is investigated under each aspect of inquiry.

2.2.1 Language in Conflict

I use the term ‘**Language in conflict**’ to refer to the body of research that investigates ‘what does the language do in the context of conflict?’. By context here I mean the context of its occurrence. So, if we refer to the conflict as the ‘interaction’, the language we are looking at is the language used in this interaction as it unfolds. In other words, it pertains to the language through which the conflict is conducted, and how conflicts are acted out via language. In this line of research, the focus is generally on the role of language and its effects on the dynamics of the conflict. I refer to this aspect of inquiry as the ‘*interactional*’ aspect, which usually examines the linguistic and interactional features of language to highlight the importance of this linguistic knowledge of the features in future engagement with conflicts.

2.2.2 Language of Conflict

‘**Language of conflict**’ is the term I use to refer to the body of research that examines ‘what do conflict stakeholders do with language, and what is the function of this language in conflict situations?’. By ‘conflict situation’ here I mean the ‘macro’ context of the conflict, not necessarily the context of its immediate occurrence. Rather, over a span of time, which covers a breadth of possibilities, covering a certain conflict event, era, or stage of the conflict. By ‘stakeholders’ here I mean those enacting the conflict by being actively engaged. Thus, the main thrust of this body of research is to investigate the language used by the conflict stakeholders in their management of this conflict. In this line of research, the main focus is on the linguistic aspects of dealing with conflict, as one way of the myriad ways in which conflict management can be investigated. I refer to this aspect of inquiry as the ‘*political*’ aspect, which usually examines the linguistic features of the language to demonstrate the ideological effects of this use within the wider context of the conflict.

2.2.3 Language about Conflict

Lastly, I use the term ‘**Language about conflict**’ to refer to the body of research that investigates ‘what do the linguistic representations of the conflict or conflict stakeholders do in the context of conflict?’. By ‘representations’ here I mean the information about the conflict as relayed to the public via the different media outlets or broadsheets. In this case, the main thrust of this body of research is to investigate the language used by media or newspaper representatives in their coverage of the conflict and the politics behind these representations. In this line of research, the focus is on the role these institutions actively play (as channels of information) – as well as the role of those who might be engaged behind the scenes – in affecting public opinion and their orientations toward the conflict as well as its stakeholders. I refer to this aspect of inquiry as the ‘*representational*’ aspect, which usually examines the linguistic features of these representations to demonstrate their ideological effects on the general public – nationally or internationally – within the wider context of the conflict.

Although these three definitions that I devised to describe the general aspects of the inquiry, which came out from scoping the field that investigates language and conflict may seem easily distinguishable, the defining lines that separate these aspects are sometimes blurry. Thus, in my review of the body of literature in the coming sections, while I review and group the studies under

their respective aspects, I highlight where the blurry lines exist under each of the three charted aspects of the inquiry.

2.3 Language and Conflict: Aspects of the inquiry

In the following sections, I draw on the three key lines of research in the linguistics discipline that investigate language and conflict corresponding to the three abovementioned working definitions of ‘language’. I outline the focus of the research conducted under each aspect, delve into their investigations, conclusions and sometimes the data they analyse, to pinpoint how their foci render a gap in the investigation of the social problem that my research is investigating. Then, I specify the line of research that my research follows and elaborate on how I wish to develop this line of research. I also highlight the significance of what my research offers within this line of research in 2.4 before I discuss its significance more broadly across the different disciplines in 2.5.

2.3.1 The Interactional Aspect

The interactional aspect is one of the main areas of investigation of the language used in conflict situations. The focus of these studies is to investigate how the communications among conflict stakeholders affect conflict dynamics. As such, the review of the studies conducted under this aspect includes the studies that examine the language used in the communications among conflict parties or stakeholders in the original conflict event. Leung (2002) calls the in-situation language ‘*conflict talk*’ and she defines it as “a situated activity, interactionally accomplished by the participants” which she investigates “to understand or describe the process of conflict talk as it unfolds, from its initiation to its termination” (p. 3). Based on the classification of this definition, she looks at data that includes practices that are “functionally specific, e.g., schools, mediation sessions, small claim courts” (p. 4).

The focus of the linguistic investigation in Leung’s research, and in similar research, is the interactional structure of these naturally occurring exchanges of ‘conflict talk’. They look at patterns of moves and countermoves on the speech act level. Specifically, how moves are constituted and how arguments continue. Also, they look at how the mechanisms of participation and turn-taking unfold to lead to either successful mediation in a non-adversarial mode of conflict resolution or further escalation; interpreting the argumentative sequence of exchanges via the use of the notion of face (Folger, Poole and Stutman, 1997; Labov, 1990; Hutchby, 1996; Garcia, 1991;

Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998). In general, the research conducted under this line of research aims to highlight the importance of the role of language in the management and resolution of conflicts.

What is noticeable about this stream of research is that they do not agree on a term or a definition of what they refer to as the language of the interaction. For example, whilst Taylor (2014), similar to Leung, examines the language that is used in naturally occurring exchanges in situations of conflict, he uses a different term. Taylor uses the term ‘conflict discourse’ to refer to the language used in the communication between the conflicting parties in conflict situations. He investigates this discourse and its form of delivery to reveal the orientation of the conflicting parties towards the conflict. Thus, he focuses on the distinction between two types of communication, namely cooperative and competitive communication. He analyses language moves in conflict situations to distinguish these types of communication. Taylor argues that the analysis of the cue-response sequences based on this distinction between the two types of communication can reveal the parties’ orientation towards the conflict. He divides his linguistic analysis into two sections; the first examines the language on the micro-level; style, choice of functional words, opening words and how these constitute different communicative acts that relate to speakers' motivational goals and conflict outcomes. The second investigates how the cycles or phases produced by such use of language move the conflict either to a resolution or an escalation.

In the same vein, Yusuf (2018) investigates the role of language as an effective tool to escalate, resolve or prevent conflicts. With a specific focus on language as a conflict prevention tool, in his analysis of a concession speech, he aims to highlight how this speech contributed to averting a potential political conflict amid an atmosphere of tension in the country. He approaches the analysis from a conflict resolution angle; he extracts sentences from the speech which he calls ‘de-escalatory language’ and groups together the “sentences that appear to have portrayed the same idea and are, therefore, capable of making the same appeal to Nigerians” (p. 29).

Likewise, Adejimola (2009) examines the role of language in communication and conflict resolution "in a way to see their interconnectivity and productivity" (p. 1). He highlights the importance of language and communication between parties involved in a conflict (for the management and the resolution of the conflict) especially if those conflicts result from the exchange of “perceptions, assumptions, stereotypes, and attitudes, which have been built up by conflict groups vis-à-vis others" (p. 3). In this case, Language, on the one hand, is not just a means

of communication but is also culture-related, and communication, on the other hand, is a significant means of resolving conflicts. From the lens of his approach, both are the instruments used to dialogue, negotiate, mediate, facilitate, and settle disputes in societies.

It is worth noting here that the stream of research I have reviewed so far under this aspect looks at language as a means of communication that can either escalate or resolve the conflict. The analysis conducted either focuses on the 'linguistic moves' or the 'lexical choices' that lead up to either of these effects on the conflict dynamics. Their investigations vary in terms of the instances they examine, either single instances/occurrences or within a process, depending on the explanations they need to draw out for the purposes of their research. This makes this stream of research the furthest from my research, given the different focus we have in terms of what language we look at. Thus, I keep the section on this aspect of inquiry relatively short in comparison with the other sections that intersect more with my research. However, I would like to conclude this section with the most controversial research that sits comfortably at the exact line that marks the intersection between the interactional aspect and the political one, according to the working definitions of language I provided in section 2.2.

In the book *'Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution: Debating Peace in Northern Ireland'* (2010), Hayward and O'Donnell attempt to reveal "the ways in which 'conflict' and 'peace' in Northern Ireland have been framed at various levels and stages" and point out the claim that "it is *political* discourses that prevail in a process of conflict resolution" (p.1, emphasis in original). They define political discourse "broadly not by its context or speaker but in terms of its use, i.e., language that performs the social function of defining collective identities, legitimate hegemony and motivating values which find expression in political associations and goals" (p. 3). Thus, in "setting out this book on the relationship between discourse, conflict and peace", they "examine the choice of language used by various actors and its possible effects on transition from violent conflict" (p. 2). This is to uncover the "niceties and norms of political conflict management" (ibid).

On the one hand, Hayward and O'Donnell emphasize the importance of communication in the investigation of language in conflict. They attribute the transition from violent conflict to a resolution to the use of language, specifically to the effect of linguistic choices. In this, the focus of their inquiry seems to fit under the interactional aspect, where this effect is seen to come from linguistic choices in their context of occurrence. On the other hand, it investigates the language of

conflict, exploring the functions of the discourse of the conflict actors within the ‘macro’ context of the conflict. This emphasizes the political utilisations of language, which entails multiple factors coming into play when explaining the function of the discourse not only the linguistic factors, (e.g., matters of power, frames, agency, accessibility, etc.), and in this, their research fits under the political aspect.

Although I share with Hayward and O'Donnell their interest to investigate the norms of political conflict management, we differ in the way we go about examining it. The way they go about it is similar to my original aim for this thesis, which was to identify the linguistic strategies used before and after the signed agreement to trace any subtle changes in the arguments/suggested resolutions in the officials’ discourse. However, they do not face the same challenge I faced since they are not concerned with the reception of the discourse by the public audience, which makes their analysis of the “political speeches” less complicated than the data that I consider for my research. Yet, I find their definition of ‘political discourse’ rather vague, where they make no clear differentiation between politicians (i.e., conflict stakeholders or experts) and officials (i.e., representatives of the government or the state). On the other hand, their definition of the context of the ‘political discourse’ they are investigating is rather fluid, where they consider this discourse in two different contexts; the discourse that takes place at the negotiating tables as well as the discourse that is addressed to the public.

(...) we posit that communication is as much a part of conflict as a peace process – that political discourses which shaped prospects for agreement did not begin with secret negotiations or multi-party talks. Hain’s speech, as an example of political discourse (...) also serves to remind us that the very act of officially identifying ‘a peace process’ centres on a change in perception as to the legitimacy (no matter how tenuous) of speakers, means and channels of communication around conflict issues. Research presented in this book shows that a change in perception among key powerful players accompanied a change in discourses of legitimisation of other actors or events.

(Hayward and O'Donnell, 2010, p. 6)

This flexibility in the definition of the context of their inquiry brings back the same challenge of the need for considering matters related to the channel of communication as highlighted by Jeffries and O’Driscoll in (Evans et al., 2019, p.3). As these channels affect the delivery as well as the reception of this discourse and therefore its function.

2.3.2 The Political Aspect

The political aspect presents a different scope for investigating the role of language in the management of conflicts. Specifically, the body of research I review under this aspect investigates what conflict stakeholders do with language and what function this language achieves in the wider context of conflicts. Therefore, it is important here to elaborate on my definition of ‘stakeholders’ since the explanation of the functions of this discourse has to do with matters of discourse agency. For example, who are the speakers that the researchers, as well as the public, recognize as the agents/actors of this discourse? This argument is related to the challenge I mentioned with Hayward’s vague definition of the actors of the discourse they refer to as ‘political discourse’. Thus, in my review of the studies under this section, I focus mainly on how the researchers define conflict stakeholders in their research and what data they look at to investigate the discourse of these stakeholders.

Jeffries (2013) examines the language of politics, specifically the effect of the ‘invented’ opposites once used by politicians and how they become a shorthand way to send messages to the audience. She believes that the importance of these ‘invented’ opposites is “not just to be seen in relation to the internal politics of a country” but she further argues that “the lead-up to major conflicts – and their playing out – is peppered with opposition construction of this kind” (p. 28). She argues that “new opposites are not the only example of ‘emergent meaning’ that appear in the language of politics”, rather these emergent meanings are “specific and often time-limited meanings of everyday words, which take on particular associations or implications through their usage in public texts such as newspapers” (p. 29).

Jeffries provides several examples of these emergent meanings and the linguistic features that help create these meanings. For example, she looks at “the way in which the meaning of the word water shifted subtly but perceptibly in the reporting of the Yorkshire water crisis in 1995” (ibid). Another example she provides is “the changing semantics of the words democracy and radicalisation in the press at the beginning and towards the end of the New Labour era” (ibid). She also looks at the “common tendency for words which are overused in political discourse to be simultaneously ‘emptied’ of meaning and used as a kind of shorthand for a complex set of ideas” (ibid). The example she provides for this linguistic tendency is from “the language of the reporting of the Blair

years” which she compares to “the language of the Major years, immediately prior to this period” (ibid) to highlight this effect.

Similar to Hayward’s use of the term ‘political discourse’, Jeffries’ use of the term ‘language of politics’ seems quite flexible to some degree in relation to the agents of this discourse. Sometimes she uses it to refer to the language used by government officials, e.g., the prime minister, while on other occasions, she uses it to refer to the language used by the politicians of some political parties. The lack of attention paid to matters of agency in research of this sort is observed to place more focus on “understanding the nature and function of political discourse and with critiquing the role discourse plays in producing, maintaining, abusing, and resisting power in contemporary society” (Dunmire, 2012, p. 736). In this case, the language used in conflict situations is often looked at and investigated similar to the investigation of political discourse in any other context.

Quite similarly, Królikowska (2016), in her investigation of the language used in conflict situations, which she labels the ‘*discourse of conflict*’, attributes the agency of this discourse to the political actors/state. In her dissertation, she examines the speeches of the Israeli Prime Minister to categorize the ‘discourse of conflict’ as a genre in political communication. Królikowska argues that “[d]iscourse of conflict has specific and (more or less) stable structural, content related and functional characteristics that are typical for political genres and, thus, enable to classify, analyze and interpret it as a (potentially new) genre in political communication” (p. 144). Yet, she identifies that the use of this term is theoretically problematic; being “still to a large extent unpopular in the wide panorama of multidisciplinary (including linguistic) research on various types of conflicts” (p. 1).

Królikowska defines this ‘discourse of conflict’ as:

a set of communicative events in which speakers negotiate meanings about the conflict in order to achieve particular goals in this conflict; these meanings are developed and negotiated as a result of mutual influence of the utterances produced and the surrounding context of conflict, with a view to achieve particular goals in this conflict and to represent and discursively create the conflict in a specific speaker-chosen, goal-oriented way

(Królikowska, 2016, p. 142)

With the findings of her research, Królikowska establishes an official relation between what she calls the ‘discourse of conflict’ and what is known as political discourse in conflict settings. With this definition, Królikowska appears to adopt the general approach that has been taken up by many scholars investigating the political discourse and its effects on conflict management and resolution. This definition of the ‘discourse of conflict’ considers conflict as a political phenomenon and the language used in it as a political discursive practice. Consequently, we find such studies usually tend to offer explanations of “the language practices through which political speakers ... ‘imbue their utterances with evidence, authority, and truth’ and, thereby, achieve legitimacy in particular political contexts” (Dunmire, 2012, p.737).

This tendency in this stream of research has the potential to disregard the nuances of matters of agency, as analysts usually “attend to the way the discursive practices of describing, categorizing, and evaluating render the ‘world of things’ meaningful” (Shapiro, 1981, as cited in Dunmire, 2012, p.737). Meanwhile, they attend less to the context where these discursive practices are usually delivered and the possible effects of this context on the audience’s clarity about the boundaries of agency in this discourse. In this sense, this stream of research usually studies and explains power inequality in discourse in terms of being produced and reproduced in the best interest of the dominant groups via means that have to do with *access* and *legitimacy* (Van Dijk, 2001; Fairclough, 1989; Van Leeuwen, 2007; Rojo and Van Dijk, 1997; Van Dijk, 2005).

This is evident in Reyes (2011), who, in her research, aims to account for the crucial use of language in conflict situations. Particularly, she examines the use of the discursive structures and strategies in the speeches given by political leaders in two different armed conflicts to explain “how these strategies are linguistically constructed and shaped” (p. 781). By doing so, Reyes aims to underline the role of language in the process of legitimization. She “develops and proposes some key strategies of legitimization employed by social actors to justify courses of action” and their “military presence” (ibid). Reyes adopts an interdisciplinary framework that is based on Critical Discourse Analysis as well as some analytical tools from Systematic Functional Linguistics.

Similarly, Hansson (2015), in his pursuit of underlining the policies and actions of the UK government in the management of crises, investigates “blaming and blame avoidance” in their communications as “essential building blocks of public narratives about crises” and as “blame-related defensive practices by government insiders” (pp. 298-9). He focuses on the linguistic

aspects of blame avoidance adopted by the UK government, where he explores “textual examples from public statements of UK government officeholders to illustrate how blame avoidance works at the highest level of administration” (p. 297). He refers to this language as ‘government communication’ or ‘executive government communication’, which according to him, includes “oral, written and visual used by, and on behalf of, government officeholders” that are “directed at the general public or particular groups in society” (p. 326).

Hansson argues that “to understand blame avoidance as a dominant recurring theme in public communication we should look beyond current linguistic approaches to conflict talk” to “open new avenues of critical research into language use in politics” (p. 297). He identifies government figures as the actors of this discourse, whom he refers to as ‘government office holders’ and sometimes ‘policy makers’. Even though Hansson has been more specific, compared to Hayward and Jeffries, regarding the actors of this discourse, he aims to reveal the ‘intentionality’ that is “intrinsically related to political discourse” to “maintain their hegemonic power, through different means and particularly through discourse” (Reyes, 2011, p. 783).

The gap I identify in the stream of research that is classified under this aspect is related to the conceptualization of power and power inequality that underlie many of the studies I review. If we agree with Coleman’s definition of conflict as “a means of seeking or maintaining the balance or imbalance of power in relationships” (2011, p. 120), then I would argue that I adopt a different conceptualization of power and power inequality in my investigation of language in this research. Coleman, in his investigation of the body of literature that covers the main aspects of power, identifies *power bases* as one aspect of power. He defines power bases as “the resources for power or the tools available to influence one’s environment” or “the other party”, and he calls this “potential power” (p. 123). According to the literature he reviews, there exist many “typologies of the bases of power (such as wealth, social capital, physical strength, weapons, intelligence, knowledge, legitimacy, respect, affection, organizational skills, allies, and so on)”, which can be useful for “discerning different resources for power” (ibid).

From the above typologies, I would like to highlight *knowledge* as the one typology that suits the purposes of my research as opposed to *legitimacy*. I would also claim based on the literature I review for my thesis, that the power base of knowledge is the least investigated in the linguistic studies that address the topic of conflict. By ‘knowledge’ here I mean the information that is shared

with the public about the conflict, its stakeholder, and its events in the form of reports, facts, news, speeches of officials, etc. In this sense, my thesis is concerned with examining the power inequality in this process of knowledge/information sharing with the public and explaining how this form of power inequality is being produced and reproduced in the best interest of the dominant groups that relay the information to the public.

The argument I aim to put forward here by emphasizing the importance of defining conflict stakeholders has to do with issues of accountability. In focusing on matters of ‘agency’ in the language investigated, we look at power from the side of those who are less privileged to examine how far the power of the dominant parties is being contested. Thus far, much of the existing literature investigates language use and its power ‘to influence’, however, I find a dearth of studies that investigate the effects of language used on the power ‘to resist’. In this, I agree with Coleman’s definition of power being “power to challenge (...) power to resist” in the investigation of how power “influences the types of conflicts to which people of differing levels of power are more or less frequently exposed to” (Coleman, 2011, p. 120). In this case, the power inequality not only lies in the possession of knowledge on one side that controls, but also in the factors that may affect this process of information sharing in a way that makes this information less contested.

In my investigation of voice fusion, I aim to explore its effect on the power relations between the dominant side (i.e., the government) and the public. I argue that if this voice fusion is one of the main characteristics of the language that is used in the information-sharing process, it undermines the public’s ability to hold the dominant side accountable, and therefore, negates their power to resist or challenge. I find this conceptual effect of VF as challenging as the effect of *naturalization* – which is one of the most important concepts underlying CDA – as both can lead to negative effects on the power to resist by making matters less questioned and therefore less contested. This effect of naturalization is at the core of Jeffries and Walker’s (2017) research on the keywords used in the press during the New Labour years.

In their research, Jeffries and Walker (2017) investigate how political communication in a certain political era effects a change in the meanings communicated by everyday words. Particularly, they examine how the socio-political keywords, which have been proven – by statistical analysis – to be popular in political news discourse when the New Labour government was in power, effect a change in the usage and function of these words in the press at the time. Thus, they were “interested

in the general language of the news rather than the language of Labour itself”, where they argue that news texts “were likely to be reflecting the zeitgeist of the Labour government” (p. 1). This is to uncover the semantic shift of those keywords' meanings by arguing that they have gained political meanings over this period that outweigh their everyday meanings.

In doing so, Jeffries and Walker place at the core of their investigation “the language of the news, as it concerns and is affected by the language of politics” (p. 2), which is a connection I find very critical. By critical here, I mean in terms of the ‘entity’ to which we can attribute the original agency of these keywords and hence this shift of meaning of the chosen keywords, the New Labour and Blair or the newspapers. How can the audience identify who started using these keywords first, or even how can the researchers verify that the first instances of using these words were initiated at the side of the government and not the newspapers? This intrinsically highlights the significance of my research here, as it introduces a vital step of investigation that prudently precedes investigating and attributing the naturalization of the meanings of these keywords to certain discourse agents.

This challenge in relation to the discourse agency of the keywords in reporting news is evident in my dataset as well, which I find a very interesting point for future research. For example, there were some instances where I observed the use of keywords and suggested resolutions that reflect the zeitgeist of certain periods in the conflict history, yet it was challenging for me to identify and spot the ‘agency’ of the voices that brought the keywords and resolution to a discussion in the first place. Given that these keywords usually have major effects on the public’s perception of the conflict at different times as well as on the overall dynamics of the conflict at different stages, it is crucial to investigate their agency first prior to attributing their effects to certain discourse agents. Therefore, I find the critical connection that Jeffries and Walker investigate in their research reflective of the blurry line that marks the intersection between the political aspect and the representational aspect of the inquiry, which I discuss in the coming section.

2.3.3 The Representational Aspect

The representational aspect of the inquiry into language and conflict is used here to refer to the studies that investigate the linguistic representations of the conflict or conflict stakeholders in media outlets or broadsheets. As with the political aspect, many scholars, in their investigations of the language used in media or press representations, aim to uncover the biases, ideologies and

sometimes the politics behind those representations. In this sense, the stream of research under this aspect focuses on the role these institutions play (as channels of information) – as well as the role of those who might be engaged behind the scenes – in affecting public opinion and their orientations towards the conflict as well as its stakeholders.

According to the “inventory that circumscribes all the possible variety of interaction that takes place within the context of conflict”, which Jeffries and O’Driscoll (2019) suggest, the body of literature under the current section explores one or more of the factors that have a bearing on how conflicts are acted out or represented (p. 2). Jeffries and O’Driscoll classify these factors under four parts: “who? (parameters of participation); how? (categories of means); what? (categories of object); when and where? (spatio-temporal categories)” (ibid). These factors were observed to have been investigated in this stream of research; separately or sometimes in combination with other factors either within the same part of the above inventory or with factors from other parts in the one research study. This made it difficult to use the classification from the inventory with the same original outline in my review of the studies here.

However, I find this inventory useful as a reference to identify and classify the linguistic aspects that the studies under this aspect of the inquiry focus on in their investigations. Consequently, it enables me to identify the gap in what has been investigated thus far in this domain and highlight what I offer here in relation to the different elements of the inventory. Given that my research is concerned with the interplay of the different voices in the language used in reporting conflicts, I focus, in my review of the studies under this section, on two elements of this inventory. The first is the *parameters of participation* – in terms of which voices are identified as the agents of this discourse and to whom the ideologies behind the language used are attributed, and the second element is the *categories of means* – in terms of how the conflict is acted out and/or is represented to be acted out. In addition to that, since I am concerned with the effect of this interplay on the relations of power, I focus on the concept of power they explore in their investigations (i.e., power ‘to influence’ or power ‘to resist’), especially in those studies that adopt the CDA framework.

I start this part of the review with Van Nimmen (2018), with whom I share the same concern and point of departure regarding the news media being the main source of information and hence its undeniable influence on the public. We also share the same take on ‘power’ that “the producers of a certain discourse are proven to be in a position of power over the consumers” (p. 9). Yet, we

differ with regard to Van Nimmen's aims to reveal how the press and many media outlets are controlled by the state. In his investigation of how "news media represent the other" in their "discursive construction of conflicts in the Middle East by Arabic news networks" (p. 5), he argues that these media representations "have become one of the ways for politicians, political parties and the state, to spread their ideas, beliefs, stances and opinions" (p. 10).

Even though Van Nimmen expresses concern regarding matters of agency in relation to the agents of this discourse, by asking the question of "who are the players that exercise the power in a media product?" (p. 10), there was not a clear response to this question but rather a contradictory one. At one point, he argues that "the news network/newspaper/news agency actually defines which content is included and excluded, which sources are being referred to and how the reports are being framed" (ibid), while at another point, he makes the argument that "media have become one of the ways for politicians ... to spread their ideas" (ibid). His main argument in the case of Aljazeera and Alarabiya, both being state media, is that they can be used as "a platform for the state to spread its ideas and national image" (ibid).

Van Nimmen refers to this as *hegemonisation* "a well-known strategy of state media", where "the state media attempt to construct a hegemonised, stable image of the state in contrast with an unstable image of other entities – such as antagonistic entities" (ibid). However, he provides no clear basis upon which he constitutes this relationship between media and state/authorities, except for the fact that these two newspapers are state media. The challenge with this connection that he makes is not only with the basis upon which he constitutes the relationship but also that it does not directly address matters of agency from an accountability perspective, i.e., who is to be held accountable for these ideologies. Rather it is concerned with revealing the power in this hidden relationship between the media and the state, whose basis remains controversial.

The focus of Van Nimmen's research reflects the focus of a huge body of research that is concerned with investigating the *parameters of participation*, i.e., who is enacting the conflict, and/or who is engaged behind the scenes. The main thrust of their argument is usually the power of news media in promoting ideologies and influencing the public. In this, they either attribute these ideologies to the news producers (either at the forefront of the act of reporting, or on behalf of the institutions to which they belong) (e.g., Khosravinik, 2009; Taiwo and Igwebuikwe, 2015; Tehseem et al., 2020; Afzal, 2019) or to the state, governments, or politicians (from behind the scenes) (e.g., Jeffries and

Walker, 2017; Van Nimmen, 2018). The kind of power they look at is the power that resides in the ideologies that are hidden in the discourse they use. Matters of agency in this body of research do not particularly or essentially have to do with the issue of accountability, rather they have to do with who has the power ‘to influence’ (intentionally or not).

This power ‘to influence’ has been investigated at a national level (e.g., Jeffries and Walker, 2017; Van Nimmen, 2018; Taiwo and Igwebuikwe, 2015; García-Marrugo, 2013), where the power of representation involves the state or the newspapers and their ideologies that affect the national public in their respective countries. The power of representation has also been investigated at an international level to address the issue of dominant frames. In this case, the power of representation has to do with who is presenting the most dominating frames (e.g., Amer, 2017; Abeed, 2017; Bazzi, 2009; Wenden, 2005). So, to put it in simple terms, at the national level, it addresses the power of ‘who gets to tell the story?’, whilst at the international level, it addresses the power of ‘who gets to tell the prevailing story?’.

Amer (2017), for example, in his examination of the “US and UK press coverage of the Gaza War of 2008–2009”, aims to uncover the relationship between discourse and “other social elements such as power relations, ideologies, economic and political strategies and policies” in the international press (p. 2). He examines “the discursive practices and linguistic features that are responsible for drawing a specific representation of the social actors” to identify their “representation choices” (ibid). This is to unveil and highlight the “ideologies underlying the different practices in the representation of social actors and examine their reflections on the image of Israeli and Palestinian actors in the international press” (ibid).

The findings of Amer’s study show that these reports are “influenced by the political orientations of the newspapers and also their liberal and conservative ideological stances” (p. 1), where Amer suggests that “there are similar lines between the foreign policy of the USA and the UK on the one hand, and the media of those countries on the other hand, in relation to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict” (p. 8). This conclusion is similar to Abeed’s (2017), who investigates the representation of the Libyan revolution in British broadsheet newspapers to reveal the textual bias of the media coverage of the event as well as the way it represents the key participants of this conflict. The study reveals that this news bias is observed in “the choice of a particular linguistic structure is a matter of portrayal and representation rather than a matter of accuracy” (p. 237), and “reflected in

the choice of stories that are reported” (p. 238). Abeed also observed that “the language of British newspapers was highly ideological in representing this event despite British news outlets endorsing the values of democracy, freedom and universal rights” (p. ii).

While Amer (2017) and Abeed (2017) are concerned with revealing the power and biases in the conflict representations by the most influential media outlets, Bazzi (2009) and Wenden (2005) are more concerned with exploring the linguistics of defying the power of the most dominant representations. Bazzi (2009), in her investigation of the media representations used at times of conflict, focuses on “the language representations in the media over the Arab-Israeli conflict” (p. 3), specifically the Arab media representations. She makes the argument that “The West, being the powerful party in the world’s current civilisation and media, can easily market its news representations through its dominant media sources”, which she finds as “a dangerous (although bloodless) weapon if such representations serve the political, economic and ethnic interests of the powerful nations only” (ibid).

In her research, Bazzi brings forth matters of “linguistic representations that challenge the established uses of the dominant powers” (p. 5). In this sense, I find Bazzi’s research an attempt to explore the power ‘to resist’ the most dominating media sources. To do so, Bazzi adopts a semiotic framework to examine how those meanings are “produced, shared and consumed by a particular society through the media apparatus” (p. 3). She argues that these news practices “form relations of power towards ‘the Other’” and therefore her investigation would reveal “the ideological function of language” (p. 5).

Wenden (2005) also investigates this struggle for the power of representation in a similar way. She uses the concept of ‘representation’ to refer to “the language used in a text or talk to assign meaning to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects” (p. 90). She argues that since meanings are “construed by linguistic representation”, which “determine the way in which we think about particular objects, events, situations”, this can lead to a “competition among groups over what to be taken as the correct, appropriate, or preferred representation” (ibid). “The competition over meaning among groups is referred to as the “politics of representation” (Holquist, 1983; Shapiro, 1988)” (ibid). In this research, Wenden examines a special report (of 13 articles) posted on Aljazeera’s English website on the al-Aqsa Intifada, which

was intended to present an alternative representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the Israeli media coverage.

In her analysis of the alternative representations, Wenden investigates the themes used to represent the events that make up the conflict and the ideologies underlying these themes. She also examines the characterization of the conflict actors and their actions to identify the attribution of agency in the representation of their actions. However, in her inquiry about agency and attribution, her focus is utterly different to mine. She is concerned with how the conflicting sides are portrayed/presented to be saying/doing in the conflict from the angle of positive/negative representations rather than from the angle of accountability. Her analysis reveals that this special report “provides an alternative representation on the conflict” which in turn provides “the basis for changing power relations through discourse” (p. 106) by defying the prevailing representation.

It is noticeable in the literature reviewed thus far under the representational aspect that the researchers, in their investigation of the *parameters of participation* – in relation to who is involved and how are they involved, have been more concerned with the representations of these parameters than the delivery of these parameters. In other words, they looked into the linguistics of the representations rather than the linguistics of how these representations are delivered to the public. As the case with the political aspect of the inquiry, this focus on the linguistics of the representations placed more weight and value on the power ‘to influence’ and less on the power ‘to resist’; more on the power in the practice of language use and less on the power in questioning what is in the language used.

This creates a gap in the body of research that addresses the *representativeness* aspect under the *parameters of participation* that Jeffries and O’Driscoll in (Evans et al., 2019) suggest in their inventory. As we have observed from the above literature, the prevailing interest in this stream of research has to do with investigating the power in the act of the representation (e.g., conflict frames, actors, events), whereas almost no interest in investigating the power in the re/presentation of the discourse of others in the reporting of conflict news. Consequently, less attention has been paid to developing models that investigate matters of agency and attribution in conflict news and therefore creating a gap in the literature that should investigate their possible outcomes. Thus, in my research, I aim to bring attention to this gap that overlooks investigating the power of uncontested knowledge.

It is worth noting here that this gap in the body of research that addresses the *representativeness* aspect under the *parameters of participation* was observed to correlate with a gap in addressing the *language activity/genre* aspect under the *categories of means*. Especially, regarding the focus on issues of accountability in this stream of research. One possible explanation for this correlation has to do with the dichotomy that often exists in their reference to the language used in the reporting as ‘media discourse’, or ‘news media’ even though what they aim to investigate are the political discourse and its agents.

This blurriness about discourse agency in the language that is investigated under this aspect of the inquiry has been for the most part overlooked by the researchers and scholars. It was observed in the above review that the preoccupation with matters such as revealing the underlying ideologies of the discourse used has created no urgent need to question discourse agency in the investigation of matters of accountability. Therefore, my first step to address this problem is to devise a neutral term that describes the language used in reporting conflict while avoiding any prior/default attribution of agency as pertains to the agents of this discourse. In the coming section, I introduce my own working definition for the type of discourse under investigation here based on the scope of my research, highlighting the importance of a unified/neutral term for this discourse.

2.4 Language: Whose language is it?

In this section, I discuss the gap that is created by the dichotomy regarding discourse agency in the literature reviewed and the need for a term to refer to these conflict representations in the news in 2.4.1. I propose this new term in 2.4.2, present its definition, and highlight the significance of this term in filling the research gap I identified. In 2.4.3 I provide further support to the argument I make about the important addition that such a term and definition offers to this line of research.

2.4.1 Devising a neutral term: filling the gap

It is noticeable from the literature reviewed under the three abovementioned aspects of the inquiry that the investigation of the language used in conflicts has received varied attention across the linguistic discipline. The main observation that stands out from the above review is the clear dichotomy that has been created by and among the scholars in the field of linguistics in their investigation of the language used in conflict situations. On the one hand, the studies set to analyse the discourse of the politicians or officials at times of conflict identify this discourse as the

‘discourse of conflict’. The agency of this discourse is usually attributed to the politicians and/or the state/government officials. Also, the power these scholars usually reveal is the power of language to influence/persuade the audience/public via (e.g., ideology, legitimation, representation of ‘self’ and/vs. ‘other’, etc.).

On the other hand, the studies set to analyse the discourse of the press, or the news media identify this discourse as ‘conflict representations’ or ‘media discourse’. The agency of this discourse is usually attributed to media representatives or the institutions they represent, and sometimes in an indirect way to the political systems of the countries where these news media exist. Also, the power these scholars usually aim to reveal is in the ideologies behind how different conflicts, events, or actors are represented. Again, the same kind of power to influence/persuade the audience/public via (e.g., ideology, legitimation, representation of ‘self’ and/vs. ‘other’, etc.). This dichotomy was observed to render a gap in the body of literature that investigates the language used in conflict situations, where the interplay between both discourses remains an area that needs further investigation.

Even though some of the studies reviewed pointed out the connection between the agents of both discourses, they either used a term that gives agency to one entity while the attribution of ideology is granted to another entity, (e.g., Bazzi, 2009, who uses the term ‘media discourse’, while labelling the extracts from her data as ‘political signs’ – referring to the agents of the political discourse), or provided no sufficient linguistic evidence to support the connection they make (e.g., Van Nimmen, 2018, who argues that the state uses media representations as a tool to spread its ideologies – see full analysis under section 2.3.3). This led me to look further into studies that address this connection even from outside the context of conflicts, knowing that the power of media representations and the political interference behind them is not a novel inquiry. Rather, it has been the focus of many studies that have attempted to prove the state/political involvement behind media representations.

According to Fetzer and Lauerbach (2007), this interplay between politics and the media has “traditionally been conceived as macro-structuralist phenomena and much theorizing on the part of sociology, media studies and political communication has gone into elucidating the relations between them” (p. 5). In their investigation of how media discourse and political discourse interact, they argue that “[i]n discourse analysis, for instance, the focus of inquiry in media discourse has

so far mainly been on the study of journalistic practices in certain genres, or the discourse practices of politicians, less frequently on how they interact” (p. 7). And between the two disciplines (i.e., media discourse and political discourse), they argue that “what constitutes the goals and purposes, subtypes, genres and discursive practices of this hybrid discourse, is the question pursued in political discourse analysis” (p. 15).

In their investigation of political discourse as disseminated in the mass media, Fetzer and Lauerbach call this type of discourse “*mediated political discourse*”. They define it as “the outcome of the encounter of two different institutional discourses – those of politics and of the media” (p. 15). They argue that the analysis of this type of discourse reveals the ‘*symbolic politics*’ behind it; for it is more concerned with the expressive dimension of politics – the presentation of politics, not its production, given that “most of the data that discourse analysis deals with belong to mediatized politics” (p. 5). The argument behind this is that “[t]he production of politics for the greater part takes place behind the scenes, and the public very rarely has access to it” (ibid), which is why they believe that the ‘*mediated political discourse*’ is “for most people the only way in which they ever encounter politics” (p. 3). I found in this term and the definition they provide almost a matching description of what I am set to investigate only in a different context, the context of conflict. Thus, I decided to replicate this definition with some adaptations to suit the purpose of my research, as will be explained in the coming section.

2.4.2 Mediated conflict discourse: replicating the term

By the same token, to fill the gap identified in the body of literature that investigates the language used in conflict news reporting, where the discourses of multiple entities (e.g., politicians, officials, media representatives, etc.) usually intersect, I use the term ‘*mediated conflict discourse*’ (MCD). MCD refers to the discourse where the speech of the different voices, actors, and conflict stakeholders co-exist in the information made available about the conflict. The word ‘mediated’ here refers to the channel through which the information is made available to the public. By channel here I mean the *categories of means* of how/where the conflict is manifested (see Evans et al., 2019), i.e., newspapers in the case of research.

This channel consequently accounts for how the discourse of these entities as well as the speech of these different voices are relayed to the public. Meaning, that due to the nature of this channel, MCD comprises the presentation and representation of the narrative as well as the speech of several

discourse agents. In this sense, ‘mediated’ does not necessarily apply only to newspapers per se as the communication channel. Rather, it applies to all channels where the information made available to the public comes in the form of second-hand information that involves multiple agents processing and presenting the information. In this sense, ‘mediated’ becomes the distinguishing characteristic of the language of the news in general – paperback or mediatized through different social media outlets.

Linguistically speaking, this characteristic makes reported speech one of the most salient linguistic characteristics that distinguish MCD. Therefore, investigating this discourse necessitates the examination of the effect of these different discourses coming together rather than the effect of any of them separately since they are dispatched together to the public and not separately. In this sense, this definition suggests that the discourse practices of these different entities should be examined, described and compared as the main constituents of this discourse and not handled separately, which is what distinguishes this research study from the literature reviewed above. Consequently, this definition negates the exclusive attribution of conflict representation to media discourse, and conflict management to political discourse; rather the construction, as well as the interaction of both discourses, is what this research argues to constitute MCD.

Such an investigation of the mediated representations of conflicts as a type of discourse has been disregarded by Leung (2002) on the premise that this type of discourse does not contain enough data for the micro-analysis of the discourse. She argues that:

A great deal of work on conflict focuses on retrospective accounts of the conflict and what was said, either by those directly involved or by observers (Labov, 1990). This type of reporting often relates more to the conflict rather than the talk itself, and usually glosses over much of the interactional detail ... Even if transcripts are available, they often do not contain sufficient detail for microanalysis

(pp. 3-4)

However, Leung’s argument seems to overlook the main proposition behind examining this type of discourse, particularly its specific settings and audience. It dismisses the fact that there are certain types of discourses, which the general public can only access in their retrospective form, a case in point being the discourse that my research investigates. The other side of Leung’s argument that I also argue with is the implied suggestion of separating and differentiating ‘representations of conflict’ from ‘discourse of conflict’ based on the reasons she provides. It is a differentiation

that was observed to be created by and among the scholars who have approached this topic as explained in the abovementioned distinction of how language has been investigated in the literature I reviewed for this research (see section 2.2). However, this differentiation should be reconsidered to account for the nuances of the cases where the discourse made available to the audience is in a retrospective form, which makes it fall in the middle between the hard lines of the current distinction in the existing body of literature.

2.4.3 The challenge of a unified term/definition

The absence of a neutral term and a specific definition that refers to the discourse I investigate in this research was observed to be a result of two main factors. The first factor pertains to the lack of attention paid to this intersection between what is known and defined as the ‘political discourse’ and what is known and defined as ‘media discourse’ as demonstrated in the above review. The other factor is related to the lack of consensus among scholars interested in this intersection on a concept and a definition that describes this type of discourse. Either way, this was found to have a challenging effect on the scholars’ ability to build on each other’s research or to use the same working definitions when referring to similar phenomena. Below I introduce two examples that represent this challenging effect.

The first example has to do with the challenge of not solely agreeing on a concept, but also the reference of these concepts. For example, the term ‘*discourse of conflict*’, has been used multiple times with no unified reference among scholars as to the agency of this discourse, i.e., the main actors of this discourse. Królikowska (2016) uses the concept ‘*discourse of conflict*’ to refer to the communications and negotiations of meanings conducted by the politicians in relation to the conflict, attributing the ideologies of these representations to the politicians. By contrast, Van Nimmen (2018) and Carpentier (2008) use the same term to refer to the discourse of media representatives and their representations of the conflict and its actors, attributing the ideologies of these representations to the media outlets.

The other example that I will use to conclude this section is a review of Fairclough (1995)’s chapter ‘Discourse representation in media discourse’, which investigates a very similar point to mine, but with no attempt to suggest a definition of this type of discourse that we both investigate. The main purpose of his paper is to identify “tendencies in the representation of spoken and written discourse in newspapers and to suggest how these tendencies accord with ideologies which are implicit in

practices of news production” (p. 54). Even though this purpose qualifies his paper to be grouped with the literature I review under the representational aspect – given the exclusive agency he attributes to the actors of the news production – I review it here because the main thrust of his investigation puts his paper at the exact line that marks the intersection between the current trend of the representational aspect and what my research aims to bring to this stream of literature.

To fulfil the purpose of his paper, Fairclough examines “articles which appeared in five British national newspapers” about “a publicly available written report” by “the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee on hard drug abuse” to compare the news representation of discourse with an 'original' (ibid). To then “explain specific linguistic properties” of this “particular type of discourse in terms of ideologies and relations of power” (ibid). He calls this type of discourse ‘*discourse representation*’, which he investigates using Volosinov's account of the distinction between “primary (the representing or reporting discourse) and secondary discourse (the discourse represented or reported)” (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 54-5).

Based on the analysis of his data, Fairclough creates a framework that “incorporates five parameters in terms of which texts or types of discourse can be compared with respect to discourse representation: *mode, boundary maintenance, stylisticity, situationality, and setting*” (p. 55, emphasis in original). The findings from his analysis show that there are two main tendencies in the representation of discourse: “tendency1: low demarcation between primary and secondary discourse; tendency 2: focus upon representation of the ideational meaning of the words used” (p. 61). He concludes his paper with the value added by his research being to reveal the ideological process in the representation of discourse in news media by highlighting “how social structures and relations are instantiated in the fine detail of daily social practices, including discourse” namely “the representation of discourse in news media” (p. 65).

What Fairclough and I share is that we look at the same phenomenon, i.e., how the discourse of different agents is represented in news reports, specifically '*the dynamic interrelationship*' of primary discourse and secondary discourse (Volosinov as cited in Fairclough, 1995, p. 55), however, our end goal is different. For the purposes of his research, Fairclough is interested in investigating how “the way in which secondary discourse is interpreted may be controlled by the way it is contextualized in primary discourse” to underline the effect of discourse representation in news media. My research, by contrast, is interested in investigating the potential effect of this

dynamic interrelationship of primary and secondary discourse on the audience and how this effect comes about.

With the difference in the end goal, our means of achieving this goal also differ, even if only slightly. To underline the effect of discourse representation in news media, he proposes a framework to compare the represented texts/discourses to the original one. This method though would not be handy to the audience in the context of reading/hearing the news, because this possibility, Fairclough himself argues, would not exist under normal reading conditions. Thus, to explain the dynamic interrelationship of primary and secondary discourse, i.e., voice fusion or what Fairclough refers to as 'low demarcation' and highlight its possible consequences on the public, I propose exploring the patterns of this VF that can be distinguished by the regular reader without referring to the source, but rather by referring to the text.

In this, I see the main difference between what Fairclough has done and what I attempt to do in my research lies in what we aim to raise awareness about regarding this phenomenon. While Fairclough aims to raise awareness about this low demarcation as one of the tendencies that are implicit in the practices of news production in the media discourse, I aim to raise awareness about this voice fusion in the information sharing process that the public engages with regarding matters that touch them in their everyday life. To raise this type of awareness among the public, I argue that it starts with naming the phenomenon and agreeing on a definition for this reference. For this to happen, scholars need to be able to identify and name the phenomenon amongst themselves, not only to be able to reflect it to the general public but also to build on each other's contributions.

This leads me to the final section of this literature review where I zoom out from the linguistic discipline to look at how this literature in the linguistics discipline and its discussion of conflict-related issues is compatible with the current discussion in the other disciplines that address the same issue. How disciplines are building on each other's arguments and contributions for an optimal tackling of the same social problem. Thus, in reviewing the recent literature in the media discipline, I am not keen to chart out the gap in this body of research as I did in the linguistics discipline above. Rather, I aim to spot the relevant challenges and arguments that the researchers from both disciplines commonly share to identify the gap in researching the social problem that is under investigation in both fields, to then highlight how my research fits in the current or most recent arguments in both fields.

2.5 Language and conflict: A critical approach

In my introduction chapter, I stated that I adopt CDA as a critical approach to discourse analysis to answer my research questions. But what is in a critical approach? Van Dijk writes that CDA is critical as well as interdisciplinary in the sense that it is “problem- or issue-oriented, rather than paradigm-oriented” (1995, p. 17). In this sense, the matters that concern the researchers, who adopt this approach, stem from social and/or political problems not from the specificity of their disciplines. Meanwhile, the ways that they go about investigating these social problems should be paradigm-oriented, using the tools made available in their disciplines. In this sense, CDA unites researchers with overlapping interests across the different disciplines in their investigation of relevant social problems. But if the problem is social, what is the problem under investigation here in my research?

The social problem that represents the point of departure for my research is the public’s ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions during times of conflict. This social problem, like all social problems investigated in the studies that adopt CDA as their framework of analysis, pertains to power, specifically the power of representation. This issue has gained equal interest from scholars across different disciplines, namely media as well as linguistics. Thus, I find it important to review here some of the recent literature in the media discipline to explore how the work of the different scholars from both disciplines fits in amongst each other in their investigation of this social problem. Also, how their arguments are coming along or parting ways and the effect of either of these circumstances on tackling the social problem under investigation.

One of the most investigated arguments by media scholars in their investigation of the power of representation is the effect of digitalization of the various media outlets and broadsheets on the representations of conflicts. This research interest has given rise to a stream of research concerned with examining the frames used in political conflicts; how the frames in this digitalized context affect the dynamics of the conflict, as well as the power hierarchies in conflict communications (Bob 2012; Knüpfer, C. B., & Entman, R. M. 2018; Al Nahed 2015; Hammond 2018; Manor and Crilley 2018). This line of research is inspired by an established body of research on ‘digital politics’ – how politics is being conducted and reflected upon in digital communication – which investigates how technologies do not simply replicate power relations but play a role in establishing them (Coleman and Freelon 2015; Blumler 2013; Bennett and Pfetsch 2018). The

main research problem this stream of research problematizes is how conflicts are framed in the political discourse, with a special focus on the effect of the current digital platforms on the flow of information.

This makes this stream of research not only analogous to much CDA discussion of how ideologies in texts reflect/establish existing/emerging power relations but also an emulation of the same research interest of the above-reviewed literature in the linguistics discipline. This is evident in this body of literature, where many of the media scholars, in their investigation of the power of representation, have relied mainly on the different schools of discourse analysis in their examination of the ideological effects of these representations and the frames embedded within on social realities, power distribution and legitimization. Thus, in the coming section, I review the core effects of the current digital platforms on the flow of information and their respective arguments as outlined in this stream of research to then compare these arguments to the current arguments in the linguistics discipline.

To map out the influences of the transnational information flow in the digital environment on framing conflicts, Knüpfer & Entman (2018) outline a list of four main challenging influences on the ways conflicts are framed (i.e., media fragmentation, international publics, network effects and architectures of digital platforms). The first influence is *media fragmentation* created by the abundance of information generated by digitisation. Many researchers argue that this influence would put an end to the dominance of the traditional models of mass media and press institutions; causing a shift from their systems within their respective interior medium to an external one addressing niche audiences (Prior, 2007; Sheppard, 2008). According to, Knüpfer and Entman, this fragmentation “challenges once-stable hierarchies through which powerful institutional actors address audiences and advocate for preferred frames” (2018, p. 482).

The second influence is concerned with the creation of an *international public* by the transnational information flow (e.g., Manor and Crilley, 2014; Knüpfer & Entman, 2018). Knüpfer & Entman (2018) argue that “media fragmentation and the opening of formerly more encapsulated news environments ... will likely allow for more spill-over effects from one country’s media systems to others” (p. 483). In this context, they distinguish two levels for frame competition that would affect this international public conceptually: international and transnational levels. The ‘*international frame competition*’ constitutes “conflicts primarily between different states and media systems”

(ibid), whereas the *'transnational frame competition'* constitutes conflicts that “occur across institutional boundaries and borders, and to some degree outside traditional hierarchies”, whereby “the intended target of communication strategies is not situated within their own political borders but rather within other nation-state” (ibid).

The third influence is the *networks effects* created by the networked framings of online communities that reflect their respective constructed knowledge to shape the public’s interpretation of events. In their analysis of this influence, Knüpfer and Entman (2018) are concerned with institutional power and how it can be reflected in news content. They argue that while the effects of these networked framings vary, they will always be seen as a part of the already existing scholarly concern of the political interactions among gatekeepers, the public and elites. The fourth influence is the *architectures of digital platforms*, which “govern the way communities constitute themselves and how information is transmitted” (Entman and Usher, 2018 as cited in Knüpfer & Entman, 2018, p. 485). In this feature they are concerned with “platforms ... along with the corporate interests and company policies that govern them” and how these “will hold increasingly sway over who gets heard by whom and under what conditions they may exchange points of view” (ibid).

In essence, these influences correspond to the aspects of the inquiry in the linguistics body of literature reviewed above, especially the representational aspect. For example, the third influence (i.e., the *network effects*) corresponds in a way to the focus on agency regarding *parameters of participation* – in terms of which voices do they identify as the agents of this discourse and to whom do they attribute the ideologies identified in the language used and are they at the forefront of communication or are they acting from behind the scenes. Similarly, the second influence (i.e., the *international public*) corresponds in a way to the focus on framing and frame competition, which I referred to earlier as ‘who gets to tell the story?’ and ‘who gets to tell the prevailing story?’ Even though the fourth influence seems to be the least relevant to my current research – given its focus on a more technical aspect of related to media platforms and potentially their algorithms, the first influence, I argue, is the most relevant to me and the line of linguistic research I situate my research within.

Therefore, I would like to outline here the argument I aim to make in my research and in what way it is relevant to the first influence (i.e., media fragmentation) by tracing the original argument that

was initiated in the linguistics line of research. One of the main arguments that Fairclough (1989) raises is the unequal relations of power in news reporting due to the lack of accessibility for certain groups to discourse and media. In his approach to CDA, Fairclough argues that power is exercised via the communication of solely the ideologies of the dominating voices. Based on what I review under the *media fragmentation* influence, this argument is counterargued by most recent media studies on the basis that the current transnational flow of information challenges the “once-stable hierarchies through which powerful institutional actors address audiences and advocate for preferred frames” (Knupfer & Entman, 2018, p. 482).

The main support for this argument is that these forms of information flows constitute a *unitary arena* in which frame contests occur (Van Aelst et al., 2017 as cited in Knupfer & Entman, 2018, p. 477). Knupfer & Entman argue that with the emergence of novel forms of information flows, conflicts and the way they are framed are no longer located within the media with their traditional role as gatekeepers (ibid). However, I would counterargue this claim on two bases: on the one hand, these novel forms of information flow only allow for more voices to be heard but they do not eliminate media representations from being one of these voices. On the other hand, these manifold voices would remain rather problematic if what is described as *voice inclusion* (where multiple voices are included/heard) creates or turns into *voice fusion* (i.e., lack of clarity about the discourse agency) – given that mediated conflict discourse (regardless in whose representations) is always presented to the public in reported speech.

Therefore, in my investigation of the consequences of conflict representations, I propose to switch the focus from the different media outlets and conflict stakeholders to focus on the public. As is noticeable in the quest of the previous studies in both fields, the power that has always been in question is the power ‘to influence’ and less on the power ‘to resist’. Even the researchers, who were interested, to some extent, in the power to resist, focused on it from the standpoint of the power of getting their frames out there to ensure more voices are heard and not only the dominant ones. Yet, in this case, the power that remains in question here is the power of the stakeholders to tell the story as well. But what about those who get the story? The consumer.

Switching the focus here would be in a sense to focus more on enabling the public to become more critical themselves when receiving conflict news instead of putting the focus on revealing the underlying ideologies of those who are providing the frames. Being a critical and active consumer

of the news starts with awareness; awareness of the power ‘to resist’ not only the power ‘to influence’ – the power that starts at their end. This is where I find the real gap in the investigation of conflict representations in news as a social problem, in the reviewed literature of either of the two disciplines.

2.6 Summary

In this chapter, I reviewed the research into the language of reporting conflicts. I reviewed the body of literature in the field of linguistics, where I introduced three working definitions of language in situations of conflict that correspond with the three aspects of inquiry observed in the literature, under which I grouped the previous studies based on the focus of their investigation. I also introduced my own working definition for the discourse under investigation here based on the scope of my research, highlighting the value of a unified/neutral term for this type of discourse. Then, I referred to some of the recent studies from the media discipline, where I positioned the social problem that my research investigates in relation to the most recent investigations of the same social problem in this discipline.

I underlined the most recent arguments in the Linguistics discipline as well as the Media discipline and clarified how these arguments have built on one another thus far in tackling the social problem under investigation to demonstrate how they both interrelate. I also underlined how my research takes this argument a step further. I concluded the chapter signalling the need for a shift in focus as pertains to the power that is being at play in discourse representations in media, more specifically in the mediated conflict discourse that I examine in my research. In the coming chapter, I outline the theoretical framework I use in my analysis, where I draw on the theoretical challenges, I find with the current implementations of CDA as pertains to the type of power under investigation. I also outline the combined approach that I propose in this research to help alleviate these theoretical challenges.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1 Introduction

Mediation involves the movement of meaning from one text to another, from one discourse to another, from one event to another. It involves the constant transformation of meanings ... Mediated meanings circulate in primary and secondary texts, through endless intertextualities ... in which we as producers and consumers act and interact, urgently seeking to make sense of ... the mediated world

(Silverstone, 1999, p. 18)

I find Silverstone's view on mediation as described in the above quote quite descriptive of what my research problematizes, regarding the movement and circulation of meaning in primary and secondary texts, notably in the language used in reporting conflicts. If we agree that in a political conflict it is the conflict representations – mediated through diverse media outlets – that are accessible to the public rather than the discourse that takes place at the negotiating tables, then the effect of mediation in mediated conflict discourse (MCD) – as defined in the previous chapter – is what we should seek to investigate. These mediated representations in general, and in conflict contexts, specifically, have been investigated by and large using the theoretical framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), to uncover the power that underlies these representations. However, this body of research, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, has mostly approached the investigation of the power in these representations as one that is exercised by the media (or the state from behind the scenes) in spreading their ideologies in these representations.

Nevertheless, I would like to argue here that the discourse, where these mediated representations are made available to the public, should not be considered merely as a strand of media discourse. Likewise, the agency of this discourse cannot be seen as exclusive to the media 'agents', given that these representations comprise the discourse of multiple 'agents' of several entities, e.g., experts, politicians, representatives of the government or the state, etc. This is because in conflict news reporting their discourse is mediated to the public via the same communication mediums, which creates an interplay between these discourses. In this discourse interplay, the act of mediation in discourse representation becomes the distinguishing characteristic that characterizes the language used in reporting news. Consequently, the power that underlies these representations

has to do with the effect of the act of mediation on the distribution of the relations of power and not just the ideological consequences of the content of this discourse.

The scholarly investigations that utilized CDA in the literature I reviewed in the previous chapter have, for the most part, investigated the power asymmetry in the mediated representations as pertains to '*accessibility*'. Meaning that they argue that the lack of accessibility to discourse and media for certain groups compared to its availability to the dominant groups in any society results in unequal relations of power (see Fairclough 1989). However, if we are to consider the effect of the interplay between the discourse of different agents in these mediated representations, we should not only question 'who has access to discourse?', but also 'how this discourse is mediated?'. The argument I aim to put forward here is that if these mediated representations are found to affect the public's perception of agency in MCD, and hence their ability to hold their governments accountable, then the mediation of '*knowledge*' and its circulation in discourse through endless intertextualities is as crucial as '*accessibility*' to discourse in forming as well as maintaining unequal relations of power.

Therefore, in outlining the theoretical framework in this chapter, I will present how I delineate this argument in the implementation of CDA as the main theoretical framework for my research. I start with a definition of CDA, and I introduce Fairclough's model, which I will use in my research in section 3.2. From this introduction, I identify and highlight the need to reconsider what to describe at the first stage of his model in section 3.3, before I suggest a combined approach that helps to meet these new considerations in section 3.4. Finally, in section 3.5, I present the new combined approach that reflects the new adaptations to Fairclough's approach, highlighting the value of this combined approach in delineating the above argument while answering my research questions.

3.2 Critical Discourse Analysis:

I begin this section with Van Dijk's definition of Critical Discourse Analysis and the criteria that characterize its utilisation in research, which reflect the reason I chose it to be the theoretical framework for my research. He defines it as: "*problem- or issue-oriented*, rather than paradigm oriented" in the sense that any "theoretical and methodological approach is appropriate as long as it is able to effectively study relevant social problems" (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17, emphasis in original). For many linguistic researchers, CDA is "a special approach to the study of text and talk, emerging from ... a socio-politically conscious" investigation of "language, discourse and

communication” (ibid). Therefore, when “studying the role of discourse in society, CDA ... focuses on (group) relations of *power, dominance* and *inequality* and the ways these are reproduced or resisted by social group members through text and talk”, by uncovering the discursive means of the social influence (p. 18, emphasis in original).

3.2.1 Fairclough’s approach:

CDA entails a variety of approaches – offered by many linguists – among which I find Fairclough’s approach the most relevant to the purpose of my research. Fairclough (1989) calls his approach to language analysis *critical language study* (CLS), where the word ‘*critical*’ is used in the sense of “aiming to show up connection which may be hidden from people” (p. 5). In this sense, CLS is not another approach to language study that complements what is missing in the existing models of analysis, but rather, it incorporates these linguistic models in the analysis as needed with an ‘*alternative orientation*’ to language study. This “implies a different demarcation of language study into approaches or branches, different relationships between them, and different orientations within each of them” (p. 13). The way I comprehend his conceptualization of the ‘*alternative orientation*’ is that it is the lens from which discourse analysts approach the analysis rather than the tools they use that makes the analysis a critical one.

The rationale behind this approach is to “help increase the consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others” (p. 1), by uncovering how “relations of power are ... exercised and enacted” in any discourse (p. 43). Thus, he investigates the ideologies behind the discourse that establish/maintain these unequal relations of power, and therefore maintains this domination. To do so, Fairclough suggests a 3-stage-model of analysis, where he approaches discourse as “a process of social interaction” (p. 24). This means the interpretation of any discourse is dependent on the examination of the social factors and not only the textual elements. He puts the text at the centre of his approach as “the ‘object’ of description” (p. 26) to observe two main processes which constitute what he refers to as *discourse*: a “*process of text production*”, where “a text is a product” of this process, and the second is a “*process of interpretation*, for which a text is a resource” for this interpretation process (p. 24).

This stage is followed by an explanation of the wider socio-political significance of these interpretations of the discourse which, he argues, would expose the underlying ideologies and unequal relations of power. Consequently, this would increase the public’s awareness of the role

of language in establishing and maintaining domination. One of the key factors that Fairclough identifies in his model to have a considerable bearing on these relations of domination is the mass media discourse, including television and newspapers. Fairclough argues that this is due to its nature being “designed for mass audiences” (p. 49), as well as because “producers exercise power over consumers in that they have sole producing rights and can therefore determine what is included and excluded, how events are represented” (p. 50).

Therefore, he focuses his attention on who are these producers, “who has access to which discourses, and who has the power to impose and enforce constraints on access?” (p. 62). Consequently, he specifies ‘*accessibility*’ to be one of the main criteria that underline this power asymmetry in media discourse. In this quest, he argues that “the balance of sources and perspectives and ideology is overwhelmingly in favour of existing power-holders”, specifically in the British media (p. 51). He sees the hidden power of media discourse as one “of a *mediated* ... sort between powerholders and the mass of the population”, where “the media operate as a means for the expression and reproduction of the power of the dominant class and bloc” (ibid).

3.2.2 Different motivations:

Even though what I have outlined so far in Fairclough’s approach seems to match what I am set to investigate in my research, we differ in some important respects. Fairclough and I differ in respect of the centrality of media in our quests; for example, he puts mass media at the centre of his investigation instead of the social problem. This is quite evident in his chapter ‘Discourse representation in media discourse’, where the main purpose of his research is to “identify tendencies in the representation of spoken and written discourse in newspapers and to suggest how these tendencies accord with ideologies which are implicit in practices of news production” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 54). In this sense, his research addresses and aims to answer the question of ‘what does the mass media discourse do to affect people?’

However, in my research, I put the effects of discourse representations in news reporting at the centre of my investigation, with no specific focus on media but rather on the linguistic act of mediation instead. I argue that this difference in the approach does not only affect the results of our quests but also marks different starting points. Thus, in the coming section, I will go back to his model of analysis, specifically to the description stage, to discuss what he offers to describe at this stage in relation to the motivation behind his research in section 3.3.1. Then, in section 3.3.2,

I discuss what I need to describe at this stage in relation to the motivation behind my research, where I propose bringing another model of textual analysis in combination with Fairclough's model at this stage to help me answer my research questions.

3.3 Description: What to look for?

What we describe in the textual analysis is usually driven by the objective of our research, or what Jeffries calls "the motivation for carrying out the analysis in the first place" (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 158). Hence, it is important when introducing an approach to outline at the outset the purpose that this approach or model of analysis is used for or the motivation it aims to achieve. This is to ensure that the results of the analysis fulfil the motivation behind conducting the research. Thus, in this section, I revisit the objective behind Fairclough's approach, to see if what he offers at the description stage enables me to fulfil the motivation behind my research.

3.3.1 What does Fairclough describe?

Fairclough (1989) states that the main purpose of his model is to equip the public with the right tools to combat (possible) inequalities in disadvantaged communications. Thus, he proposes an approach to help the readers to think about "longer-term tendencies in and consequences of social struggles over discourse" (p. 74), by offering them ten questions to ask of a set of linguistic features in any given text as a *guide* that is "easy for readers to assimilate" (p. 110). Also, throughout his book, he provides the readers with examples from real-life encounters to explain how dominance occurs in discourse resulting in the creation and maintenance of unequal relations of power. In the meantime, he presents them with the framework he used in analyzing the given examples to enable the public to follow the steps in the future interpretations of their everyday encounters.

In doing so, Fairclough aims to enable the public to engage critically with texts to combat these inequalities in disadvantaged communications. He believes that this approach is useful in situations where "participants maybe placed at social risk during the communication, suffering disadvantage in consequence of the inequalities of communication" (1989, p. ix). I, by and large, align the purpose of my research with Fairclough's objective behind his model regarding raising people's awareness of their social surroundings. Nonetheless, I find his framework quite broad and challenging to follow, specifically, regarding two main aspects: its accessibility to the public to apply such a framework to assorted life situations; and its replicability by other researchers. Thus,

in the coming sections, I shall discuss the two challenges in sections 3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2, before I outline how I propose to address these challenges in my research in section 3.3.2.

3.3.1.1 The public accessibility:

In the pursuit of his objective, Fairclough encourages the public to become more “critical” in their everyday engagements, by becoming more conscious and aware, because, to him, “consciousness is the first step towards emancipation” from the inequalities that exist in the in disadvantaged communications (1989, p. 1). And to equip the public with the right tools to do so, Fairclough builds up this model – based on his knowledge of the linguistic field – in a way that is accessible to them. Thus, he presents the analytical categories and linguistic tools, which the researchers from the linguistics discipline use in their analysis of language use, at an introductory level, by turning them into ‘critical’ questions to ask/bear in mind when interacting with any given text.

The core purpose of these questions is for the public to think beyond the texts they are interacting with and to consider the different possibilities and consequences of not just *what* is being said but more importantly *how* it is being said. This is evident, for example, in his proposed questions that encourage the public to consider how it is necessary when looking at “the features which are actually present in a text” to take into account “what other choices might have been made, i.e. of the systems of options in the discourse types which actual features come from” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 110). Also, how the “set of formal features we find in a specific text can be regarded as particular choices from among the options (e.g. of vocabulary or grammar) available in the discourse types which the text draws upon” (ibid).

Yet, I would like to note here two key interrelated challenges I find with what I have just outlined from Fairclough’s description stage: *context* and *feasibility*. If we are to equip the public with tools to utilize when engaging with discourse, it is important to consider the *context*/setting in which they engage with the discourse to test the feasibility of their application. Thus, if the setting we consider here, for example, is the setting where they interact with the mass media discourse, it may be challenging and rather almost impossible for the public to apply these ten questions, especially, in their everyday routines, e.g., while reading the newspapers or watching the news. The challenge here is one of *feasibility*, as in such settings, the reader may not typically stop to analyze distinctly Fairclough’s suggested formal features that underlie the discourse they are interacting with given the nature of this context.

It is worth noting here that the matters that underlie the challenge of context and feasibility may also take other forms when applying Fairclough's model in real life. For example, for the public to be able to take into account the other choices that could have been made in a certain discourse, as Fairclough argues, they need to be aware first of "the systems of options in the discourse types which actual features come from" (ibid). I consider this a challenge that has to do with the context-dependent aspect, which the public needs to be acquainted with first if they are to engage critically with this discourse type. Similarly, for them to be able to regard the formal features used in a specific text as particular choices from among the options, they need to be aware first of these other options "(e.g. of vocabulary or grammar) available in the discourse types which the text draws upon" (ibid). I also see these options or systems of options as context-dependent aspects that are challenging to identify without familiarity with the discourse type/context.

This brings me to the other key challenge and the point I would like to note about what Fairclough offers at the description stage, i.e., less is more. For the public to be aware of these context-dependent aspects in different discourse types, they need first the help of researchers from different fields and disciplines, who usually highlight these aspects in their analyses to raise the public's awareness of them, since it is not something they necessarily know as general knowledge. In this, I find *less is more*; in terms of the questions that can be provided in any one given context. For example, we may find that addressing only one question of the ten questions has a better potential of providing the public with what they need in this context. For example, the question of "Is agency unclear?" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 111) can be enough for a quest to understand the intricacies and nuances of the clarity of agency in a certain context, as is the case with my current research.

The benefit of the notion of *less is more* is not only the reasonable amount of information that we share with the public in each setting but also the context that facilitates the uptake of this information, as opposed to the general questions proposed by Fairclough, which do not account for such a context. Consequently, the more we provide the public with context-related linguistic toolkits, the more we are able to facilitate their critical realisations of their everyday encounters in each different setting and enable them to be wise judges of their own surroundings. This comes with the hope that the cumulative effect of the aspects acquired from the different contexts would eventually enable them to instinctively ask the texts they interact with all the questions that Fairclough proposes.

3.3.1.2 The model replicability:

The other challenge I find with Fairclough's description stage pertains to its replicability by other researchers. If the objective of the researcher who utilizes Fairclough's model is to encourage the public to become more "critical", which of the questions that Fairclough offers at the description stage should the researcher use in their analysis to enable the public to ask the 'critical' questions they should ask of the texts in a given context?

Before answering this question, we need to look at the tools that Fairclough offers at this stage in the model. In the *description* stage, Fairclough suggests investigating a range of general linguistic features: "features of vocabulary, grammar, punctuation, turn-taking, types of speech act and the directness or indirectness of their expression, and features to do with the overall structure of interactions - as well as examples of nonlinguistic textual features ('visuals')" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 109). He lists these features mainly under three broad linguistic categorizations: *vocabulary*, *grammar* and *textual structures*. Under each categorization, he asks critical questions related to the *experiential*, *relational* and *expressive* values of these linguistic features.

From the perspective of a linguistics researcher, the ten questions that he lists underlie several linguistic features and tools at different levels of language and discourse, as shown above. I do not consider this a critique of the model per se, since this model, in essence, and these questions aim to address the people who do not have a linguistic background. Rather, I consider this a reminder to the researchers, who wish to replicate his model, that in their different quests, they will need to identify the specific level of language and discourse that they are set to investigate. Now, to answer the question I posed above, I need to identify first the level of language I will investigate before choosing the tools for the analysis. To do so, I need to consider the motivation behind my research, which is what I will discuss in the coming section.

3.3.2 What do I need to describe?

If CDA is "*problem- or issue-oriented*, rather than paradigm oriented" (Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17, emphasis in original), our choice of the linguistic features that we describe should be driven by the social problem we are investigating. This should not mean that the choice of linguistic features should be based on "what one 'sees' in a text, what one regards as worth describing, and what one chooses to emphasize in a description" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 27). Rather, it should be based on a

rigorous and justified choice of the level of language and discourse that we choose to describe based on the problem we are investigating. To clarify how this looks in a concrete example, I will explain how my choice of these linguistic tools was driven by the social problem of my research.

My research investigates the lack of clarity about the agency of the voices reported in conflict news, i.e., voice fusion (VF) to question the public's ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions at times of conflict. This entails one key point to describe in my analysis, i.e., how this VF is realized at the textual level. In this case, the main purpose of my 'textual' analysis is to equip the researchers as well as the public with a toolkit of the linguistic markers that contribute to the occurrence of VF in discourse. This purpose led me to use the Critical Stylistics (CS) model by Jeffries (2010), in which she offers the linguistic models/theories of analysis in the form of conceptual tools/effects rather than in a technical form to help the researchers connect the conceptual functions to their textual elements. Therefore, in the coming sections, I will introduce the tools of analysis she offers at the description stage of her model in section 3.3.2.1 and then I will discuss the theory and the rationale behind this model in section 3.3.2.2.

3.3.2.1 The textual-conceptual tools:

CS is a strand of stylistics that is concerned with finding the ideology in any text, not just literary texts. It is called 'critical stylistics' to "distinguish it from mainstream critical discourse analysis (CDA) on the one hand and from literary stylistics on the other" (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 157), "bringing the best of stylistics and critical linguistics together" (Jeffries, 2010, p. 16). In this critical strand of stylistics, Jeffries introduces the textual-conceptual tools as "a vital part of the stylistic approach to critical language study" (Jeffries, 2014a, p. 409). The main idea of these tools is that "they try to capture what a text is doing conceptually in presenting the world ... in a particular way" (ibid). Hence, in this model, Jeffries offers the linguistic tools in a conceptual form rather than a technical form to help connect the conceptual functions to their textual elements. This way, these tools are set to enable the researchers to explain "how the resources of the linguistic system are being used to produce this conceptual meaning" which is "the textual part of the process and is what defines this approach as essentially stylistic" (ibid).

The core rationale behind this model is to investigate a "third level of meaning-making" between the semantic and the pragmatic, which she calls textual/conceptual meaning (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 163). Jeffries situates this third level of meaning between the textual and the contextual, which

“takes place in texts and is an effect of the combination of structures into texts” (ibid), similar to the co-textual aspects “whose meaning takes effect in textual surroundings” (p. 162). Taking Halliday’s meta-functions of language as the starting point for her approach, Jeffries is keen to tie what Halliday calls the ideational meaning to the textual level of language use – where she defines ‘textual’ as “the meanings produced when linguistic forms are combined into text” (Jeffries, 2014b, p. 471). She argues that this ideational meaning is “the point at which conceptual text worlds are created, potentially leading ... the ideological experience of someone reading a political manifesto” (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 163). It is at the ideational level, she argues, that “naturalized ideologies feature in language use” (Jeffries, 2015b, p. 382).

Since her model falls between the ideational and the textual, Jeffries introduces her ‘*textual-conceptual*’ tools to the audience in a form that brings both levels together and not separately. In this form, she lists the tools based on their function, as if they are an answer to the question of “*what is the text doing*” (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 164). This list includes: "Naming and Describing; Representing Actions/Events/States; Equating and Contrasting; Exemplifying and Enumerating; Prioritizing; Assuming and Implying; Negating; Hypothesizing; Presenting the Speech and Thoughts of other Participants; Representing Time, Space and Society" (Jeffries, 2010, p. 15). She argues that these functions are “part of the ideational function of language in that they create a particular view of the world” (Jeffries, 2014a, p. 412). Underlying her interest in the function, like Halliday, is “the notion that the function of language is more important or more central to language than anything formal or structural” (p. 410).

Jeffries’ key argument behind this model is that functions do not “equate in a one-to-one fashion with any particular lexical or grammatical feature” (Jeffries, 2010, pp. 15-16). Thus, she looks at the textual features as ‘triggers’ that may as well create the same ideational function. To give an example that illustrates this lack of *form-function mapping*, Jeffries explains how English modality can be delivered through various linguistic features, such as “modal auxiliary verbs (*may, might, should etc.*)” as well as “other lexical ways ... such as modal adverbs (e.g. *probably, certainly*)” and “modal adjectives (e.g. *probable, definite*) and modal main verbs (e.g. *think, believe*)” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 16, emphasis in original). Hence, in naming the tools on her list, she reflects this “combination of textual features (triggers) and ideational function” (Jeffries, 2014a, p. 412). Yet,

she emphasizes the function in the wording of the tools to open the space for exploring the various ‘linguistic’ features that may achieve each/any of these functions.

3.3.2.2 How the model works:

The guiding principle behind Jeffries’ interest in investigating the different ‘linguistic’ features that realize the same function is stylistic in nature. Jeffries argues that these features represent different choices available to the speaker/writer to choose from, and thus these choices represent their style in a way. Based on this premise, and in agreement with Simpson’s, she sees that such style “represents certain selections from a pool of available options in the linguistic system” (Simpson, 1993, p. 8, as cited in Jeffries, 2010, p. 16). Hence, as a stylistician, Jeffries (2010) is “concerned with stylistic choices, and the textual analysis which can illuminate the choices that a text producer has made, whether consciously or not” (p. 16). In the meantime, she is also concerned with helping the reader “to ask the question ‘how else could this same basic information have been conveyed?’ and the related question ‘Are there ideological effects of making the choices that we see in this text?’” (p. 87). Consequently, when drawing on the ideological effects of the analyzed texts, the formal aspects of these features, she argues, should be “described as an essential part of explaining what is happening ideologically” and that the “ideological effect will be linked back to the textual features described” (p. 30).

Putting the text at the centre of her model, and the function as the starting point of the analysis, Jeffries makes “an eclectic use of a range of models to cover such a broad set of features” that underlie the functions listed in the tools she presents (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 160). The way she presents them in the model is as follows: she introduces one textual-conceptual function at a time with “related tools for analysing the ways in which texts represent the world”, accompanied by the ideological consequences of these representations, where she explains “the technical aspects of the feature with examples” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 17). In doing so, she investigates these representational practices through the utilisation of the existing descriptions of these linguistic features as found in “many semantico-grammatical theories and models” (p. 14). For example, she analyzes the textual-conceptual function of ‘representing actions/events/states’ using Halliday’s transitivity, and ‘hypothesizing’ using the model of modality, etc. Yet, what remains unclear, to me, is the utilisation of the tools she offers in any discourse analysis. Will the researcher use all the tools in the analysis?

If all the tools are utilized at once, the challenge is one of *feasibility*, similar to the abovementioned challenge with the linguistic features that Fairclough covers in his approach. Especially, if Jeffries already questions the feasibility regarding *whether and when* to look at every instance of what her model investigates, based on the frequency of these functions at the textual level. For example, if “each verb produces a transitivity choice”, the question would be “whether and when to look at each and every clause” (2015a, p. 168). On the other hand, if we choose some of these tools to use in our analysis, the challenge is one of *rigour* as pertains to what textual-conceptual function(s) will be considered significant for the discourse under investigation. Also, we need to establish how researchers can decide at the outset what is most significant for their analysis and what would make this choice theoretically rigorous.

Before attempting to answer this question, it is important to summarize what was discussed in this section. The key challenges I identified in Fairclough’s description stage have to do with the accessibility and replicability of his model. Regarding the replicability of his model, I have identified two main issues; the first has to do with the choice of the level of language which the researcher is set to investigate, and the second has to do with the choice of the tools for analysis. Whilst Jeffries’ model was found to help with the identification of the level of language to investigate, the challenge with the choice of the tools for analysis remains. Therefore, in the coming section, I aim to address the two remaining challenges, specifically, the choice of tools and the accessibility of the model.

3.4 The tools for analysis:

If what we describe in the analysis is driven by the motivation for carrying out the analysis in the first place, then the choice of whether to use all the tools or to pick some of them is also dependent on the same motivation. Thus, while choosing the tools, we need to bear in mind the motivation behind the research, the hypothesis we aim to test in the analysis, and the end product we wish to generate from the analysis. To do so, we should ask three questions: ‘what theories/models do we need to use at the description stage?’, ‘what do we need to describe in the analysis to test this hypothesis?’, and ‘what is the end product do we aim to generate?’

I find Jeffries’ model useful in helping us to consider as well as address these three key points at the description stage, hence addressing the two remaining challenges that I have with Fairclough’s model. Thus, in this section, I will discuss how Jeffries’ model enables us to 1) decide on which

tools/theories or models we need to use in our analysis in section 3.4.1; 2) identify the focus of the analysis that would enable us to test the hypothesis in section 3.4.2; 3) group the patterns that come out from the analysis in accessible typologies 3.4.3.

3.4.1 Which textual-conceptual tools?

The choice of the tools for the analysis was driven by the conceptual effect of VF that my research problematizes. Based on the initial observations of my data, the main conceptual effect that stood out was this lack of clarity about the agency of the reported voices. Thus, these observations that were generated due to the familiarity with the data created a bottom-up inductive approach which led me to pursue the investigation of this effect. As a result, what I need to describe are the textual features that contribute to creating this conceptual effect. This makes the description step of my research a deductive stage where I explore these empirical observations to seek patterns in them. This is where I find Jeffries' model more convenient to serve such a purpose as opposed to the description stage from Fairclough's model. But why?

The format in which Jeffries lists the tools in her model (i.e., functions in the form of participles that describe what the text is doing) enabled me to identify the linguistic models I need to use to approach the analysis of my empirical observations. It helped me to relate these observations from the data to one (or more) of the tools. In this, I see Jeffries' model not only has to do with the description stage but also has to do with what I call the 'pre-description' stage. By 'pre-description' stage I mean the stage the researchers need to choose the theory/model to use in their analysis of the observations to test the hypotheses that stem from their data. I would imagine that it would also benefit other researchers who already identified some key observations from their data but are still unsure yet about which model(s) to use in their analysis.

For example, if the researcher observes the salience of a tendency to start the news stories from the crime reporting section with a description of the perpetrator's name, age, nationality, etc., they may choose the textual-conceptual function of *naming and describing* to analyze the ideologies behind this tendency. They may choose to focus their critical analysis on the ideological effect of such information on the audience's perception of a group of people or certain nationalities, by questioning the relevance of such information to the crime they committed. Also, they may choose to investigate the tool of *prioritizing* to investigate the effect of prioritization on creating certain

perceptions, taking into consideration the social/political context within which this act of reporting takes place.

Another example is if a researcher observes a certain effect of the reporting of the government management of a conflict in a given context, e.g., the style in which reporters usually “list” the government actions in dealing with the conflict. In this case, the researcher may choose to investigate the textual-conceptual function of *exemplifying and enumerating* to question the ideological consequences of the lack of understanding of the difference between these two textual practices. For example, what are the ideological consequences if one is to be considered at play at the expense of the other? The ideological challenge in this context is the conceptual effect it creates, e.g., generating a sense of completeness in the list provided where it is not due. And how would this affect the perception of the receiver and their reception of the news?

We can notice from the two examples I provided above how the choice of the textual-conceptual tools is based on the motivation for carrying out the analysis. Yet, we can also notice that multiple foci can be covered by the same tool or multiple tools that can cover the same focus; hence, the need for considering the *hypothesis* while choosing the tools to narrow down the focus of the analysis. This is evident when we can find that the analysis of the same tool may lead to a different end product, e.g., a certain typology or a list of tendencies in a specific type of discourse based on the focus of the analysis. This not only marks the need for considering the hypothesis when choosing the tools but also the need for considering the *motivation* behind conducting the analysis. Such considerations not only help us identify the tools for analysis rigorously but also find focus in what we are describing.

Here I will mention two concrete examples of how the consideration of hypothesis and motivation helped me to choose the tools for my research. The first example is that bearing in mind the conceptual effect that my research problematizes has to do with the lack of clarity about the agency of the reported voices, the tool that seems the most suitable from Jeffries’ list is ‘presenting the speech of others’, where she uses Short’s model (1996), as MCD, by default, entails and involves the act of speech presentation due to the nature of reporting. Yet, one might argue, that the model of speech presentation would be intuitively used in research like mine, case in point is Fairclough’s research on ‘Discourse representation in media discourse’ (1995). So, the question here would be, why Jeffries’ model? This brings me to the second example where the choice of the tools was not

so intuitive. But before I mention the second example, I would like to address first the question of why Jeffries' model?

3.4.2 What is problematic?

If we assume that when choosing the tools based on our hypothesis and motivation there would be tools that are intuitive to choose and others not so intuitive, then I would like to make a case that I found this model useful in both cases. The assumption is that, if the choice is intuitive, the model helps us find focus in the description, but if the choice is not so intuitive, the model enables us to make these choices. To explain this assumption, I will refer to what Jeffries offers in her model and elaborate on how I found it useful in both the abovementioned cases.

The difference between what Fairclough and Jeffries offer at the description stage is not the range of linguistic models/theories that the researcher can draw on. Rather, I see the difference in the way they present the tools they offer. For example, I find that Jeffries' model encourages us to ask 'critical' questions of the textual-conceptual tools compared to Fairclough's model which urges us to ask 'critical' questions of the linguistic features of the texts. I find in Jeffries' question 'what the text is doing?' with which she starts her model the potential to make us ask the logical 'critical' follow-up question, i.e., 'what is problematic about what this specific textual-conceptual function is doing in the text in relation to the problem of your research?'

The assumption here is that this question helps us to find focus in the description of the tool that is intuitive, which in my case is the presentation of the speech of others. Take Fairclough and me as an example, where we both use the same linguistic model (i.e., speech presentation) to describe our data (see full explanation in section 2.4.3). Even though the patterns that came out of this description are quite similar, our motivations differ and therefore we differ in the focus, approach, as well as in the end products of our analyses.

In his research, Fairclough is interested in uncovering the "ideologies which are implicit in practices of news production" by identifying the "tendencies in the representation of spoken and written discourse in newspapers" (Fairclough, 1995, p. 54). Thus, in his description of the speech presentation patterns, his focus is on grouping these patterns under the category of tendencies related to the media discourse. Consequently, the end product of his description is a list of tendencies in the representation of discourse in newspapers.

However, using Jeffries' model helped me to be preoccupied with asking critical questions of the model I am using, e.g., how can I use this model in a way that helps me address what I see problematic specifically in relation to the problem of my research. Hence, in my analysis of news reports, my focus is on the power of the act of mediation itself rather than the power of media discourse. Accordingly, the end product of my analysis is not focused on media tendencies but rather is focused on generating a typology of the patterns in which this lack of clarity happens at the textual level. This end product is the driving motivation behind doing the analysis.

In this, I see the difference between both, where Fairclough's questions have to do with the analysis itself, whilst Jeffries' question has to do with the focus of the analysis. Now, this is not necessarily embedded in the model or clearly stated by Jeffries herself in her presentation of the model, however, it has been my experience using this model. The argument behind this value I attribute to Jeffries' model is that if we ask this 'critical' follow-up question of the textual-conceptual tools, it means we ask them of the model that we use in the analysis. The point I aim to make clear by giving this example is that had I followed Fairclough's approach to CDA as it currently stands, I would have had the same preoccupation with asking critical questions of the texts. As a result, I would have replicated his study with the same preoccupation with the power of media discourse.

The other side of the assumption here is that bearing in mind the question of 'what is problematic about what this specific textual-conceptual function is doing in the text in relation to the problem of your research?', when choosing the tools, has the potential to open the space for the researchers to consider theories/models that are not necessarily intuitive for their analysis. For example, taking into account the conceptual effect of voice fusion and its possible realisation at the textual level enabled me to identify another textual-conceptual tool, i.e., prioritizing. This choice has been driven by the possible realisation of the conceptual effect of VF via the prioritization of certain information that has to do with the agency of the voices that are reported in MCD. This would help expand the scope of their analysis by including more relevant textual-conceptual tools for a more comprehensive typology, where there would be occasions that "two or more are working either in tandem or more closely to produce effects that might be described jointly" (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 174).

3.4.3 Accessible typology

Now that we have addressed the challenge of choosing the tools for the analysis, in this section, I address the other challenge I have with Fairclough's model, i.e., its accessibility to the public. If

we aim to increase the public's awareness via the typologies we create, then inasmuch as this typology should be linguistically oriented, it should also be devised in a way that can be accessible to the public. The argument here is that if we present the public at the outset with the conceptual effect that is socially problematic before presenting them with the linguistic markers that underlie this effect, this will make the typology more accessible to them. Hence, I find Jeffries' model to be useful in creating such a typology due to its preoccupation with the ideational meaning.

If the ideational meaning is the point at which the conceptual perception of the world is created, then we can assume that the conceptual effect of the discourse practices occurs at the same ideational level. For the purposes of my research, we can think of voice fusion as an example of this conceptual effect that gets created. If based on Jeffries' model, the conceptual effect is the first step of the investigation, where we describe texts in relation to a specific effect (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 163), then the focus of the typology would be centered around VF while in the meantime presenting them with the textual cues that trigger or help create this conceptual effect.

I find this accessible for it presents the audience with the conceptual *effect* first and the linguistic markers that underlie this effect, instead of the regular approach that puts the focus on the linguistic *structures* by presenting the public with the analysis of the linguistic markers to then explain the effect of these markers in context. Whilst the latter approach aims at understanding phenomena and explaining them to the public, it does not provide them with a certain ideological effect per se that they can recognize in their future engagement with this discourse. However, the first approach enables the public not only to be aware of the conceptual effects that contribute to the creation and maintenance of unequal relations of power but also to be able to identify and name them.

This would increase the possibility for the public to hopefully question what they are reading and consider the potential effects of this discourse in their future engagement with it. Thus, the core value of Jeffries' approach when presenting typologies to the public is that it enables the researchers to present the linguistic markers which underlie these strategies as clues to look for while engaging with the texts, any text, in similar contexts. This would in turn grant more accessibility for the public to the typologies generated, which would first make them aware of the existence of the conceptual effect of this discourse and provide them with the tools to identify it which would eventually decrease their susceptibility to being misled by it. Also, it creates more

buy-in from the public to engage with the typology, since they already have a reason to explore these linguistic strategies and markers that help explain the effect, we present them with.

To sum up, in this section, I have demonstrated the benefit of combining Jeffries' and Fairclough's approaches in helping me address the challenges I encountered with Fairclough's description stage. In the coming section, I will outline how this combined approach looks, not only at the description stage but also at the other stages of Fairclough's model.

3.5 The combined approach:

In this section, I present the combined approach to CDA that I use in my research. I would like to reiterate here that the main point of difference between the combined approach I propose here, and Fairclough's approach is the starting point of the textual analysis. This starting point is the value added by bringing in Jeffries' model, which lends Fairclough's model a more rigorous and systematic exploration of what to look for in the textual analysis. The main alteration that this different starting point creates in Fairclough's original model, is the formation of an additional stage, i.e., the pre-description stage, where the researchers choose the theories/models for their research.

This starting point, as demonstrated in the previous section, not only affects the choice of the tools of analysis and the rationale behind using them, but also affects the end product of the analysis and its fulfilment of the motivation behind the research. Hence, when outlining the combined approach in this section I will highlight the similarities/differences in each stage of the analysis where I cross paths/depart ways from Fairclough's and Jeffries' original models.

3.5.1 Pre-description

When I say that the actual difference between what Jeffries and Fairclough offer in their respective approaches to textual analysis is the starting point, I also would like to argue that the difference is not in the set of tools they offer. Rather, I agree with Jeffries' point, that the "tools of analysis that we need to perform all kinds of text analysis are the same" (2014a, p. 408). I also agree with her argument that the critical-stylistic approach "can draw on the same range of systematic and text-analytic tools as literary stylistics" and the only distinction would be the "motivation for carrying out the analysis in the first place" (2015a, p. 158). Hence, what is in question here in Fairclough's

model is not the need for more models/theories to be made available for the researchers to choose from, but rather a more systematic way based on which they choose the models for their analysis.

Whilst Fairclough approaches the textual analysis in the description stage starting with the “formal properties of texts” (1989, p. 26), he does not provide a systematic way of choosing the models that will help the researchers to investigate these formal properties of the texts, or which formal properties to look at in the first place. So as Jeffries, in her framework, she does not specify steps to follow when utilizing the tools from her model, which is a matter I addressed in the previous section (see section 3.3.2.2). Yet, I find in her approach to textual analysis that starts with the textual-conceptual functions, the potential for a more systematic way of choosing the tools of analysis. This potential lies in the list of tools that reflect the connection between the ideational meaning (at the conceptual level) and their textual *triggers* (at the level of language use).

One way to interpret this connection that Jeffries makes is to put the focus of our analysis on the conceptual effect and aim to identify the textual triggers that contribute to this effect in our textual analysis. In this sense, I see Jeffries’ model adding an additional stage before the description stage, i.e., the pre-description stage that is concerned with identifying the suitable tools to explore this conceptual effect. This stage represents an inductive approach since the conceptual effect, based on which I formulate my hypothesis, stems from familiarity with my data. Thus, whilst Fairclough starts his analysis at the textual level, by asking critical questions of the textual structures, I see in this inductive approach that Jeffries asks the critical questions of the conceptual effect(s) of the discourse under examination, and hence the textual structures underlying it.

3.5.2 Description

If the pre-description/inductive stage is about where to start the critical analysis of any discourse (i.e., choosing the tools of analysis), then the description/deductive stage is about what to look for (i.e., what to describe in the analysis). In this case, we describe specifically the textual cues that trigger/contribute to the conceptual effect under investigation. For example, if I identified the textual-conceptual tool of presenting the speech of others as one of the tools of analysis for my research, in my textual analysis, I need to describe how the act of speech presentation contributes to the creation of the VF effect. Similarly, in choosing ‘prioritizing’ as a tool, I need to describe in what way the textual practice of prioritizing contributes to the conceptual effect of VF.

The argument that I would like to make here is that this focus on the connection between the conceptual and the textual in the description stage has the potential to allow the researchers to approach the models/theories that they draw on with a critical eye that enables them to adapt such models to suit the purposes of their research. To give concrete examples from my own research, I will outline here the theories/models I use in my analysis of presenting the speech of others and prioritizing. I will also highlight how this focus has allowed me to adapt the models that I draw on to suit the purposes of my research.

3.5.2.1 Presenting the speech of others:

This textual-conceptual tool is concerned with considering “the viewpoint of the participants who are discussed in texts ... whose words ... are mediated by the narrating voice of the text” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 130). Under this textual-conceptual tool, Jeffries uses the model of speech and thought presentation from Short, 1996, where “at the root of this model is the traditional distinction between direct and indirect forms of speech presentation” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 131). What Short problematizes in this model and Jeffries reiterates in her utilisation of this model is that “there is *always* a gap between the original version and any quotation”, where the “power to represent the words ... of others is potentially very manipulative of their ideologies as well as those of the reader” ... “even if no malice is intended” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 130, emphasis in original).

This gap between the original version and any quotation is captured in Short’s model as a matter of faithfulness in the act of reporting the words of others, “whereby the direct version claims to present *exactly* the words that were spoken whereas indirect speech presents a ‘reported’ version of the same speech act” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 131, emphasis in original). Thus, in his classification of the categories of speech presentation, he lists these categories on a cline of faithfulness from the least faithful to the most faithful. However, these categories are not clearly demarcated at all times, and therefore these categories which sit between the direct and indirect speech have an “uncomfortable effect of merging the narrator’s voice with that of the original speaker” which “can be a significant factor in the effect of non-fiction texts on their recipients” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 133).

Even though this merging of voices is exactly the linguistic phenomenon that my research is investigating, Short and I investigate different effects of the same speech presentation categories. Whilst Short’s model is concerned with the effect of this merging of categories on the degree of *faithfulness* in reporting, my research is concerned with its effect on the clarity of the reader about

the agency of the voices reported in conflict news. Hence, I found the focus as well as the classification of speech presentation categories in Short's model unfitting for the purpose of my research. Therefore, for the purposes of my research, as will be demonstrated in the analysis in chapter 5, I propose a different classification of these categories.

In this new classification, I list these categories on a cline based on the clarity of agency in the represented discourse. In this cline, the speech presentation categories range from clear (where the agency is assigned by the author) to unclear (where the agency is perceived by the audience). By assigned, I mean the agency assigned by the reporter in their original choice of speech presentation categories, and by perceived, I mean the agency that the audience might attribute to the speech reported as a result of the effect of VF and not necessarily the actual agency reported in the news report. Thus, when I describe *merging*, for example, in my textual analysis, I would not describe this feature in general or out of context but rather specifically in relation to the creation of VF as a conceptual effect. Hence, I argue that the connection between the conceptual and the textual, which has been brought by the combined approach, is what enabled me to create such a focus in the description stage.

3.5.2.2 Prioritizing:

In this textual-conceptual tool, Jeffries (2010) considers “the syntactic possibilities for prioritizing some information or comment over other, building upon existing knowledge of information structures, transformational options and subordination in English” (p. 77). She refers to the information structure of the English clause specifically and the existing knowledge of this structure that it “generally puts new and important information into the final position in a clause, so that the reader/hearer has a sense of where to look for the salient information when reading/listening” (ibid). When considering the possibilities for prioritizing in the transformational options, she refers to “the model of grammar arising from the work of Noam Chomsky (1957, 1965)” (ibid), and for the possibilities for prioritizing in subordination, she refers to “Jeffries 2006 for some of the main types of subordination and Quirk et al. 1985 for a comprehensive account” (p. 78).

Even though the main idea behind this conceptual tool is to investigate how some parts of a sentence “may be more prominent than others” as well as how this conceptual effect “is accessed through a range of different structural (formal) analyses”, this effect has always been investigated in relation to the “English utterance/sentence” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 87). Thus, I would like to argue

the need for more openness when considering the syntactic possibilities for prioritizing in terms of how prominence is given to some parts of a sentence over others. Whilst Jeffries acknowledges the “potential for different languages and cultures to have a different (sub-)set of textual-conceptual functions to English or to prioritise their use differently to English-speaking communities” (Jeffries, 2014a, p. 412), I assume that the potential that needs acknowledgement for further consideration here does not necessarily have to do only with different/more textual-conceptual functions per se, but also more options of syntactic possibilities/information structures through which prioritization can be realised.

Driven by the same principle of considering “how different textual choices ... inevitably change the priorities of the sentence as a result” (Jeffries, 2010, pp. 85-6), I argue that the researcher might be able to identify more types of information structures – based on their observations of the patterns that come out from the data – through which the priorities of the sentence can change. To give an example here, based on the observation of the patterns that came out from my data, I have found the information structures of news reports to affect/change the priorities of the sentence, especially in MCD. Now, considering the same questions of “how else could this same basic information have been conveyed?” and the related question ‘Are there ideological effects of making the choices that we see in this text?’” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 87), I aim to investigate prioritization in my research from a different lens to that of Jeffries’ which focuses on the structures of the English clause.

The premise behind this argument is that if we agree that the identification of the linguistic possibilities for prioritizing some information over others happens when we compare our existing knowledge of these information structures to the information structures that are used in the discourse we are investigating, then we may also agree that this rule is not only applicable to the structure of the English clause. Whilst our general knowledge of the information structure of the English clause is that it “generally puts new and important information into the final position in a clause so that the reader/hearer has a sense of where to look for the salient information when reading/listening.” (Jeffries, 2010, p, 77), our general knowledge of the information structure of news reports is that it generally puts the information of the reported voice and their qualification next to the reported voices when they are quoted for the first time.

Therefore, in my investigation of prioritizing, I look specifically at the prioritization of information that has to do with the definition of the roles of the voices that are reported in the news reports, to investigate the conceptual effects of this prioritization. Precisely, how prioritization of the voice attribution or sometimes the lack of it affects the reader's clarity – throughout the reading experience – on the role of reported voices to whom the agency of the speech presented is attributed. Thus, when I describe the textual structure of attribution, for example, in my textual analysis, I would not describe this feature in general or out of context but rather specifically how it contributes to the creation of VF as a conceptual effect. Hence, I argue, again, that the connection between the conceptual and the textual, which has been brought by the combined approach, is what enabled me to create such a focus in the description stage.

3.5.3 Interpretation

Fairclough (1989) uses the term interpretation “both as the name of a stage in the procedure and for the interpretation of texts by discourse participants” (P. 141). In this, he stresses “the essential similarity between what the analyst does and what participants do” at this stage, while also acknowledging the differences between the two (ibid). In this stage, Fairclough is concerned with explaining how “interpretations are generated” (ibid). By highlighting how interpretations are generated through the “combination of what is in the text and what is ‘in’ the interpreter, in the sense of the members’ resources (MR) which the latter brings to interpretation” (ibid). He explains how this process happens; how the “formal features of the text” serve as “‘cues’ which activate elements of interpreters’ MR, and that interpretations are generated through the dialectical interplay of cues and MR” (ibid).

The key conclusion that Fairclough arrives at as a result of his investigation of how interpretations are generated is that the stage of interpretation “makes explicit what for participants is generally implicit”, specifically “the dependence of discourse practice on the unexplicated common-sense assumptions of MR and discourse type” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 162). However, what this stage does not do, according to Fairclough, is “explicate the relations of power and domination and ideologies which are built into these assumptions, and which make ordinary discourse practice a site of social struggle” (ibid), and hence the need for the stage of explanation.

Unlike Fairclough, Jeffries argues that “if we are to understand the precise ways in which texts may transmit, reinforce or inculcate ideologies in their readers, we need to understand a great deal

more about the process of interpretation than what we currently know” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 12). In her chapter “Interpretation”, Jeffries attempts “to explain how we interpret texts” basing her explanation on “a descriptive framework ... which uses Halliday’s (1994) metafunctions of language as its starting point” (Jeffries, 2014b, p. 469). In this framework, she sees “textual interpretation” as “a larger model of language”, which considers three aspects of meaning, namely the meaning that arises from “how the basic elements of language work (phonology, morphology, grammar, semantics)”, and “how the context of language use can interact with textual features (pragmatic)”, and lastly the meaning that arises from “(co-)textual features of language, which produces insights into the combination of propositional meaning and style that constitutes all language use” (p. 470).

Jeffries argues that this last aspect of meaning involves “a choice from a number of alternative ways of including the same propositional content and therefore is a way of presenting the world through language” (p. 471). In this, she sees this type of meaning “would be considered ideational in Halliday’s terms” (ibid). She further explains that “while not being definitively intentional or necessarily conscious, this level of meaning tends to indicate the viewpoint of the producer (or, if it is relevant, the author, narrator, etc.)” (p. 472). Thus, if we are to consider ideologies when we are interpreting texts, Jeffries identifies ideologies at this exact level of language, i.e., the ideational level. This is based on the premise that the “ideational meaning – the construction of a particular worldview – takes place and can produce naturalized, or at least assumed, ideologies” (Jeffries, 2015b, 387).

To decide on what the interpretation stage entails in this combined approach, it is important to ask at the outset, what are we interpreting? And what do we need to interpret? The first answer that comes to mind is that we interpret what we are describing. In this answer, I see the connection between both stages, precisely how the interpretation stage is not separate from the description stage, but rather works in tandem with it. Thus, if at the description stage, we describe texts in relation to the conceptual effect that is under investigation, then at the interpretation stage, we interpret how the textual features that we described contribute to the creation of this conceptual effect. To give a concrete example, if we describe the features that mark the low demarcation between the primary and secondary speech in discourse, we interpret how the function of these features at the textual level contributes to the creation of the effect of VF at the conceptual level.

In this, I find my take on interpretation in the combined approach to be a mix of both Fairclough's and Jeffries' approaches. On the one hand, I find the focus on interpreting the function of the linguistic/textual elements that we are describing in relation to the conceptual effect under investigation matches what Fairclough offers at the interpretation stage. Specifically, I see it as a response to his question "what's the role of language in what is going on?" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 146). It is the dimension where Fairclough argues the need for making *connections* that include "both ways in which texts are tied to the situational contexts in which they occur and ways in which connections are made between parts of a text" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 149).

In making these connections, I see the textual features that we describe at the description stage are no longer features, rather they become markers or *cues* that trigger the conceptual effect that we investigate. In this case, even though we are drawing on the formal functions of these features at the textual level, in general, in our interpretation of their functions, we consider them in a certain context. This is not too far from what Jeffries is suggesting, except that Jeffries does not necessarily take the situational context into consideration like Fairclough, rather she focuses on the *co-textual* level of meaning-making, which "takes place in texts and is an effect of the combination of structures into texts" (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 163) by considering "those aspects whose meaning takes effect in textual surroundings" (Jeffries, 2015a, p. 162).

While I agree with Fairclough's focus on thinking about the role of language in what is going on when interpreting the texts, I do not fully follow his procedures in this stage. As he argues that in the interpretation stage "these cues are 'read' in conjunction with, and in the light of an element of the interpreter's MR: the *social orders* that she brings to interpretation" (Fairclough, 1989, p. 150). This is not the case, for the purposes of this combined approach, since the focus here is not on how to explain how texts make meanings, which is the core focus of Fairclough's interpretation stage. Rather, the focus is on explaining how this conceptual effect is realized via the functions of the features that are described in the texts.

The other factor that this difference may stem from is our different definitions of the term *cues*. I define cues as linguistic features in context. In other words, the linguistic features only become cues when described and interpreted in context, namely the context of the research conducted. Hence, if we assume that cues are (linguistic features + context), then there is no need for further consideration of social orders when interpreting the discourse at this stage since the context/*social*

situation type is already embedded in the context of the social problem that the research is investigating. Thus, in the combined approach, I do not consider the *social orders* (i.e., “a sort of typology of social situation types” where “interpreting is a matter of assigning an actual situation to a particular type”) that are brought to the interpretation by the readers. Rather, the social order that is considered is brought by the context of the research problem.

In this sense, to make “explicit what for participants is generally implicit” at this stage does not necessarily have to do with “the dependence of discourse practice on the unexplicated common-sense assumptions of MR and discourse type” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 162). It can also be achieved by interpreting how certain linguistic practices can achieve certain conceptual effects to enable them to make these *connections*. What is implicit in this case is the linguistic knowledge that enables a linguist to see what others who do not possess the same type of knowledge do not see. This way, the interpretation stage in the combined approach does not necessarily confirm the occurrence of this conceptual effect as a result of these textual features per se, but rather it only displays the possible effect of these cues at the conceptual level, by drawing on their function at the textual level.

3.5.4 Explanation

At this stage, Fairclough (1989) aims to “explicate the relations of power and domination and the ideologies which are built into these assumptions, and which make ordinary discourse practice a site of social struggle” (p. 162). To do so, he puts the “interpretative procedures in the production and interpretation of texts” at the centre of his attention to explain how the *reproduction* of these procedures effects the reproduction of the relations of power and domination as well (ibid). One key factor that he identifies to have a bearing on these interpretative procedures is MR. In the explanation stage, MRs “are seen specifically as ideologies” (p. 166), in the sense that the “assumptions about culture, social relationships, and social identities which are incorporated in MR, are seen as determined by particular power relations in the society” (ibid). Therefore, in the reproduction of these MR, Fairclough sees “their contribution to struggles to sustain or change these power relations” (ibid). This is where he also sees the connection between the stages of interpretation and explanation.

The objectives of this stage, Fairclough explains, is to “portray a discourse as part of a social process, as a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures, and what

reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them” (p. 163). To fulfil this objective, Fairclough suggests asking three questions of the discourse under investigation:

“what power relations at situational, institutional and societal levels help shape this discourse? ... what elements of MR which are drawn upon have an ideological character? ... How is this discourse positioned in relation to struggles at the situational, institutional and societal levels? ... Does it contribute to sustaining existing power relations, or transforming them?”

(Fairclough, 1989, p. 166)

Whist Jeffries does not consider explanation as part of her framework, due to her focus on “the micro-analysis end of the spectrum” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 3), I consider the questions that Fairclough offers at the explanation stage in my combined approach except for one, specifically, the question which addresses MR, since the combined approach is not exclusively concerned with what the reader brings to their interpretation of texts.

If I were to ask the other two questions of the mediated conflict discourse, which this research is set to investigate, the answer would take us back to the point where this chapter started, which has to do with the power of mediation. What kind of power do we see in the act of mediation, particularly in the presentation of the discourse of others? Explaining this kind of power should not be separate from what we describe and interpret in the previous stages, but rather it should complement it. Hence, if what we make explicit in the interpretation stage is how certain linguistic practices can achieve the conceptual effect of VF, what we explain at this stage is what relations of power underlie this conceptual effect and thus what relations of power and domination are reproduced by the reproduction of this type of discourse. This is where Fairclough and I differ in our explanations of the power of mediation.

Fairclough argues that the reproduction of power in mediated representations, especially in the discourse of media, has to do with the ‘accessibility’ to this discourse (see Fairclough 1989), whilst I find the power of these mediated representations in the knowledge distribution process that the public experiences when reading/listening to the news. By knowledge distribution I mean the process where the public is presented with the discourse of different voices/discourse ‘agents’ as *one whole bloc*, as Volosinov puts it, “in which case only the “what” of speech is taken in and the

“how” is left outside reception” (Volosinov, 1973, p. 119). In this exact process, where we are no longer able to distinguish the boundaries of the primary and secondary discourse, or even the secondary discourse of the different reported voices, resulting in passive information consumption by the public, I see the unequal relations of power being created between the public and any other entity involved in this process.

The underlying power of the process of knowledge sharing is not a new notion; it has been discussed by other researchers. Foucault (1982), for example, introduces the concept of ‘*privileges of knowledge*’ in his analysis of the relationship between discourse and power. He focuses his investigation of these privileges on how the struggles against them were constituted instead of how these privileges were practised. For example, how these struggles were constituted by forming “an opposition against secrecy, deformation, and mystifying representations imposed on people” and “an opposition to the effects of power which are linked with knowledge, competence, and qualification” (p. 781). I find this focus on the struggles against the *privileges of knowledge* to be similar to mine, especially with the kind of power that I emphasize and aim to address in my research, i.e., the power ‘to resist’.

Hence, to enable the public to resist the unequal relations of power, we need to portray this discourse “as part of ... a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures” as well as “what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 163). To give a concrete example, I use my research as an illustrative example. The first step is to make the public aware of the conceptual effect that is created by this discourse (pre-description stage). Then, to describe the patterns in which knowledge is woven into baffling representations that create this conceptual effect (description stage) while demystifying those representations by connecting the linguistic *features* to the conceptual effect, to help them become aware of the linguistic *cues* that trigger this effect (interpretation stage). Then, to explain the power that underlies the uncontested knowledge created by this conceptual effect, while highlighting the need for a ‘critical’ and a more ‘active’ participation from them while reading/ listening to the news (explanation stage). Thus, to help the public to be more critical in their engagement with MCD, I encourage them to ask two questions, “Who says?” and “Says who?”.

3.6 Summary:

In this chapter, I outlined the theoretical framework for investigating MCD and its effect on the public's ability to hold their governments accountable. Putting this social problem at the centre of attention; I combined and adapted two approaches for a holistic and focused investigation of this discourse, by tapping on and investigating the correlation between the textual features and the conceptual functions of discourse. In this combined approach, I outlined the tools of analysis that I will be using in my investigation of this discourse and the rationale behind choosing them. I also delineated my argument regarding the type of power that deserves further focus in the implementation of CDA based on the nature of the discourse under investigation. Specifically, I argued how the linguistic structures of mediation/circulation of '*knowledge*' in discourse are as crucial as '*accessibility*' to discourse in forming as well as maintaining unequal relations of power.

Finally, I argued that the first step to resisting this type of power is to ask two 'critical' questions, "Who says?" and "Says who?" when engaging with MCD, which I shall address in the two chapters of my analysis. In the coming chapter, 'Methods', I will outline the methods for data collection used in this research, focusing on the process of sourcing, and collecting the data. I will also lay out the steps followed to annotate the dataset according to the two textual-conceptual functions outlined in this chapter under the description section of the combined approach. I will also introduce suggested adaptations to the models I'm using in my analysis in response to the challenges encountered during the data annotation to accommodate the focus of my study and help me to enable the public to ask these two critical questions mentioned above.

4. Methods

4.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the methods for data collection used in this thesis, focusing on the process of sourcing and collecting the data. It also lays out the steps followed to annotate the dataset according to the two textual-conceptual functions outlined in chapter three. In the following sections, the two stages of data collection and dataset annotation will be detailed. In Section 4.2, I focus specifically on the data source for my study, the search terms used and the rationale behind choosing a subsection of the data collected to be the focus of my analysis. Section 4.3 describes how I manually annotated the dataset for the two textual-conceptual functions: presenting others' speech and prioritizing, with Section 4.3.1.3 presenting a description of the units of analysis I used when examining the 'presenting of others' speech' textual function. Under each subsection of the dataset annotation, I outline the model I used in annotating the dataset and discuss the practical challenges that were encountered during the annotation process. I also introduce suggested adaptations to these models to accommodate the focus of my study and the purposes of my analysis before I conclude this chapter in Section 4.4.

4.2 Data collection

In the discussion below, I describe the data source and the selection of data. In section 4.2.1 I provide detailed information about the data source for my study. In section 4.2.2, I provide details on how I used the search engine to collect my data, the search terms I used to find the data, and the number of articles collected that cover the period under investigation. I also provide the rationale behind choosing a small-sized dataset of the original data collected to suit the qualitative analysis while yet representative of the era it covers.

4.2.1 Selection of the data source

The data source for the study is the Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper, an Egyptian national broadsheet that is published in English. The newspaper articles were collected from Masress (Egypt Press), a searchable electronic repository for Egyptian newspapers. The website collects news and articles from 107 Egyptian newspapers that are published in English and Arabic. The website is designed to update the news every half hour and has an activated feature that makes the news transmitted

from more than one source present once on the main page. However, the reader is still offered the opportunity to view all the news by visiting the specialized pages by classification, or from the list of newspapers. It also allows the reader to search for particular search terms.

The website also categorizes news and articles and ranks them according to their importance in an automated way. Since the process of categorizing and arranging news and articles is done by computer-generated algorithms, the presented topics do not take into account any political or intellectual orientation. Therefore, the reader may find at the same time different points of view expressing different, and sometimes contradictory positions. For the purposes of my research, I used the search engine to choose Al-Ahram Weekly from the list of newspapers to then search for particular search terms related to my research.

4.2.2 Selection of the data

I used Masress search engine to find newspaper articles that cover the topic of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and the Nile water issue between 2010 and 2019. I used the following search terms to ensure that the search results include all the news articles that tackle the conflict:

- The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
- The Renaissance Dam
- GERD
- The Nile River
- The River Nile
- Ethiopia

I conducted this search in two ways to ensure that the results include all the news articles that cover the topic. First, I conducted a general search under the Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper section, using these search terms. Then, using the same search terms, I searched by year (e.g., from 1st January 2010 to 31st December 2010). This is to cross-check that I get the same number of articles that came up in the first general search. Both searches brought up results that included not only the conflict over GERD but also general news on Ethiopia and the Nile River. I had to read through the articles that came up in the results to make sure I include only the ones that address the topic of the conflict over GERD.

The data collected comprises (232 articles in total) over the span of the original period under

investigation (2010 – 2019). I downloaded the news articles into individual Word files and included the hyperlink to the article at the bottom of each file (for easy access to the articles online). Then, I put these files in folders according to the year of publication – for example, 2010, contains all the articles that were published during this year. This resulted in a total of 10 folders, one for each year of the period under investigation. I printed all the articles and ordered the news articles manually – according to the date of their publications – ready for manual annotation.

The data collected is very versatile, as it allows for various alterations to answer different research questions. If the articles are grouped according to the date of publication, it can give an overview of how much of the data was published each year. This allows the researcher to cross-check the date of publication with the different events of the conflict. Also, on a timeline of the conflict events, the researcher can easily group and/or search news articles that were published during any particular conflict event. This can be easily managed using NVivo application to upload and manage the data collected by using different codes and case classifications.

For the purposes of my research, I grouped the articles according to the presidential eras during which they were published. This is to help me investigate and present the different functions of the linguistic patterns that would come out of my analysis within its socio-political context. Similarly, it would help the readers to explore the different interpretations of these patterns in relation to the context of the conflict events. I decided to focus on the newspaper articles that cover only one presidential term to make sure I have a small and more manageable amount of data. Meanwhile, it would still be a dataset that is representative of the presidential era that it covers. Hence, I chose to focus my analysis on the newspaper articles that cover the presidential term of President Morsi, which comprises a total of 24 articles. I found this small-sized dataset suitable for the qualitative analysis needed to answer my research questions.

4.3 Dataset annotation

The discussion below describes how I annotated the dataset for the two textual-conceptual functions: presenting others' speech and prioritizing. Section 4.3.1 provides the method I followed to annotate the occurrences of speech presentation and the challenges of this annotation process, outlining examples from the dataset. In section 4.3.2, I explain the method I propose to annotate the challenging examples from the previous section. I also outline the units of analysis I use in this

proposed method. Section 4.3.3 provides the method I followed to annotate the occurrences of prioritizing and the challenges of this annotation process, outlining examples from the dataset.

4.3.1 Annotation of presenting others’ speech

The first stage of annotation addresses the first textual-conceptual function of presenting others’ speech. The first step of annotation was to label the speech presentation mode in which each sentence is reported according to Leech and Short’s modes of speech presentation (SP) (i.e., Direct Speech (DS), Indirect Speech (IS), Free Direct Speech (FDS), Free Indirect Speech (FIS) and the narrative report of speech acts (NRSA).

According to Leech & Short (2007), **DS** refers to reporting what someone has said by quoting the words used verbatim using quotation marks and an introductory reporting clause, whereas **IS** refers to reporting what someone has said, by expressing what was said in different words (p. 255). **FIS** and **FDS** are the freer and more indirect forms of the two above modes, where **FIS** is the same as **IS** only with an omitted reporting clause, while “tense and pronoun selection are those associated with **IS**” (p. 261). Similarly, **FDS** is the same as **DS** only without either or both of the above features (i.e., the quotation marks and the introductory reporting clause) (p. 258). As for **NRSA**, they define it as reporting “a speech act (or a number of speech acts) has occurred, but where the narrator does not have to commit himself entirely to giving the sense of what was said, let alone the form of words in which they were uttered” (pp. 259-60). Table 4.1 presents invented examples by Leech & Short (2007) that illustrate the distinction between these SP modes, where the textual markers of the degree of faithfulness for each mode are indicated in blue font.

SP modes	Examples
DS	He said ‘I’ll come back here to see you again tomorrow’ (p. 256)
IS	He said that he would return there to see her the following day (p. 256)
FIS	He would return there to see her again the following day (p. 261)
FDS	(1) He said I’ll come back here to see you again tomorrow (2) ‘I’ll come back here to see you again tomorrow’ (3) I’ll come back here to see you again tomorrow (p. 258)
NRSA	He promised his return (p. 260)

Table 4. 1 Invented examples of speech presentation categories

Distinguishing the modes of speech presentation has not been a straightforward process during the

annotation phase, rather it was difficult sometimes to determine the SP mode of some sentences. For example, the sentences that would qualify as IS were not always as clear as the case in the invented example provided in the above table. In some instances, it was challenging to differentiate IS from FDS, specifically when *that dependence* is introduced but the tense of the verb is not backshifted. Leech and Short (2007) describe such instances as the *odd status* of IS in terms of truth claims and faithfulness, by being “in a sort of halfway house position, not claiming to be a reproduction of the original speech, but at the same time being more than a mere indirect rendering of that original” (p. 261).

This halfway position creates ambiguity around the SP mode under which we should classify such instances, thus, I annotated them as IS/FDS. In the following table, I identify the different SP modes in an extended extract (1) from an article, where again speech presentation markers are in blue font and the tense that is not backshifted is **emboldened** and underlined.

SP modes	Extended extract (1) from “The Near Tempest” news article
IS/FDS	1 Mohamed Barakat stated as a matter of fact that good intentions are not enough in building sound international relations. And that, he wrote applies to Egypt's relationship with Africa.
DS	2 "Reactivating Egypt's relationship with the black continent requires effective efforts on the economic and political fields on an official as well as popular level," Barakat wrote in the official daily Al-Akhbar.
NRSA	3 While Barakat appreciated the positive moves to improve relations with Africa and the successful visit that Mursi paid to Addis Ababa, he called for a clear Egyptian plan based on a thorough study of the needs of the states on the continent to improve relations.
NRSA	4 Barakat also pointed to the importance of starting with the Nile Basin and neighbouring states as the first phase.
FDS + FDS	5 Thus, he concluded, it is not appropriate to keep the budget earmarked to the Foreign Ministry's Egyptian-African fund in that ridiculously low \$30 million. "If we are serious in our attempt to start a new phase in our relations with Africa, the budget should be multiplied tenfold at least."

<p>IS/FDS + ? + ?</p>	<p>6 Akram El-Kassas wrote that interests and national security govern relations between states. Egypt's interests in Africa are on various levels, the most important of which is the Nile water issue. Thus, Egypt should improve its relations with the Nile Basin states.</p>
<p>DS</p>	<p>7 "Egypt is in need to rebuild its relation with Africa in general and the Nile Basin states in particular on the basis of mutual economic and human interests," he wrote in the independent daily Al-Youm Al-Sabei.</p>
<p>IS</p>	<p>8 The writer suggested that we could benefit from Egypt's role in Africa in the fifties and sixties in addition to studying the present investment opportunities that could come out with mutual benefits.</p>

Table 4. 2 Ambiguous cases of IS and FDS

The ambiguity created by the tense not being backshifted is not limited to instances of IS and FDS modes; it was also challenging to distinguish the reporter’s narrative from the freer forms of reported speech (i.e. FIS and FDS). Specifically, the instances when both reporting features (i.e. the quotation marks and the introductory reporting clause) are omitted as can be seen in paragraph 6 in the table above. In such cases, it was difficult to determine whether these sentences were the reporter’s or said by the reported voice. I annotated such instances as FDS/reporter or FIS/reporter, firstly, to differentiate them from the clear instances of FIS and FDS, and secondly, to refer to the lack of clarity about discourse agency in these sentences even before any occasions of transitions or blending with other speech modes of neighbouring sentences. Table 4.3 shows two instances where the ambiguity falls between the reporter and the reported voice as demonstrated in the underlined sentences, where again SP markers are in blue font:

<p>SP modes</p>	<p>Examples</p>
<p>FIS/reporter</p>	<p>[1] “There has been no agreement governing the use of this dam, so there is nothing that prevents Ethiopia from using its water for any project,” he added. Enebar said that there would be adverse effects of the reduced flow of the Nile on the environment, with increased pollution and increases in salinity threatening fish and plants.</p> <p><u>Damming such a huge amount of water behind the dam's reservoir would also increase the amount of evaporated water by 0.5 per cent.</u> “This is not a small problem, since only some five per cent of the river's water is currently utilised, while the rest is wasted,” Enebar said.</p> <p>(Abdel Razek, 2013, Watering economic woes)</p>

FDS/reporter	<p>[2] Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaeddin agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. <u>Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.</u></p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)</p>
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Table 4. 3 Ambiguous cases of reporting/reported speech

We can see in the FIS/reporter example that the underlined sentence is fully integrated into the speech of the reported voice, which makes the reader more inclined to consider it FIS, however, the prospect of this sentence being the reporter’s narrative remains. Similarly, in the FDS/reporter example, we can see that the fact that the underlined sentence goes right after what is reported makes the reader more inclined to consider it FDS, yet again the prospect of this sentence being the reporter’s narrative remains. While Leech & Short (2007) have already found the lack of quotation marks and locutionary clauses to produce ambiguity that creates confusion in the readers’ minds regarding who is saying what, which results in attributing the speech to other characters in the novel, the consequences of such ambiguity in the field of politics have a more serious impact on the audience which deserves further investigation.

This ambiguity created by the tense not being backshifted was also encountered in some instances where it was difficult to decide whether some sentences qualify as FIS or FDS. This is because the changes that usually take place when the conversion from direct speech to indirect speech happens are no longer obvious in the freer forms of reported speech. This can be observed in the above examples in table 4.3, where the only differentiation between the FIS and FDS is the verb tense being backshifted. Otherwise, we can no longer trace the indirect speech via the inverted commas, subordination, or the change of pronouns. Even the tense of the verb can get more ambiguous where we can no longer decide whether the past tense is the original tense of the sentence or the backshifted form of it as the case in the following example [3], where again SP markers in blue font, the sentence with the agency in question underlined, and the tense emboldened & underlined:

[3] “Meanwhile, the military threats should not be mixed with political discourse. Journalists should stop talking about a military reaction,” **Abdel-Halim told** Al-Ahram Weekly.

The initial reaction to the diversion of the Blue Nile **was** a weak one, with the president's office saying one day after the diversion had been announced that it would not affect Egypt's share of the Nile water.

“Any project on the River Nile requires diverting the course of the water before starting construction. The present project will not affect Egypt's share of the Nile water,” [said presidential spokesman Omar Amer](#) at a news conference.

(El Bey, 2013, Diplomacy is the key)

In the underlined sentence, the tense of the verb is not a clear indicator of the SP mode, as it is difficult to determine whether to annotate the underlined sentence as FIS or FDS. There is also another layer of ambiguity here as to whether this sentence is said by the previously introduced reported voice (i.e., Abdel-Halim) or by the reporter herself. Hence, I annotated such examples as FIS/FDS/reporter. While the first layer of ambiguity has to do with what the reporter commits herself to in terms of faithful reporting, the other layer of ambiguity has to do with a lack of clarity regarding the agency of the speech. Since the core focus of my research question has to do with the people’s ability to hold their governments accountable for their decision, I’m more concerned with the second layer of ambiguity that has to do with ambiguous agency in reporting.

This focus on the agency aspect in reporting rather than faithfulness made me less concerned about some of the above-mentioned ambiguous cases than others since I use the SP modes differently in my research. I investigate these modes as indicators of clear/unclear agency rather than indicators of faithful/unfaithful reporting. Therefore, the ambiguity in examples such as whether to annotate a sentence as FIS or FDS would not be as significant since both modes indicate the agency of the reported voice. However, what remains in question are the instances where discourse agency is ambiguous as the case with the examples annotated as FIS/reporter and FDS/reporter, or even the different instances of what qualifies as FDS. Consider the following example [4] for illustration:

[4] Arbitration in political issues depends on pressure and good relations with other countries and international parties, [he said](#). “Ethiopia has prepared itself with a strong file in favour of its cause. Had it not done so, it would not have been able to convince the international institutions to fund the building of the Dam.”

(El Bey, 2013, Diplomacy is the key)

According to Leech & Short’s (2007) definition of FDS, both sentences in example [4] qualify as FDS, where in the first sentence the quotation marks are missing, and in the second sentence, the reporting clause is missing. The difference between both examples of FDS is that what is in

question in the first has to do with the degree of faithfulness in reporting but not the agency of the person saying the sentence – since the reporting clause exists, whereas in the latter it has to do with the clarity of the agency of the person saying the sentence – since it is reported as verbatim, yet the agency is unclear. Therefore, I developed a model parallel to that of Leech & Short’s that focuses on agency in report to help me account for the instances of SP modes that create ambiguity regarding the agency of the speech reported. In the following section, I provide an account of how this this model was developed as part of the inductive process in my analysis.

4.3.2 Agency in report model

In this section, I explicate the research procedure that led me to devise this proposed model of agency in reporting as part of my inductive process. In 4.3.2.1, I introduce the new classification of the SP modes that I devised to account for discourse agency in reporting. Then, I introduce the different patterns in which VF occurs at the textual level in 4.3.2.2. Lastly, in 4.3.2.3, I introduce the units of analysis I used to describe the VF instances, explaining how these units emerged as part of carrying out the study, and how I coded them.

4.3.2.1 Categories of SP modes

For the purposes of my research, I categorised Leech & Short’s SP modes according to their degree of clarity about agency to examine whether they reflect clear agency of the speech reported instead of investigating the author’s commitment to faithful reporting as suggested in their original model. Thus, I categorised the SP modes according to three degrees of clarity that I observed regarding agency in reporting (i.e., clear, anonymous and ambiguous) based on the initial phase of annotation as explained in the previous section. **Clear** agency is used to refer to the instances where the reader can identify the voice whose speech is reported, whereas **anonymous** agency refers to the instances where the reader is unable to identify the voice whose speech is reported. **Ambiguous** agency is used to refer to instances where it is difficult to decide whether a sentence belongs to the reporter’s narrative or to the speech of the reported voice. Table 4.4 shows how the SP modes are categorised under the new proposed model:

Agency in report	Clear				Ambiguous		Anonymous
SP modes	DS	IS	NRSA	FDS	FIS	FDS	FDS

Table 4. 4 Categories of agency in reporting

We can see in the table above that according to Leech & Short's (2007) original definition of FDS mode, some different instances of FDS would qualify under different categories in the new model I propose. This is because the original definition accounts for three mixed degrees of clarity regarding discourse agency in reporting as demonstrated in table 4.5:

Examples of FDS	Clarity
<p>[5] Hani Raslan, from Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, said the move is positive inasmuch as it seeks to find a mechanism for cooperation and emphasises the will of the three member states to cooperate.</p> <p>(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)</p>	<p>Clear</p>
<p>[6] Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaeddin agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. <u>Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.</u></p> <p>(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)</p>	<p>Ambiguous</p>
<p>[7] <u>“War is never a solution. The solution is to look rationally at the issues. When you do that you realise that the states making requests so that they can develop have every right to what they are asking for. Surely it should be possible to sit and agree on a quota for each state.”</u></p> <p>(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)</p>	<p>Anonymous</p>

Table 4. 5 Mixed degrees of clarity regarding agency in FDS

Hence, I needed to revise the definition of FDS in my proposed model to account only for the cases where the agency of the reported speech is anonymous, such as example [7]. In this case, I use **FDS** to refer to reporting what someone has said by quoting the words used verbatim without using a reporting clause. Meanwhile, I annotated the ambiguous cases like example [6] as FDS/reporter, since they are reported in present tense, yet they lack a reporting clause. As for the examples like example [5], I treated them as a sub-type of DS on the grounds that they reflect clear agency. It is worth noting here that while annotating the data for SP modes, I observed that VF tends to occur due to the ambiguous agency of the speech reported at multiple textual levels not only on the single sentence level, which I shall explain in detail in the following section.

4.3.2.2 Voice fusion at the textual level

I annotated all the ambiguous instances regarding discourse agency as voice fusion (VF), while

denoting the textual level at which VF occurs. For example, I used the term “**sentence level**” to refer to the VF that occurs at the single sentence level as the case with the above-mentioned examples where it is hard to pin the sentence under one SP mode. Whereas I used “**paragraph level**” to refer to the VF that occurs due to the transition between the ambiguous or anonymous SP modes and other modes, creating ambiguity about the agency of the neighbouring sentence(s) within the same paragraph. Lastly, I used “**exchange level**” to refer to the VF that occurs due to the transition between and across multiple paragraphs, creating ambiguity about the agency of one or more of the following paragraphs. Table 4.6 shows instances of VF at these three textual levels:

Textual level	Extended extract (2) from “Dampening disputes” article	SP modes
	1 Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since “the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.”	DS
Exchange level	2 <u>“The depth of the Nile's course in source countries, especially in Ethiopia, is 500 metres deep. This makes it impossible to build anything similar to the High Dam in just 10 months. But without building in such a compressed timetable anything that is constructed will be flushed away by the annual two-month flood”</u>	FDS
Sentence/ Paragraph level	3 Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaaeddin agrees with Nasreddin’s assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. <u>Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.</u>	NRSA + DS + FDS/reporter

Table 4. 6 VF instances at the different textual levels

Two voices are introduced in this extract resulting in VF at the exchange level where the agency of the entire paragraph 2 within this exchange being in question. On the other hand, we can see that the underlined sentence in paragraph 3 with the ambiguous agency creates VF not only at the sentence level where we are unsure whether we should annotate it as FDS or reporter, but also at the paragraph level. This is because there is a potential effect to be created in the reader’s mind regarding their perception of the agency of the underlined sentence as a result of transitioning from sentences with clear agency to sentences with ambiguous agency.

It is worth noting here that Leech and Short (2007) have touched upon some examples of these transitions in the narrative report in novels, however, they did not identify their patterns. Rather, they were more interested in explaining how this effect of ambiguity comes about and the literary effect these transitions create. They concluded that in such cases of ambiguity “the mode of speech presentation is determined not by the presence of formal linguistic features alone, but also by our knowledge of extra-linguistic contextual factors” (p. 256). In the literary context, such factors have to do with the reader’s familiarity with the manner of expression of certain characters and/or the narrator’s style based on which they attribute the agency of the discourse to these characters or the narrator. I didn’t find this applicable to the context of news reporting since transparency and clarity about the agency of the reported voices is essential.

Even though Semino & Short (2004) attempted to refine Leech & Short’s model to be applicable to other written narrative genres by introducing a new annotation system signalling ambiguities across modes of presentation, they continued to address the faithfulness aspect of speech presentation where the ambiguity about agency remained unaddressed. So, I decided to investigate this ambiguity further where I call these transitions that facilitate the occurrence of VF blending. **Blending** refers to the patterns where the speech reported begins in a speech presentation mode and then blends into another mode creating ambiguity about the agency of the neighbouring sentences or paragraphs. I identified the most common patterns of blending and categorised them in the analysis chapter based on the clarity of agency of the SP modes between which the blending of the speech and narrative occurs. At this stage, it was important to pinpoint the units of analysis I use when referring to the patterns of VF. The identification, as well as the annotation of these units, will be discussed in the following section.

4.3.2.3 Units of analysis

The units of analysis are meant to enable me to chunk up the news article into sections to describe the patterns in which VF occurs at the textual level. The reason I’m interested in looking at the structure in which the content is delivered is to identify how this structure impacts the function of the textual features laid out in the text. Even though White (1997) also looks at the structure of newspaper articles by examining the generic organization of the English-language print-media reports, the two types of reports that he identifies their generic structure do not serve the purpose of my analysis. Because when I’m looking at the format of reporting in the news articles, I do not

aim to identify the generic organization of the news article, rather to identify the boundaries within which VF instances occur to help me when exemplifying these instances in the analysis chapter.

Since the boundaries of the units of analysis were observed to be affected and shaped by the format of reporting in the news articles, the SP modes were examined in units based on the format of reporting. Two main formats of reporting were widely encountered in this dataset: **the first format** is where the news articles discuss one subject matter (i.e., the issue of GERD for example) and the reported speech of different voices are listed one after another. In this case, the contribution of each reported voice is presented in one block of paragraphs. Therefore, it was easy to identify the boundaries of the content of their contribution since they are determined by the beginning and the end of the contribution of the voice whose speech is presented at one time, before moving on to the following reported voice as illustrated in the following extract in table 4.7:

Units of analysis	Extended extract (3) from “The near tempest” news article	News reporting (format 1)
<p>Contribution unit 1</p>	<p>1 Mohamed Barakat stated as a matter of fact that good intentions are not enough in building sound international relations. And that, he wrote applies to Egypt's relationship with Africa.</p> <p>2 "Reactivating Egypt's relationship with the black continent requires effective efforts on the economic and political fields on an official as well as popular level," Barakat wrote in the official daily Al-Akhbar.</p> <p>3 While Barakat appreciated the positive moves to improve relations with Africa and the successful visit that Mursi paid to Addis Ababa, he called for a clear Egyptian plan based on a thorough study of the needs of the states on the continent to improve relations.</p> <p>4 Barakat also pointed to the importance of starting with the Nile Basin and neighbouring states as the first phase.</p> <p>5 Thus, he concluded, it is not appropriate to keep the budget earmarked to the Foreign Ministry's Egyptian-African fund in that ridiculously low \$30 million. "If we are serious in our attempt to start a new phase in our relations with Africa, the budget should be multiplied tenfold at least."</p> <p>-----</p> <p>6 Akram El-Kassas wrote that interests and national security govern relations between states. Egypt's interests in Africa are on various levels, the most</p>	

Contribution unit 2	<p>important of which is the Nile water issue. Thus, Egypt should improve its relations with the Nile Basin states.</p> <p>7 "Egypt is in need to rebuild its relation with Africa in general and the Nile Basin states in particular on the basis of mutual economic and human interests," he wrote in the independent daily Al-Youm Al-Sabei.</p> <p>8 The writer suggested that we could benefit from Egypt's role in Africa in the fifties and sixties in addition to studying the present investment opportunities that could come out with mutual benefits.</p>
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Table 4. 7 Units of analysis from news reporting format (1)

As seen in the table above, the contribution of each reported voice forms a unit of analysis which I call a **contribution unit**, where any VF that occur within it usually falls between only two voices (i.e., the reporter and the reported voice). During the annotation stage, I identified the boundaries of each contribution unit by drawing two lines; one marks the beginning of the contribution and the other marks the end of it. A contribution unit usually comprises multiple paragraphs, where the reporter presents the speech of one reported voice in a variety of SP modes. Each paragraph comprises one sentence or more, each sentence represents a smaller unit which is the **speech unit**. A speech unit is the smallest unit of analysis, which is the sentence that carries the SP mode.

The **second format** of reporting that was widely encountered in this dataset is where the writer of the news article is not merely reporting or listing the opinions of the different writers on the topic of the article. Rather when they are also making a point by drawing upon the opinions of different reported voices and making connections and/or comparisons between them. In this format, the contribution of each reported voice is not presented one after the other, but rather they are referred to and presented throughout the news article in multiple different sections. For example, in this format, the news article may be divided into multiple subsections, where each subsection discusses one certain point or idea. In this case, the writer of the news article would report the speech of multiple voices under different subsections.

In this case, the contributions of the different reported voices were observed to intersect, forming a unit of analysis which I term **exchange unit**. The exchange unit comprises several contribution units of multiple reported voices, in which case, VF occurs across contribution units rather than within a contribution unit. Table 4.8 illustrates the annotation of the units of analysis from the second format of news reporting:

Unit of analysis	Extended extract (4) from “Dampening disputes” news article	News reporting (format 2)
Contribution unit	<p>1 Nasreddin Allam, former water resources and irrigation minister, pointed out that the Renaissance Dam is one of four dams which Ethiopia plans to construct on the Blue Nile, one of two main tributaries that provide Egypt with 60 per cent of its annual share of 55.5 billion cubic metres of water.</p> <p>2 “The storage capacity of the Renaissance Dam is 200 billion cubic metres. Add to this the capacity of the Takazi Dam work on which began in 2009 and one can foresee a situation in which Ethiopia will control the amount of water coming to Egypt and Sudan,” argues Allam. <u>The Takazi Dam is on the Stet River, the other tributary of the River Nile.</u></p> <p>3 Ethiopia, says Allam, plans to construct four dams for irrigation purposes that are also capable of generating 2,000 megawatts of electricity, nine times the amount produced by Egypt’s High Dam. <u>This is in addition to 25,000 megawatts planned to be produced by other rivers in Ethiopia.</u></p> <p>4 “Ethiopia will be the biggest exporter and controller of energy in East Africa. It will soon be exporting energy to Somalia and Djibouti in the east, Kenya and Uganda in the south, Sudan and South Sudan in the west, and to Egypt and Europe in the north,” said Allam.</p>	
Contribution unit	<p>5 Hani Raslan, head of the Sudan and Nile Basin Countries’ Studies Programme at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, says that following the Ethiopian announcement, “Egypt can expect to lose at least seven billion cubic metres of its share of water once the Grand Renaissance Dam is finished.”</p> <p>6 <u>The River Nile is the confluence of the White Nile, with its source in Lake Victoria, and the Blue Nile which springs in the Ethiopian highlands. It provides 90 per cent of the water needs of Egypt’s 90 million inhabitants.</u> Water experts say that even if Egypt’s share remains constant population growth will outstrip existing water supplies by 2017.</p>	
Exchange unit	<p>7 Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University’s Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since <u>“the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.”</u></p> <p>8 <u>“The depth of the Nile’s course in source countries, especially in Ethiopia, is 500 metres deep. This makes it impossible to build anything similar to the High Dam in just 10 months. But without building in such a compressed timetable anything that is constructed will be flushed away by the annual two-month flood.”</u></p>	

<p>Exchange unit</p>	<p>9 Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaaeddin agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. <u>Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.</u></p> <p>10 Bahaaeddin adds that this does not mean that Egypt approves of the construction of the dam.</p> <p>11 “We are still waiting for the outcome of the tripartite commission,” he says, adding that the commission, mandated to report on the impact of the dam, is due to report in the next few days. Egypt's position, says Bahaaeddin, is that it opposes the dam's construction if it is shown it will negatively impact on Egypt's water share.</p> <p>12 Bahaaeddin also stresses the crisis of water management in Egypt. “We cannot afford to waste a single drop of water,” he says.</p> <p>13 Egypt's position, Bahaaeddin reiterated, is that it does not oppose “any development constructed in any Nile Basin country” as long as it does not “damage the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan”.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>14 <u>Shares of Nile water are based on several principles. According to Raslan, the share of any country must be in proportion to its population and extent of agricultural land. Nile Basin countries should also desist from harming any neighbouring country.</u></p> <p>15 <u>An international dispute will develop between Egypt and other Nile Basin countries should they refuse to alter their position. According to Raslan, there are not many alternatives. “Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option will be the use of force,” says Raslan.</u></p> <p>16 <u>Egypt has set three conditions before signing the Nile Basin Framework Agreement: water security, being informed in advance of any planned projects on the river banks and making the completion of such projects conditional on Egyptian and Sudanese approval.”</u></p> <p>17 “We have water and won't need to think about securing outside water till five or six years from now. We have an adequate amount of water to fulfil our needs for now,” says Bahaaeddin.</p>
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Table 4. 8 Units of analysis from news reporting format (2)

As we can see from the above extract, the first two units are annotated as contribution units similar to the ones from news reporting format (1), where the VF instances are between the reported voice

and the reporter's voice as indicated in the underlined sentences. Whereas the latter two units are annotated as exchange units, since the confusion about the agency in the VF instances falls between two reported voices as can be seen in paragraph 8 and 16, and hence a corresponding confusion about the qualification of the voice of the unit in question based on their different roles (i.e., reporter, official or expert, etc.). The consequences of such confusion about the qualification of the reported voice are of crucial importance during the analysis when investigating the functions of the VF patterns at the interpretation stage. Hence, I distinguished these cases by categorising them under different units of analysis as will be explained in the following section.

4.3.3 Annotation of prioritizing

The third stage of annotation was to label the instances of prioritizing in relation to the role or qualification of the voices, whose speech is reported in the news articles. In the news reporting field, these qualifications are called *attributions*. Attributions, according to Busà (2013), are “a complete identification of the source when it is first mentioned” (p. 42). To identify the patterns of prioritizing in the sources' attributions, I use the model of prioritizing as presented by Jeffries which considers “the syntactic possibilities for prioritizing some information or comment over other, building upon existing knowledge of information structure” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 77).

For the purposes of my research, I focus on two key aspects of prioritizing; the first aspect is related to the prioritization/deprioritization of these attributions in relation to their position regarding the sources/voices they describe. In news reporting, the common information structure for *attributions* is that they typically come right next to the source/voice when it is first mentioned. This means the attribution is generally prioritized in its position in relation to the source that is providing the statement. Thus, I looked at each occurrence of reported speech when the voice is introduced for the first time to identify the position of the attribution in relation to the statement provided.

The second aspect of prioritizing is related to the prioritization/deprioritization of some information over others in the description of the quoted voice that is included in the attribution. In news reporting, the common information that is included in the *attributions* is usually the source's “full name and job title (when relevant) in the first reference” (Busà, 2013, p. 42). This means that the role of the source providing the statement is generally prioritized in its complete identification when it is first mentioned. Thus, I looked at each occurrence of attribution when the source/voice

is introduced for the first time to identify how far the information prioritized in the attribution is reflective of the qualification of the reported voice.

In the following sections, I discuss in detail the annotation of both aspects of prioritizing. In section 4.3.3.1, I explain how I annotated the prioritization of attributions in terms of their position as a clause element. In section 4.3.3.2, I describe how I annotated the prioritization of information structures within the attributions, specifically the information in relation to the source/voice’s role and qualification. In this section, I outline Goffman’s classification of role, to which I propose an adapted classification based on which I annotate the role in my dataset. I also present Fairclough’s membership concept in relation to the qualification of the reported voices to which I propose a framework within which this membership can be investigated.

4.3.3.1 Prioritizing attributions

During the process of annotating attributions, I considered key aspects of how the attributions are positioned in relation to the sources/voices they introduce. I focused on where they appear in the structure of the reported speech to identify which clause element is prioritized. Hence, I looked at the position of attributions that accompany the first mention of each voice whose speech is reported. I annotated these instances either as *fronted* (i.e., when the attribution occurs in an initial position next to the first mention of a source), or *deferred* (i.e., when the attribution is deferred to occur after the speech is reported), or *omitted* (i.e., when the attribution is not mentioned). Meanwhile, I noted the textual elements prioritised in each instance of the different positions to refer to them in the analysis. Table 4.9 provides examples of the different positions of the attribution as well as the elements prioritized in each case:

Position of attribution	Examples	Elements Prioritized
Fronted	<p>[8] Advisor to the Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Rafik Khalil underlined the importance of dialogue if three major sticking points are to be overcome: the mechanisms of any new water sharing system, the issue of prior notification of any project within the Nile Basin and the imposition of a majority rather than unanimous vote among NBI states to ratify any decision. Egypt and Sudan have consistently refused to shift their position on all three issues.</p> <p>(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)</p>	Attribution

Deferred	<p>[9] The aftermath of the Ethiopian decision to divert the Blue Nile and build the Renaissance Dam is still a matter of serious concern. Writers looked at the way the authorities are dealing with it.</p> <p>Mohamed Ali Kheir wrote that without exaggeration, Egypt has entered a dangerous zone because it is the first time that Egypt has been faced with a major threat to its national security.</p> <p>“Egypt's security is confined to two places: its eastern gate [Sinai-Israel border], and the Nile water. In the military dogma the latter is more important. Throughout Egypt's history, it has never faced threats from the two places at the same time,” Kheir wrote in the independent daily Al-Shorouk.</p> <p>(El Bey, 2013, Two train tracks)</p>	Affiliation
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Table 4. 9 Different positions of attributions

It is worth noting here that these categories are not only relevant when annotating the attributions of the speech reported, but also when annotating the attribution of the writers of the news articles. This is evident, especially, in a number of news articles, where crucial information is reported, yet not in reported speech but rather in the voice of the news article writer. Therefore, in such cases, the readers need to identify the attribution of the writer and his/her qualification to convey such information and opinions. These instances were frequently observed in the data to have omitted attribution. The analysis of the effects of each of these categories and what the reader is invited to focus more on was found to complement the analysis of the effects of voice fusion on the reception of conflict news reporting. The other aspect of prioritizing that is also key to understanding the different linguistic elements that contribute to the creation of VF is the prioritizing of information structures, which will be discussed in the following section.

4.3.3.2 Prioritizing information structures

During the process of annotating the information structures in attributions, I considered the information in relation to the source’s role and qualification. I focused on two main aspects; 1) how reflective these attributions are of the role of the quoted voices; 2) what information is prioritized in the attribution regarding the qualification of the reported voice. Hence, the annotation of information structures went through two stages; the first stage was to label each attribution according to the role of the reported voice, and the second stage was to label the clarity of the voice

qualification as captured in the attribution.

The role of the speaker/writer, according to Goffman (1981), refers to the person being “active in some particular social identity or role, some special capacity as a member of a group, office, category, relationship, association, or whatever, some socially based source of self-identification” (p. 145). He proposes that this role “conflates three roles: *animator* - the person who is actually making the sounds, or the marks on paper; the *author* - the one who put the words together; and *principal*, the one whose position is represented by the words” (as cited in Fairclough, 1995, p. 62). Even though his classification invites the audience to pay attention to the capacity in which the speaker/writer is speaking/writing, some of these roles can be challenging to distinguish by the mere reading of the news. Also, this classification is focused more specifically on distinguishing who produces the discourse not only who delivers it, which is a slightly different focus from what I aim to address by discussing the voice role.

Hence, for the purposes of my research, I adopt his definition of the role and adapt the different roles which the role of the writer conflates. What I adopt is the definition of the role as the capacity in which the reported voice is introduced as well as the capacity in which the reporting voice is functioning. What I adapt are the different capacities that were observed to be the most frequent in the news articles that I collected as well as in news articles in general. The role of the reported voices, in my dataset, was observed to conflate three roles: **official** - the person who represents the stance of the government or the state; **expert** - the one who has relevant expertise in a particular domain of knowledge; and **reporter**, the one who puts the statements of the different voices together to report the updates on the conflict situation. Thus, I looked at the attributions that accompany the reported voices and annotated them either as an *official*, *expert*, or *reporter*. Table 4.10 provides examples of the three voice roles:

Examples	Voice role
<p>[10] Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaaeddin agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)</p>	<p>Official</p>

<p>[11] Unlike the other Nile Basin countries, which have several other sources of water, the Nile provides Egypt with 95 per cent of the country's water needs, Nader Nouredin, a professor of land and water resources at the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, told the Weekly.</p> <p>(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)</p>	<p>Expert</p>
<p>[12] The 25 January Revolution in Egypt put the issue of the water of the River Nile back at the top of the foreign-policy agenda. Diplomatic efforts at creating common interests and boosting economic cooperation seem to be the best way of managing conflicts arising from differences over the distribution of the river's water, and the various countries involved have shown a willingness to build bridges in an effort to capitalise on mutual interests and bring about a win-win situation for all.</p> <p>While popular diplomacy has proven successful in the post-revolution management of Nile water issues, popular-official diplomacy can also help improve relations between Egypt and the other Nile Basin states, building further bridges between them. As if to demonstrate this idea, last week saw the conclusion of a 10-day tour to South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia, in order to involve civil society organisations in boosting cooperation with the Nile Basin states, according to Magdi Amer, assistant foreign minister for Nile Basin states affairs, who headed the delegation.</p> <p>(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)</p>	<p>Reporter</p>

Table 4. 10 Voice roles in reported news

Distinguishing the roles of the reported voices has not always been a clear process; sometimes it was difficult to determine how to classify some of the reported voices under the three above categories. There were instances where it was challenging whether to annotate the role of the reported voice as *official* or *expert*. One of these instances is when the reported voice is presented as an advisor of an official personnel. According to the above definition of the *official* voice, the advisor does not fully qualify as such, since he is not to be questioned for certain decisions taken or to be held accountable for them in case this course of action failed to be in the best interest of the people. However, he may be perceived by the readers as a reliable source of information that is reflective of the government’s stance, decisions, or course of action taken to resolve this conflict. In such cases, I annotated the role of the reported voice in these examples as the *expert* voice.

As for the instances where there was ambiguity around the annotation of the *reporter’s* voice, many of these instances were due to the ambiguity regarding the agency of these units. This usually

happens when the narrative of the reporter is blended in with the reported speech as he goes on presenting the speech of the reported voices while constantly blurring the line between both discourses. However, it was observed that it was rather a simple and straightforward process to identify the *reporter's* voice at the beginning of the news article as the case with example [12] in table 4.10. This is because the reporter had not yet introduced any of the reported voices, which reassures the reader in such cases that these units are in the reporter's voice.

The annotation of the *expert* voice has been the most challenging compared to the other voice roles. This is because in many instances even though the attribution would reflect the expert voice role, there is sometimes a lack of clarity regarding the voice's qualification created by the omission of some of the details of the qualification in the attribution. For example, the attribution does not reflect a full description of the reported voice as the case in examples [13] – [15]:

[13] Hani Raslan, [from Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies](#), said the move is positive inasmuch as it seeks to find a mechanism for cooperation and emphasises the will of the three member states to cooperate.

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

[14] Amany Al-Taweel, [an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies](#), points out that such open meetings are all but redundant when it comes to addressing the real issues.

(El Bey, 2013, Testing diplomatic waters)

[15] According to Khaled Abu Bakr, [an international lawyer](#), international arbitration would not be in Egypt's interest. Ethiopia is very active in the international community, he told the Weekly, whereas Egypt is not, with the result that Cairo would be unable to exert the same pressure as Addis Ababa.

(El Bey, 2013, Diplomacy is the key)

We can see that in examples [13] and [14], there is no description of the role of the reported voices in the institutions to which they are affiliated. This prioritises the affiliation to the actual role of these voices which reflects the role of the expert even though there is no detailed description of their expertise. This was observed in many instances to possibly affect the reader's ability to question/contest the qualification of the reported voices. Even though Sorial (2017) makes a similar argument that ordinary citizens tend to accept expert views based on their societal

affiliations than assessing their *tokens of expertise* that are presumably stated in their *attributions*, she did not investigate how this conceptual effect is achieved at the textual level.

Also, Fairclough (1995), on the other hand, who refers to this phenomenon as *membershopping*, identifying it as one of the stylistic devices and tools that affects the audience’s interpretation of secondary discourse, did not provide a clear framework that investigates the patterns of how this membershopping happens on the textual level. Hence, in the following section, I propose a framework within which this membershopping can be investigated, where I present a method to identify the patterns of membershopping at the textual level.

This brings us to the second stage of annotation, i.e. the annotation of membershopping instances. During this stage, I annotate the attributions according to the clarity of the qualification of the reported voices, specifically, the clarity of the description of their role. Based on the instances that were encountered in the dataset, I categorized the ambiguous instances of qualification into two main categories: vague and anonymous. **Vague** qualification refers to the instances where the name of the affiliation is prioritized over the full description of the role of the reported voice, placing emphasis on the affiliation. **Anonymous** qualification refers to the instances where the affiliation, as well as the description of the voice role, are omitted, with a mere membershopped reference to qualify the voice either as an expert or an official voice, placing emphasis on the role. Table 4.11 provides examples of two categories of ambiguity about the voice qualification as well as the elements prioritized in each case:

Clarity of qualification	Examples	Prioritizing
vague	<p>[16] Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since “the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.”</p> <p>(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)</p>	Affiliation
Anonymous	<p>[17] In the assessment of one concerned official statements made during the meeting can only undermine Egypt's negotiating position with Ethiopia. “Before the meeting we had a strong legal basis to say that as a Nile Basin country our rights should not be undermined as a result of irrigation schemes by any other Basin state. International law was on our side. Now we are in a position that could be easily qualified by international law as aggressive.</p>	Role

	We have a very tough diplomatic mission ahead of us to remedy the damage,” said the diplomat .	
		(Ezzat, 2013, Outflanked by crises)

Table 4. 11 Ambiguity of role in membership

As we can see, both types of ambiguous qualifications in both examples prioritises the affiliation of the reported voice (as in example 16) and their role (as in example 17) over a detailed description of the capacity in which these reported voices function. This in turn may impact the reader’s critical engagement with the speech reported similar to the impact of deferring/fronting the attributions in relation to the speech reported. This impact was observed to be amplified when coupled with the variant degrees of clarity about discourse agency. Table 4.12 illustrates the conceivable impact of both agency and qualification on the reader’s engagement with the news:

Qualification	Examples	Agency
Clear/ prioritised	[18] Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaaeddin agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. <u>Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.</u> (Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)	Ambiguous
Prioritised	[19] Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since “the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.” <u>“The depth of the Nile's course in source countries, especially in Ethiopia, is 500 metres deep. This makes it impossible to build anything similar to the High Dam in just 10 months. But without building in such a compressed timetable anything that is constructed will be flushed away by the annual two-month flood”</u> (Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)	Anonymous
Deferred	[20] “Why is our government, which is ranked among the 10 least transparent governments, ignoring the least rules of transparency and concealing the report on the dam? It should reveal the results to the people so that they know the magnitude of the crisis facing the country,” Mohamed Ahmed wrote in the official daily Al-Ahram .	Clear

	(El Bey, 2013, Two train tracks)	
Anonymous	[21] In the assessment of <u>one concerned official</u> statements made during the meeting can only undermine Egypt's negotiating position with Ethiopia. “Before the meeting we had a strong legal basis to say that as a Nile Basin country our rights should not be undermined as a result of irrigation schemes by any other Basin state. International law was on our side. Now we are in a position that could be easily qualified by international law as aggressive. We have a very tough diplomatic mission ahead of us to remedy the damage,” <u>said the diplomat</u> .	Clear
	(Ezzat, 2013, Outflanked by crises)	

Table 4. 12 Agency and qualification in reporting

Note how the prioritization of clear qualification in example [18] has the potential to capture the reader’s attention that may result in a lack of attention to be paid to the ambiguous agency in the last speech unit in this paragraph. Similarly, the prioritized attribution in example [19] putting emphasis on the affiliation of the reported voice in addition to the quotation marks indicating faithful reporting may result in a lack of attention to be paid to the anonymous agency of the underlined paragraph. Likewise, the markers of clear agency in examples [20] and [21] may result in a consumption of the speech reported despite the anonymity of the voice’s qualification or the absence of the full description of their role.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, I illustrated how I sourced and collected the data for this research, where I detailed the two stages of data collection and dataset annotation. I also explained the rationale behind choosing a subsection of the data collected to be the focus of my analysis. I outlined how I annotated the dataset according to each of the two selected textual-conceptual functions for this research. Under each subsection of the dataset annotation, I outlined the model I used in annotating the dataset and discussed the practical challenges I encountered during the annotation process. I also introduced suggested adaptations to these models to accommodate the focus of my study and the purposes of my analysis. With this annotation, I provided the foundation for the analysis in the two coming analysis chapters. Particularly, I will present and analyse the VF patterns that came out from the annotation of the textual-conceptual function of presenting others’ speech in chapter 5. Then, I will present and analyse the patterns of the key aspects of prioritising that came out from the annotation of the textual-conceptual function of prioritising in chapter 6.

5. Voice fusion: Who says?

5.1 Introduction

... the true object of inquiry ought to be precisely the dynamic interrelationship of these two factors, the speech being reported ... and the speech doing the reporting ... After all, the two actually do exist, function, and take shape only in their interrelation, and not on their own, the one apart from the other. The reported speech and the reporting context are but the terms of a dynamic interrelationship.

(Volosinov, 1973, p. 119)

When exploring the effect of mediation in the act of discourse presentation, the emphasis here in my thesis is on examining the interplay between primary and secondary discourse. Precisely, I focus on how this dynamic interrelationship, as Volosinov describes it in the above quote, looks at the textual level and in what way it may impact the public's perception of agency in mediated conflict discourse (MCD). In his investigation of this dynamic interrelationship, Volosinov argues that previous research of "the forms of reported speech committed the fundamental error of virtually divorcing the reported speech from the reporting context" (ibid). Thus, he explores the possible directions that "the dynamism of the interrelationship between the authorial and the reported speech move" (ibid). Volosinov identifies two basic directions; the first is the basic tendency toward reported speech to "maintain its integrity and authenticity; a language may strive to forge hard and fast boundaries for reported speech", which he calls the *linear* style. The second tendency is to "obliterate the precise, external contours of reported speech" (pp. 120-121), which he calls the *pictorial* style.

Even though the pictorial style is closely related to what my research problematizes, in his account of this reporting style Volosinov focuses on whether the reported speech only reflects "the referential meaning of the utterance" (p. 121) or it also reflects "the expressiveness, the stylistic qualities of speech, its lexical coloration, and so forth" (p. 119). In this case, the object of inquiry in his research is focused on the effect of the content of the utterance on the public's reception of the news. However, for the purposes of my research, I investigate the linguistic structures of this dynamic interrelationship between primary and secondary discourse to identify its effect on the public's ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions. Therefore, in my account of this pictorial reporting style, I focus on how this dynamic interrelationship may affect the

audience's perception of discourse agency in MCD to highlight the relationship between discourse agency and the possible lack of accountability.

In the coming section, I give a brief introduction to discourse presentation and the two discursive acts it conflates, which I will examine in this chapter and the next chapter. I outline the working definitions of both discursive acts as will be used in my research and delineate the focus of what I investigate under each discursive act. Then, I state specifically the problem I am set to investigate in this chapter and lay out the questions I aim to answer in the following sections of this chapter.

5.2 Discourse presentation in MCD

Considering the nature of news reporting in general and thus the nature of mediated conflict discourse (MCD) specifically, discourse presentation comprises three key interrelated factors: the reporting voice, the reported voice(s) and the narrative/speech reported. Hence, to examine how discourse presentation may affect the audience's perception of discourse agency, I examine the discursive practices where the three factors come into play at the textual level. In this inquiry, discourse presentation is seen as a process that involves two inseparable discursive acts carried out by the author/reporter of the news article: speech presentation and voice presentation. Speech presentation refers to the discursive act, where the news article writer presents the readers/audience with the speech of the sources he/she reports. Voice presentation refers to the discursive act, where the news article writer presents the readers/audience with the source of the information as well as their qualification (i.e. a full identification of this voice when it is first referenced).

The process of discourse presentation in the field of news reporting is called *sourcing*. Sourcing is the “practice of locating and using a person or a publication to provide information” which is “a basic tool in news reporting, as it allows journalists to pursue objectivity and fairness” (Busà, 2013, p. 40). However, with the speech of several reported voices coming into play with each other as well as with the reporting voice in any single piece of news reporting, this journalistic practice poses a challenge for the audience to distinguish the contributions of these voices and therefore the agency/qualification of the agents of this discourse. Therefore, in this chapter, I focus on the discursive act of speech presentation and in the next chapter, I explore the discursive act of voice presentation to identify the patterns of their occurrence in MCD that create a lack of clarity about the discourse agency and qualification of the reported voices.

For the purposes of this research, I use the term voice fusion (VF) to refer to these instances where there is a lack of clarity about the discourse agency and hence qualification that result in difficulty to distinguish what is said by which of the voices whose speech is presented in the news report. By ‘discourse agency’ I mean the ownership of the speech that is reported, and consequently, the ownership of the information that is conveyed in this speech. In this case, discourse agents are the individuals whose discourse and/or stance is presented and/or reported in the news we are reading or listening to and to whom we attribute the agency of the speech reported. To examine how this VF is created by the discursive act of speech presentation and how it looks on the textual level, I aim to answer the following questions:

4. What are the patterns of VF in speech presentation?
5. How do these patterns function at the textual level?
6. How does this VF function in the context of the conflict?

To answer these questions, I explore the previous approaches to the discursive act of speech presentation, specifically the ones that address the pictorial style of reporting to identify their accounts of investigating discourse agency in section 5.3. Then, in section 5.4, I lay out my approach to the investigation of discourse agency in report that I use in my analysis in section 5.5, where I explicate the effect of discourse agency on the public’s ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions by highlighting the relationship between discourse agency and accountability in discourse.

5.3 The discursive act of Speech presentation

The investigation of the tendency of the discursive act of speech presentation to “obliterate the precise, external contours of reported speech” (Volosinov, 1973, pp. 120-121) usually entails two objects of inquiry. The first has to do with the investigation of Halliday’s *ideational* and *interpersonal* aspects of meaning, similar to Volosinov’s focus, in his account of the *pictorial* reporting style. The other object of inquiry, which I aim to bring to a discussion here, has to do with the level of clarity about discourse agency in this *pictorial* reporting style. Even though this latter object of inquiry has been touched upon by Fairclough (1995), in his investigation of the dynamic interrelationship between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ discourse in speech presentation, his account of discourse agency in report remains lacking and in need of further development. Thus, in section 5.3.1, I lay out Fairclough’s account of the two main objects of the inquiry, and

in section 5.3.2, I lay out his approach to addressing the latter object of inquiry, where I highlight the areas that his approach does not necessarily address.

5.3.1 The ‘interpersonal’ vs. ‘agency’

The dynamic interrelationship between the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ discourse in discourse presentation, specifically the pictorial style of reporting, has been addressed by Fairclough (1995). He uses the term ‘*boundary maintenance*’ to refer to “the extent to which the voices of primary and secondary discourse are kept apart or, on the contrary merged” (p. 58). Fairclough bases his framework on Volosinov’s account of the style where the “primary (the representing or reporting discourse) and the secondary discourse (the discourse represented or reported)” (pp. 54-5) are merged. In his research, Fairclough identifies two main patterns of how *merging* occurs at the textual level: *incorporation*, where “the secondary discourse is being translated into the voice of the primary discourse, through vocabulary and other changes” and *dissemination*, where “the secondary discourse ‘takes over’ the primary, in the sense that the voice ... of the secondary discourse directly affects the primary discourse” (p. 58).

To give concrete examples of how each pattern looks in a sentence, I provide below two examples of merging from Fairclough’s research. “Suppose for instance that the Labour leader Neil Kinnock says ‘Margret Thatcher must resign’, and this is represented in two different headlines” (ibid), then the two following examples represent incorporation and dissemination respectively:

(1) *Maggie must get out, says Kinnock*

(2) *Margret Thatcher must resign*

(Fairclough, 1995, p. 58, emphasis in original)

The first example is what Fairclough calls *incorporation*. As we can see, *incorporation* has to do with changes in the interpersonal features of the utterance, where the primary and secondary discourses are merged in a way that renders us unable to identify the exact words from the original utterance. Yet the agency of the utterance, in this case, remains clear due to the existence of the reporting clause. The second example is what Fairclough calls *dissemination*. As we can see, *dissemination* has to do with the presence/absence of the formal features that enable us to distinguish the agency of the discourse. In this pattern, the primary and secondary discourses are merged in a way that renders us unable to decide whether this example is in primary or secondary

discourse. Thus, the agency of the utterance becomes unclear due to the absence of the reporting clause and/or other formal features that mark agency in discourse.

Such an ambivalence regarding the speech of the reported utterance/voice that results from both types of merging can only be cleared when checked against the original speech source, Fairclough explains. In his research, he was able to check the ambiguous instances of reported speech from the newspaper articles (i.e. the data for his research) against the original speech source (i.e. the report of the House of Commons), to which he had access and against which background the news articles were published. However, taking into consideration the normal reading conditions, the readers of the newspapers are not typically in such a privileged position to compare the reported speech to its original utterances in their everyday encounters with the news. While *incorporation* remains problematic in such settings, my focus here is particularly on *dissemination* since it is the type of *merging* that has to do with the level of clarity regarding discourse agency in the discursive act of speech presentation.

5.3.2 Agency and speech modes

To detect how *dissemination* takes place at the textual level, Fairclough identifies a mode in his classification of the speech presentation modes to underlie this type of merging. He calls this mode “UNSIG(nalled)” and he codes it as “UNSIG”. He uses this mode to refer to the “cases where what is clearly secondary discourse appears in primary discourse without being explicitly marked as represented discourse” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 55). He explains that UNSIG “includes what Quirk et al. (1972) and other standard accounts call Free Indirect Discourse (FID)” (ibid). This also includes Free Indirect Speech (FIS) from Leech & Short’s model (2007). I find his codification of a new mode an attempt to make up for the ambiguous cases where it is difficult even for the researchers to classify some sentences under the existing modes of speech presentation.

Fairclough’s UNSIG mode is similar to the FIS/reporter mode that I used in the annotation of my data (see table 4.3). We both do not treat FID (i.e., FIS in Leech & Short’s model) as a separate mode. The reason for this is that “in a number of cases, we have a modal verb” like would “which could be taken either as a ‘back-shifted’ form of a modal in secondary discourse marking FID (here *would* back-shifted from *will* with the meaning of ‘prediction’), or as a modal belonging to primary discourse (would with a hypothetical meaning)” (p. 57, emphasis in original). So, what he did is that he coded all such instances as UNSIG only to check them later against the report in his

data, to find “5 of the 40 instances of UNSIG are examples of FID” (ibid), while the rest were primary discourse. He acknowledges that “under normal reading conditions”, that possibility of checking the instances with the source “would of course not exist, and such instances are likely to be taken simply as primary discourse” (ibid).

However, his UNSIG mode does not account for all the instances of ambiguity as explained in the previous chapter, which I encountered during the annotation of data. For example, his UNSIG mode does not account for the instances where there is ambiguity between FDS and primary discourse (as demonstrated in table 4.3). Or even the instances where there is ambiguity regarding whether some sentences qualify as FIS or FDS because the changes that usually take place when the conversion from direct speech to indirect speech happens are no longer obvious in the freer forms of reported speech. The ambiguity in such instances where the only differentiation between the FIS and FDS is the verb tense being back shifted has another layer that creates further confusion between the reported voice and the narrative voice on top of the abovementioned ambiguity, which is not accounted for in Fairclough’s UNSIG mode.

The other key difference between Fairclough’s inquiry and my research is the way we approach the investigation of *merging* at the textual level, specifically the dissemination pattern. Fairclough identifies “a close link between dissemination and UNSIG”, where “UNSIG is the main mode for dissemination, and all instances of UNSIG involve dissemination” (p. 59). In this, Fairclough focuses his attention on the ambiguity of agency in single units of speech. However, what Fairclough does not necessarily take into account in his examination of this dissemination pattern is the ambiguity that results from the interplay between these units which are inherently ambiguous and other speech units that classify under other modes of speech presentations, and how this ambiguity comes about.

Since my research is interested in investigating the effect of MCD on the reader/listener in their everyday encounters with this type of discourse and under normal reading conditions, I explore these units, taking into consideration the co-textual aspects of their occurrence. In this context, these units do not occur individually or separately but rather they interplay with different speech presentation modes on a larger scale at the textual level, where the functions of these speech modes take effect and are affected by their textual surroundings. Also, for the purposes of my research, I focus specifically on what Fairclough calls the *dissemination* aspect of *merging* since it is the

aspect that is concerned with the level of clarity about discourse agency. Thus, I revisit the modes of speech presentation to address the challenging instances that have not been accounted for in Fairclough's account of *dissemination* to identify a better way to detect how *dissemination* takes place at the textual level.

Hence, in section 5.4, I revisit Leech & Short's classification of modes of speech presentation to suggest an adaptation of their 'cline of interference' that addresses what is unaccounted for in Fairclough's account and thus helps me to better investigate discourse agency in reporting. Then, in my analysis in section 5.5, and in light of the new model, I expand on Fairclough's conception of *merging* within the single unit to include how this merging of voices takes place in long stretches of discourse via the exploration of these speech presentation modes within the *contribution units* and possibly across the *exchange units*.

5.4 Discourse agency in speech presentation

Whilst I investigate speech presentation in the light of and based on Leech & Short's classification of modes of speech presentation, the special focus of my research on agency has created a need to re-envision their cline of 'interference'. This cline lists the categories of speech presentation modes "from the more bound to the more free end", where it starts from "seeing the event entirely" from the author's perspective, but as we move along the cline, the author's interference "seems to become less and noticeable" (Leech & Short, 2007, p. 260). This cline is devised to measure the author's commitment to faithful reporting. For the purposes of my research, I identified a different need to the purpose that this cline was devised for, i.e., the need for a cline that classifies these same speech presentation modes based on the clarity of the discourse agency.

In this re-envisioned classification, I list the varieties of speech presentation on a cline, which I call the cline of 'agency', from DS (the most direct form of reporting) to FDS (the freest form of reporting) in discourse. I categorize these varieties under the varying levels of clarity about the author's delineation of the agency of the reported voices, from **clear** (where the discourse agency of the reported speech is clearly demarcated) to **ambiguous** (where the discourse agency can either be attributed to the reported speech or the reporter) to finally **anonymous** (where the discourse agency of the reported speech is not demarcated), as shown in the following diagram:

Cline of ‘agency’ in report




Figure 5. 1 Cline of agency in report

Based on this new classification, the speech presentation modes are ordered differently on this cline compared to Leech & Short’s original cline. This change in the order of the modes is not the only change that this new cline brings compared to the original cline; it also changes some of the definitions of the speech presentation modes and what qualifies under each mode. Thus, I delineate here the new definitions of these modes based on which they follow the above order on the ‘cline of agency’. For DS and IS, I utilize the same definitions of Leech & Short, where **DS** refers to reporting what someone has said by quoting their words using quotation marks and an introductory reporting clause, and **IS** refers to reporting what someone has said, by expressing what was said in different words (p. 255), while keeping the reporting clause as an indicator of discourse agency.

In this case, both **IS** and **DS** qualify under **clear** agency since they both keep the linguistic features that show clear evidence of reported speech and discourse agency. Consequently, the key linguistic difference between **IS** and **FIS** is the absence of this evidence due to removing the reporting clause and that dependence. However, this linguistic difference does not necessarily generate a freer version of IS as specified in the cline of interference. Rather, it can also generate ambiguity around the agency of this sentence as to whether it qualifies as a freer version of reported speech or as primary discourse. This is why FIS qualifies under the **ambiguous** agency section in the above cline where I code it as FIS/reporter – which Fairclough calls UNSIG in his classification of speech modes.

This brings us to the **FDS** mode, which is the most challenging to categorise on the cline of agency with its current definition from Leech & Short's model. As the current definition qualifies some of its instances under each of the three above classifications of clarity of agency (see discussion under table 4.5). Leech & Short define FDS to be the same as DS only without either or both of the two distinguishing features of DS (i.e., the quotation marks and the introductory reporting clause) (p. 258). Thus, this definition entails three formats of FDS: the first format is missing the reporting clause only; the second format is missing the quotation marks only, and the third format is missing both. For the purposes of this research, I use the first format as the main definition of FDS on the 'cline of agency'.

The reason for choosing the first format to be the main definition of FDS here is because it is one of two formats that maintain linguistic features that clearly distinguish the reported voice from the reporter's voice, agency-wise. The first format creates this distinction due to the existence of the quotation marks, while the second format establishes this distinction by virtue of the existence of the reporting clause. Even though both formats maintain linguistic features that clearly distinguish the reported voice from the reporter's voice, the first format is the only format that qualifies under the **anonymous** agency section in the above cline. Because while the existence of the quotation marks negates the attribution of the agency of such instances to the reporter's voice, the absence of the reporting clause technically attributes the agency of these units to no one.

In this sense, the freeness of the first format in my research has to do with the anonymous attribution of agency (i.e., no reported voice is assigned the agency of this speech), whereas the freeness of the second format has to do with the faithfulness of reporting (i.e., the reported voice is not fully committed to the content of the speech reported). Hence, the first format presents the challenge with the biggest weight in relation to the question of discourse agency which comes at the centre of my 'cline of agency', due to the anonymity of the reported voice, and therefore I annotated them as FDS.

As for the instances that fit the description of the second format (i.e., the one missing the quotation marks only), I treated them as a sub-type of DS. This is because as far as this 'cline of agency' is concerned, such instances are accompanied by a reported subject, which makes them qualify under the **clear** agency section on the cline of agency.

The instances that fit the description of the third format (i.e., the one missing both the quotation marks and the reporting clause), were observed to present a similar challenge to that of FIS during the process of annotation in relation to discourse agency. This is due to the ambiguity these instances pose regarding the agency of the speech reported, and hence I coded them as FDS/reporter. Note that the only distinction between FIS/reporter and FDS/reporter is the tense of the verb being backshifted or not). Thus, as far as this ‘cline of agency’ is concerned, both modes/formats qualify under the **ambiguous** agency section on the cline of agency since they are not accompanied by a reported subject.

5.5 Blending speech presentation modes

To investigate how the merging of the different voices takes place in MCD, I look at these speech presentation modes in long stretches of discourse to explore the patterns in which they occur. Then, I analyze these patterns to identify how they function in relation to the co-textual aspects of their occurrences and in what way they affect the audience’s clarity about discourse agency. The most noticeable pattern that was found across the dataset is when a contribution unit or an exchange unit begins in one speech presentation mode and then “blends into” another speech presentation mode (as Leech & Short describe it), generating ambiguity around the agency of one or more of the embedded speech units. Hence, I shall refer to this pattern as blending in my analysis in the coming sections.

There are two key common patterns in which this blending was observed to occur at the textual level in my dataset: the first pattern marks the move from speech/contribution units with a clear agency to ones with an ambiguous agency, and the second pattern marks a move from speech/contribution units with a clear agency to ones with an anonymous agency. I discuss both patterns in sections 5.5.1 and 5.5.2 respectively. The generated ambiguity from both patterns is observed to “create the impression that they are inseparable and relatively indistinguishable aspects of one state” (Leech & Short, 2007, p. 258).

5.5.1 Blending: clear into ambiguous agency

In this section, I discuss the first common pattern of blending, which marks the move from speech/contribution units with a clear agency to ones with an ambiguous agency based on the cline of agency in speech presentation. In section 5.5.1.1 I examine the contribution/exchange units that

consist of a combination/blend of IS + FIS/reporter units, and in section 5.5.1.2, I examine the contribution/exchange units that consist of a combination/blend of DS + FIS/reporter units.

5.5.1.1 IS + FIS/reporter

In the following contribution units, we can notice that the clarity of the discourse agency of the first speech unit is usually coupled with a lack of clarity about the agency of the latter speech unit. We can also notice that the ambiguity of the latter speech unit is created by the absence of the reporting clause. Even though the absence of reported speech markers does not make these units qualify as reported speech, the existence of other linguistic markers does not negate the possibility of considering them as such either. This is evident in examples [1] – [3], where the speech units with ambiguous agency are indicated in blue font:

[1] Mustafa Al-Guindi, an MP and coordinator of the popular diplomacy delegation that visited Ethiopia and Uganda last year, has described the situation by saying that while Egypt is concerned about the effects of the dam, Addis Ababa has repeatedly emphasised that the dam will not have any effect on the amount of water reaching Egypt. [As a result, no action should be taken until the findings of the tripartite technical committee looking into the matter are released.](#)

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

[2] Hani Raslan, from Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, said the move is positive inasmuch as it seeks to find a mechanism for cooperation and emphasises the will of the three member states to cooperate. [But while it may strengthen relations between the three countries it will not resolve differences between Upper and Lower Nile Basin states.](#)

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

[3] Nouredin gave Ethiopia as an example, saying that though it had the right to open its doors to foreign investment in the field of agriculture, this could not be at the expense of Egypt's share of the Nile's water. [Likewise, Ethiopia's decision to irrigate the land using river rather than rain water should be revised such that it uses non-Nile water or subterranean water sources.](#)

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

We can notice from all the above examples that the ambiguity of the agency of the free units is created due to some contradictory linguistic features that do not fully qualify the units in blue font under either the primary or the secondary discourse. On the one hand, the absence of reported speech markers (i.e., the reporting clause and the quotation marks) allows these units to take on some of the syntactic possibilities of the main clause; eliminating the possibility of considering them as reported speech. This impression is also reinforced by the tense of the units in blue font in

all three examples not being backshifted, hence again eliminating the possibility of considering them as reported speech.

On the other hand, we can also notice that other textual factors, e.g., the use of connectors, contribute to a possible impression of considering these units as reported speech. Note the use of **connectors** (e.g., ‘*as a result*’, ‘*but while*’, ‘*likewise*’) at the beginning of the second speech units in all three examples. These connectors give an elaborative nature by indicating contrast and comparison or cause and effect that puts the reader under the impression that the second speech unit onwards is a continuation of the discourse of the reported voice(s) from the previous speech unit(s). The same can be observed in examples [4] – [6]:

[4] According to Shehata, Ethiopia postponed ratification of the agreement last year, and it has not changed its position since. Moreover, it began working on the foundations of the dam even before Burundi signed the agreement. While the committee has the authority to examine the impacts of building the dam, there has been no mention of what might happen should those impacts be found to be negative on the downstream states.

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

[5] At the end, Kheir described the issue as a real test for Egypt's rulers, institutions and political elite. Unless they unite their ranks and abandon differences, the deluge will swallow everybody. However, the first move needs to come from the presidency.

(El Bey, 2013, Two train tracks)

[6] Akram El-Kassas wrote that interests and national security govern relations between states. Egypt's interests in Africa are on various levels, the most important of which is the Nile water issue. Thus, Egypt should improve its relations with the Nile Basin states.

(El Bey, 2012, The near tempest)

Note that the only difference between this set of examples and the previous set is that each example in this set contains two ambiguous *speech units* instead of one. Similar to the above set, the use of connectors enhances the possibility of attributing the agency of the entire contribution unit to the reported voice from the first speech unit in each of the above examples. Note in example [5], the use of connectors allows the speech units to build on each other, where the second speech unit provides an elaboration of what is mentioned in the opening speech unit, whereas the third speech unit presents a resolution to what has been problematized in the two previous units. The same applies to examples [4] and [6], which make each of the above contribution units sound like a

coherent whole. Even though these speech units are more likely to be attributed to the reported voices from the previous speech units than to the reporter's voice, these units remain problematic either way, since there is no factual linguistic proof that confirms the attribution of their agency to either of these voices.

The other textual feature that was observed to contribute to attribution of agency of the entire contribution unit to the reported subject is **central reporting clause**. I use it to refer to the reporting clause when deferred to happen after the opening speech unit and hence it falls in a middle position between two units. It was observed to function quite similarly to the connectors from the above examples, as can be seen in the underlined reporting clauses in examples [7] and [8]:

[7] Some source countries suffer from periodic drought, points out former minister of water resources and irrigation Mohamed Nasreddin Allam. They are anxious to utilise the Nile for irrigation and, in some cases, for producing hydroelectricity, as well.

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

[8] Nevertheless, Nouredin for one still believes that popular diplomacy alone may not resolve the water problem. Instead, it can act to pave the way for better relations in future and enhanced cooperation. Official diplomacy is more likely to resolve the root of the problem, he said. Without a resolution to the water problem, there cannot be good relations.

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

Note how this puts the reporting clause in a central position between the first and second speech units, which may give the readers the impression that the second speech unit is a continuation of the speech that started in the previous speech unit. While this middle position of the reporting clause can be a strong textual feature that communicates such a cognitive effect as illustrated in examples [7] and [8], this effect may get amplified when paired with other textual features, as can be seen in the emboldened words in the following examples [9] and [10]:

[9] Should the committee find the dam will not impact on Egypt's share of Nile water then there will be no problem, said Raslan. **But should** it conclude the project will negatively affect Egypt then Cairo will be forced to ask Addis Ababa to redraw its plans.

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

[10] The situation is dangerous, he added. **Thus dealing with the matter involves wide consensus in which all the political powers should be consulted in order to reach a joint and clear solution**.

(El Bey, 2013, Two train tracks)

While these two examples maintain the use of the central reporting clause, like the two above examples, they additionally follow a technique like that of ‘*suspended quotations*’ in the field of literature. ‘Suspended quotation’, according to Lambert (1981), is an “interruption by the narrator of a character’s speech” (as cited in Mahlberg and Smith, 2012, p. 52), which creates a **suspension** that Lambert describes as “‘a handy place to put information, gestures, facial contortions’ and other details that he subsumes under the heading of ‘suprasegmentals’” (ibid). We can notice that the suspension in examples [9] and [10] functions quite similarly to suspended quotations. Note how the suspension in both examples creates a place for the reporting clause to exist in a central position between the first and second speech units to function in the same way as in examples [7] and [8]. In this case, the use of connectors, i.e., ‘But should’ at the beginning of the second speech unit in example [9] and ‘Thus’ in example [10], in combination with the use of suspension, is observed to enhance the effect of discourse continuation.

Even with an altered order of the speech units (i.e. the unit with the ambiguous agency coming first), the effect of the suspension remains the same, as can be seen in example [11]:

[11] [Egypt could also take part in financing or building the dam and participate its operation.](#) **And that, Raslan insists**, will open the door for cooperation over other projects.

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

The suspension here has an altered order of speech units compared to examples [9] and [10]. It starts with the speech unit which appears formally to be a narrative report, due to the absence of any reported speech indicators, except for the tense of the verb, which is not necessarily a clear indicator of discourse agency. This impression is quickly altered once the reader gets to the second speech unit, which starts with the coordinating conjunction ‘And that’ – referring to the previous speech unit – followed by a reporting clause; exhibiting subordination and providing the readers with a reported subject. Such a structure can easily subsume the initial impression that this contribution is attributed to the reporter’s voice and instead attribute it to the reported subject. This cognitive effect is reinforced by the nature of the suspension that generates the impression that the information that is introduced in the opening speech unit is being elaborated on in the following unit.

It is worth noting that the challenge with the suspension here is not only applicable if the reader assumed the agency of the entire contribution unit to belong to the reported voice, but it is also

applicable even if the reader was able to distinguish that the agency of the first speech unit, technically, belongs to the reporting voice and that the second unit belongs to the reported voice. In both cases, the effect of the validated proposition made in the contribution unit by the reported voice (who is introduced as an expert) remains, and in the meantime, the accountability of such validation is negated from both voices. Consider in case the reader did not assume the agency of the contribution unit, the subordination suggests that the main proposition which is made by the reporting voice in the first speech unit is supported by the reported voice (through his insistence on the fact that such a step will open the door for cooperation).

Nevertheless, the use of the suspension renders the validation provided by the reported voice incomplete because of subordination, and in the meantime, the main proposition remains only a suggestion by the reporting voice. Consider, on the one hand, the use of the modal verb ‘could’ in the first speech unit indicating a suggestion/possibility of a proposed action that in no way would hold the reporter accountable for a mere suggestion. On the other hand, consider the incomplete validation in the second speech unit, where there is no concrete linguistic evidence that what the reported voice insists will open the door for cooperation is what was proposed in the previous speech unit. This also would in no way hold the reported voice accountable for such a validation, which seems to be taken out of its original context – that in case we consider the first speech unit to be the reporter’s narrative and not the speech of the reported voice.

In some cases, this same effect that was found to be achieved by the use of suspension in the previous example was also found to be achieved even without the existence of the suspension structure, as the case in example [12]:

[12] The writer regarded the meeting held to discuss the Renaissance Dam as an international scandal. [Egypt may take years to correct the repercussions of that encounter.](#)

(El Bey, 2013, Two train tracks)

The *description* of the meeting as an ‘international scandal’ by the reported subject in the first speech unit makes the transition to the *evaluation* of its consequences in the following speech unit more logically attributed to the same reported subject. This is due to the elaborative nature of the second speech unit, which gives the readers this impression of being a continuation of the discourse of the same subject from the previous speech unit. Yet again, the absence of the reported speech indicators in the second speech unit technically attributes the agency of this unit to the reporting

voice. Whilst the use of the modal verb ‘may’ in the second speech unit only indicates speculation of possibility that can simply be expressed by the reporting voice, the serious effect of the description represented in the use of the word ‘scandal’ in the previous unit reinforces the speculation. This is found to collectively result in a contribution that functions as an evaluative statement that appears to be made by the reported voice.

It is noticeable in all the above examples that the speech units in question (i.e., FIS/reporter) provide the readers with mainly two types of information: necessary steps and evaluative opinions. So, in examples [1], [3], [5], [6], [9], and [10], the speech units with ambiguous agency function as direct recommendations of what is necessary or should/should not be done. While in examples [2], [7], [8], [11] and [12], the speech units with ambiguous agency function as statements of opinion. This increases the probability of attributing the agency of these units to the reported subjects from the neighbouring units since they are logically expected to be delivered by the “expert” voice/the reported voices who are likely to possess such information. Yet, as explained in all the above examples, there is no factual linguistic proof that confirms the agency of these speech units with the ambiguous agency to belong to the reported voices. Hence, such attribution of agency remains perceived agency based on which no voices can be held accountable for the information reported in these units.

5.5.1.2 DS + FIS/reporter

This pattern is very similar to the previous one except for one main difference which is that the reporter here commits himself to a more faithful report by reporting direct speech. This pattern also marks the movement from speech units with a clear agency to units with an ambiguous agency. In the following examples, we shall explore how the speech units with an ambiguous agency that occur after a DS speech unit are also more likely to be attributed to the reported voice than to the reporting voice, like the previous pattern. Again, the speech units with an ambiguous agency are indicated in a blue font:

[13] "If the Nile Basin states, especially Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, become genuine partners in joint projects, they could provide food and electricity for all the Basin states," Al-Guindi said. Egypt has the manpower and Sudan has the fertile land to do so. Cooperation could produce food for everyone as a result.

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

Note the similarity between the structure of this contribution unit and the structure of example [7]. The deferral of the reporting clause here, as well, puts the reporting clause in a central position between the first and second speech unit, where the reader is more likely to perceive the second speech unit as a continuation of the discourse of the reported subject from the previous DS unit. That in addition to the elaborative nature of the two following speech units contributes to the creation of the same perception of agency. It is worth noting here that even though the most common pattern of blending that was observed frequently in my dataset moves from clear to ambiguous agency, there were a few instances where the blending moves in a different order, i.e., from ambiguous to clear agency as the case in the following examples:

[14] [The Renaissance Dam, if built, would make the existing Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser, which stores water behind it, redundant.](#) "The Nile's water reaching Sudan and Egypt would be coming through a small canal that receives surplus water left over after Ethiopia has generated the power it wants if this dam is built," he added.

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

[15] [Damming such a huge amount of water behind the dam's reservoir would also increase the amount of evaporated water by 0.5 per cent.](#) "This is not a small problem, since only some five per cent of the river's water is currently utilised, while the rest is wasted," Enebar said.

(Abdel Razek, 2013, Watering economic woes)

Similar to example [11], the two above contribution units start with a speech unit that at a first glance appears to be a narrative report, due to the absence of the reported speech indicators. Similarly, we can notice that this effect is quickly altered once the reader gets to the second speech unit, which is a direct quote followed by a reporting clause. This direct quote can easily subsume the initial impression that this contribution is attributed to the reporter's voice but rather to the reported subject. Especially, with the information that is introduced in the opening speech unit is elaborated further in the following unit.

Note in example [14], that the speech unit with the ambiguous agency functions as a statement of opinion. However, this opinion is of a specialized nature that is logically expected to come from an "expert" voice who possesses such information and in turn is entitled/qualified to make such a statement. This increases the possibility that the reader is more likely to attribute the agency of this unit to the reported subject from the speech unit with the clear agency. The same explanation

applies to example [15] where the speech unit with the ambiguous agency also contains specialized information, whose agency is less likely to be attributed to the reporter's voice.

What is noticeable here about this uncommon order of movement in this blending pattern is that it emphasizes the **information** as opposed to the common pattern of blending that emphasizes the **agency**. In the common pattern, the agency is processed first by the reader/listener, in which case the higher the possibility for the effect of this agency to continue in the following units – in case the following units contain no clear indications of a different agency. In the uncommon order, on the other hand, the information is processed first, in which case the higher the possibility for this information to be attributed to the reported voice from the following unit with the clear agency, as explained above.

Looking closely, we shall find that both orders perform the same function in discourse. In the common pattern, the effect of the continued agency created by the blending of the units with the clear agency and the units of the ambiguous agency makes the audience process the information in the ambiguous units without knowing who said it. Similarly, in the uncommon pattern, the effect of prioritising the information in the unit of the ambiguous agency also makes the audience process the information without knowing who said it. Hence, in both patterns, the audience processes the information irrespective of their agency.

In both cases, we can notice that there are two types of discourse agency at play: assigned agency and perceived agency. **Assigned agency** refers to the agency that is originally assigned by the author of the article to the speech of the reported voices, i.e., **clear**, **ambiguous** or **anonymous** (see figure 5.3). **Perceived agency** refers to the agency that is possibly attributed by the reader/listener to the ambiguous or anonymous units when they interact with the discourse. In this case, DS would be the norm or baseline for the assigned agency, as well as IS – when accompanied by a reporting clause. On the other hand, FIS and FDS would be the norm for the perceived agency as demonstrated in the below diagram:



Figure 5. 2 Types of ‘agency’ in report

As observed in the above analysis, the FIS/reporter mode that qualifies under the ambiguous agency section on the ‘cline of agency’ is not assigned to a certain voice per se to whom the readers can attribute discourse agency. Since the analysis of almost all of the above examples has revealed the non-existence of factual linguistic proof that conclusively confirms the attribution of the discourse agency of the speech units in question (indicated in blue font) neither to the reporter’s voice nor to any of the reported voices. Hence, the agency of these units would usually qualify under the perceived agency type according to the above figure, where the attribution of its agency is dependent on the reader/listener’s interaction with the discourse.

In this case, many linguistic features that distinguish both of the above patterns of blending were found to affect this interaction and generate this perceived agency (e.g. connectors, suspension, subordination, and central reporting clauses). They were found to increase the possibility of the attribution of discourse agency to the reported voices, due to their movement from clear agency to ambiguous agency, creating an effect of discourse continuation of the reported subject from the previous unit with the clear agency. This was observed to result in the processing of information regardless of the lack of clarity around discourse agency, which in turn was found to increase the lack of accountability for the information reported in these units with the ambiguous discourse agency that would likely go unquestioned due to the perceived agency effect.

5.5.2 Blending: clear into anonymous agency

In this section, I discuss the other common pattern of blending, which marks the move from speech/contribution units with a clear agency to ones with an anonymous agency based on the ‘cline of agency’ in speech presentation. In section 5.5.2.1 I examine the contribution/exchange units that

consist of a blend of IS + FDS units, and in section 5.5.2.2, I examine the contribution/exchange units that consist of a combination/blend of DS + FDS units.

5.5.2.1 IS + FDS

In the following contribution units, we can notice that the clarity of the discourse agency of the first speech unit is coupled with a lack of clarity about the agency of the latter speech unit. We can also notice that the anonymity of the latter speech unit is created by the absence of the reporting clause and its reported subject. Even though the absence of a reported subject makes the agency of these units anonymous, the presence of the quotation marks indicates faithful reporting. This is evident in the speech units that are indicated in blue font in the following examples:

[16] Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. [The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since “the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.”](#)

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

In the above example, the contribution unit starts with an IS unit which blends into an FDS unit, which, similar to the first pattern of blending, puts the reader under the impression that the second speech unit is a continuation of the discourse of the reported subject from the previous speech unit. However, the key difference between this pattern of blending and the previous pattern is that the anonymous speech unit poses no ambiguity between the reporting voice and the reported subject, but rather it poses anonymity of the reported subject to whom the reported speech should be attributed. In this case, the effect of freeness that is created by such movement towards FDS is not perceived by the readers as a negative move, since the presence of the quotation marks creates the effect of faithful reporting. Hence, the FDS unit is likely to be perceived as space provided by the reporting voice to the reported voice to explain the matter further in their own words.

The key challenge with this impression of commitment to faithful reporting in the FDS units is that technically speaking, the agency of these units is not actually associated with any particular reported voices. In such instances, even though the quotation marks negate the possibility of attributing the agency of these units to the reporting voice, they do not confirm attributing these units to a reported subject per se either. Hence, in case their agency is attributed by the reader to the reported subject from the neighbouring speech unit, such attribution qualifies under the *perceived* agency type, rather than the *assigned* agency as explained in figure 5.2.

Some of the linguistic features that are found to facilitate this perceived agency under this pattern of blending are to some extent similar to the features that were stated in the previous pattern. Note, for example, how prioritizing the reporting clause in the first speech unit puts emphasis on the agency. This, when coupled with the quotation marks from the second speech unit, enhances the possibility that this anonymous speech unit would be attributed to the reported subject from the initial unit with the clear agency. Also, how the elaborative nature of the second speech unit gives the impression of discourse continuation from the previous unit. While this was observed to have been achieved via the use of suspension in the previous pattern, it is observed to be achieved here via the use of what Heritage and Watson (1979) call *formulation*.

Formulation happens when speakers “formulate ... stories, reports, and announcements, or more generally, *news*” by summarizing in fewer words what was said “in-so-many-words” (Heritage & Watson, 1979, p. 124). Fairclough (1995) considers formulation as a “setting device” that is “usually a summarizing gist of the secondary discourse before it occurs in a fuller representation” (p. 61). By a setting device, he means that it is “concerned with the extent to which and ways in which reader/listener interpretation of secondary discourse is controlled by placing it in a particular textual context (or ‘cotext’)” (p. 60). The textual cotext that we are considering, for the purposes of this research, is the interplay between the speech units within a contribution unit, or between the contribution units within an exchange unit.

Looking closely at example [16], we can note that the sentence “*alarm is unnecessary*” in the first speech unit can be seen as a formulation of what is yet to be explained in fuller representation in the following speech unit. This interpretation is reinforced by the detailed explanation in the second speech unit of why “alarm is unnecessary”. While formulation as a tool may effect such an interpretation, there is no factual linguistic proof that confirms the attribution of the agency of this second speech unit to the reported voice from the previous unit. This effect of discourse continuation that is created by formulation has been frequently observed in many examples:

[17] Thus, he concluded, it is not appropriate to keep the budget earmarked to the Foreign Ministry's Egyptian-African fund in that ridiculously low \$30 million. "If we are serious in our attempt to start a new phase in our relations with Africa, the budget should be multiplied tenfold at least."

(El Bey, 2012, The near tempest)

[18] Ethiopia's Renaissance Dam, says Al-Kousi, will be 250 metres high and create a lake of 72 billion cubic metres. “Ethiopia anticipates cultivating millions of feddans with the water. It has already sold one million feddans to the Saudi company Savola to grow sunflowers for oil and 1.6 million feddans to a US agri-business. The water that is used, as well as that stored in the lake, would once have flowed through Egypt.”

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

In addition to the effect of formulation that gives the reader the impression that both speech units are inseparable but rather complementary to each other and the same of course applies to the agency of these units, we can also note that the information that is provided in the second speech unit of both examples reflects a specialized knowledge of a certain field. This can be observed happening here after two types of statements that are provided in the opening speech units: an *evaluative* statement as in example [17] and a *descriptive* statement as in example [18], after which an explanation is intuitively expected. Meanwhile, given the nature of this specialized knowledge, it is equally intuitively *not* to be expected to be provided by the reporter's voice. Therefore, in such instances, the quotation marks in these FDS units would produce a positive effect of less *interference* from the reporter's side and more space to be offered to the reported subject *verbatim*. This in turn increases the likelihood for the second speech unit in quotation marks to be automatically attributed to that reported subject from the previous unit.

In all the above examples, the information in the second speech units is given more weight and authorization by being reported *verbatim* indicated by the quotation marks. Thus, in case attributed to a reported subject, these units would be assumed/deemed to be reflective of an expert stand on the topic, which makes it highly likely to be trusted. In this case, the readers are more likely to feel reassured that “*alarm is unnecessary*”, in example [16], due to the explanation provided in the following FDS speech unit. Similarly, in example [17], the readers are more likely to question the effectiveness of the systems in place due to the doubts that were cast in the second speech unit by virtue of conditional if, and/or to fear the dam with its described measurements in example [18] due to the consequences of its utilisation that are explicated in the second speech unit in the same example. This attributes power to the quotation marks, which makes the audience more likely to process the information irrespective of their agency and without much questioning of who said it.

The effect of the *formulation* was found to be reinforced when coupled with a central reporting clause, in this pattern of blending, similar to the effect of suspension being reinforced by virtue of

the same feature in the previous pattern of blending. The middle position of the reporting clause in the opening speech unit was observed to contribute to the possibility of attributing the agency of the entire *contribution unit* to the reported subject. Its effect on the perception of agency of the FDS speech unit is noticed to be the same in both patterns of blending, as seen in examples [19] – [21]:

[19] Arbitration in political issues depends on pressure and good relations with other countries and international parties, he said. “Ethiopia has prepared itself with a strong file in favour of its cause. Had it not done so, it would not have been able to convince the international institutions to fund the building of the Dam.”

(El Bey, 2013, Diplomacy is the key)

[20] Egypt will eventually need to increase its own quota, he says. “Due to population growth an individual Egyptian's share of potable water is less than 750 cubic metres per year, compared to 2,000 in upstream states. Officials must start talking about this and associated issues. The most important principal is that the Nile is for all countries.”

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

[21] Looking for ways to maximise the utilisation of its current water resources is now a matter of life or death for Egypt, said Enebar. “We should reactivate the Jongeli Canal project, which would increase the volume of water coming from the southwestern tributaries of the river in Sudan by digging a canal bypassing the swamps where most of this water is being wasted.”

(Abdel Razek, 2013, Watering economic woes)

While the use of *formulation* and the central reporting clause has the potential to create the effect of perceived agency regarding the FDS units as seen in the above examples, there are no actual reported subjects whom the reader can hold accountable for the information/statements provided in these FDS units. Looking at the above examples, we will find that the information whose provider should be held accountable for its validity is assigned *anonymous agency* (in the FDS speech units), whereas the information that is generally less crucial is assigned *clear agency* to the reported subjects (in the IS speech units). Note in example [19], for instance, the unit with clear agency reflects general information about arbitration and its correlation with good international relations, while the unit with the anonymous agency has specific information about Ethiopia's situation in relation to the general information that was provided in the previous speech unit.

The critical consequences of perceived agency in such an example cannot be summarized only in the lack of accountability for the authenticity of the information provided in the anonymous speech unit, but also in its consequences within the context of the conflict. In this context, where various resolutions are being discussed, some resolutions are considered, and others are excluded. In this example, arbitration is one of the resolutions discussed in this article, and while the statement of the reported subject in the first speech unit of this contribution is observed to be fairly neutral toward this resolution, the contribution unit, on the whole, communicates a different orientation toward this resolution. This interpretation is implied by the information included in the anonymous speech unit which indicates Ethiopia is privileged somehow in relation to this resolution. It is also consolidated by the following ambiguous unit in the same exchange unit as indicated in blue font:

Arbitration in political issues depends on pressure and good relations with other countries and international parties, he said. “Ethiopia has prepared itself with a strong file in favour of its cause. Had it not done so, it would not have been able to convince the international institutions to fund the building of the Dam.”

Arbitration is also a long process and one that involves Ethiopia's consent. Its outcome would be binding on both parties.

With such an interpretation, the reader would be left with an excluded resolution to the conflict, however with no clear agency of who actually excluded this resolution. Hence, the challenge here is not only applicable if the reader assumed the agency of the entire contribution unit to belong to the reported voice, but it is also applicable even if the reader was able to distinguish the difference between the clear and anonymous units. In both cases, the reader would be left with an excluded resolution regardless of who made the exclusion.

5.5.2.2 DS + FDS

Even though the main difference between this pattern of blending and the IS + FDS pattern is the author's commitment to faithful reporting in the first speech unit, this pattern also comes with its challenges in relation to its contribution to the achievement of the perceived agency. One key textual feature that was observed to contribute to this effect is the use of suspension, as seen in examples [22] and [23]:

[22] "This is a great mistake," Noureddin said. "Canada which has only two per cent fresh water, is a developed country. Other desert states that do not possess water at all have also achieved development." The presence of countries like China, Korea and Israel in the Nile Basin states and

their rapidly growing investment there are also dangerous signs that could lead to further differences among the states in the future.

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

The suspension here, as noted in the above section, creates a place for the reporting clause to exist in a central position between the first and second speech units to function in the same way as the deferred reporting clause. It creates the impression that the discourse that started in the first speech unit is continuing in the following unit. Yet again, this cognitive effect that may get created by the use of suspension here has no factual linguistic proof that confirms the agency of the second speech units in these instances to belong to the reported subject in the first speech unit. This is because the suspension in the above example was not implemented in the usual way as described by Lambert (1981). Normally, suspended quotations occur within the limits of the same sentence delineated by a comma that separates the speech of the reported voice from the narrative of the narrator, however, this is not the case here. The speech units in example [22] are rather separated by a full stop, which technically separate the agency of both units even though the cognitive effect of suspension does not. The tangible challenge with this style of suspended quotations that is separated by a full stop, as far as my research is concerned, is that the lack of proof of agency in these units equates to a lack of accountability in relation to the statements made.

Note also that in this example, similar to example [19], there is no actual reported subject whom we can hold accountable for the authenticity of the information/statements provided in the FDS unit. In this case, the information whose provider should be held accountable for its validity is assigned an *anonymous agency* (in the FDS speech unit), whereas the information that is generally less crucial is attributed *clear agency* to the reported subjects (in the DS speech units). Also, there is no actual linguistic correlation between what the reported subject describes as a mistake and the information that is provided in the subsequent units. It is also worth noting here that the critical consequences of perceived agency and therefore the lack of accountability do not only involve the challenge of the authenticity of the information provided but can also be seen within the larger context of the conflict as evident in example [23]:

[23] “There aren't a lot of alternatives in such cases,” says Abul-Wafa. “Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option is the use of military force.”

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

Note that while the anonymous unit in this example does not contain specialized information which the reader needs a reported subject to hold accountable for its authenticity, its consequences are more embedded within the context of the conflict. In this context, while various resolutions are being discussed, a critical resolution is introduced in the FDS unit. In this example, “military force” is the controversial resolution that is technically being introduced by an anonymous voice. Note how the statement of the reported subject in the first speech unit of this contribution, where the agency is clear, contains no suggestions of resolutions. Yet, the contribution unit, on the whole, due to the effect of the suspension, communicates a suggestion of a resolution; a controversial one.

Putting this into the broader context of the conflict, due to this effect of perceived agency, the audience will more likely fail to identify, as they read or follow the news, who introduced which resolutions. Or which resolution is a mere suggestion by an expert voice and which resolution is a decision taken by the government. This can be seen as one of the critical consequences of this effect of perceived agency, which even if created at the textual level, its challenging effect does not remain at that level. While the instant consequences are challenging during the process of reading the news, the long-term consequences are even more challenging, in the context of a prolonged conflict like the one under investigation. In such a context, it would be almost impossible for the audience to remember who presented certain resolutions and who should be held accountable for what.

The effect of the suspension was also observed to be achieved at the textual level through the use of a standard central reporting clause even without the use of suspension, as the case with examples [24] and [25]:

[24] "My main concern now is to know from the unbiased committee that will disclose its findings to the peoples of the Nile Basin countries whether the dam will harm Egypt or not," Al-Guindi told the Weekly. "If the report states that it will, Egypt will argue that the CFA is illegal as it would deprive Egypt of one of its basic human rights, water."

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

[25] "In the event the dam collapses much of Sudan will be inundated. Egypt's High Dam would be seriously affected if Lake Nasser happened to be full," warns Raslan. "The Italian company which was awarded the construction contract [without tender] has said it will inject the ground with cement but this will only delay any potential problems."

(Leila, 2013, Conflicting reports)

Note the effect of suspension in example [24] is created by the discussion (in the FDS unit) of two possible scenarios of what might happen based on the findings of the committee that are mentioned (in the previous DS unit). Similarly, in example [25], it is created by the expression of concern (in the DS unit) of the dam collapsing, and the statement of (suspected) reassurances (in the following FDS unit). The blending, created by the suspension, is observed to give the impression that both speech units in each of the above examples are faithfully reported while in fact, it is not the case, as explained above. This is why the function of the central reporting clause here is observed to be equally critical, as while it is a tool that separates agency at the textual level, this separation of the discourse agency may highly remain at that textual level, given the possibility of perceiving the FDS unit as a DS unit at the conceptual level.

This being the case if we look closely at the information that is included in the DS units, which the reported voices can actually be held accountable for, we can notice here that these units include basic information/general comments that pose questions/raise concerns, where the accountability factor for such information is not a concern. While in the meantime the FDS units, which none of the reported voices can actually be held accountable for, include evaluation stands and suggested resolutions, where the accountability factor for such information is a concern.

Note in example [24], the reported subject is quoted to only express concern by posing a question “whether the dam will harm Egypt or not”, while the speech unit with the anonymous agency is the unit that actually states a suggested course of action in case the findings from the report proves that the dam will harm Egypt: “Egypt will argue that the CFA is illegal as it would deprive Egypt of one of its basic human rights, water”. Similarly, in example [25], the reported subject is quoted to merely indicate a general comment that “There aren't a lot of alternatives in such cases”, while the speech unit with the anonymous agency states a serious course of action: “the only remaining option is the use of military force”.

Another linguistic feature that was also observed to create this effect of perceived agency, which in turn affects the accountability in discourse is what Fairclough calls *slipping*. Fairclough uses this term to refer to slipping between modes when the one *speech unit* happens to contain mixed agencies. We can find these segments of slipping underlined in black font while the segments with anonymous or ambiguous agency indicated in blue font in examples [26] and [27]:

[26] “The Nile Basin Initiative [NBI] was launched in 1998 to establish regional cooperation among the countries who share the Nile following major agricultural changes,” says Allam. **Egypt has no problem in supporting any of the Nile Basin countries which want to build dams for producing electricity** “as these types of dams do not affect Egypt's quota of the water”, he adds. But dams built for storing water to be used in agriculture are another matter altogether. They constitute a “huge threat to Egypt's share of Nile water and accordingly Egypt can never agree to them”.

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

[27] **All the states concerned should work on the principle of "don't harm anybody, and don't allow anybody to harm you."** according to Al-Guindi. **It would not be acceptable for Egypt to live under a "water poverty line"**, he said. **However, it would also be unacceptable for Ethiopia to suffer from a shortage of electricity.**

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

Even though Fairclough (1995) treats slipping as a sub-type of direct discourse on the grounds that slipping in most of these instances has always been into direct speech (p. 55), I realised that these segments of units become problematic in terms of the accountability concern. While Fairclough argues that slipping marks an “explicit demarcation between the ‘voice’ of the reporter or the newspaper and the ‘voice’ of the person whose discourse is being represented” (p. 56), there is no linguistic proof that these segments that occur outside of the quotation marks belong to the reporter’s voice. In this case, the segments in blue font remain agentless with the possibility of being attributed to the reporter or the reported subject (i.e., in a freer form of reporting).

Looking at the above examples, the segments in black, in theory, are the ones which the reported voice(s) can be held “*fully*” accountable for. We can notice that in examples [26] and [27] that these segments provide the readers with incomplete information, due to being taken out of their original context. Note in example [26], the segment that is attributed to the reported voice contains a confirmation that “*these types of dams do not affect Egypt's quota of the water*”, however, there is no actual antecedent reference in this segment of the speech unit that the determiner ‘these’ refers to. Also, there is no linguistic proof either that the determiner ‘these’ necessarily refers to the “dams for producing electricity” that are mentioned in the segment that, in theory, is not attributed to the reported voice. Hence, such segments do not present complete information that the reported subject can be held accountable for. Yet, when read in its cotext, they are highly likely to be perceived as one unit where the meaning is complete due to the blending of both segments.

The other matter that is fairly noticeable in this example, looking closely at the blue segments, is that the entire argument that is being made in this example is made by an anonymous or ambiguous voice. Note that the entire argument that “Egypt has no problem in supporting any of the Nile Basin countries which want to build dams for producing electricity” is **not** made by the reported subject. Also, the entire comparison between the “dams for producing electricity” and the “dams built for storing water to be used in agriculture”, and how the latter constitutes a “huge threat to Egypt's share of Nile water and accordingly Egypt can never agree to them” is **not** made by the reported subject. Yet, the consistent use of reported speech markers, i.e., the reporting clauses and the quotation marks throughout the example gives the impression of faithful reporting, which highly likely encourages the readers to process this argument regardless of who made it. Hence, the result of this slipping/blending is contribution units with *perceived agency* attributed to certain subjects, while in essence, these subjects cannot be held accountable for the information provided in such contributions.

Similarly, in example [27], the segments in black, which are technically the ones that the reported voice can be held “*fully*” accountable for, provide the readers with incomplete information, due to being taken out of their original context. In this case, the segment that is attributed to the reported voice contains a statement of the principle “*don't harm anybody, and don't allow anybody to harm you*”, however, there is no actual argument made about this statement. Again, looking closely at the blue segments, we can find that the entire argument is made by an anonymous or ambiguous voice, that “all the states concerned should work on the principle” and that “it would not be acceptable for Egypt to live under a “water poverty line”, as well as “it would also be unacceptable for Ethiopia to suffer from a shortage of electricity”. Note how slipping in this example makes it impossible for the readers to make complete sense of the segments on their own if separated, should they try to, since their meaning only becomes complete when blended. This effect is evident in the example [28], due to the use of the conditional clause in blue font:

[28] **Should a compromise not be reached**, “Egypt will have to launch a political, diplomatic and legal campaign on the national regional and international levels to show that it is presenting a fair case that conforms to international law,” Raslan told participants.

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

Note the use of the conditional clause “should a compromise not be reached” in the first segment implies the condition on which the achievement of the second segment of the speech unit depends. Here, *slipping* creates the impression that the entire contribution unit is attributed to the reported voice, where the readers will be less likely to stop and ask which segment belongs to which voice, and highly likely to attribute the entire contribution unit to the reported voice. Yet again, since *slipping* divides the speech unit into two sections that have separate agency, there is no linguistic proof that the compromise not being reached is the condition on which the reported subject bases his statement in its original context.

Thus, in this case too, when such information is incorporated in a new context/co-text via *slipping*, the attribution of agency becomes problematic regarding the accountability for the information provided. Because even though *slipping* achieves the demarcation between the reporter and the reported voice at the textual level, as Fairclough argues, we notice that at the conceptual level, this demarcation is overlooked by virtue of the effect of the *perceived* agency. Yet, the reported subject is to be held accountable only for the segment that is marked as DS by quotation marks, which may reflect a different meaning if/when retrieved to its original context, as opposed to the new context that bounds Egypt’s action of ‘*launching a campaign to present its case*’ to the condition of ‘*reaching a compromise*’.

Referring back to figure 5.2, we can notice that the anonymous agency of the FDS mode makes it also so that it is not assigned to a certain reported voice per se. Thus, the non-existence of any linguistic proof that conclusively confirms the discourse agency of these speech units renders the readers unable to attribute discourse agency to any of the reported voices. Hence, the agency of these units would usually qualify under the *perceived* agency type, where the attribution of its agency is dependent on the reader/listener’s interaction with the discourse. In this case, many linguistic features that distinguish this second pattern of blending were found to affect this interaction and help generate this *perceived* agency (e.g., formulation, central reporting clause, suspension, slipping, etc.). They were observed to increase the probability of the attribution of discourse agency to the reported voices, due to their movement from clear agency to anonymous agency, which was also observed to result in the processing of information irrespective of their agency. This in turn was found to increase the lack of accountability for the information reported in these units that would likely go unquestioned due to the perceived agency effect.

Hence, when investigating accountability in discourse reporting here, we notice that discourse agency comes at the forefront of this investigation. In this investigation, the speech presentation modes were found to result in two types of ‘accountability in discourse’: *full* accountability and *no* accountability. These two types were found to juxtapose the two types of discourse agency explained in figure 5.2, where *Full accountability* refers to the units or segments that formally indicate a “clear” *assigned agency* and *No accountability* refers to the units or segments that formally indicate an “ambiguous” or “anonymous” *assigned agency*. In this case, **DS** would be the norm or the baseline for full accountability of the information the reported subject provides, while **FDS** remains at the other extreme end of the cline, where no particular voice is to be held accountable for the information provided. This can be seen in the below graph, where the modes of speech presentation are displayed along a cline from full accountability to no accountability:



Figure 5. 3 Types of ‘accountability in report’

While *perceived* agency was found to be inherent even in the single units of speech presentation modes that underlie the ambiguous and anonymous agency, which inevitably entails a lack of accountability for the speech reported, the complexity of this accountability issue was observed to be aggravated by the effects of blending. This is due to the linguistic features of blending that were observed to amplify the impact of perceived agency by constantly removing the distinction between the assigned agency and the perceived agency, which eventually makes the perceived agency go unnoticed. Blending, in this case, denotes the normal reading conditions of the news that create the setting for blending to occur, which makes blending central to the research under investigation. In this sense, blending is seen as a linguistic factor that amplifies an effect that

inherently exists in the single units by virtue of the setting in which the process of reading/listening to the news occurs.

This amplified effect of *perceived* agency forms a correlation between discourse agency and accountability in discourse. In this correlation perceived agency, by virtue of blending, has been observed to be mostly attributed to the reported voices, which instinctively creates perceived accountability that usually facilitates the processing of information irrespective of its (actual) agency. In this case, whatever qualifies under the *No accountability* section in figure 5.3 would not remain as such, but rather it would turn into perceived accountability. This is because the anonymous agency of the FDS mode and the ambiguous agency of the FIS mode makes it so that no accountability is originally assigned to a certain voice per se. Hence, any attribution of accountability to any of these modes is dependent on the reader/listener's interaction with the discourse. And since the attribution of accountability is dependent on the attribution of agency, then any perceived agency has to do with an equally perceived accountability.

The danger of both, the perceived agency and perceived accountability that underlie the conceptual effect, which I call voice fusion is that they do not create confusion per se in the minds of the audience that would urge them to stop and question where the confusion comes from. Rather, it is the fact that they are highly likely to go unnoticed if the audience is not paying attention, due to the effect of blending, that makes their effect alarming. Consequently, the audience is also highly likely not going to stop and question who is to be held accountable for which piece of information that is presented to them, in which case the unnoticed agency would equal unquestioned accountability. At this exact moment, I identify the exercise of power in news reporting; the point where the audience becomes passive recipients of the news. Hence, the first step to resisting this kind of power that is brought about by voice fusion is to ask the question: who says?

5.6 Summary

In this chapter, I examined the first discursive act that underlies the discourse presentation process (i.e., speech presentation) and how it affects the audience's perception of discourse agency in MCD. To do so, I re-envisioned Leech & Short's 'cline of interference' to meet the need for a cline that classifies the speech presentation categories based on their clarity regarding discourse agency. Thus, in the new 'cline of agency', I listed the categories of speech presentation in a way that measures the clarity of the author's delineation of the agency of the voices they report. Using

this cline, I identified the patterns of blending in which voice fusion occurs at the textual level, then I analyzed the functions of the linguistic features that distinguish both patterns of blending. Based on the functions of these linguistic features, I distinguished two types of discourse agency in reporting as well as two types of accountabilities that were found to juxtapose each other in MCD. Finally, I explained the effect of the public's perception of discourse agency on their ability to hold their governments accountable, by explicating the correlation between perceived agency and accountability. In the coming chapter, I will examine the second discursive act that underlies the discourse presentation process (i.e., voice presentation).

6. Voice fusion: Says who?

6.1 Introduction

Sourcing gives us an answer to one of the important questions that readers may ask of a news text: 'to whom can this be attributed?'

(Bednarek, 2006, p. 638)

In this chapter, I report on the second part of my investigation of discourse presentation, i.e., the analysis of the discursive act of voice presentation, after reporting in the previous chapter on the first part of my investigation, i.e., speech presentation. Here, I focus on voice presentation, particularly, how the attributions of the reported voices are presented, i.e., the “complete identification of the source when it is first mentioned” (Busà, 2013, p. 42). This is to examine the effect of the position and clarity of these attributions on the public’s ability to distinguish the reported voice and its *role*, to whom the speech is attributed, as Bednarek puts it in the above quote. Given that voice presentation with its definition here as the discursive act that presents the readers with the source as well as their qualification, it can be seen to overlap with *Epistemological positioning* (EP).

According to Bednarek (2006), EP “deals with questions such as ‘Who is the source of information?’, ‘What is the basis of someone’s ...knowledge?’” (p. 635). In her investigation of EP, Bednarek focuses on the second question, i.e., ‘*What is the basis of someone’s knowledge?*’ She explores the correlation between *evidentiality*, i.e., “the linguistic marking of the basis of speaker/writer knowledge” (ibid) and *sourcing*, i.e., “who is mentioned as the source of a proposition” in naturally occurring text, i.e., newspaper texts (p. 639). However, in my investigation of voice presentation, I focus on the first question, i.e. ‘*Who is the source of information?*’ This is to explore the correlation between the *attributions* of the reported voices and the public’s ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions. Particularly, I examine the effect of the position and clarity of the reported voices’ attributions on the public’s perception of their qualification, i.e. the social role or capacity that qualifies them to make their statements to highlight the relationship between qualification and the possible lack of accountability.

In the coming section, I briefly introduce the discursive act of voice presentation and explain how it helps us answer the question of *Who is the source of information?* Then, I state the problem I am set to investigate in this chapter and lay out the questions I aim to answer in the following sections of this chapter.

6.2 Voice presentation in news reporting:

Voice presentation in news reporting usually presents the readers/audience with the source of the information (i.e. the voice to whom the agency of the speech reported is attributed) as well as their qualification (i.e. a full identification of this voice when it is first referenced). The description of the quoted voices in news articles is called *attributions*, which according to Busà (2013) can be defined as “a complete identification of the source when it is first mentioned”, usually the voice’s “full name and job title ... in the first reference” (p. 42). In this sense, voice presentation is part of a journalistic practice that is called *sourcing* in news reporting, which is the “practice of locating and using a person or publication to provide information that will be used for news stories” (p. 40).

Attributions, in this sense, are meant to “empower readers to judge the quality of the information reported and whether it comes from an impartial or biased observer” (ibid), to enable them to determine how they would process the information reported to them. Likewise, these attributions should intrinsically enable the readers to identify the social capacity/role of the reported voices, e.g., experts or government officials, in which they make their statements since they reflect their full identification. Based on this identification, the readers should be able to hold the reported voices, mainly the government officials, accountable for their decisions based on the statements they are reported to provide as far as my research is concerned. Nevertheless, on many occasions across my dataset, a lack of clarity was observed regarding the attributions of the voices when their speech was reported, either because these attributions are not placed in their regular position or omitted all in all, or the descriptions of the voices are not clearly stating their roles.

These instances where there is a lack of clarity about the voice attributions led me to question whether in such cases the layperson would still be able to hold their governments accountable for their decisions if they are unable to identify what they report about the conflict in the first place. Therefore, in this chapter, I aim to address and answer the following questions:

1. What are the patterns in which attributions occur in voice presentation?

2. How do these patterns function at the textual level?
3. How do these patterns affect the readers' ability to hold their government accountable?

To answer these questions, I explore the body of research that investigates attributions in section 6.3, before I outline the correlation between attribution and qualification in section 6.4. Then in section 6.5, I lay out my approach to investigating voice presentation in news reporting that I use in my analysis in the same section before I conclude in 6.6.

6.3 Attributions as evidence:

In this section, I explore the previous research that investigates attributions as evidence of expertise where in section 6.3.1, I identify the gap and highlight a distinction that I address in this chapter, and in section 6.3.2, I discuss briefly evidentiality and EP to highlight how my investigation of voice presentation can be seen as an offspring of EP.

6.3.1 The functionality of attributions:

Previous scholarly investigations have questioned the functionality of *attributions* in fulfilling their objective of helping the audience to contest the opinions of the reported voices before processing their information. Some researchers argue that these attributions in several cases facilitate the uptake of the reported opinions without contestation. Sorial (2017), for example, identifies *pseudo* experts as one of the factors that facilitate the uptake of opinions. Sorial defines *pseudo* experts as those who “appear to have technical knowledge even though they actually do not” and by whose *perceived expertise* “are able to secure uptake of their views” (p. 305). She argues that layperson tends to accept expert views based on their societal affiliations, or what she calls *tokens of expertise* where “persons with expertise ... typically appeal to audiences to accept their views by emphasizing *who* they are, rather than what they say” (p. 309).

A similar argument has been made by Fairclough (1995), who identifies *societal affiliations*, or what he calls *membershopping* as one of the factors that underlie *predisposing interpretation* in media discourse. *Predisposing interpretation*, according to Fairclough, is a stylistic device that was found, along with all its underlying factors, to “cumulatively but implicitly ascribe massive legitimacy to the secondary discourse” (p. 61), which eventually would highly likely facilitate the uptake of the opinions reported in the news instead of contesting them. According to Fairclough, *Predisposing interpretation* can be achieved by a number of linguistic tools and devices, e.g.,

“illocutionary force of the secondary discourse ... the contribution of stylisticity to setting ... the extensive membershiping” in the reported news (p. 60).

The common factor between Fairclough, Sorial, and what I am investigating here is the focus on the *attributions* or the description of the reported voices in news reports. While they both argue that in some cases, these attributions do not necessarily serve their original purpose as evidence of qualification, i.e., being liable to contestation, they either provide no sufficient analysis of their claims or no sufficient explanation of their arguments. For example, although Fairclough identifies some of the linguistic tools that underlie the effect of *membershiping*, he provides no typology of patterns in which *membershiping* occurs at the textual level since it is not the core inquiry of his research. Similarly, while Sorial identifies *perceived expertise* to result from the audience’s tendency to assess the experts rather than the scientific evidence due to the *tokens of expertise*, she does not explain how the conceptual effect of *perceived expertise* comes about or what textual features help create it.

The variance I identify between Sorial’s investigation of the attribution of the reported voices and my current inquiry is the *role* of the reported voices that each is interested in investigating. While Sorial’s research is preoccupied with assessing the *expertise* of the expert voices that are reported in the news articles, my research is preoccupied with readers’ ability to identify first the qualification (i.e., role/capacity that makes them qualified), either as an expert or a representative of the government/state. Hence, the challenge I find with Sorial’s research specifically or the body of research that pursues the same inquiry is their preoccupation with assessing the *expertise* without much consideration to readers’ clarity first on the role of these voices.

This preoccupation with investigating the effect of the *expertise* of the reported voices is evident in the work of many researchers who have questioned areas such as the legitimacy assigned to expert voices by attempting to answer questions like who counts as an expert? (Remus, 2014; Peters, 1994; Wagner et al., 2019). Similarly, the body of research that investigates the experts’ degree of expertise and the effect of their *societal affiliation* on the legitimacy of their discourse also puts the same focus on assessing the quality and level of expertise of the reported voices and their effect on the processing of the information reported before questioning the readers’ clarity first on the role of these voices in the first place (e.g. Vasterman and Ruigrok, 2013; Shih et al., 2013; Steele, 1995).

This body of research presents us with descriptions of what counts as an expert, interpretations of their degrees of expertise, and explanations of the effects of their expertise on the audience's perception of them and subsequently the information they provide. In this, it presupposes the clarity of the attributions provided in the news articles and hence the readers' ability to assess the relevant evidence of expertise. Such presupposition does not account for the instances where the attributions of the reported voices are ambiguous, as the case with the instances that were found across my dataset, and the effect of this lack of clarity on the readers' ability to identify the qualification of the reported voices (i.e., role/capacity in which they are active).

The difference between my research and this body of research stems from the lack of a very minute yet fundamental distinction between the *expertise* and the *qualification* of the reported voices, which I would like to bring to attention here. *Expertise*, in the above body of research, refers specifically to the public's in/ability to assess the degree of expertise, and whether their level of expertise is convincing for the readers to trust their opinions. *Qualification*, in my research, is used to refer to the public's in/ability to identify/distinguish the role/capacity in which the reported voices are active, in other words, what qualifies them to make their statements. *Qualification* in this sense is detected based on and in light of the *role* of the reported voices in which they are introduced to the readers and within which frontiers they make their respective statements, whereas *expertise* in this sense is assessed/judged based on the *evidence* – however this evidence looks at the textual level in different types of discourse.

6.3.2 Evidentiality and Epistemological Positioning:

The absence of this distinction between expertise and qualification was also observed among the researchers who investigate *evidentiality*, i.e. “the basis of the information on which a speaker's/writer's statement is based” (Jacobsen 1986: 3–7; Bybee and Fleischman 1995: 13, as cited in Bednarek, 2006, p. 636). According to Bednarek, they have been concerned with the evidence of the *markers of evidentiality* in diverse ways, e.g., “(Givon 1982; Chafe and Nichols 1986; Willet 1988 ... Hill and Irvine 1993b; DeLancey 1997 ... Johanson and Utas 2000; Mushin 2001; Aikhenvald and Dixon 2003; Aikhenvald 2004)” (ibid). However, I find that Bednarek (2006) offers a wider standpoint on *evidentiality* in her *Epistemological positioning* (EP) that may incorporate the evidence of qualification in *attributions*, not just the evidence of expertise.

Epistemological positioning, according to Bednarek (2006), deals with questions such as “‘Who is the source of information?’, ‘What is the basis of someone’s (the writer’s or a third party’s) knowledge?’” (p. 635). Bednarek defines ‘knowledge’ as the “information of which speakers/writers are aware, and to which they refer in their propositions” (p. 655). In this sense, Bednarek argues that “there is much more overlap” between the concept of epistemological positioning and “evidentiality in its broader definition”, however, she prefers “using the term epistemological positioning (rather than evidentiality), because of the etymological roots involved (epistemological derives from Greek *epistēmē*, ‘knowledge’, whereas evidential automatically calls up notions of evidence)” (p. 637). Bednarek uses the notion of the *basis of knowledge* or “the term evidentiality to refer to a specific subcategory of EP, that of marking evidence” (ibid), where EP involves the following elements:

- **Basis of knowledge** (evidentiality): was it seen, inferred, heard, etc.?
- **Certainty of knowledge** (epistemic modality): how certain is the speaker/writer of his/her knowledge? Epistemological positioning and evidentiality 63
- **Deviations from knowledge** (mirativity): is what the speaker/writer describes expected or unexpected in terms of his/her knowledge of the world?6
- **Extent**: is the knowledge limited in some way?

(Bednarek, 2006, pp. 637-8, emphasis added)

Even though Bednarek’s focus on *evidentiality* or the ‘basis of knowledge’ still puts focus on the evidence of *expertise* rather than the evidence of qualification, her focus on investigating the effect of the setting (i.e., the naturally occurring text) on how evidentiality is perceived draws our inquiries closer with some variations. Like Bednarek, I investigate the effect of evidentiality in the same setting, however, with a focus on the readers’ in/ability to identify the source of information. Taking into consideration an ideal reading of the news, we shall find that for the readers/public to be able to judge the basis of *knowledge* of the reported voice (i.e., the evidence of their expertise), they need first to be able to identify the source (i.e., the social *role/capacity*) and their qualification against which they are making these statements. Hence, if we are to investigate the two questions that EP deals with, regarding the source of information and the basis of their knowledge, I would assume that we should start this inquiry by identifying first the source of information. Therefore, in my investigation of voice presentation, I examine the question of *who is the source of information?* with a specific focus on *attributions* since it is the main source where the readers would look for an answer to this question, as explained in the following section.

6.4 Role and qualification in attributions:

Attributions are seen to conflate two functions in news reports: evidence of the role of the source of the information as well as evidence of the qualification of this source to make their statements in light of this role. Thus, in the coming sub-sections, I elaborate on both functions of attributions to outline the correlation between attribution and qualification of the reported voices that I use in my analysis in section 6.5.

6.4.1 The role of the reported voice:

The process of identifying the source of information involves first the identification of the voice role or the capacity in which they function. Here, I utilize Goffman's definition of *role* being "some particular social identity or role ... special capacity as a member of a group, office, category, relationship, association" or whatever socially based source of identification in which a person is active (Goffman, 1981, p. 145). Goffman argues that "in thus introducing the name or capacity in which he speaks, the speaker goes some distance in establishing a corresponding reciprocal basis of identification for those to whom this stand-taking is addressed" (ibid). In other words, when the reported voices are introduced to the audience, the writers introduce them in the role in which they want them to be perceived by the audience.

For the purposes of my research, I perceive a different classification of the roles that underlie the term *speaker* in Goffman's original classification. In this new classification, I map out three key roles that underlie the term *voice*, which refers to the voices that are often present in news reports. Due to the nature of news reporting generally and MCD specifically, the *role* of the voice predictably involves three voices that the readers may identify with: *official* - the person who represents the stance of the government or the state; *expert* - the person who has relevant expertise in a particular domain of knowledge; and *reporter*, the person who puts the statements of the different voices together to report to the public the updates regarding the conflict.

This identification of the voice role, in an ideal reading of the news, is not a general identification that should happen once when the voice is first referenced, especially if the readers are expected to contest the information reported by the different voices in news articles. This means that the readers should ideally be aware, throughout their experience of reading the news, of not only who is making the statement they read (agency-wise) but also the role of the voice that is making the

statement. This way, the readers could possibly process, for example, the information reported by an *official* voice as reflective of the government's stance, decisions, or course of action they take to resolve this conflict. Similarly, for the *expert* voice, the reader would process the information they report as reflective of information/opinions relevant to their respective qualification.

6.4.2 Qualification of the voice's role:

Likewise, in an ideal reading of the news, the process of identifying the voice role precedes and leads to another inseparable process, that is checking the voice's qualification to make their statements in light of their *roles* as explained in the above section. For example, to make a statement on the benefits/downsides of the construction of a water dam, the quoted voice would ideally be qualified as an *expert* voice to know about issues of water dams. Similarly, to make a statement about the government's political course of action to address a certain issue, the quoted voice is ideally in a role that qualifies him as a representative of this government. Hence, in this process, an informed reader should check whether these voices are making statements that accord with their respective roles in the first place in light of the identified voice role from the previous step before processing the information.

In this sense, the qualification of the voice is related and bound to the role or capacity in which they are introduced, where the voice's role is their evidence of qualification, based on which an informed reader judges the voice before processing their statements. Because ideally, it defines what the readers would do next when processing the information. For example, if the reader is reading a statement about a course of action that is represented as a resolution to the conflict, an informed reader needs to be aware of the role of the voice who made this statement. If, for example, it is made by a voice that is representative of the *official* role, then ideally the reader would process it as such to hold them accountable for these statements later. If, however, it is made by a voice that is representative of the *expert* role then the reader would ideally assess the relevant evidence of their qualification to make an informed decision on whether to adopt or reject their views.

Given the lack of clarity that was observed regarding the attributions of the reported voices in my dataset, in the coming section 6.5, I investigate how the different patterns of attributions affect the readers' ability to identify the role of the voice and check their qualifications as elaborated here. In doing so, I also consider the impact of the setting i.e., regular reading conditions of the news and how this may aggravate the effect of the instances of unclear voice attributions.

6.5 Qualification in voice presentation

In news reporting, *attributions* typically accompany the reported voices/sources when they are first mentioned, and they are usually positioned right next to the source. This means that *attributions* are generally prioritized in their position in relation to the source that is providing the statement. The ideal reasoning for this is for the qualification of the quoted voices to be contested; by enabling the readers/audience to identify the source and assess its qualification. However, it has been observed throughout my dataset that these attributions are not always prioritized (i.e., placed in a focal position in relation to the source they describe) or clear (i.e., the description of voice in these attributions is not conclusively indicative of a certain role).

Hence, in my investigation of voice presentation here, I examine the effect of *prioritizing* on how *attributions* function in news reports, namely, how *prioritizing* affects the readers' ability to identify the role of the source of information and contest their qualifications. According to Jeffries (2010), *prioritizing* as a conceptual tool can be achieved at the textual level "by exploiting the information structure, the transformational possibilities or the subordination possibilities of the language" (p. 80). Thus, I explore the textual choices (i.e., the information structures/linguistic forms) that indicate this prioritization at the textual level in my investigation of the patterns in which attributions occur. In the analysis below, I investigate these patterns in relation to two main elements: the position of the attribution in relation to the statement provided by the reported voice, and its clarity in relation to the role of the source as described in these attributions.

Since the main purpose of attributions is for the qualification of the reported voices to be contested or held accountable, I classified the different patterns in which attributions were observed to occur at the textual level in my dataset according to how far their qualifications can be contested. By contested here I mean the occasions when an informed reader is able to follow the abovementioned steps of identifying the source of information and checking their qualification. In this sense, contested qualification of an expert voice entails the assessment of the relevant evidence of their qualification before accepting/rejecting their views, whereas contested qualification of an official voice role entails the public's ability to hold them accountable for their statements/decisions.

In this classification, I list these patterns of voice attribution on a cline, based on the degree of clarity of the description of the reported voices, where **Full** attribution (refers to a full description of the voice & its role), **Elusive** attribution (where the description of the voice does not reflect a

conclusive interpretation of a given role), and finally **No** attribution (where no description of the voice is provided). I categorize these patterns under varying levels of contested qualification, based on the description of the source as provided in the attribution, as shown in the following diagram:




Figure 6. 1 Cline of qualification in report

In this cline of qualification, the patterns of attribution are listed based on the hypothesis that the contestation of qualification is based on the attribution’s degree of clarity. Thus, the clearer the attribution is in reflecting the role of the reported voices, the higher the possibility that their qualification would be contested and/or held accountable. Accordingly, if/when **Full** attribution is prioritized, it presumably becomes the norm for contested qualification/accountability, whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, **No** attribution becomes the norm for uncontested qualification. Elusive attribution, in this case, falls in the middle where qualification may or may not be contested either when the description of the voice is not prioritized and/or when it is not conclusive of a given role. Using this cline, to test this hypothesis in the following analysis, I examine the linguistic forms of *prioritizing* under each pattern of attributions. Then, I explain in what way *prioritizing*, under each category, may affect the readers’ ability to contest the qualification of the voices, either by holding them accountable or uptaking their opinions without contestation.

6.5.1 Full attribution

Here, I examine the instances where a full description of the voice is provided in the attributions and prioritized; placed in a focal position. I begin with examining the examples of the speech and contribution units neighbouring the attribution when the voice is first referenced in section 6.5.1.1 and then I move to examine the examples of the exchange units which occur at a later point in the news reports where they are accompanied only by reporting clauses in 6.5.1.2.

6.5.1.1 Prioritized attribution

Here, I examine the instances where a full description of the voice is provided in the attributions and prioritized; placed in a focal position. I examine the examples of the speech and contribution units that occur next to the attribution when the voice is first referenced.

[1] **Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaeddin** agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. *Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.*

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

[2] Access to Nile water is based upon several immutable principles, insists **professor of international law Ahmed Abul-Wafa**: the shares of individual states must be in proportion with population size and the area of land under cultivation and no Nile Basin state should act in a way that harms any other country using Nile water.

Yet what happens when these principles are flouted?

“There aren't a lot of alternatives in such cases,” **says Abul-Wafa**. *“Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option is the use of military force.”*

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

Note in both examples the description of the reported voices is articulated in full, as indicated in blue font, clearly reflecting the social roles of these voices. Also, the attributions are prioritized in position in relation to the statements they make. Even though prioritizing the full attribution here enables the readers to be clear on the voice role and qualification, it does not guarantee full liability for the information provided in the above examples. Note how the lack of clarity about the agency of the italicized speech units in both examples due to the non-repeated reporting clauses may potentially create the effect of perceived agency, as explained in the previous chapter. In this case, the readers are likely to attribute the agency of these statements to the voice role reflected in the neighbouring attributions.

As a result, the readers may take the statement *“the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt”* in example [1] as representative of the government/state's stance on the conflict; assuming their liability for it while this is not the case. Similarly, in example [2], they may take *“the only remaining option is the use of military force”* as representative of an expert opinion, while again this is not the case. The challenge with this perceived agency is that it creates

perceived accountability, where the readers assume that the reported voices can be held accountable for their reported statements/information, which is not the case, since they cannot be held accountable for the vague and/or anonymous speech as the case in the two above examples. Note how the type of information that is included in the speech units with the questioned agency, indicated in italics, is more controversial in nature compared to the information in the speech unit with the clear agency that accompanies the attribution.

Note in example [1], the agency in question is the agency of the voice that states the information of whether “*the diversion process will stop the water from flowing down the river to Egypt*”. Similarly, in example [2], the agency in question is the agency of the voice that states that “*the only remaining option is the use of military force*”. Hence, in both cases, the qualification that is crucial to be contested is the qualification of the voices in the units with the questioned agency. This leaves the public holding nobody accountable for the information in the first example in case this was proven to not be the case, while it leaves them assuming that “military force” is the only possible remaining resolution, according to the experts, in the second example. Also, since the type of information in both examples is not at odds and can typically be expected to come from both voices in their respective social roles/capacities, it is likely to facilitate the uptake of such statements without paying much attention to the unclear agency of the last speech units.

In this case, we can notice that even though in both examples the readers are provided with all the linguistic elements that supposedly enable an informed reader to follow the process of identifying the source of information and checking its qualification (i.e., prioritized full attribution and clear voice role), a lack of accountability remains regarding the information that is reported. This was observed to occur in the above examples due to perceived accountability that is created in relation to the speech units with vague and/or anonymous agency. In these cases, we can notice the linguistic features of full attribution and a clear role function at the textual level in a way that contributes to the occurrence of perceived accountability instead of contributing to the contestation of the qualification of these voices or holding them accountable.

In some other instances of full attribution, I observed that even though full attributions were provided, the identification of the voice role was not always a straightforward process. In these instances, there was not a clear-cut distinction between the reported voices based on my above classification of role, as the case with example [3]:

[3] [Advisor to the Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Rafik Khalil](#) underlined the importance of dialogue if three major sticking points are to be overcome: the mechanisms of any new water sharing system, the issue of prior notification of any project within the Nile Basin and the imposition of a majority rather than unanimous vote among NBI states to ratify any decision. *Egypt and Sudan have consistently refused to shift their position on all three issues.*

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

Note in this example that the role of the reported voice can be quite ambiguous, where on the one hand ‘*advisor to the Minister of Irrigation*’ may seem to fit the classification of the *official* role, by being in such a close position to the minister, on the other hand, it may also be classified as *expert* role. In this case, the reiteration of the importance of resolving the *three sticking points* and Egypt’s unchanged position on them is not a confirmation from the government for this to remain unchanged, rather it remains mere advice that does not bind the government to any promises. Yet, prioritizing a full attribution of a voice that is trusted enough to be the minister’s advisor gives the impression of legitimacy and an official-like role that may slide as an official role to some readers under regular reading conditions. This can also be seen in the exchange unit in example [4], where the description of the voice does not reflect a clear-cut conclusive role:

[4] [Mustafa Al-Guindi, an MP and coordinator of the popular diplomacy delegation](#) that visited Ethiopia and Uganda last year, has described the situation by saying that while Egypt is concerned about the effects of the dam, Addis Ababa has repeatedly emphasised that the dam will not have any effect on the amount of water reaching Egypt. *As a result, no action should be taken until the findings of the tripartite technical committee looking into the matter are released.*

"My main concern now is to know from the unbiased committee that will disclose its findings to the peoples of the Nile Basin countries whether the dam will harm Egypt or not," Al-Guindi told the Weekly. *"If the report states that it will, Egypt will argue that the CFA is illegal as it would deprive Egypt of one of its basic human rights, water."*

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

Like example [3], prioritising the attribution when combined with a description of a voice that is inconclusive of a certain role is observed to give the impression of legitimacy. Note how the description of the voice as ‘*MP and coordinator of the popular diplomacy delegation*’ is complex and conflates multiple descriptions that cannot be easily classified according to the above classification of role. This posits the question of under which voice role the reader would classify a coordinator of diplomacy delegation. Such ambiguous cases may leave the reader more uncertain about the role of the voice yet at the same time more likely to perceive such voices as qualified

enough to make these statements. The challenge with this type of general qualification, i.e., not tied to a certain role, is that it has the potential to make the readers more inclined to process such information without much contestation, since as explained previously, contestation of qualification is based on the role of the source, which may not be the case here given the complex description of the voice in this example.

The other challenge with this impression of qualification that is not related to a role is that it directs the readers' attention to focus on this general qualification by placing the full attribution in a focal position in the first contribution unit. In doing so, the reader is less likely to notice the speech unit with the vague agency that is italicized in this contribution unit, where there is a high chance for perceived agency to occur (regarding the speech units whose agency is in question). Also, note the prioritization of the DS speech unit in the second contribution unit draws the attention of the readers to the authenticity of the speech reported. In doing so, the reader is less likely to notice the speech unit with the anonymous agency that is italicized in this contribution unit, where there is a high chance for perceived agency to occur due to the same reasons explained in the previous chapter. This impression of general qualification was also found to be supported by the use of expressions and verbs that reflect authority, e.g., "no action should be taken" and "will argue".

I find in these prioritised elements the ideal definition of Sorial's *tokens of expertise* and in the way they function the ideal description of the process that possibly leads to perceived qualification regarding the reported voice. If we begin with the fronted attribution that is coupled with a description of a voice that is inconclusive of a certain role, we can notice that it blurs the distinguishing line between the different roles of the voices. And since the identification of the source role is a key first step for an informed reader to be able to contest the qualification of the voices and their statements, this blurred description of the voice is likely to result in an uncontested qualification.

Then, looking at the prioritization of this "vague" full attribution and the DS speech unit by placing them in a focal position in both contribution units we shall notice that it directs the readers' attention to *evidence*, yet due to its vagueness, it does not support the process of checking the qualification of the voice. This can be seen in the use of full attribution that gives the impression of qualification, even though it does not reflect a conclusive role. Also, this can be seen in the use of quotation marks in the DS and FDS units in the second contribution unit as evidence of

faithfulness, reliability, and accountability, while this not being the case in the FDS unit since it has no actual voice to whom the reader can attribute its agency. This utilisation of quotation marks as evidence of faithfulness, where faithfulness is not in question was found to reinforce the lack of accountability. Note the effect of the quotation marks in example [5] when the full attribution is not prioritized even if the description of the voice is rather clear:

[5] “Ethiopia's signing an international agreement guaranteeing Egypt's and Sudan's quotas of Nile water is a must before both countries can approve the building of the new dam,” wrote [Ahmed Al-Naggar, head of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Al-Ahram](#).

“If such an agreement is not signed, giving the go-ahead to this project would be political insanity that would tempt Ethiopia to further violation of the two states' water rights.”

(Abdel Razek, 2013, Watering economic woes)

Note in example [5] the DS speech unit is prioritized instead of the full attribution of the reported voice. This puts emphasis on processing the content first before the identification of the voice role. As a result, faithfulness is prioritized compared to the process of checking the voice’s qualification. In this case, faithfulness is found to perform a different function compared to its original function, i.e., holding someone accountable for their verbatim language. Instead, the impression of legitimacy and faithfulness functions to conceivably facilitate the uptake of the information with almost no consideration for the issue of accountability. Consequently, the lack of accountability in the second italicized speech unit with the anonymous agency is likely to go unnoticed since nothing is confusing or contradictory per se about this statement being stated by the reported voice from the previous speech unit that would urge an informed reader to stop to question this oddity by the time they get to read this anonymous speech unit.

We can see that this effect of faithfulness is maintained throughout the exchange units in examples [4] and [5], due to the presence of the quotation marks in the DS and FDS units. In both examples, the perceived agency, which is likely to result from the combination of the quotation marks in all the FDS units and the unrepeated reporting clauses, may again result in perceived qualification regarding the anonymous speech units that are italicized. This is by virtue of the combination of the quotation marks in all the FDS units and the full attribution from the neighbouring speech units, which under regular reading conditions creates a high potential of attributing the agency of the FDS units to the voice role reflected in the nearby attributions.

Note that even though readers are provided with full attribution in examples (3 – 5), two main linguistic elements were observed to prevent an informed reader from following the process of identifying the source of information and checking its qualification. Namely, the vague voice role and the evidence of faithfulness. The first element, i.e., the lack of clarity about the voice role was found to give the impression of general qualification due to the use of full attribution, while the second element, i.e., the evidence of faithfulness was observed to give the impression of evidentiality of qualification due to the use of DS/FDS where quotation marks are present.

The prioritisation of both elements was observed to possibly direct the readers' attention to other irrelevant issues that are not in question, which was observed to reinforce a lack of accountability regarding the crucial information that is reported. This was observed to occur in the above examples due to perceived qualification that is created in relation to the speech units with vague and/or anonymous agency. In such cases, full attribution and DS become factors that contribute to the creation of this perceived qualification rather than being factors that contribute to contesting the qualification of the quoted voices or holding them accountable. As a result, this perceived qualification makes full attribution no longer the norm for full accountability.

6.5.1.2 Unrepeated role

Here, I examine the examples of the exchange units which occur at a later point in the news reports where they are accompanied only by reporting clauses. Even though the full attributions of these voices were provided when they were first introduced, the effects of perceived qualification and general qualification – observed in the above section – were found to be aggravated in these instances where the attributions are not repeated throughout the news articles. This was observed to result in probable confusion for the readers to follow through with the arguments that each voice role makes due to the intersection of the roles of the different reported voices, as can be seen in the analysis of the following examples.

[6] *Shares of Nile water are based on several principles. According to Raslan, the share of any country must be in proportion to its population and extent of agricultural land. Nile Basin countries should also desist from harming any neighbouring country.*

An international dispute will develop between Egypt and other Nile Basin countries should they refuse to alter their position. According to Raslan, there are not many alternatives. “Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option will be the use of force,” says Raslan.

Egypt has set three conditions before signing the Nile Basin Framework Agreement: water security, being informed in advance of any planned projects on the river banks and making the completion of such projects conditional on Egyptian and Sudanese approval.”

“We have water and won't need to think about securing outside water till five or six years from now. We have an adequate amount of water to fulfil our needs for now,” says [Bahaeddin](#).

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

Note that both voices in example [6] have been introduced earlier with full attributions; *Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaeddin* as representative of the *official* voice role and *Hani Raslan, head of the Sudan and Nile Basin Countries' Studies Programme at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies* as representative of the *expert* voice role. Even though these attributions were prioritized in their first introduction; providing all the linguistic elements that supposedly enable an informed reader to follow the process of identifying the source of information and checking its qualification (i.e., prioritized full attribution and clear voice role), these attributions are no longer prioritized by the time the readers get to read the above exchange unit. As a result, other linguistic elements get to be prioritized in these units.

Looking closely at what is in focal position in each contribution unit here, we can notice that the information is prioritized in all four units. This puts emphasis on processing the content first before the identification of the voices, assuming that by the time the readers get here they still remember the voice role from the attribution they read at the beginning of the news article which is hardly the case. Note the prioritization of information is usually accompanied by the linguistic markers of faithfulness, i.e., the multiple uses of reporting clauses in blue font and the quotation marks in the italicized FDS as well as the DS units. The prioritization of these textual markers contributes to the creation of the effect of faithful reporting by directing the focus of the readers to the seemingly clear agency for credibility while at the same time possibly taking their focus away from deciphering the voice role of the reported voices. As a result, any perceived agency that may result from the prioritization of these textual markers, e.g., all the units with the anonymous agency that are italicized in the above example, would highly likely turn into perceived qualification.

Also, looking closely at the content of the speech reported, we can notice the alarming effects of perceived agency quite evidently in this example especially when the fused voices belong to different roles. Note in this example, the third contribution unit is an FDS unit “*Egypt has set three conditions before signing the Nile Basin Framework Agreement: water security, being informed*

in advance of any planned projects on the river banks and making the completion of such projects conditional on Egyptian and Sudanese approval.””, which is centred between two reported voices: the *head of the Sudan and Nile Basin Countries' Studies Programme* representative of the *expert* role and the *Minister of Irrigation official* representative of the official role. In this case, the agency of this unit is not attributed to either of the two voices, which makes Egypt's position on the conflict and the three set conditions that are stated in this unit a piece of information that lacks accountability.

As a result, in case this stated position changes or the three set conditions are not met, nobody shall be held accountable for this statement, as the public would not know whether this change reflects a change in the government's position or one that contradicts a mere expert's opinion. And in case it was a change in the government's position the readers are likely unable to stop and ask if this change is actually a step in Egypt's favour, or if it is a compromise from the Egyptian side and a failure in preserving the country's water rights while addressing the conflict since the readers are unsure about the agency of the voice that makes this statement in the anonymous unit in the first place. This leaves the readers unsure as to which voice should they attribute the agency of this unit, which results in perceived agency since this unit is not assigned any agency.

It is worth noting here that in the above analysis we have taken into consideration the ideal reading conditions of the news where the reader is assumingly conscious of the roles of the reported voices throughout the reading experience. Yet, it is also important to take into consideration here the other possibility when this is not the case under regular reading conditions. In this setting, even an informed reader is likely to not be conscious at all times of the roles of the reported voices by the time they would get to the point when they are reading the above example. In such cases, the unrepeated attribution will likely make them take these statements without much contestation to the voice role or their qualification to make these statements. Given the length of this news article and the wide gap between the first introduction of the two voices and the above quotations, it is highly unlikely that the readers will distinguish their respective voice roles throughout the reading experience.

This point is similar to Emmott's (1997) contribution to understanding the reading process, regarding the reader's ability to hold information versus their attention being “usually concentrated on one context in particular” (p. 123). She uses the terms “binding” and “priming” to refer to where

the reader has his/her attention concentrated. According to Emmott, binding means that “‘episodic’ links between entities (people and places) are established, thereby creating a context which is monitored by the mind”, whereas priming describes “the process by which one particular contextual frame becomes the main focus of attention for the reader” where the reader is to “concentrate on the action occurring in that particular place” (ibid). Applying these notions to the example at hand, we can think of the original introduction of the full attribution at the beginning of the article as the information that is *bound* into a mental frame. On the other hand, we can think of the reporting clauses and the markers of faithfulness as *primed* in the above exchange unit.

According to Emmott, primed information is the information that “the mind remains aware of” (p. 124) since it is the information that exists in the readers’ current main context. We can notice from what has been discussed thus far under this section that what is prioritized in the exchange units with the unrepeated voice role is what is primed in the readers’ minds. E.g., in example [6], the prioritization of the authenticity of the reported information, by prioritising its linguistic markers, primes faithful reporting since it exists in the readers’ current main context. Accordingly, the absence of the role of the voice that reports the information binds voice qualification due to its non-existence in the readers’ current main context. As a result, even though voice qualification was once primed (when the two voices in example [6] were first introduced with full attribution), it is bound in this exchange unit (with the absence of the role of the two voices and the prioritization of faithfulness instead). Note that the effect of binding is reinforced and aggravated by the wide gap between the first introduction of voice attributions and the units that occur later in such lengthy news articles. Consequently, perceived qualification of the role of the reported voices is likely to result.

The alarming effect of perceived agency/qualification was observed not to be exclusive to the instances when the voices that are fused belong to different voice roles. The unrepeated attribution was also found to have a serious effect even when the voices in question belong to the same voice role. Many of the examples that were found across the dataset were voices that are representatives of the *expert* voice role as in examples [7] and [8]:

[7] “Given that people are already suffering from a shortage of water, and we are completely dependent on the Nile, we can get international support for our case,” says Abul-Ghar. Egypt must petition for international pressure to be brought to bear in support of its position, he argues. Then, Cairo can enter into negotiations with Addis Ababa with the aim of becoming a partner in building

the dam and securing an agreement that it will be the last dam built on the Blue Nile and that none of the reservoir created will be for irrigating land in either Ethiopia or Sudan. “Through diplomacy we can reach an understanding on these matters and sign a new agreement,” he says.

“Egypt can argue that Ethiopia started building the project before the report of the tripartite committee and that it refuses to acknowledge Egypt's water quota,” says Al-Taweel.

Shaarawi also argues in favour of negotiations and pressure. “We should realise that the problem is multi levelled,” he says. *“There is major Arab investment, especially from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Indian and Chinese investment in the project. The Muslim Brotherhood regime should use its good relations with Qatar to improve our negotiating status with Ethiopia.”*

(El Bey, 2013, Testing diplomatic waters)

Similar to example [6], we can notice that the prioritization of the textual markers of clear agency in combination with the unrepeated attributions in example [7] contributes to the conceptual effect of perceived qualification. Note the prioritization of the markers of clear agency, i.e., the DS speech unit as well as the multiple uses of reporting clauses, primes the effect of faithfulness, whereas the role of the reported voice and his qualification is bound. Accordingly, an overall impression of credibility and accountability accompanies these markers of clear agency, while not being the case. Note the third speech unit with the vague agency in the first contribution unit *“Then, Cairo can enter into negotiations with Addis Ababa with the aim of becoming a partner in building the dam and securing an agreement that it will be the last dam built on the Blue Nile and that none of the reservoir created will be for irrigating land in either Ethiopia or Sudan”*. This unit is centred in position between two speech units with clear agency which would likely result in perceived agency for this vague speech unit. The same case is observed in the anonymous FDS unit that is italicized in the third contribution unit. As a result, both effects of perceived agency and perceived qualification are observed to collectively prevent an informed reader from following the process of checking the source of information and its qualification.

[8] “There aren't a lot of alternatives in such cases,” says Abul-Wafa. *“Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option is the use of military force.”*

Historically, only Egypt and Sudan had a guaranteed share of Nile water. Other Nile Basin countries received enough rainfall annually to cover their agricultural needs. While early agreements were signed by Britain and Italy as colonial powers, the most recent agreement on quotas was signed by Egypt and Sudan in 1959. “All these agreements,” says Abul-Wafa “are protected by international law.”

The 1959 agreement saw Egypt's total share of the Nile waters rise to 55.5 billion cubic metres and Sudan's to 14.5 billion cubic metres. This amount comprises six to eight per cent of the total rainfall over the Nile Basin. Much of the rest is lost, some through evapotranspiration — the consumption of plants — yet more by seepage into the ground. “What we use is very little when compared to the potential. Yet to tap this potential there must be far better management of the water in some areas, such as the equatorial lakes where water losses are huge. Weeds consume more than is lost through natural evaporation,” says Abul-Wafa.

“The Nile can provide for all of the countries lying in its basin if properly used,” said Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's African Institute.

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

Likewise, in example [8], the prioritization of the markers of clear agency in combination with the unrepeated role is seen to create the same effect of perceived qualification as explained in the above example. Because the readers are less likely to stop while reading this exchange unit to question the agency of the two italicized units with the vague agency at the beginning of the second and the third contribution units. Again, we can notice that the prioritisation of the information in both units compared to the deferred reporting clause facilitates the uptake of the information without contestation.

As a result, the readers are less likely to stop, for example, while reading the above exchange unit in example [8] and question whether this reported voice is making a statement that accords with the role that is stated in their attribution. They are less likely to stop and question how the voice that is previously introduced earlier in full attribution as a *professor of international law Ahmed Abul-Wafa* is making a statement of such a specialized agricultural nature in the italicized speech unit in the third contribution unit. And since this speech unit has vague agency, the reader will not be able to hold this voice accountable for the authenticity of this information nor can they hold the reporter accountable for it since there is no linguistic proof that attributes the agency of this unit to them. Consequently, despite this lack of accountability, the readers are likely to process this information without contestation due to the effect of perceived agency and perceived qualification.

Thus far in the analysis of the examples under this section, I have considered the informed reader of the news, who is assumed to be conscious of the roles of the reported voices. Bearing in mind the binding and priming notions regarding the reader's concentration level, it is difficult to see how the readers would manage to be as clear on the roles of all the reported voices throughout the entire news article or in an exchange unit as the one in example [7], much less in the context of a

prolonged conflict. The logical question to ask here is what if the reader is not an informed reader? One can imagine that the public under regular reading conditions would hardly follow the process of identifying the role of the reported voice and checking their qualification. Hence, in the analysis below the diagram, I explain how in the two possible types of readers' engagement regarding the process of checking the reported voice role and their qualifications, full attribution was observed *not* to be the norm for contested qualification and accountability.




Figure 6. 2 Cline of accountability in report

Even though full attribution was hypothesized as the norm for contested qualification (see figure 6.1) and full accountability (see figure 6.2), the above analysis suggests otherwise. The first possibility is when the reader can successfully apply the process of checking the role and qualification of the voice in the examples where full attribution and clear role are prioritized. In these examples, the lack of accountability observed in the units with anonymous/ambiguous agency does not make full attribution the norm for full accountability since no voices are held liable for the information in these units, as seen in examples [1] and [2]. The second possibility is when the reader may not successfully or not at all apply this process where full attribution is prioritized however with an elusive voice role. In these examples, the lack of accountability observed in the units with anonymous/ambiguous agency as well as in the units with clear agency does not make full attribution the norm for contested qualification since the information in these units is likely to go uncontested, as observed in examples [3] and [4].

In both possibilities, the prioritization of different information structures was found to make full attribution lacks accountability/less contested; due to perceived accountability in the first and perceived qualification in the latter. Perceived accountability refers to the instances where VF units

are ascribed qualification when assigned the agency of the neighbouring reported voice, as the case with the italicized unit in example [1]:

[Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaeddin](#) agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. *Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.*

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

In such instances, prioritizing markers of clear agency (e.g., quotation marks and reporting clauses) and full attribution were observed to put emphasis on faithful reporting which subsequently deprioritizes checking the agency of these VF units. Accordingly, full attribution and DS become factors that contribute to the creation of this perceived accountability instead of being factors that contribute to holding the quoted voices accountable for their statements. In these instances, the lack of accountability was observed to stem from this perceived accountability.

Perceived qualification refers to the instances where VF units are ascribed qualification if assigned the agency of the neighbouring reported voice, especially when an elusive voice role is provided, as the case with the italicized unit in examples [2] and [4]:

“There aren't a lot of alternatives in such cases,” [says Abul-Wafa](#). *“Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option is the use of military force.”*

(Leila, 2013, Watered down dispute)

[Mustafa Al-Guindi, an MP and coordinator of the popular diplomacy delegation](#) that visited Ethiopia and Uganda last year, has described the situation by saying that while Egypt is concerned about the effects of the dam, Addis Ababa has repeatedly emphasised that the dam will not have any effect on the amount of water reaching Egypt. *As a result, no action should be taken until the findings of the tripartite technical committee looking into the matter are released.*

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

In both cases, prioritizing markers of clear agency and full attribution (even if the role is elusive) was observed to put emphasis on these elements which would subsequently deprioritize checking the agency of these VF units or the role of the reported voice, creating the effect of general qualification. Accordingly, full attribution and DS become factors that contribute to the creation of this perceived qualification instead of being factors that contribute to holding the quoted voices

accountable for their statements. In these instances, the lack of accountability was observed to stem from this perceived qualification.

In addition to prioritizing markers of clear agency being an element that was observed to facilitate perceived qualification, the effect of binding and priming in the instances of “unrepeated role” was also observed to perform the same effect in longer stretches of texts. Especially, when the process of checking the qualification becomes very challenging due to the absence of the attributions later in the news articles, in which cases, qualification is rather likely to be assumed by the readers as they carry on in their reading experience based on the principle of once qualified, always qualified. In other words, reading the full attributions once at the beginning of the article is likely to create the impression of qualification when markers of clear agency are prioritized in the later sections of the articles.

6.5.2 Elusive attribution

Here, I examine the instances where the reported voices are indistinctly introduced to the readers, either due to the attributions being deferred in position or because their attributions reflect indistinct voice roles. I begin with examining the examples where the attribution is not placed next to the voice when it is first introduced, but rather placed after the statement of the voice is reported in section 6.5.2.1 and then I move to examine the examples where the description of the reported voice is not provided in full in section 6.5.2.2.

6.5.2.1 Deferred attribution

Here, I examine the instances where the reported voices are indistinctly introduced to the readers due to the attributions being deferred in position. In these examples, the attribution is not placed next to the voice when it is first introduced, but rather placed after the statement of the voice is reported as the case in examples [9] – [11].

[9] [Newspapers](#) followed President Mohamed Mursi's visit to Ethiopia which was hailed as an opportunity to redevelop sound relations with the African continent (...)

[Mohamed Barakat](#) stated as a matter of fact that good intentions are not enough in building sound international relations. And that, he wrote applies to Egypt's relationship with Africa.

"Reactivating Egypt's relationship with the black continent requires effective efforts on the economic and political fields on an official as well as popular level," [Barakat wrote in the official daily Al-Akhbar](#).

(El Bey, 2012, The near tempest)

[10] [Akram El-Kassas](#) wrote that interests and national security govern relations between states. Egypt's interests in Africa are on various levels, the most important of which is the Nile water issue. Thus, Egypt should improve its relations with the Nile Basin states.

"Egypt is in need to rebuild its relation with Africa in general and the Nile Basin states in particular on the basis of mutual economic and human interests," [he wrote in the independent daily Al-Youm Al-Sabei](#).

(El Bey, 2012, The near tempest)

Note that in examples [9] and [10] the attributions are deferred, while other information takes a more prominent position. This is observed to happen here in two layers of prioritizing: the first layer is visible here via the *fronting* of the noun “Newspapers” compared to both contribution units of the reported voices that follow. Fronting, according to the Oxford dictionary, is defined as “any syntactic process by which elements are moved to a marked position at the beginning of a sentence” (Matthews, 2014). While “newspapers” as a noun is not an element of a particular sentence here, the way it prefaces the introduction of the quoted voices makes it perform almost the same function of creating a certain focus for the readers. This focus is seen to contradict the general focus of attributions (i.e., the full description of the reported voices). In this sense, a general qualification of the role of the coming voices is established and primed through which lens, the readers proceed with the reading process.

The second layer of prioritizing happens at the contribution level in each of the above examples, where the reported information is prioritised and the attributions are deferred, by being placed after the reported statements. As explained previously, this puts emphasis on processing the content first before the identification of the role of the voice, where the process of checking the voice’s qualification does not follow the ideal order of its steps. Note how in both examples the readers are implicitly introduced to a general role that is defined for them by the author of the news article via the fronting of the noun “newspapers”. Hence, the role of these voices is likely to be assumed by the readers instead of being checked as to whether they are, e.g., writers or journalists due to the vagueness of the description.

Both layers of prioritizing were found to shift the readers’ focus away from the process of identifying the voice role and checking its qualification. Note how presenting the readers at the outset with the noun “newspapers”, in the first layer of prioritizing, removes the focus from the individual voices and their full description in the attributions. This effect is reinforced by the

second layer of prioritizing where the description of the voices is elusive and not reflective of the voice but rather of the name of the newspaper. As a result, both layers are observed to shift the readers' focus by depersonalizing the personalized nature of attributions and making them institutionalized instead. This is evident in examples [9] and [10] in prioritizing the names of the newspapers in which *the articles* were published, instead of *the writers* who wrote the article and what qualifies them to make their reported statements. Accordingly, this puts more emphasis on general entities and hence results in general qualification as opposed to contested qualification. This style of altering information structures is adopted in a very similar way in example [11]:

[11] The aftermath of the Ethiopian decision to divert the Blue Nile and build the Renaissance Dam is still a matter of serious concern. [Writers](#) looked at the way the authorities are dealing with it.

[Mohamed Ali Kheir](#) wrote that without exaggeration, Egypt has entered a dangerous zone because it is the first time that Egypt has been faced with a major threat to its national security.

“Egypt's security is confined to two places: its eastern gate [Sinai-Israel border], and the Nile water. In the military dogma the latter is more important. Throughout Egypt's history, it has never faced threats from the two places at the same time,” [Kheir wrote in the independent daily Al-Shorouk](#).

(El Bey, 2013, Two train tracks)

Like examples, [9] and [10], example (11) also reflects the two layers of prioritizing the linguistic elements that reflect general qualification, which inhibits the process of checking the voice's qualification. This is evident in all three examples as the elements of the voice attribution that the readers are provided with are “less amenable ... to scrutiny and/or objection or disagreement by the reader/hearer” (Jeffries, 2010, p. 78). Even for an informed reader, the role of these writers, according to the classification I provided earlier in this chapter, remains unclear. The question here is whether the reader would classify them under the *reporter* voice or the *expert* voice since not all news articles are written by journalists. In this case, the readers need a full description of the writer to be able to distinguish their qualifications.

This absence of a full description of the reported voices is likely to result in perceived qualification where the readers may presuppose that the mere citation of these voices in the news articles makes them qualified, as the case in examples [9] – [11]. Also, there is another possibility that the reader would object to or on the contrary agree with these writers by the mere mention of the names of the newspapers to which they are affiliated. This effect was found to be reinforced by the use of

contrast in all three examples. Note the contrast in the use of the adjectives “*official*” and “*independent*” in the description of the newspapers, which classifies them according to the type of the newspapers. This creates a dichotomy between the readers possibly based on their political inclinations in which case the positive or negative evaluation of the opinion of the writers who are affiliated with the *official/independent* newspapers is likely to be affected by the reader being part of the right/left-wing political circles.

In neither of these possibilities would the readers base their assessments on factual information provided in the description of the reported voices. Also, in both possibilities, the readers are obliged to process the information first before making any informed decisions about what they would do with it. Thus, these decisions are likely to be affected by the readers’ perception of the institutions to which they are affiliated. We can notice that neither of the above possibilities involves a questioned accountability either voluntarily or ignorantly. For example, the readers who are part of the right/left-wing political circles and choose readily to accept/reject the information and statements based on the affiliation of the reported voice are probably not concerned as much with questioning accountability. On the other hand, the readers, who usually ascribe importance to what is reported in the official outlets as representative of the stance of the government/state, are less likely to contest the qualification of the reported voices due to the absence of their full description, which results in lack of accountability where the readers may think they are holding the government accountable for such statements while this is not the case.

6.5.2.2 Indistinct role

Here, I examine the instances where the reported voices are indistinctly introduced to the readers because their attributions reflect indistinct voice roles. In these examples, the description of the reported voice is not provided in full as in the case in examples [12] – [14].

[12] Tarek Kotb, [from the Foreign Ministry's Nile Basin States Department](#), said that the delegation had included 20 figures representing the government as well as 15 NGOs. A single approach could not resolve all possible conflicts, he said, but "political means, together with the efforts of NGOs and popular diplomacy, go hand-in-hand in order to improve relations and create a better ambiance among the Nile Basin states," Kotb told Al-Ahram Weekly.

(El Bey, 2012, The River Nile: bridge or barrier?)

[13] Hani Raslan, [from Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies](#), said the move is positive inasmuch as it seeks to find a mechanism for cooperation and emphasises the will of the

three member states to cooperate. But while it may strengthen relations between the three countries it will not resolve differences between Upper and Lower Nile Basin states.

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2012, Prospects of cooperation)

[14] Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since “the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.”

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

In all three examples [12] – [14], like the examples from the above section, the reported voices are indistinctly introduced to the readers. However, it is not due to the attributions being deferred in position, but rather because they reflect indistinct voice roles. These indistinct roles result from the vagueness of the description of the reported voices in their provided attributions. This vagueness is observed to occur due to the absence of a full description of the job/position that these voices hold in the mentioned entities/institutions. Such a “choice about whether to include a particular piece of information”, according to Jeffries, is considered also a stylistic tool for prioritizing that has its ideological effect on the readers (2010, p. 80). Vagueness, in this case, Jeffries (2010) argues, helps avoid confronting outstanding issues related to the statements being made. Likewise, it was observed to make the qualification reflected in the attributions less contested.

Note here that the absence of the description of the roles of the reported voices in their respective institutions reduces the possibility of liability and increases the likelihood of unquestioned uptake of the reported statements. Note, for instance, Kotb in example [12] is highly likely to be placed under the *official* voice role since he is introduced to be part of the “*Foreign Ministry's Nile Basin States Department*”. The same applies to Raslan in example [13], who is introduced to be part of the “*Centre for Political and Strategic Studies*”, and Nasreddin in example [14] who is introduced to affiliate with “*Cairo University's Institute for African Studies*”. All three voices are highly likely to be considered knowledgeable enough to be placed under the *expert* voice role based on their affiliation with these institutions, and at the same time regardless of their actual roles or capacities in these institutions.

Additionally, note here that the absence of the description of the roles of the reported voices in their respective institutions gives prominence to their affiliations which in turn invites the readers

to focus more on the institutions to which these voices are affiliated. This is evident in the prioritization of the attribution in their position in all three examples, where, like example [4], the fronting of the attribution when paired with a description of a voice that is inconclusive of a certain role gives the impression of legitimacy, which may leave the reader more likely to perceive such voices as qualified. This brings back the challenge with this type of general qualification, with an additional element of the institution, where the parameters of qualification are decided based on the entity to which they are affiliated and according to which the credibility of the news or the probability of dismissing them is determined.

6.5.3 No attribution

Here, I examine the instances where the article writer or the voices reported are not introduced to the readers; either the attributions of the voices are omitted or the attribution that is provided is membershiped. I examine the examples where no attribution is provided in section 6.5.3.1 and the examples where the description of the reported voice is not provided in full in section 6.5.3.2.

6.5.3.1 Omitted attribution

It has been observed in almost all the news articles in my dataset that the attribution of the news article writer is never mentioned at the outset or even at a later point. In the majority of the news articles, these writers report the speech of *expert* and *official* voices in their articles with varying patterns of attributions for credibility as well as accountability. However, in some of the news articles like “River war” (Said, 2013), “A story of intrigue and hostility” (Essawi, 2013), and “Entebbe all over again” (Nkrumah, 2013), there is either no quoted voices as is the case in the first-mentioned article or only one voice is quoted as is the case in the latter two. In all three articles, the information structure that is prioritized is the name of the writer that is provided at the outset; however, no attributions were provided for all three writers.

This stylistic choice of omitting the attribution of the news article writer negatively affects the ability of the informed reader to contest the qualification of these writers, as Jeffries (2010) argues “putting something at a higher syntactic level ... is likely to make it more susceptible to questioning” (p. 86). Accordingly, an informed reader is presented with almost no linguistic elements in all three articles that would enable them to follow the process of checking the qualification of the voice before processing the information from the entire article. As a result, the

omission of the attributions facilitates the uptake of a sheer amount of information as fact without much contestation. In addition, the only two elements that are available for contestation (i.e., the name of the writer and the name of the newspapers) may not be contested based on the qualification that is reflected in the description of the writer. Rather, they are likely to be contested, as explained in the previous section, based on their affiliation or the reader's familiarity with them, or as Sorial (2017) puts it "because of who they are rather than the actual evidence they present for their views" (p. 306).

As a result, their qualification is likely to be *perceived* based on their mere ability to publish in a prominent newspaper for example, since access to media is generally assumed by the readers to be "most open to socially dominant sectors, both as 'reliable sources' and as 'accessed voices'" (Hartley, 1982, p.111). In this case, the readers are less likely to question how reliable this information is while relying on the assessment of the publishing entities with which they are affiliated, as explained in the previous section.

Likewise, this explanation applies to news articles where the name of the writer is omitted as the case in the articles "An upstream dilemma" (2013), "The Renaissance Dam debacle" (2013), and "Prospects of cooperation" (2012). The omission of the writer's name, like the indistinct role from the above section in examples [12], [13], and [14], gives prominence to their affiliations. This in turn invites the readers to focus more on the institutions with which these voices are affiliated, by omitting the description of the individual voices and fronting the name of the institution in the position where the name of the writer is usually mentioned. This brings back the challenge of general institutional qualification, where the parameters of qualification are decided based on the entity to which they are affiliated and according to which the credibility of the news or the probability of dismissing them is determined.

6.5.3.2 Membershopped role

Here, I examine the instances where no article writer or reported voices are clearly introduced to the readers, but rather they are introduced in membershopped attributions. In these examples, the description of the reported voice is not provided in full as seen in examples [15] – [20].

[15] While expressing appreciation for the change of attitude in Cairo towards Africa, [diplomats of the Nile Basin countries](#) insist that Egypt still needs to realise that the demand of Nile Basin

states for Nile water is "legitimate" and "irreversible" as it is designed to serve the purpose of development from expanding irrigation to widening power grids.

"We welcome stronger ties with Egypt but this does not mean we will give up on our rights," said a Nile Basin diplomat.

(Ezzat, 2012, Back in Africa)

[16] Amr's visit was described by a diplomatic source as an exploratory visit that would be followed by several high level visits to discuss the possibility of the implementation of the recommendations of the tripartite report on the Renaissance Dam. "*The report is the starting point according to which we can start political dialogue,*" he added.

(El-Bey, 2013, In quest of a win-win situation)

Note that both the name of the source as well as their attributions are omitted in examples [15] and [16] which are observed to hinder the process of checking the qualification of the reported voices. In the meantime, note the reported information is prioritized by fronting it at the beginning of both examples, while the writer's description of the reported voice is deferred. This creates a focus for the readers, i.e., to process the information first while it makes the membershiped description of the voice role less amenable to scrutiny. I use the term *membershiped* role to refer to this form of voice description based on Fairclough's use of the term membershiping. Fairclough, however, did not define this term, thus for the purposes of my research, I use the *membershiped* role to refer to the instances where no attribution is provided and hence the role of the reported voice is decided by the writer's/journalist's choice rather than assessed by the readers based on a detailed description of the voice's qualification.

In this sense, the qualification of the reported voices with the membershiped role is decided for the readers beforehand, which makes these voices less amenable to objection or contestation by the readers. Note the use of the noun phrase "*diplomats of the Nile Basin countries*" in example [15] and "*diplomatic source*" in [16] reflects this notion of membershiped role, which gives the impression of authority or validity to the reported voice regardless of the absence of the full description of what their actual role is. Also, deferring these membershiped roles in both examples contributes to making them less amenable to contestation. Note how both nouns "*diplomats of the Nile Basin countries*" and "*diplomatic source*" are backgrounded by virtue of the subordination in example [15] and the use of the passive voice construction in example [16].

We can also notice that the omission of the attributions in both examples is combined with an omission of the names of the sources, which contributes to the lack of accountability of the reported speech. Note how the nouns: “Nile Basin diplomat” in example [15] and “diplomatic source” in example [16] are used to refer to both the agency and the qualification of the quoted voices in the above examples. Hence, while no voice is to be held accountable for the reported information, the readers are likely to process this information without contestation. In this case, prioritizing enables the news article writers to shift the attention of the readers from qualification assessment to information consumption. This is clear in examples [15] and [16] where the *fronting* of these membership roles and the *omission* of agency and attribution remove the focus from the agency of the quoted voice (i.e., who is to be held accountable for this statement) as well as the qualification of the voice (i.e., what qualifies them to make this statement).

More importantly, it is crucial to consider here how the membership role as a pattern of prioritizing negatively affects DS being the norm for clear agency. Note how the omission of the names of the reported voices in examples [15] and [16] makes the agency of both contribution units anonymized. Note how the anonymity of the voices in these units inevitably affects the DS units in example [15] *"We welcome stronger ties with Egypt but this does not mean we will give up on our rights," said a Nile Basin diplomat* and example [16] *"The report is the starting point according to which we can start political dialogue," he added* to become FDS since they lack agents to which the readers can attribute the agency of the presumably DS units. In this case, both speech units that are italicized in the two examples are no longer DS but rather FDS. This alteration of the function of DS from being the norm for clear agency to function as anonymous agency also contributes to the consumption of information with perceived accountability which is not the case.

The possible effects of almost all the above-mentioned patterns of prioritizing can be observed to be quite detrimental, especially in the context of prolonged conflicts, where the conflict unfolds over a long span of time. In such contexts, the news reported usually features activities such as problem definition, suggested resolutions, and assessment of resolutions/decisions/actions in relation to the conflict. As such, the effect of prioritizing in texts as explained thus far would be likely to affect the readers' ability to distinguish/remember what arguments were proposed or accepted or rejected by which voice roles. Likewise, they are less likely able to recall the original problem definition, who presented this definition or who redefined it and on what basis.

As a result, such actions are likely to be processed subconsciously by the readers without contestation, as is the case with the assessment of an action in example [17]:

[17] In the assessment of [one concerned official](#) statements made during the meeting can only undermine Egypt's negotiating position with Ethiopia. “*Before the meeting we had a strong legal basis to say that as a Nile Basin country our rights should not be undermined as a result of irrigation schemes by any other Basin state. International law was on our side. Now we are in a position that could be easily qualified by international law as aggressive. We have a very tough diplomatic mission ahead of us to remedy the damage,*” [said the diplomat](#).

(Ezzat, 2013, Outflanked by crises)

Note in this example the different actions that the quoted voice is making, e.g., the assessment of an endeavour that undermined Egypt’s negotiating position; the assessment of Egypt’s legal basis being stronger before this endeavour; the statement that the international law was on Egypt’s side and the statement of the consequences of this certain endeavour. This raises the question of how the readers are expected to recollect over a long span of time the constant definitions and redefinitions of the problem and by which voice roles if they can identify neither the agency nor the qualification of the reported voice in the above contribution that is making such statements. How would they be able to follow up with the consequences of these statements, or hold anyone accountable for them if there is no voice to which they can attribute the discourse agency?

This membership role has not been found exclusive to the *official* voice role as shown in the above examples; it has also been observed to occur with the *expert* voice role. It was also found to be coupled with the anonymity of the quoted voices, which has been observed to strengthen the effect of this pattern. Consider examples [18] and [19]:

[18] Both [Egypt and Sudan](#) were surprised by the news, but while [Sudan](#) described the decision as “shocking”, believing it will negatively affect their quota of Nile water, Egypt's presidential spokesman Omar Amer told the press that the decision taken by the Ethiopian government would not impact on Egypt's share. Meanwhile, [Egyptian water experts](#) criticised Egypt's official reaction and expressed alarm.

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

[19] [Experts](#) looking into the possible outcome of the current Ethiopian hydroelectric projects have offered a wide array of views, not all compatible with what the Ethiopians say.

Unlike the official Ethiopian position, [technical studies](#) and [expert opinions](#) suggest that the Renaissance Dam and the rest of the project planned for the Blue Nile may reduce significantly the amount of water going downstream.

(Al-Ahram Weekly, 2013, An upstream dilemma)

Note in both examples how the anonymized membership role occurs by omitting the names of the reported voices and using collective nouns to refer to the agency as well as the qualification of the reported voices. Note the collective nouns “Egypt” and “Sudan” in example [18] as well as “Experts”, “technical studies” and “expert opinions” in example [19] are all prioritized in position as the subject of their respective speech units. This was observed in example [18], for instance, to put emphasis on the reactions of both countries to the “decision” reported while deemphasizing the agency of who specifically expressed these reactions from both countries. In this case, the lack of agency and qualification of who expressed these reactions invites the readers to process the information with no contestation to who said it. For example, who was surprised? Who thinks the decision was “shocking”? are questions that the readers probably will not ask due to the emphasis that is placed on the information instead of the agency/qualification of the reported information.

Also, note that the use of comparative structures in example [18] is observed to create a dichotomy that affects the public’s perception of qualification despite the anonymized membership roles. Note the first comparative structure in *“but while [Sudan](#) described the decision as “shocking”, believing it will negatively affect their quota of Nile water, [Egypt's presidential spokesman Omar Amer](#) told the press that the decision taken by the Ethiopian government would not impact on [Egypt's share](#)”*. “Sudan” here is put in a syntactic frame in comparison with Egypt's presidential spokesman, which is likely to set a convention that both referents belong to the same social role. For example, if the reader classifies the spokesperson to belong to the *official* role, there is a high possibility that they would also classify the noun “Sudan” here to be representative of the country/state, which in this case it would be perceived agency rather than assigned agency.

The second comparative structure can be seen across speech units or at the contribution unit level. For example, we can see it across speech units as in *“[Egypt's presidential spokesman Omar Amer](#) told the press that the decision taken by the Ethiopian government would not impact on [Egypt's share](#). Meanwhile, [Egyptian water experts](#) criticised [Egypt's official reaction](#) and expressed *alarm*”*, where again we can notice the comparison that is held between the official role and expert

role. Also, we can notice it at the contribution unit level where the comparison is held between three entities: possibly officials in Sudan, officials in Egypt and water experts. What is worth noting in all these comparative structures is what elements are prioritized in these structures and how these elements affect the function of this structure in discourse.

In ideal reading conditions, comparative structures are used to allow an informed reader to hear the opinions of the different voices before making an informed decision regarding these opinions, which can hardly be the case here. Note the varying degrees of clarity regarding the description of the roles of the entities in comparison in example [18], i.e., full attribution, anonymized membership role and a collective noun. This variation does not constitute a solid basis for a reasonable comparison nor for the process of checking the voice's qualification to take place. On the contrary, prioritizing full attribution for only one entity out of three invites the readers to focus more on the entity that is to be held accountable which, in the above example, is the entity that is likely to be blamed for having a different reaction towards the news compared to the other entities which found it "shocking" or expressed "alarm" towards.

It is worth noting here that the information reported by those who we may deem as *expert* voices under the membership role was mostly observed in my dataset to fall under two categories. The first category involves reporting their opinions/suggestions either in the form of general statements or in comparative structures with other voice roles like examples [18] and [19]. The second category involves reporting scientific information related to their area of expertise, which Sorial (2017) argues that "[g]iven the highly technical nature of expert knowledge" (p. 308), the readers – who are non-experts do not have the necessary skills to assess these views. The other challenging layer of this highly technical information that was observed to have a significant ideological effect on the reception of this information has to do with the timeliness of reporting the information (i.e., the choice of when/how reported), as can be seen in example [20]:

[20] The diversion of the Blue Nile is part of the process required to build the Renaissance Dam which many [water experts](#) believe will severely reduce Egypt's share of Nile water.

(Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes)

Note here that the scientific information is given prominence by being prioritised in position in the speech unit compared to the membership role, i.e. "water experts" in the subordinate clause. Yet, they are strongly tied with subordination which in turn highlights the significance of the piece

of information that it “will severely reduce Egypt's share of Nile water” since it is the opinion of the “water experts” regarding the effect of the “diversion of the Blue Nile”. The other scientific information that may not receive equivalent focus is “the diversion of the Blue Nile being part of the process required to build the Renaissance Dam”, given the focus that is placed on the other piece of information. As a result, the readers are likely expected not to pay much attention to it.

Looking closely at the political context of example [20] and example [18], both examples are related as they are reported in the same news article. The decision that is referred to in both examples is that “Addis Ababa announced that it would begin diverting the course of the Blue Nile” (Leila, 2013, Dampening disputes). Note how the decision is reported in example [18] as “shocking”, while in example [20] it is reported as “part of the process required to build the Renaissance Dam”. Furthermore, note how in example [18] the word “shocking” is reported to describe a “decision” or a “move”, whereas in example [20] the same “diversion” is described as “part of the process”. This raises the question of how come this decision is reported as “shocking” while it is part of a process that has already started years ago. Also, one might question the reason behind such a disparity in reporting the same matter in the same news article.

Surprisingly, looking closely at the entire news article, example [20] comes first in order before example [18], which means that it is prioritized in its position. Note example [20] comes as part of a contribution unit reported at the outset of this article, where this information regarding the diversion being “part of the process required to build the Renaissance Dam” is not prioritized, as explained in the above analysis. Then, this contribution unit is followed by many contribution units that describe the diversion as a “move” or a “decision”. This decision is also described as a “shocking” political move amid multiple reporting of concerned experts “expressing alarm” towards this “disastrous”, “traumatizing” and “abrupt” decision. If we are to compare the effect of the information that is prioritized in the first contribution unit to the effect of the units that follow, we can clearly see the effect of binding versus priming in this example. The possible logical explanation for both contradicting descriptions to co-exist in the same article is that the information in the first contribution unit gets bound whereas the information in the following units is primed.

The possible effect of binding and priming within one article, as demonstrated in example [20], raises the question of the timeliness of reporting the information in a prolonged conflict. The choice of when to report the information and how becomes a crucial factor that can easily allow for

manipulation of vital information that could attribute liability to certain systems or personnel while denying liability to others, especially if the conflict is extended to include multiple ruling systems. The above example is a perfect example that clearly demonstrates this idea; if the decision of diverting the Blue Nile is perceived in relation to policy failure, the liability is likely to be attributed to the current ruling system. However, if the decision of diverting the Blue Nile is perceived as a “part of the construction process”, the liability is likely to be attributed to an earlier point in time. For this reason, I argue that timeliness is a major factor when analyzing the reporting of the speech of expert voices.

6.6 Summary

In this chapter, I examined the discursive practice of voice presentation to identify its effect on the public’s ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions. To do so, I outlined a correlation between attribution and qualification to investigate the effect of attributions on the public’s perception of qualification in MCD. In my investigation of this correlation, I identified a gap in the existing literature, where I underlined a distinction between expertise and qualification. In preparation for my investigation of attributions, I presented a re-envisioned classification of Goffman’s definition of role to enable me to investigate the above correlation. I also provided definitions of role and qualification, where both are interconnected, based on the two functions that attributions conflate in news reports.

Then, I presented my approach to investigating voice presentation in news reporting on a cline of qualification, where I classified the different patterns of attributions according to their possible level of contestation. Using this cline, I examined the effect of *prioritizing* on the function of *attributions* in news reports. I analyzed the functions of the textual structures and features that marked this prioritization at the textual level. Based on this analysis, two routes were observed to possibly occur where in each, full attribution was observed *not* to be the norm for contested qualification and accountability. Finally, the discussion of the examples under the different patterns of attribution showed that in this correlation between attribution and qualification, attributions were observed to perform the opposite function to what it is devised for. Hence, it was observed to adversely affect the public’s ability to hold their governments accountable.

7 Conclusion

In this research, I set out to investigate the public's ability to hold their governments accountable for their decisions at times of conflict. This question was stirred by an agreement hailed in the Egyptian press/media as a resolution to what was back at the time a 5-year-old conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt, which several years later did not seem to end. Thus, I decided to investigate what the officials report about the conflict to answer my research question. To do so, I examined their discourse as reported to the public in the medium of news reports with all its complexity and interrelatedness with the discourse of other entities, i.e., reporters and experts. In doing so, my research was concerned with investigating the officials' discourse in the context of its occurrence to examine the possible effects of its interplay with other discourses on the public's reception/consumption of the officials' discourse and their ability to hold them accountable.

In this chapter, I conclude the investigation of my research where in section 7.1 I summarise the key research findings in relation to my research aims and questions. Then, in section 7.2, I discuss the value of my research and outline its implications both in the field of linguistics as well as for the public. After that, in section 7.3, I review the limitations of the study in relation to the size as well as the type of data selected for this research, before I propose opportunities for future research in section 7.4 that would help complement and consolidate the research that is reported here. Then, I summarise the chapter with some concluding remarks in section 7.5.

7.1 Overall findings of the research

In this section, I outline the overall findings of my research in relation to the research aims and questions. Therefore, I restate here the research questions regarding voice fusion (VF) in Mediated Conflict Discourse (MCD). Then, I discuss each question and outline the main research outcomes that were developed from the investigation of each question.

In my investigation of the officials' discourse in the context of its occurrence to examine the possible effects of its interplay with other discourses on the public's ability to hold them accountable, I noticed during the initial phase of dataset annotation some instances where there is a lack of clarity about the agency of some of the speech that is reported in the news reports. In these instances, I faced difficulty to distinguish what is said by which reported voice, either between the reporter and the reported voices or sometimes amongst the reported voices

themselves. I used the term Voice Fusion (VF) to refer to these instances and I decided to focus on this VF as one pattern of how the different reported voices may interplay in MCD. In doing so, I aimed to examine and answer the following questions in my research:

1. What are the patterns of voice fusion in mediated conflict discourse?
2. How do these patterns function textually and in the context of the conflict?
3. How does this voice fusion affect power relations between governments and the public?

To answer the first research question regarding the patterns of VF, I investigated the discourse presentation process in news reporting. Namely, the two inseparable discursive acts carried out by the author/reporter of the news article, i.e., speech presentation and voice presentation. To identify the patterns of VF in speech presentation, I examined the speech presentation modes in the speech of the reported voices to investigate the degrees of clarity they reflect about the agency of these voices. Equally, to identify the patterns of VF in voice presentation, I examined the attributions of the reported voices to explore the degrees of clarity they reflect about the role of the reported voices whose speech is reported.

A new model was developed as part of the inductive process of my analysis in my quest to explore these various degrees of clarity about the discourse agency of the reported voices. This new model categorises Leech & Short’s SP modes according to their degree of clarity about agency to measure whether they reflect clear agency of the speech reported instead of measuring the author’s commitment to faithful reporting. Thus, these SP modes were categorised according to three degrees of clarity that I observed during the initial phase of annotation, producing a new cline which I call cline of agency in report:




Figure 7. 1 Cline of agency in report

The analysis of the first discursive act (i.e., speech presentation) indicated that VF happens due to what I call the **blending** of different speech modes within and across contribution units in the long stretches of discourse. Blending was observed to occur across the dataset when a contribution unit or an exchange unit begins in one speech presentation mode and then blends into another speech presentation mode, where there is ambiguity around the agency of one or more of the embedded speech units. The analysis revealed two key common patterns in which blending was observed to occur at the textual level in my dataset: the first pattern marks the move from speech/contribution units with a clear agency to ones with an ambiguous agency, and the second pattern marks a move from speech/contribution units with a clear agency to ones with an anonymous agency.

The analysis of the second discursive act (i.e., voice presentation) indicated that VF happens due to **prioritizing** different linguistic structures within and across contribution units in the long stretches of discourse. Prioritizing was observed to occur, mainly in relation to two elements: the position of the attributions (in relation to the statements provided by the reported voices) and the role of the reported voices (in relation to the clarity of the description of the voice in these attributions). The analysis revealed three common patterns in which prioritization was observed to occur at the textual level in relation to both elements: the first underlies full attribution and clear voice role; the second underlies elusive attribution and indistinct voice role, and the third pattern underlies omitted attribution and membershiped voice role.

To answer my second research question regarding how these patterns function textually and in the context of the conflict, I analysed how both features of blending and prioritizing function at the textual level. Based on these textual functions, I provided interpretations and explanations of how these functions can possibly affect the public's perception of agency and qualification of MCD in the context of the conflict as pertains to my research question. Hence, I examined first how the textual patterns of blending and the linguistic features of these patterns function at the textual level to highlight the correlation between discourse agency and accountability. Then, I examined how the textual patterns of attributions and their correlation with the voice role function at the textual level to highlight the relationship between qualification and accountability.

The analysis and discussion of both patterns of blending showed that the movement of the blending from clear agency to ambiguous/anonymous agency was observed to create an effect of **discourse**

continuation of the reported subject from the previous unit with the clear agency, where many linguistic features that distinguish both patterns of blending were found to facilitate this effect of discourse continuation (e.g., central reporting clause, suspension, connectors, subordination, etc.). As a result, both patterns of blending were observed to increase the possibility of attributing the agency of speech/contribution units with the ambiguous/anonymous agency to the reported subjects from the neighbouring units. Yet, given the fact that there is no factual linguistic proof at the textual level that could confirm the agency of these ambiguous/anonymous units to belong to the reported voice, such attribution of the agency was observed to result in perceived agency based on which no voices can be held accountable for the information reported in these units.

While this *perceived* agency was found to be inherent even in the single units of speech modes that underlie the ambiguous/anonymous agency, its effect regarding the lack of accountability of these units was observed to be aggravated by the linguistic act of blending. Blending, in this case, was observed to denote the normal reading conditions of the news, where speech/contribution units do not occur separately but rather blend into each other, which is the ideal setting for the effect of blending to take place. In this sense, blending was found as a factor that amplifies an effect that inherently exists in the single units by virtue of the setting in which the process of reading/listening to the news happens. This makes the effect of blending central as well as relevant to the research under investigation due to its effect to make the perceived agency of the ambiguous/anonymous agency units go unnoticed and hence the lack of contested agency.

The analysis and discussion of the three patterns of attributions revealed that prioritizing different information structures increases the possibility of attributing the qualification of the reported subjects from the units with clear agency to the neighbouring speech/contribution units with the ambiguous/anonymous agency. Specifically, the prioritization of full and elusive attributions was observed to create an effect of **perceived qualification**, where the qualification of the reported subject from the previous unit with the clear agency is likely to be attributed to the subsequent units with the ambiguous/anonymous agency. Yet, given the fact that there is no factual linguistic proof at the textual level that confirms the agency of these ambiguous/anonymous units to belong to the reported voice, such attribution of the agency and hence qualification was observed to result in perceived accountability where no voices can be held accountable for the information reported in these units.

While this perceived qualification and henceforth perceived accountability were found to be inherent in the units of speech modes that underlie the ambiguous/anonymous agency (if/when attributed to the reported voices), its effect regarding the lack of accountability was observed to be aggravated by the act of prioritizing. Prioritizing, in this case, was observed to denote the normal reading conditions of the news, where the effect of priming and binding is likely to take place in this setting impacting the focus of the readers. In this sense, prioritizing was found as a factor that amplifies an effect that inherently exists in the speech/contribution units by virtue of the setting in which the process of reading/listening to the news takes place. This makes the effect of prioritizing central as well as relevant to the research under investigation due to its effect to make the perceived qualification of the ambiguous/anonymous agency units go unnoticed and hence the lack of contested qualification.

Putting into broader context the effect of voice fusion as observed to result from/aggravated by both blending and prioritizing, it was observed that the public may fail to identify, as they read or follow the news of the conflict, who introduced which resolutions, or which resolutions are mere suggestions by expert voices and which resolutions are reflective of the government's stance or decisions. This was noted as one of the critical consequences of the effect of perceived agency and perceived qualification, which even if created at the textual level, their challenging effects do not remain at that level. While the instant consequences were found to be challenging during the process of reading/watching the news, the long-term consequences were found to be even more challenging in the context of a prolonged conflict, where it would be almost impossible for the public to trace who presented certain resolutions and who should be held accountable for what.

Finally, to answer my third question regarding the effect of this voice fusion on power relations between governments and the public, I utilised the analysis and discussions of the patterns and the functions of both blending and prioritizing to draw conclusions that answer my third research question.

The results of the analysis indicated that voice fusion disempowers the public by impeding them to hold their governments accountable due to the effects of blending and prioritizing. The discussion of the examples of both patterns of blending showed that in this correlation between agency and accountability, the markers of clear agency were observed to perform the opposite function to what they are devised for. Similarly, the discussion of the examples under the different

patterns of attribution showed that in this correlation between qualification and accountability, voice attributions were observed to perform the opposite function to what it is devised for.

The analysis demonstrated that even though clear agency (i.e., DS and IS) in news reporting was hypothesized (on a cline of accountability) as the norm for full accountability, the analysis showed otherwise. On several occasions, due to blending, clear agency was observed to be a factor that contributed to generating the effect of perceived agency instead of being a factor that contributes to holding the quoted voices accountable for their statements. Because prioritizing the markers of clear agency in the course of the act of blending was found to result in perceived agency, which makes the units with ambiguous/anonymous agency less contested for their agency. As a result, the reported voices in these units were found less liable to be held accountable for the statements they make, since the attribution of accountability is dependent on the attribution of agency, then any perceived agency has to do with an equally perceived accountability.

Similarly, the analysis showed that even though full attribution in news reporting was hypothesized (on a cline of qualification) as the norm for contested qualification, the analysis showed otherwise. On several occasions, due to prioritizing certain information structures, full attribution was observed to be a factor that contributed to generating the effect of perceived qualification instead of being a factor that contributes to holding the quoted voices accountable for their statements. Because prioritizing different information structures even when full attribution is provided was found to result in perceived qualification that makes full attribution less contested for the voice role. As a result, the reported voices in these units were found less liable to be contested for their qualification based on their voice role and therefore less liable to be held accountable for the statements they make, since the attribution of accountability is dependent on the voice role to whom the accountability is attributed, then any perceived qualification has to do with an equally perceived accountability.

The danger of both, the perceived agency and perceived qualification that underlie the conceptual effect of voice fusion is that they do not create confusion in the minds of the audience per se. Hence, what makes their effect alarming is that they are highly likely to go unnoticed, therefore if the audience is not paying attention to the effect of blending and prioritizing, no effect of confusion would urge them to stop and question such an effect. As a result, the audience is less likely to stop and question who is to be held accountable for which piece of information presented to them, in

which case the unquestioned agency and qualification would equal uncontested accountability. At this exact point, I identified the disempowerment of the public, where both tools that are supposed to empower them (i.e., agency and attribution) no longer fulfil the objective they were devised for; disabling them to ask the two essential questions that empower them: who says? And says who?

7.2 Implications of the research

In this section, I outline four key implications of my research findings, namely: creating a basic level of knowledge of the phenomenon of voice fusion; developing a new model to account for agency in reported news; directing more scholarly attention to investigating the power ‘to resist’ in the field of CDA, and finally constituting a combined approach to CDA that helps generate accessible typologies to the public that bridge the gap between linguistic knowledge and its practical consequences. Under each implication, I outline its contribution on a theoretical level in the field of linguistics as well as on a practical level for the public.

The first implication of my research is that it helps create a foundation level of knowledge of the phenomenon of voice fusion on a theoretical level as well as on a practical level.

On a theoretical level, my research introduced the term and definition of MCD that aimed to address the gap identified in the body of literature that investigates the language used in reporting the information made available about a situation of conflict, which comprises the presentation and representation of the narrative as well as the speech of several discourse agents. This term addressed the absence of a unified term and a specific definition that refers to the discourse that falls in this intersection between what is known and defined as the ‘political discourse’ and what is known and defined as ‘media discourse’, by accounting for how the discourse of multiple entities (e.g., politicians, officials, media representatives, etc.) as well as the speech of these different reported voices intersect when relayed to the public. This term represents the first step to addressing the lack of consensus on a term/definition among the scholars who are interested to investigate this intersection, which would enable them in the future to build on each other’s research and use the same working definitions when referring to the same discourse/phenomenon.

On a practical level, my aim was to raise awareness about this voice fusion in the reporting of the information that the public usually receive about matters that touch them in their everyday life. To raise this type of awareness among the public, I argued that it starts with naming the phenomenon

and agreeing on a definition for this reference. Thus, I identified a neutral term for this type of discourse, i.e., MCD to bring their awareness to the importance of distinguishing the agency of these different discourse agents. I also introduced the term voice fusion to increase the public's awareness of the interplay between the discourse of the different entities in MCD and highlight how this linguistic phenomenon has such an immense bearing on shaping and maintaining relations of power among the public and their governments.

The second implication of my research is that it introduces a new method for future researchers to account for agency in reported news.

On a theoretical level, literary stylistics has for so long benefitted from Leech & Short's model of speech presentation with all the subsequent refinements to the original model focusing on the "faithfulness" dimension alone. One of the key implications of my research is that it reveals the multidimensionality of the linguistic act of speech presentation, where SP modes can be utilised to account for the agency dimension. Devising a new model to measure the clarity of discourse agency in reported speech is methodological contribution that presents the field of stylistics with a more nuanced way to analyse speech presentation in news reporting.

On a practical level, this model reveals the importance of establishing basic public knowledge of the linguistic terms and expressions. This is because the explanation of a linguistic phenomenon like VF requires a background knowledge of the jargon used to refer to the different modes in which the speech of others is presented. Such a foundational level of knowledge becomes a prerequisite for the public's accessibility to the findings of linguistic research without undermining the intellectual integrity of the topic.

The third implication of my research is that it helps direct linguistic attention to investigating the power 'to resist' in the field of CDA, where the focus on the power 'to influence' prevails.

On a theoretical level, the question I raise in my research regarding the issue of accountability aimed to investigate the power 'to resist', where I found a dearth of studies that investigate this type of power in the literature on CDA. The importance of investigating this type of power is to generate a balance in the field in relation to the focus of the research and hence the practical implications of these studies. While the studies that focus on examining the power 'to influence' help raise the public's awareness about different topics, examining the power 'to resist' aims to

take this awareness a step further by activating the public and urging them to think further what they aim to do with this awareness. Hence, my research is an invitation to researchers to lend more attention to investigating this type of power, especially when examining social problems of public concern to help increase the applicability of the research findings.

On a practical level, looking at power from the side of those who are less privileged would appear more relatable to the public; providing them with reasons why should they care about this voice fusion per se and what questions to ask if they care. By focusing on the power ‘to resist’, we not only portray this discourse “as part of ... a social practice, showing how it is determined by social structures” or highlight “what reproductive effects discourses can cumulatively have on those structures, sustaining them or changing them” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 163), but also provide them with the tools to resist these effects and challenge these unequal relations of power. In focusing on matters of ‘agency’ and ‘qualification’ in the language investigated, I aimed to enable the public to observe and discern how far the power of the dominant parties is being contested and equip them with the relevant questions they need to ask to further contest this power.

The fourth implication of my research is that it introduces a combined approach to CDA to generate an accessible typology to the public, which bridges the gap between linguistic knowledge and its practical implications in the everyday life of the layperson.

On a theoretical level, the adaptation of Fairclough’s and its combination with Jeffries’ approach supported a holistic examination of the phenomenon of VF, bridging the gap between the linguistic and the practical. This combined approach addressed certain recurrent criticism of Fairclough’s original approach, specifically regarding the linguistic basis of the description stage as well as the accessibility of his approach to the public. I argued that combining both approaches helps generate a well-staged analysis that addresses both issues, starting with a pre-description stage as a first step to make the public aware of the conceptual effect that was created by this discourse, followed by a description stage, where the linguistic patterns/features in which knowledge is woven into baffling representations were described. Meanwhile, these patterns were demystified while they were being described by connecting the linguistic *features* to the conceptual effects they created, to help the public become aware of the linguistic *cues* that trigger this effect (interpretation stage). This interpretation was followed by an explanation of the power that underlies the uncontested knowledge created by this conceptual effect, where the need for a ‘critical’ and a more ‘active’

participation from them while reading/listening to the news was highlighted (explanation stage), to help the public be more critical in their engagement with MCD.

On a practical level, I found this combined approach as well as the analysis generated using it to be more accessible to the public compared to the general questions offered in Fairclough's original model. Because it presented the audience with the conceptual effect first and the linguistic markers that underlie this effect, as opposed to Fairclough's approach that presents the public with the analysis of the linguistic markers prior to the explanation of the effect of these markers in context. Thus, the combined approach creates more buy-in from the public to engage with the typology, since they already have a reason to explore these linguistic strategies and markers that help explain the effect, we present them with. It also enables the public not only to be aware of the conceptual effect that contributes to the creation and maintenance of unequal relations of power but also to be able to identify and name it.

The other practical implication of this combined approach on a practical level is that it bridges the gap between the linguistic and the practical when presenting typologies to the public. This combined approach enabled me to present the linguistic markers which underlie these strategies as clues for the public to look for while engaging with the texts, any text, in similar contexts. This would help them recognize it in their future engagement with this discourse and hopefully increase the possibility for the public to question what they are reading which would eventually decrease their susceptibility to being misled by it.

7.3 Limitations of the research

The first limitation of this research is the size of the dataset, as I decided to focus on newspaper articles that cover only one presidential term. While I found this small-sized dataset representative of the presidential era that it covers as well as suitable for the qualitative analysis needed to answer my research questions, additional research is needed to further validate and/or complement the linguistic patterns that came out from my analysis. For example, almost all the patterns of blending that came out in my analysis indicated movement from clear agency to units with a less clear agency, so it would be worthwhile investigating a dataset of bigger size to observe the patterns of blending that would come out, and whether they would indicate the same movement or additional patterns of different movement would emerge. Similarly, almost all the patterns of full attribution that came out in my analysis included units of VF (where the agency is either ambiguous or

anonymous), so it would be worthwhile investigating a dataset of bigger size to observe whether this is a general pattern or other linguistic features might arise to negatively impact full attribution from being the norm for full accountability.

A further limitation of this research is related to the type of data collected for this research, as I decided to focus only on one form of news reporting, i.e., newspaper articles. While newspaper articles are representative of one key form of mediated conflict discourse, it makes this research monodimensional since it does not account for other forms of MCD, e.g., broadcast news. Hence, the patterns of VF reported in this research cannot be generalised and described as inclusive of all types of MCD. Consequently, it would be worthwhile investigating the other key form of MCD, i.e., broadcast news through which the public receives information about the conflict. This is to explore how VF patterns would occur in this type of news reporting compared to newspaper articles and to explore whether such an investigation would further validate and/or complement the linguistic patterns that came out from the current research that investigates newspaper articles.

7.4 Recommendations for future research

One of the key implications of this research that is worth further research is the re-envisioning of the faithfulness dimension of speech presentation and the introduction of the agency dimension. The model of agency I proposed in this research was found functional in the investigation of matters related to accountability, where the speech presentation modes were observed to function somewhat differently compared to Leech & Short's faithfulness model. It would be worthwhile investigating how these different speech modes function in different contexts and what linguistic factors would affect their original function in relation to the clarity of discourse agency.

Another future research avenue I would suggest is to further explore the correlation between prioritizing and other textual-conceptual functions (TCFs). While I investigated thoroughly as well as rather separately the TCFs of presenting the speech of others and prioritizing, the findings of my analysis constantly drew them together in an inseparable way. Therefore, the other key implication of this research that is also worth further research is the correlation between prioritizing and speech presentation. Below I offer a fully integrated model that outlines this correlation, conflating both TCFs, based on my research findings, as a way forward to further investigate this correlation in discourse:




Figure 7. 2 Accountability in mediated conflict discourse

This diagram illustrates the correlation that was found between prioritizing and the two discursive acts of discourse presentation (i.e., speech presentation and voice presentation) in my investigation of my research question. The right side of the diagram shows the effect of prioritizing in the act of speech presentation, where prioritizing the units with clear agency when blended with units with vague/anonymous agency was observed to create perceived agency in these units. Quite similarly, the left side of the diagram shows the effect of prioritizing in the act of voice presentation, where prioritizing full attribution or linguistic markers of qualification was observed to create perceived qualification in the units with vague/anonymous agency. Hence perceived accountability for the information reported in these units was observed to be conceived as a result of both effects of perceived agency as well as perceived qualification. These units are where I identify the occurrence of voice fusion at the textual as well as the conceptual level.

Consequently, the further research avenue that seems most fitting, in this case, is reader-response testing. This is to test the readers' perception of agency and qualification of the reported voices during their experience of reading the news under regular reading conditions. Because the investigation that is reported in this research is qualitative in nature and the interpretation of how these textual features function in this context necessitates further validation. Therefore, the testing of both effects of perceived agency as well as perceived qualification through this type of analysis could challenge and perhaps refine the critical stylistic account of how voice fusion functions at the conceptual level. I envision this to be done using questionnaires to explore and compare the

respondents' reports concerning their own perception of agency and qualification in the units with vague/anonymous agency.

7.5 Summary and concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have reviewed the research I conducted to answer a question that stemmed from a real social problem that may concern the active public who are eager to become aware of their surroundings. I restated the motivation for my research and showed how it addressed gaps in the existing research into the language of conflict and how this gap affects people in their everyday life. I revisited the research questions that guided the analysis reported in this thesis and outlined my research findings pertaining to these questions. I delineated the key implications of my research on a theoretical as well as a practical level. I also proposed recommendations for future research that would address the limitations of the current research as well as build on the implications and findings of my research.

This is the first step towards making the public aware of the conceptual effect of voice fusion that is created during the experience of reading the news. It describes the patterns in which knowledge is woven into interconnected presentations of voice and speech that contribute to creating this effect. To empower the public to resist the power that underlies the uncontested knowledge created by this conceptual effect, this research highlights the need for a 'critical' participation from them while reading the news. Thus, this research encourages the reader to ask two questions, "Who says?" and "Says who?" as the first step to such critical engagement with the news.




Figure 7. 3 Question to ask when engaging with the news

The above figure shows the three key elements in news reporting, i.e. the information reported, the agency of the source and the role of the source. The arrows in this figure point to the elements the reader needs to pay attention to when any one element is prioritised. For example, if the information is prioritised, the reader asks two questions, “who says?” And “says who?” While if the role is prioritised, it is important to ask the question of “who says?” to ensure clarity about the agency of the reported information. Finally, if the agency of the voice is proritised, it is important to ask the question of “says who?” to ensure clarity about the role of voice whose speech is reported. These two questions, as opposed to Fairclough’s ten suggested questions, are expected to be more accessible to the public to use when engaging with the news.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

The near tempest

Doaa El Bey Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 19 - 07 - 2012

Mohamed Mursi, Addis Ababa, Hillary Clinton, Damascus: optimists battle pessimists in the press.
Doaa El-Bey and Rasha Saad scan the papers

Newspapers followed President Mohamed Mursi's visit to Ethiopia which was hailed as an opportunity to redevelop sound relations with the African continent. It also followed Hillary Clinton's visit to Egypt together with various developments regarding the fate of the parliament and the constituent committee responsible for drafting the new constitution.

Al-Akhbar on Monday quoted Mursi as saying 'Egypt regained its status in the heart of Africa' and Al-Gomhuriya had 'Egypt back in Africa after an absence for 17 years'.

Al-Youm Al-Sabei on Monday quoted Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi as saying 'Egypt will not be in the grip of one group' and the Al-Ahram banner on Sunday noted 'Egyptian-American talks to improve mutual relations'.

Al-Shorouk on Tuesday wrote 'Battle of thanaweya amma ends; another battle for joining top colleges starts' and Al-Wafd on Tuesday wrote 'Mubarak back in Tora prison'.

Mohamed Barakat stated as a matter of fact that good intentions are not enough in building sound international relations. And that, he wrote applies to Egypt's relationship with Africa.

"Reactivating Egypt's relationship with the black continent requires effective efforts on the economic and political fields on an official as well as popular level," Barakat wrote in the official daily Al-Akhbar.

While Barakat appreciated the positive moves to improve relations with Africa and the successful visit that Mursi paid to Addis Ababa, he called for a clear Egyptian plan based on a thorough study of the needs of the states on the continent to improve relations.

Barakat also pointed to the importance of starting with the Nile Basin and neighbouring states as the first phase.

Thus, he concluded, it is not appropriate to keep the budget earmarked to the Foreign Ministry's Egyptian-African fund in that ridiculously low \$30 million. "If we are serious in our attempt to start a new phase in our relations with Africa, the budget should be multiplied tenfold at least."

Akram El-Kassas wrote that interests and national security govern relations between states. Egypt's interests in Africa are on various levels, the most important of which is the Nile water issue. Thus, Egypt should improve its relations with the Nile Basin states.

"Egypt is in need to rebuild its relation with Africa in general and the Nile Basin states in particular on the basis of mutual economic and human interests," he wrote in the independent daily Al-Youm Al-Sabei.

The writer suggested that we could benefit from Egypt's role in Africa in the fifties and sixties in addition to studying the present investment opportunities that could come out with mutual benefits.

The visit of Clinton, the US secretary of state, to Egypt raised questions about the nature of relations between the US and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) on the one hand and the ruling council on the other. Emadeddin Hussein tried to find answers to these questions.

He started his regular column in the independent daily Al-Shorouk by wondering whether there is a deal between the US and the MB.

Those who argue with that assumption claim that proof of the deal was clearly shown during Clinton's visit to Egypt this week when she called on the military to transfer authority to civilians -- that is Mursi and the MB. That was followed, Hussein wrote, by Tantawi's statement that Egypt would never be ruled by a single faction and that there are various powers that are trying to drive a wedge between the army and the people.

While Hussein stated clearly that he is not trying to defend the MB, he wrote that it is premature to accuse the MB of striking deals with any party because Mursi has been in office for only two weeks.

"The MB could have reached an understanding or a deal with the US. But the test for Mursi could not be conducted now but after a few months and it will be linked to how he will deal with the US and Tel Aviv," he wrote.

The test will also be related to how Mursi will answer some questions, Hussein added, like what would he do to resolve the Palestinian issue, what he would do with US aid -- would he accept conditioned assistance -- and what he would do with the Iranian issue: resume relations and anger the US or wait and see.

Yehia El-Gamal looked at what could hit Egypt from the conflict between the president and the constitutional court regarding the fate of the parliament. He described Mursi's decree to annul the constitutional court ruling and order the disbanded parliament to resume its job as a devastating tempest that left Egypt in a strange situation. The president stands on one side, El-Gamal wrote, and the constitutional court on the other. Meanwhile, the military council tends to support the constitutional court.

The only way out that El-Gamal saw was the president's acknowledgment that he made a mistake and cancelled the decree.

The other problem that is facing the country at present according to the writer is that of the constituent committee and the process of drafting the constitution. "The committee should be the fruit of an agreement with the president, the military council and political powers. It should be representative of all trends in society, Muslims and Christians, men, women and youth," El-Gamal wrote in the independent daily Al-Masry Al-Youm.

In that way, the writer added, there would be a consensus on the constitution which would come as a representation of the Egyptian people.

He concluded his article by thanking God that Mursi declared before his trip to Saudi Arabia that he respects the rulings of the constitutional court. And that according to the writer is the end of the hurricane that could have hit the country hard.

Salama Ahmed Salama, Al-Ahram's former managing editor and Al-Ahram Weekly columnist, who passed away this week, was mourned by several writers.

Salah Montasser who expressed his deep sadness for the loss of a dear colleague, wrote in the official daily Al-Ahram that "the value of the writer is not in the awards he wins or positions he assumes but in his status in the heart of his readers. Salama, he said, acquired the respect and appreciation of his readers.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/30304>

Appendix 2

Back in Africa

Dina Ezzat Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 11 - 10 - 2012

IN A KEEN showing of Egyptian interest to foster ties with African countries, especially the Nile Basin states, President Mohamed Morsi arrived in Uganda on Tuesday for a one-day visit where he participated in the country's Independence Day celebrations with the president of Uganda Yoweri Museveni and other African leaders, Dina Ezzat reports

The visit, according to Cairo-based African diplomats, is a firm show of Egyptian commitment to strengthen ties with its African neighbours after what they qualified as a decade of severe decline in Egyptian-African ties.

"It is good to have Egypt coming back home -- to Africa," said one. He added, "we just hope that it would be sustainable."

Since he took office on 30 June, Morsi has been careful to show interest in Africa. According to an adviser to the president who spoke to Al-Ahram Weekly on condition of anonymity, "the man was shocked when he received a review about the state of ties we have with the Nile Basin countries. The previous regime should be tried for having overlooked such a strategic interest."

Egyptian diplomats say that it is unfair to make a sweeping complaint about Cairo's commitment to Africa and insist that it was specifically ousted president Hosni Mubarak who declined to visit African countries since the attempt on his life in Ethiopia in 1995.

"It is important to note however that other senior Egyptian officials used to go, including the prime minister and the foreign minister," said one. He added, "in fact Mubarak did visit several African countries, including no other than Uganda, towards the end when he was made aware of the gravity of the situation related to the Nile Basin countries."

During the last three years of his rule, Mubarak did try to treat African frustration and Egyptian neglect, especially as Egypt's annual share of the Nile waters was being challenged with the signing of the upstream states with a new treaty to re-distribute the Nile waters.

Mubarak's diplomatic mission failed and for the most part all concerned African countries, including the newly independent South Sudan, are determined to pursue a change of an early 20th century treaty that allocated Egypt its share of 55 billion cubic metres annually of the Nile water.

Today, informed Egyptian and African diplomats say that it looks more likely that Sudan, a low stream state, might eventually agree to the new treaty. "We have no confirmation on this matter and it should not be the case because as the low stream states, Egypt and Sudan need to organise their positions carefully," said one official concerned.

In July, Morsi visited Ethiopia where he met with its leaders on the side of his participation in the African Summit. A few weeks later, Morsi delegated his prime minister, Hisham Kandil, to take part in the funeral of Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi who passed away on 20 August.

While expressing appreciation for the change of attitude in Cairo towards Africa, diplomats of the Nile Basin countries insist that Egypt still needs to realise that the demand of Nile Basin states for Nile water is "legitimate" and "irreversible" as it is designed to serve the purpose of development from expanding irrigation to widening power grids.

"We welcome stronger ties with Egypt but this does not mean we will give up on our rights," said a Nile Basin diplomat.

Nile Basin states insist that the current treaty of Nile water distribution was signed when all these countries, including Egypt, was under colonial occupation and therefore cannot be valid much longer.

In Uganda on Tuesday, Morsi told his African counterparts that Egypt is keen to support their demands for development but that it hopes to reach ways by which neither Egyptian interests nor those of other Nile Basin states are affected, whether upstream or low stream.

"Egypt is willing to talk with its African neighbours and it is certainly willing to participate in joint development projects," said an official from the Ministry of Irrigation.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/30880>

Appendix 3

The River Nile: bridge or barrier?

Doaa El Bey Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 18 - 10 - 2012

Following a long history of conflict over water among the Nile Basin countries, Doaa El-Bey finds that popular and official diplomatic efforts are making headway

The 25 January Revolution in Egypt put the issue of the water of the River Nile back at the top of the foreign-policy agenda. Diplomatic efforts at creating common interests and boosting economic cooperation seem to be the best way of managing conflicts arising from differences over the distribution of the river's water, and the various countries involved have shown a willingness to build bridges in an effort to capitalise on mutual interests and bring about a win-win situation for all.

While popular diplomacy has proven successful in the post-revolution management of Nile water issues, popular-official diplomacy can also help improve relations between Egypt and the other Nile Basin states, building further bridges between them. As if to demonstrate this idea, last week saw the conclusion of a 10-day tour to South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia, in order to involve civil society organisations in boosting cooperation with the Nile Basin states, according to Magdi Amer, assistant foreign minister for Nile Basin states affairs, who headed the delegation.

"This is the first Egyptian official-popular delegation to head to the Nile Basin states," said Amr Khaled, a popular Islamic preacher and founder of Life Makers, a charity organisation, on his official website. Khaled was part of the delegation that visited the four Nile Basin states.

The warm welcome the delegation received was an indication, Khaled said, that both officials and peoples are willing to listen and be listened to. The delegation had visited the countries, he explained, as representatives of Egyptian civil society in order to address their counterparts and find out how they could work together. "The relationship between Egypt and these states cannot be summarised as a water issue alone. We inquired about how we could help build schools and hospitals, etc., in order to assist them. After all, we cannot resolve the water issue in the absence of other issues," he added.

The tour, organised by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, included representatives from charity organisations like Life Makers, Resala, the Food Bank, the Arab Doctors Union, the Children's Cancer Hospital and Masr Al-Kheir. Delegates met the ministers of education, health, youth, and information and representatives of civil society in each state.

Tarek Kotb, from the Foreign Ministry's Nile Basin States Department, said that the delegation had included 20 figures representing the government as well as 15 NGOs. A single approach could not resolve all possible conflicts, he said, but "political means, together with the efforts of NGOs and popular diplomacy, go hand-in-hand in order to improve relations and create a better ambiance among the Nile Basin states," Kotb told Al-Ahram Weekly.

The official-popular approach was accompanied by top-level official efforts to boost relations with the upstream states, President Mohamed Morsi concluding a visit to Uganda last week during which he took part in celebrating the country's independence day. The issue of the Nile's water was discussed with the other leaders of Nile Basin states who attended the celebration.

In July, Morsi visited Ethiopia to participate in the African Union summit, which was the first visit by an Egyptian president to Ethiopia since the assassination attempt on ousted former president Hosni Mubarak in 1995 by Islamist gunmen during a visit to Addis Ababa.

Prime Minister Hisham Kandil will also visit South Sudan soon, having already visited various upstream countries in June when he was minister of irrigation. These visits aim to improve bilateral relations between Egypt and these states and to discuss issues relating to the sharing of the Nile's water.

NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES: Meanwhile, Egypt and Sudan have said they will not sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) signed by most of the other Nile Basin states unless they are guaranteed their existing share of the river's water.

Egypt's other reservations about the agreement include the need to give the country advance notice before construction is carried out in the Nile Basin and to adjust the future voting system set up under the agreement so that any vote will always be contingent on the approval of Egypt and Sudan.

Egypt has always had a natural and historical right to the Nile. Given that the country is dependent on the Nile for drinking water and agriculture, the river is considered to be a national-security issue. Egypt is also already struggling with water shortages, and a 2007 report by the Water Research Centre said that it would face serious shortages by 2025.

Unlike the other Nile Basin countries, which have several other sources of water, the Nile provides Egypt with 95 per cent of the country's water needs, Nader Nouredin, a professor of land and water resources at the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, told the Weekly.

The water resources of any country are measured according to the total amount of water resources it has, including rain and subterranean water, he explained. Ethiopia, for instance, possesses 123.5 billion cubic metres of water per year, according to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report. Tanzania has 91 billion, Uganda 44 billion, Sudan 66 billion and Kenya 33 billion. Egypt, on the other hand, has 60.5 billion cubic metres a year -- 55.5 billion from the Nile and five from subterranean sources.

"These figures show that Ethiopia has more than double the water Egypt has, and Tanzania has double what Egypt has. They also show that Egypt has the least amount of water, given its size and population," Nouredin told the Weekly.

However, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya have decided to ignore such figures, and they have asked for a larger share of Nile water regardless of other sources. The countries accordingly signed the CFA, also known as the Entebbe Agreement, in May 2010, which aims to re-allocate water distribution and increase the upstream countries' share of the Nile's water.

The agreement also aims to allow upstream countries to construct dams and related projects that may violate the 1929 and 1959 Nile Basin agreements. The Entebbe Agreement was expected to take effect in May 2011, one year after it was signed, though other upstream Nile countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi, did not initially sign it. Burundi eventually signed in March 2011.

South Sudan, which seceded from North Sudan last year, has said that it will not join the agreement until all Nile Basin states agree on it.

Analysts differ on whether the death of Ethiopia's former prime minister Meles Zenawi in August will affect the water issue. Some argue that it could provide a catalyst toward resolving the issue, while others believe that it will not lead to any major change in Ethiopian policy.

Zenawi, prime minister from 1995, was known as an architect of Ethiopian development, and he repeatedly asked for a new agreement regarding the sharing of the Nile's water.

Initially, there were 10 states making up the Nile Basin states, becoming 11 after the division of Sudan. The seven upstream countries are Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Egypt, Sudan and South Sudan are considered to be downstream states. Eritrea is an observer state under the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).

EGYPT'S HISTORIC RIGHTS: In response to these developments, Egypt and Sudan have insisted on abiding by the 1929 and the 1959 treaties, though these are regarded by the upstream states as "colonial relics" that should no longer be treated as law.

The 1929 treaty was signed by the then British occupying authorities in Egypt and stated that no work could be undertaken on the Nile and its tributaries without Egypt's acceptance. It also gave Egypt the right to block any developments upstream in the River Nile, including dams, irrigation works and pumping stations. The treaty allocated Egypt 48 billion cubic metres a year and Sudan four billion cubic metres a year of Nile water as their "acquired rights".

Sudan and Egypt later renegotiated the 1929 treaty in 1959 under a new treaty that allowed for the construction of the Aswan High Dam as a major new element in the control of the Nile's water to the benefit of the two countries. The 1959 treaty also increased the two countries' share of Nile water to 55.5 and 18 billion cubic metres, respectively.

The 1929 treaty was the culmination of previous agreements made in 1889, 1891, 1902 and 1906 between the British and Italian governments and later also the Ethiopian government. All these agreements acknowledged Egypt's natural and historic right to its fair share of the Nile's water.

However, increasing energy needs among upstream states have prompted them to look for new sources of energy, among them dams to produce hydroelectric energy. The existing treaties are an obstacle to these countries' plans, and thus there have various attempts to renegotiate them and come up with a new collective agreement.

The first recent attempt towards that end was made with the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999. Although representatives of the member countries of the NBI met on a

regular basis over the course of the following decade, negotiations failed to progress into an agreement that could appeal to all members.

Relationships between the NBI states deteriorated after the CFA was signed.

POTENTIAL HAZARDS OF THE RENAISSANCE DAM: Potential conflict over the water issue between the upstream and downstream countries, among them Egypt, built up in March last year when Ethiopia decided to build its "Renaissance Dam" on the Blue Nile without the endorsement of Egypt or Sudan.

When built, the dam will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa and the tenth largest in the world. The dam's reservoir at 63 billion cubic metres will be one of Africa's largest. However, given that the dam is planned to be built on the Blue Nile, which provides Egypt with 85 per cent of its water, there are fears that it will restrict the amount of water reaching Egypt.

The Nile is fed by the White Nile, flowing from Lake Victoria, and the Blue Nile, flowing from Ethiopia.

Yet, experts differ on the effect of the dam. Some argue that it could provide Egypt with water throughout the year, not only in flood time, and generate electricity that could be used by Egypt and Sudan. Others say that it could allow Ethiopia to control the amount of water reaching Egypt and that as a result the country would no longer receive its appropriate share of water.

Mustafa Al-Guindi, an MP and coordinator of the popular diplomacy delegation that visited Ethiopia and Uganda last year, has described the situation by saying that while Egypt is concerned about the effects of the dam, Addis Ababa has repeatedly emphasised that the dam will not have any effect on the amount of water reaching Egypt. As a result, no action should be taken until the findings of the tripartite technical committee looking into the matter are released.

"My main concern now is to know from the unbiased committee that will disclose its findings to the peoples of the Nile Basin countries whether the dam will harm Egypt or not," Al-Guindi told the Weekly. "If the report states that it will, Egypt will argue that the CFA is illegal as it would deprive Egypt of one of its basic human rights, water."

Al-Guindi praised the work of the committee as the outcome of efforts made by the popular diplomacy delegation. For his part, Nouredin believes that building any dams on the Blue Nile will present a challenge to Egypt's water supply and to the country's national security.

"Egypt understood that Ethiopia needed to build the Tekeze Dam on the River Atbara three years ago and other dams before that. Now Ethiopia has a total of 12 dams, a number that is not found anywhere else in the world. Nevertheless, it now wants to build four more dams on the Blue Nile and its tributaries," Nouredin commented.

The Renaissance Dam, if built, would make the existing Aswan High Dam and Lake Nasser, which stores water behind it, redundant. "The Nile's water reaching Sudan and Egypt would be coming through a small canal that receives surplus water left over after Ethiopia has generated the power it wants if this dam is built," he added.

THE BAD OLD DAYS: Egypt's relations with the African states in general and the Nile Basin states in particular saw a deterioration in recent years that was widely blamed on the pre-revolutionary regime, which neglected the country's African neighbours and left relationships to deteriorate until the upstream states decided to sign the Entebbe Agreement.

Egypt even threatened to resort to war if its rights over the Nile's water were encroached upon. Egyptian former foreign minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit warned that Cairo's water rights were a "red line" and threatened legal action if a partial deal was reached. While Egypt and Ethiopia signed a cooperation agreement in 1993, relations deteriorated after 1995 following the assassination attempt on ousted former president Mubarak. Mubarak never visited Addis Ababa again after that, and the incident had a negative impact on Egypt's relations with Ethiopia as well as with other African states.

Although this deterioration in relations has been blamed on the previous regime, Nouredin points to other reasons that have contributed to the worsening relations. The fact that the upstream states have considered building dams on the Nile as their right without giving Egypt prior notice and without respecting the treaties that ban the building of such dams on the Nile without the prior consent of Egypt are among the reasons for the deteriorating relations, he said.

The upstream countries have insisted on abiding by a principle of equal rights to the Nile's water rather than the principle of equal rights to water resources that both Egypt and Sudan support. Some countries have linked their development to the buildings of dams like that planned in Ethiopia, which is even being called the "Renaissance Dam".

"This is a great mistake," Nouredin said. "Canada which has only two per cent fresh water, is a developed country. Other desert states that do not possess water at all have also achieved development." The presence of countries like China, Korea and Israel in the Nile Basin states and their rapidly growing investment there are also dangerous signs that could lead to further differences among the states in the future.

Nouredin gave Ethiopia as an example, saying that though it had the right to open its doors to foreign investment in the field of agriculture, this could not be at the expense of Egypt's share of the Nile's water. Likewise, Ethiopia's decision to irrigate the land using river rather than rain water should be revised such that it uses non-Nile water or subterranean water sources.

Moreover an agreement had been signed earlier this year by an Israeli agency for international development to increase cooperation in the fields of food security, water management, and industrial development in African states, Nouredin said. This project was being carried out in cooperation with the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO). But Egypt, which has 7,000 years of experience in agriculture, is not undertaking any similar projects.

TURNING OVER A NEW LEAF: Post-revolutionary Egypt has shown a genuine desire to reestablish good relations and boost cooperation with the Nile Basin states, as was signaled by the visit of former prime minister Essam Sharaf to Uganda and Ethiopia in a bid to boost bilateral relations and trade with particular emphasis on the appropriation of the Nile's water.

"We were in Uganda yesterday, and today we had discussions in Ethiopia. The environment is completely different from what it was during the previous period," Sharaf told journalists during his visit. A few months later, Zenawi met Sharaf in Cairo. During the meeting, both men highlighted the positive impact their talks had had, describing the Nile as a "bridge" rather than a "barrier" to warmer ties.

During the visit, Zenawi announced the formation of the tripartite technical committee that would review the impact of the Renaissance Dam on water distribution.

Moreover, Egypt saw a surge of diplomacy on the popular level after the revolution. A popular diplomacy delegation received a warm welcome in Uganda and Ethiopia in April and May last year, and it included political figures like Al-Guindi, Al-Sayed Al-Badawi, leader of the Wafd Party, Ghad Party leader Ayman Nour, and presidential hopeful Hisham Al-Bastawisi. Other members of the delegation included journalists like Sekina Fouad, popular figures like Mohamed Abul-Ghar and representatives from youth groups that took part in launching of the 25 January Revolution.

The delegation managed to convince the two countries to delay the ratification of the CFA until Egypt had elected a new parliament and president, and it prompted Ethiopia to allow the formation of the independent tripartite technical committee to investigate the effects of the Renaissance Dam.

"Popular diplomacy succeeded where official diplomacy failed. Ethiopia, which had repeatedly rejected the idea of the committee, accepted its formation after the visit of the delegation," Al-Guindi said, pointing to the fact that the mixed character of the delegation's members had helped the negotiations.

"All currents, including the Muslim Brotherhood before it assumed power, were represented in the delegation. That is how a proper popular delegation should be and that is why it succeeded," he added.

The warm welcome the Ethiopians gave to the delegation was shown during the delegation's visit to the cathedral in Addis Ababa, when members chanted with Ethiopian worshippers after mass: "Egypt and Ethiopia: one hand."

Nevertheless, Nouredin for one still believes that popular diplomacy alone may not resolve the water problem. Instead, it can act to pave the way for better relations in future and enhanced cooperation. Official diplomacy is more likely to resolve the root of the problem, he said. Without a resolution to the water problem, there cannot be good relations.

The formation of the tripartite technical committee was one outcome of the popular diplomatic efforts. The 10-member committee is composed of two experts from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia and four international experts. It held its first meeting in Addis Ababa late last year, and a sixth meeting was held in the Ethiopian capital last week. It is expected to produce its report by the end of this year.

However, according to sources at the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, Ethiopia has not given the committee all the details it needs to come up with the report, which is why some, among them

experts like Maghawri Shehata, president of the Arab Association for Healthy Water, have cast doubts on the outcome of the committee.

According to Shehata, Ethiopia postponed ratification of the agreement last year, and it has not changed its position since. Moreover, it began working on the foundations of the dam even before Burundi signed the agreement. While the committee has the authority to examine the impacts of building the dam, there has been no mention of what might happen should those impacts be found to be negative on the downstream states.

FUTURE PROSPECTS: The Nile, the longest river in the world, is 4,000 miles long. Some 160 million people in 11 countries depend on the river and its tributaries for their livelihoods. Within the next 25 years, the population of the Nile Basin states is expected to double, and demand for water for agricultural and industrial purposes will grow as well.

The need of the Nile Basin states to cooperate and even integrate should be growing as well, and there is an increasing need for a change in the approach of the Nile Basin states to water issues. Egypt has argued that it needs the Nile's water for its survival and for agriculture, while the upstream states argue that they need to use the Nile water for their own rapidly increasing development needs, famine prevention, and poverty reduction.

All the states concerned should work on the principle of "don't harm anybody, and don't allow anybody to harm you," according to Al-Guindi. It would not be acceptable for Egypt to live under a "water poverty line", he said. However, it would also be unacceptable for Ethiopia to suffer from a shortage of electricity.

"If the Nile Basin states, especially Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, become genuine partners in joint projects, they could provide food and electricity for all the Basin states," Al-Guindi said. Egypt has the manpower and Sudan has the fertile land to do so. Cooperation could produce food for everyone as a result.

Building bridges of understanding among the peoples of the different states is also essential. Khaled said that people in the African states he visited sometimes regarded Egyptians as "selfish", since they could come across as wanting to deprive other states of their right to develop their countries.

In the meantime, the picture that the media has drawn of the African states, especially Ethiopia, is one of their trying to deprive Egypt of its share of water and expose it to a water crisis. In this atmosphere, hostile feelings can thrive.

"We need to sit down with them and to understand them. The Renaissance Dam to the Ethiopians is like the High Dam to us. We can sit down with them and reach a compromise that would not harm Egypt and would not deprive Addis Ababa of its hope of development either," Khaled said.

In the hope of building such bridges, Life Makers decided to organise workshops for 50 people from each of the four states Khaled visited in Alexandria in order to boost understanding within these states. The organisation is also planning to build an international school in each country.

Other areas of cooperation suggested by experts include Egyptian assistance to upstream states in irrigation techniques, increasing agricultural imports from these states, the purchase of electricity from the hydroelectric power stations that the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments wish to build, and cooperation in both the public and private sectors in order to build a network of interests that will outweigh any conflicts regarding the Nile's water.

Other prospects for better relations in the future include the use of "soft power" through sending different official-popular delegations like the one that visited four African states last week. "When the people in these states see that Egyptian NGOs are willing to visit them to find out how they can help these countries, they will be more willing to understand and compromise," Kotb said.

In the same context, the Egyptian government launched an "Egyptian initiative for the development of the Nile Basin countries" in January this year. The initiative includes the establishment of regional training centres in the Nile Basin states. It aims to establish integrated development projects and programmes in the states in strategic fields in order to reinforce Egypt's relations with these countries in a way that helps them to achieve their development goals.

Egypt is also participating in efforts to modernise the postal sector in Africa through providing technical assistance to these countries and the training of human resources. In this effort, it is able to draw on Egypt's experience in such fields, as well as on its proven ability to develop systems in the field.

Other more technical suggestions that water experts have come up with to help save water include reviving plans for the construction of the Gongli Canal in South Sudan. This canal, first proposed in 1903, has now been revived in the form of a 500-metre canal linking the White Nile and the Congo River. When built, it will channel swamp water back into the Nile, amounting to an annual increase of Nile water availability of roughly 40 billion cubic metres.

There are various ways for African countries to achieve prosperity through establishing a network of solid relationships and creating common channels and aims. However, more efforts are needed, and these can best be done on the official as well as on the popular levels.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/30977>

Appendix 4

The new Egypt looks south

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After more than 30 years, the Egyptian people rose up in a glorious revolution that ended a long era of corruption. The revolution was triggered by the suffering of Egyptians from poverty, unemployment, tyranny and the suppression of political and social freedoms at all levels. The Egyptian revolution was greatly admired by the world especially because it maintained a peaceful nature and involved participation by all the people.

The revolution paved the way for political, economic and social transformations that challenged Egypt on the domestic and international fronts as well as its foreign policy, which will lead to critical changes in the foreseeable future. This article will answer the key question of whether the Egyptian revolution model can be copied in Sub-Saharan African countries, since those to the north are already undertaking similar revolutions to Egypt.

The people of Sub-Saharan Africa have closely monitored the revolutions north of the continent, especially since these societies have similar regimes to the despotic ones that were prevalent in the north. Unemployment, the high cost of living and poverty are also widespread. High food prices triggered protests in the southern part of the continent such as in Mozambique at the end of 2010.

Although the people of Sub-Saharan societies suffer from injustice, poverty and tyrannical regimes, they do not have the requisites of revolution or protest to overthrow these regimes. The elements that helped the Egyptian revolution reach its goals are several.

- Media presence in Egypt is much more prevalent than in the south of the continent in Benin or Gabon, for example, because of Egypt's global cultural status, unique geo-political location and large population, which explains interest by international media. So much so that the unfolding of the Egyptian revolution overshadowed coverage of the Tunisian revolution that preceded it.

International interest by world leaders and monitoring of the Egyptian revolution as seen in statements supporting the revolution, included statements by US President Barack Obama and Austrian President Heinz Fischer who suggested that the people of Egypt should be given the Nobel Peace Prize.

- Social networks such as YouTube, twitter and Facebook played a key role in organising protesters as well as broadcasting information, photographs and video footage.

- Civil society groups that organised and channelled people's feelings into positive action. Civil groups later played a role in supporting the revolution and earning world admiration and support for it. The Egyptian Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), an NGO focussed on foreign policy, contacted Norway's Nobel Prize Committee to nominate the Egyptian people and their 25 January 2011 Revolution, as a unique uprising in Egypt's history and the history of the world, to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for that year.

The ECFR sent letters to Egyptian and world Nobel Prize recipients, the deans of political science colleges and chairmen of peace institutions, and professors of international relations, history and philosophy, asking them to write to the Norwegian committee to support Egypt's nomination for the prize. They also sent letters to world leaders to endorse the nomination.

- Societal cohesion or national unity in Egypt made the entire nation come together during the revolution and blocked any attempt to drive a wedge or cause sectarian tension between Muslims and Christians. This is the core of Egypt's internal power. This high degree of cultural and social cohesion empowered the revolution to succeed. Egyptians are a national unit, speak the same language, 90 per cent of them are Muslims and it is difficult to categorise Copts and Nubians as minorities because their lives are closely intertwined with the rest of society.

Although Sub-Saharan societies suffer the same problems as Egyptians, they lack the necessary requisites for sustained revolution, which makes it difficult to reproduce the Egyptian revolutionary model in their countries. They lack information technology and communications, and the governments in some of these countries such as Djibouti, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea have full control of state media and blocked it from broadcasting the events of the Egyptian revolution. Access was only available through satellite channels that are watched by a few. In Ethiopia, a reporter was arrested when he tried to compare Egypt and Ethiopia and the possibility of applying the Egyptian model of revolution.

These conditions were instead available in several Arab states that emulated the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions demanding freedom and democracy against despotic regimes.

Meanwhile, the populations and events in these countries are ignored by international media. World leaders comment on events in Egypt, Yemen and Syria, but do not issue statements on developments in Djibouti or Cote d'Ivoire, for example.

Sub-Saharan countries lack NGOs that play a crucial role in transitioning into democracy, although there have been several attempts in these countries to shift towards democracy since the 1990s. There is now a link between political and economic conditions. African states have taken big strides in applying political reform, most prominently by espousing democracy and liberal mechanisms, and holding elections at different levels (parliament, presidency, local), as well as rotation of power.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, most African countries adopted democratic systems based on competitive elections in a pluralist setting, as demonstrated in the New Partnership for Africa's Development which enforce Africa's overall shift towards democracy and translating it into specific commitments and clear rules for application, evaluation and revision.

It is also in the founding statute of the African Union (AU) that states in its goals and principles respect for democracy and boosting popular participation in the AU's activities. There are other African documents and agreements to this end since democracy has become a demand of the people that cannot be ignored in today's African political environment, which corresponds to the priorities of the world order towards the African continent.

Sub-Saharan states also suffer sectarian, racial and ethnic divisions that are manipulated by their governments to end any protests through adopting the principle of “divide and rule”, as well as a tight security grip and violent confrontation of any protests. This makes it unlikely that the Egyptian revolution model can be applied in Sub-Saharan countries even if they share the same key issues that triggered the revolution, including corruption, poverty, unemployment, injustice, tyranny and absence of freedoms.

This begs the questions what can Egyptian foreign policy do after the revolution especially to influence its African milieu. Over the past few years, Egypt's foreign policy has faced serious problems and challenges; it was criticised for the way it handled some issues especially since there was a clear retreat in Egypt's regional and international role, and absence on issues and problems that affect Egypt's interests.

Since the revolution restored the dignity of the Egyptian citizen and was a victory over corruption and a despotic oppressive regime that neglected most of the nation's interests, the expectation is that Egypt's foreign policies after the revolution will recover Egypt's regional and international status to match its history, stature and resources. This will require Cairo to revise its foreign policies to move in the standard three spheres: Arab, African and Muslim. These are the critical fronts for Egypt, but this does not mean other domains should be ignored but at least not overtake the importance of these key areas.

Africa is especially important to Egypt because the country's security is linked to the continent's security whether in terms of geographic affiliation or River Nile water. Therefore, any events in Africa affect Egypt directly and it cannot remain immune to them or neglect Egyptian-African relations, especially key regions such as Nile Basin states and the Horn of Africa on the Red Sea.

When Egypt distanced itself and ignored its African identity it suffered serious repercussions such as the Nile Basin dilemma when six countries signed a framework agreement without Egypt and Sudan. Also, with Ethiopia's declaration that it will build the Millennium Dam without consulting Egypt could threaten Egypt's current quota of Nile water and represents a real danger.

Egypt's distance from Africa also became apparent in another key issue, namely the Sudanese problem and settling the dispute between North and South. Egypt was not involved in any negotiations between the two sides which were held entirely under Kenyan auspices. After the Machakos Framework Agreement was signed, it was apparent that Egypt was unaware of developments in negotiations and not briefed by either the Sudanese government or mediators. In fact, former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher admitted that “Egypt found out about the deal through news agencies”, and asserted that Egypt supports the unity of Sudan.

After the January 2011 referendum following the transitional phase in Sudan, Egypt was confronted by a new entity that threatens the country's national security in terms of the Nile Water Treaty of 1959 and its quota, because this nascent state was not party to this agreement and others. This happened, despite the fact that North and South Sudan constitute a strategic depth for Egypt in the south, and their disintegration or instability would destabilise the strategic balance in the region whether in the Horn of Africa or the Red Sea. This could negatively impact Egypt's security, its role and stature.

After the 25 January Revolution, despite foreign policy transitioning through difficult challenges at home and abroad, it is clear that Egypt's foreign minister — and there have been many of them of late — is working diligently to restore the Africa issue as a priority in Cairo's foreign policies. In fact, Africa was the first overseas trip by former prime minister Essam Sharaf when he toured several countries including Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan.

People diplomacy also plays a substantial role in boosting Egyptian-African relations, since the revolution promoted a key mechanism that greatly influences understanding and cooperation. People diplomacy with the participation of civil society, political parties and youth forces has succeeded on several fronts with African countries. An unofficial delegation toured Nile Basin countries 28 April-10 May 2011, including Uganda and Sudan, meeting with leaders of North and South Sudan to discuss ways of promoting cooperation and economic integration through joint investment projects.

The people's delegation also visited Ethiopia and met with the political leadership, including the president, prime minister and several cabinet members who reassured the group that Ethiopia would never harm Egypt. They also explained that the Millennium Dam is not a water dam but used to generate electricity. A significant outcome of the visit was a promise by Ethiopia's prime minister to form a team of Egyptian, Ethiopian and independent experts to study the Millennium Dam and its effects on Egypt.

Several people diplomacy delegations have visited Ethiopia, most recently a group of the ECFR on 26-29 February 2012, to discuss all aspects of cooperation between the two countries to boost and cement bilateral ties. This indicates that interest in Egyptian-African relations has been restored and should continue on several fronts to boost Egypt's presence in Nile Basin states, through development and economic projects that target the interests of both sides. Also, it is necessary to boost ties with other African states through trade, economic, scientific and cultural agreements either through the Egyptian Fund for Technical Cooperation with Africa or African organisations such as the AU, as well as regional economic blocs. This would ensure Egypt an effective role in dealing with problems, resolving conflicts, keeping the peace and rejecting foreign intervention in the continent's affairs.

The 25 January Revolution launched a new era for Egypt that is unlike any previous era, one that corrects what the former regime corrupted and neglected in terms of Egypt's strategic and vital interests. Therefore, Cairo's foreign policy must focus on restoring Egypt's regional and international standing to match its history, moral and material resources so that it can achieve the goals of the revolution and aspirations of the Egyptian people by recovering the country's regional and international influence.

If Sub-Saharan countries lack the requisites for revolutions similar to the Egyptian one, Egypt's foreign policy must focus on these countries and establish partnerships that serve the interests of both sides. This would once again establish Egypt's influence on the African continent, especially since the Egyptian revolution earned Egypt extensive international respect and enabled Cairo to move on regional and African issues.

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<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/100123>

Appendix 5

Prospects of cooperation

Al-Ahram Weekly Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 14 - 11 - 2012

Egypt's decision to rejoin the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was hailed as a positive step by participants in a symposium on prospects for cooperation and dialogue between Egypt and the Nile Basin states. The decision to re-engage in dialogue despite rejection of the Entebbe Framework Agreement signed by upstream states in May 2010 was widely praised during the symposium.

Egypt froze its membership in the NBI two years ago in protest at the decision of upstream states to sign the Entebbe Agreement which calls for the redistribution of shares of Nile water.

Cairo's re-engagement will begin with Egyptian involvement in the NBI's regional office for the east of the Nile which is focussed on establishing an electricity network between its three member states, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan.

Hani Raslan, from Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, said the move is positive inasmuch as it seeks to find a mechanism for cooperation and emphasises the will of the three member states to cooperate. But while it may strengthen relations between the three countries it will not resolve differences between Upper and Lower Nile Basin states.

The two downstream states, Egypt and Sudan, will continue to refuse to sign the Entebbe Agreement, Cairo's default position being that the 1929 and 1959 treaties on the distribution of Nile water remain in force. Sudan, too, refuses to contemplate any reduction in its share of the Nile.

The Entebbe Agreement signatories, meanwhile, insist on their right to build projects, including dams, on the Nile without first securing the consent of downstream states, as the current treaties require.

Symposium participants agreed that dialogue and boosting cooperation on a regional level among Nile Basin states could only help improve relations.

Advisor to the Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Rafik Khalil underlined the importance of dialogue if three major sticking points are to be overcome: the mechanisms of any new water sharing system, the issue of prior notification of any project within the Nile Basin and the imposition of a majority rather than unanimous vote among NBI states to ratify any decision. Egypt and Sudan have consistently refused to shift their position on all three issues.

Raslan argued that while Egypt is determined to protect its historic rights to Nile water Cairo recognises the importance of cooperation among Nile states over issues such as dam building. Egypt, he sees, must continue to refuse to sign the Entebbe Agreement until an acceptable compromise is reached over the three outstanding issues.

Both Raslan and Khalil agreed the tripartite committee is a possible venue to settle differences with Ethiopia over building the Renaissance Dam.

Indeed, a tripartite technical committee is already at work assessing the impact of the Renaissance Dam. The 10-member committee is composed of two experts from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia and four international experts. It is expected to produce a final report in February.

Should the committee find the dam will not impact on Egypt's share of Nile water then there will be no problem, said Raslan. But should it conclude the project will negatively affect Egypt then Cairo will be forced to ask Addis Ababa to redraw its plans.

Egypt could also take part in financing or building the dam and participate its operation. And that, Raslan insists, will open the door for cooperation over other projects.

Should a compromise not be reached, "Egypt will have to launch a political, diplomatic and legal campaign on the national regional and international levels to show that it is presenting a fair case that conforms to international law," Raslan told participants.

Ethiopian Ambassador Mahmoud Al-Deiri avoided answering a question on Addis Ababa's response should the committee find the Renaissance Dam negatively impacts on the flow of Nile water to Egypt.

"We are partners. And partnership to us means each country can decide for itself how to conduct its path to development," he told participants.

Al-Deiri added that the decision to sign or not to sign the Entebbe Agreement was a matter for each state to decide individually.

South Sudan's ambassador, Anthony Kon, argued that Cairo and Khartoum's refusal to sign the framework agreement was a negative position.

"Our brothers in Egypt have decided to stick to what they call their historic right over the Nile. What will Cairo do if other member states decide to build more dams or other projects? Will it resort to war to resolve the problem as the Egyptian media say?" he wondered.

"War is never a solution. The solution is to look rationally at the issues. When you do that you realise that the states making requests so that they can develop have every right to what they are asking for. Surely it should be possible to sit and agree on a quota for each state."

South Sudan, which seceded from Sudan last year, has said it will not sign the Entebbe Agreement. Yet Kon told the symposium that 60 per cent of South Sudan's population supports the agreement and suggested the government could yet change its mind.

The Ugandan charge d'affaire wondered aloud whether disagreement on an article or two could furnish enough reason for Egypt to declare war on upstream states.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/100248>

Appendix 6

Entebbe all over again

Gamal Nkrumah Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 27 - 03 - 2013

This week, a chink of light emerged from Juba over an issue that has long constituted a fundamental foreign policy challenge facing Egypt. “We joined the Nile Basin Initiative. We are on the way to join the framework agreement, through which Nile Basin countries could discuss the best ways for using water sources,” Paul Mayom, South Sudan's minister of water resources and irrigation, is reported to have announced yesterday in a surprise and as yet unconfirmed move. Mayom's statement, if proven correct, would mean that South Sudan will join the Entebbe Agreement.

A big question hangs over Egypt's readiness for this change of mindset of South Sudan. Cairo is not opposed per se to the Entebbe Agreement, however, Egypt does demand that any agreements of Nile Basin countries should be reached only with the consensus of all Nile Basin nations. South Sudan had previously rejected the water distribution agreement, originally signed between Egypt and Sudan in 1959 on the pretext that it did not have a say in the drafting of the agreement.

African upstream countries, spearheaded by Ethiopia, protest that the agreement granted the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan the lion's shares of the Nile water. It is against this backdrop that in April 2010, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania signed a new agreement in Entebbe redistributing the Nile's water. Egypt, along with Sudan, boycotted the deal, saying it was non-binding precisely because their perspective was not taken into account.

The bottom line is this. Unlike Egypt, South Sudan and other upstream Nile Basin nations are not desperately in need of Nile water for agriculture since they receive considerable rainfall sufficient for agricultural purposes at the very least. Cairo does not question South Sudan or other upstream Nile Basin nations' right to have a say in how the Nile waters are utilised and distributed. But let's not let the possibility of providing answers to the challenge of Nile waters utilisation cripple the chance for working together to collectively develop the Nile Basin.

Nevertheless, Burundi joined the Entebbe agreement in March 2011, paving the way for its approval. So, if South Sudan, also signs the agreement it will result in a de facto prevalence of the views of upstream nations to the detriment of Egypt and Sudan. Mayom is reported to have explained that South Sudan does not recognise the 1959 agreement. “We were under the control of Sudan, when the agreement was signed. Thus, we couldn't say anything,” he extrapolated further.

Egypt, which receives the largest portion of the Nile's water, has grave reservations about any agreements that do not preserve its historic rights as stipulated in the 1959 agreement. About 85 per cent of Egypt's water originates in the Ethiopian Highlands. The Blue Nile, running from Ethiopia, through Sudan to Egypt is the lifeline of the country. Rainless Egypt, in sharp contrast with its well-watered neighbours, is utterly dependent on the water of the Nile River, and has been so since time immemorial. Egypt's share of Nile waters stand at 51 billion square metres annually, according to a deal signed with Sudan on 1959, which gives the latter 18 billion square metres of

water per year. Sudan, is also more dependent on the Nile for irrigation purposes and agriculture than either South Sudan or the other upstream nations.

Nevertheless, the decision of South Sudan with regards to the Entebbe Agreement is potentially significant. A new opportunity to pursue a fresh Nile water redistribution is sorely needed. With one of its main, perhaps the most important, national security concerns pushed to one side, the hope in Cairo is that upstream Nile Basin nations, including South Sudan will now seize the moment and consider Egypt's legitimate concerns more seriously.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102034>

Appendix 7

Question of national security

Ahmed Eleiba Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 27 - 03 - 2013

The political tensions and impasses that have impeded crucial decisions in a number of vital human security areas (food security, water security, the economy, personal safety, etc) and the consistently poor performance levels of the political authorities since the revolution, which has aggravated all these concerns to alarming degrees, have led a range of political, security, economic and social figures and experts to come together to assess the current situation. Meeting in the National Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, they launched an initiative to form a national security council and submit it to the presidency for approval, as the general consensus in the meeting was that the current president will not take this initiative himself, in spite of the constitutional provision calling for the creation of this body.

Assistant Foreign Minister Ambassador Walid Abdel-Nasser told participants at the meeting that current Arab League Secretary-General Nabil Al-Arabi had submitted a full proposal for the creation of a national security council to the former head of the interim ruling military council Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. However, Tantawi told Al-Arabi, who at the time was serving as Egypt's first post-revolutionary foreign minister, that it would be better to wait until after the presidential elections were held and then to submit the proposal to the new president after he takes office.

Subsequently, the proposal was the subject of study by the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the new constitution. In spite of the considerable confusion that arose in that assembly over the respective authorities and areas of responsibility of the proposed NSC and the National Defence Council, the proposal was ultimately incorporated into the constitution. Nevertheless, since the constitution's ratification nothing has been done to put the relevant provisions into effect, "in spite of the urgent need to do so", Abdel-Nasser said.

Political affairs expert General Mamdouh Salem, who previously served as deputy chief of the General Intelligence Service (GIS), agreed with the urgency. The concept of "Egyptian national security", in spite of its crucial importance, is missing in the awareness of many Egyptians at present, he said. It was quite an eye-opener when Salem proceeded to relate, "I worked in this area in GIS for 40 years. Throughout that time, we had no clear idea what 'Egyptian national security' meant. There were no documents or guidelines to tell us this is where it begins and this is where it ends, and this is what it covers. Everybody had their own interpretation and their own assessment of how to handle it. Even at the time when president Sadat formed the National Security Council, which was subsequently dissolved, there was no clarity on the idea."

Salem emphasised the need to strengthen what he felt were the weakening bonds of national affiliation. This would be no easy task in light of the particular character of the "deep state" in Egypt, at present. He explained that around 70 per cent of the staffs in Egyptian security agencies, such as GIS and the National Security Agency, are still connected in some way or other to the former regime. He suggested that this may be a major reason behind the crisis of confidence

between the public and the security agencies, which makes it all the more important to bring the National Security Council into being.

But the tasks of forming and structuring this council raises a range of other questions, prime among which is, what exactly does “national security” mean? The concept has evolved considerably over the years to extend well beyond the conventional strategic, military and security dimensions to comprise as well a panoply of economic, cultural, social, agricultural, food sufficiency, public health, environmental and other dimensions. In brief, Salem said, it could be understood as a synonym for the drive to comprehensive development. “This is why the National Security Council is so necessary. Its chief mission is to identify dangers and challenges that our country faces, analyse and break them down into their various facets, and come up with a comprehensive vision with specific recommendations for how to address them. That vision would be set out in a document that we could call the Egyptian National Security Strategy which would be produced regularly every two or three years. The document would clearly delineate the major areas of concern, existing or potential threats and challenges, and government priorities in addressing them, and thereby serve as the general strategic framework for Egypt's domestic and foreign policies.”

As the proposal currently stands, the National Security Council would consist of the president and his vice president (if one exists), the speaker of the House of Representatives, the prime minister, the ministers of defence, interior, finance and economy, the minority or opposition leader in the House of Representatives, and the head of GIS. The latter would serve as secretary-general who would keep the council's documents which should be classified as confidential. The council would have the right to include in its meetings other ministers connected with the issues that are under discussion.

The council would have a range of consultative units. Those proposed so far include a water and food security unit that would deal with, among other things, water issues related to the countries of the Nile Basin, an economic security unit to focus on economic strategic planning and potential economic threats, and an energy security unit to develop strategies on energy resource management and sufficiency. The council would meet regularly every six months to discuss the reports and studies submitted to it by the various units, which would be staffed by a limited number of prominent experts and specialists in the units' fields. It would also convene for emergency sessions if necessary. The council would be subordinate to the office of the presidency which would assign it premises and allocate a set budget.

In an interview with Al-Ahram Weekly, Major General Megahed Al-Zayat, chairman of the National Centre for the Middle East Studies, said that he had studied a collection of strategic and policy papers that set the courses of US policy during the past 20 years. “Egypt urgently needs documents and an agenda of this sort,” he said. Al-Zayat went on to stress that there was no need for concern over a possible overlap between the proposed NSC and the National Defence Council, because the latter is formed to address special contingencies. He also attempted to allay concerns over the proposed role of GIS in the NSC. In the course of his many years of experience in Intelligence, the agency had never intervened in foreign policy affairs unless diplomatic channels were totally blocked. GIS coordinates with the Foreign Ministry and only intervenes in the event of a looming threat. In all events, in the proposed NSC, the roles of GIS and other agencies will

be clearly set out and function in accordance with set rules and procedures so as to avert the types of problems that had arisen in the past.

Discussing the economic dimension of national security, Taha Abdel-Alim, adviser at the Ahrām Centre for Political and Strategic Studies and former head of the State Information Service, put his finger on the root cause of the current instability that is preventing economic recovery: the non-implementation of the concepts, of the citizen state, an inclusive polity and the rule of law. A state based on the concept of equal citizenship must be open to all its diverse political trends, from the socialist, Nasserist and liberal left through the Islamist trends, as long as they are sincere in their espousal of Islamic values, do not exploit religion for political ends, and free themselves of ideological rigidity, and open to all strata and segments of society, including the Egyptian entrepreneurial class as long as it fulfils its responsibilities towards the state, society and the needs of development. The citizen state is the “minimum platform” on which all forces of society converge in the interests of the pursuit of the higher welfare of the nation.

One of the foremost tasks of the citizen state is to ensure the realisation of the economic rights of the Egyptian people. “This means safeguarding the nation's economic security, which entails enhancing Egypt's economic competitiveness and protecting our national economic sovereignty,” Abdel-Alim said during the meeting. “However, to do this we must, firstly, work to rise to the challenge of economic globalisation and catch up with the knowledge economy. Secondly, if we are to increase Egypt's share of global wealth, we must establish fair and equitable foundations for the assimilation of our economy into the global economy and in order to meet the challenges of GATT. Thirdly, in order to increase Egypt's prospects from globalisation, we must work to bring home the skills, talents and investments of Egyptians abroad, rather than exporting them. Towards these ends, Egypt must build an open economy capable of maximising opportunities, gains and capacities and minimising restrictions, losses and the threats posed by the knowledge economy and globalisation, which will entail the formulation of regulations that protect the national economy from the risks of deregulating the financial sector and the flow of capital into and out of the country. In other words, the state must have the power to take the strategic decision with respect to the nation's economic and social system. Fourthly, building fair and equitable foundations in the global economic order requires both the transfer of knowledge and technology and direct foreign investment in accordance with the national development priorities that Egypt sets. Fifthly, in view of the current economic straits, Egypt does not have the luxury to refuse Arab and foreign aid, albeit on terms that do not infringe on its national sovereignty, and, given the current urgency, it should accept funds available from Arab funding sources or the World Bank.”

In Abdel-Alim's opinion, the post-revolutionary constitution should have included an article in the section on the state and society, stipulating that the government must remain committed to the protection of national economic security, and another article in the section on security and defence stipulating the creation and functions of a national economic security council. He was dismayed by the current lack of political decision and direction at this crucial time. “Egypt has the infrastructure to build an economic security studies unit in the NSC. It is to be found in the Organisation of Industrialisation, the National Research Centre, the National Centre for Water Research, the National Energy Agency and other such bodies.”

In his presentation to the conference on the proposed energy unit, Youssri Abu Shadi, a leading expert in the International Atomic Energy Agency, revealed that Egyptian officials have been misleading in the information they have been giving the public with respect to the energy situation. In fact, he said, Egypt has been gripped by mounting energy crises due to the economic deterioration and security breakdowns since the revolution. He also revealed that the tender for the construction of the Dabaa nuclear energy plant, which had been scheduled for the week when the revolution began, had to be postponed and that a year later inhabitants in the vicinity destroyed and occupied the site for the project. He said that he had undertaken an experiment in collaboration with Alexandria University's college of engineering on a miniature model of nuclear reactors and submitted to the president plans demonstrating that the projected Dabaa plant would not have to use the entire area of land that had been originally designated for it. In addition, talks were underway with the people of that area to persuade them that the project would be safe. The presidency has expressed his interest in the project, said Abu Shadi who also urged the creation of an Egyptian nuclear energy ministry.

Abu Shadi went on to present an overview of Egypt's energy production, furnishing a range of statistics on available resources, production figures and subsidies. According to his studies, alternative sources of energy from water, wind or solar power or organic sources will not be sufficient to meet Egypt's energy needs. Egypt's sole solution is to produce nuclear energy, he said, stressing the urgency of the need to move in this direction as soon as possible in light of the fact that many foreign technicians who had been responsible for the maintenance of electricity plants have left the country as a result of which 30 per cent of these plants had to stop generating. He pointed out that Egyptian technicians could not replace the foreigners due to conditions related to the warranties on the machinery and to the refusal of foreign companies to train Egyptians and include them in the necessary maintenance operations. However, this was not the only cause of the mounting energy crisis during the past two years, he said. In its rush to forestall the electricity crisis, the government opened generating plants that relied on natural gas or oil that, in turn, precipitated another crisis in the form of spiralling energy subsidies that have climbed to \$115 billion.

As the workshop drew to a close, it was clear that a thorough and comprehensive proposal for a National Security Council was ready to be taken off the drawing board and put into practice. Although it still may require some fine-tuning, its architects' chief question at this stage whether they will receive the official green light which, in the opinion of many sources, does not appear forthcoming.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102002>

Appendix 8

Watered down dispute

Reem Leila published in on Al-Ahram Weekly on 23 - 4 - 2013

The River Nile has been the subject of endless treaties, most finalised during the colonial period, all of them imposed to ensure that Egypt and Sudan, as the two downstream states, are guaranteed access to sufficient water. But a status quo that has been in place for more than a century is now crumbling beneath the combined weight of population pressure and geopolitical changes.

South Sudan seceded in 2011. Upstream Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia — source of 85 per cent of Egypt's 55.5 billion cubic metre quota of Nile water — Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda are all battling to further national development. “Egypt,” says international water expert Daa Al-Kousi, “could face losing 20 per cent of its 55.5 billion cubic metre quota when the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is built.”

Cairo seems to be making light of what many see as an urgent issue with officials repeatedly insisting water scarcity is not a major problem.

“In the past, Egypt's ties with many African countries, including Ethiopia, were stumbling. Now there are great chances of enhancing cooperation that satisfies the interests of all sides. Mutual talks in this regard are currently taking place and we welcome the refurbishment of old relations with Africa,” President Mohamed Morsi said in Addis Ababa earlier this month. More tellingly, he also found it necessary to deny allegations that Cairo and Khartoum were considering military action against the as yet un-built Ethiopian dam should it be necessary to protect their quotas of water.

Ethiopia's Renaissance Dam, says Al-Kousi, will be 250 metres high and create a lake of 72 billion cubic metres. “Ethiopia anticipates cultivating millions of feddans with the water. It has already sold one million feddans to the Saudi company Savola to grow sunflowers for oil and 1.6 million feddans to a US agri-business. The water that is used, as well as that stored in the lake, would once have flowed through Egypt.”

Cairo is refusing to sign the Framework Convention of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) before three conditions are added guaranteeing Egypt's historic claims to its quota. It is demanding source countries explicitly acknowledge Egypt's historic right to 55.5 billion cubic metres of water, that they continue to seek Egyptian approval for any upstream water projects and that any existing convention articles be amended only if they secure the unanimous approval of all parties.

Upstream states have categorically refused Cairo's conditions.

Some source countries suffer from periodic drought, points out former minister of water resources and irrigation Mohamed Nasreddin Allam. They are anxious to utilise the Nile for irrigation and, in some cases, for producing hydroelectricity, as well.

“The Nile Basin Initiative [NBI] was launched in 1998 to establish regional cooperation among the countries who share the Nile following major agricultural changes,” says Allam. Egypt has no problem in supporting any of the Nile Basin countries which want to build dams for producing electricity “as these types of dams do not affect Egypt's quota of the water”, he adds. But dams built for storing water to be used in agriculture are another matter altogether. They constitute a “huge threat to Egypt's share of Nile water and accordingly Egypt can never agree to them”.

Yet despite Egyptian and Sudanese objections to Ethiopia's dam project Addis Ababa is going ahead.

Access to Nile water is based upon several immutable principles, insists professor of international law Ahmed Abul-Wafa: the shares of individual states must be in proportion with population size and the area of land under cultivation and no Nile Basin state should act in a way that harms any other country using Nile water.

Yet what happens when these principles are flouted?

“There aren't a lot of alternatives in such cases,” says Abul-Wafa. “Other than political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option is the use of military force.”

Historically, only Egypt and Sudan had a guaranteed share of Nile water. Other Nile Basin countries received enough rainfall annually to cover their agricultural needs. While early agreements were signed by Britain and Italy as colonial powers, the most recent agreement on quotas was signed by Egypt and Sudan in 1959. “All these agreements,” says Abul-Wafa “are protected by international law.”

The 1959 agreement saw Egypt's total share of the Nile waters rise to 55.5 billion cubic metres and Sudan's to 14.5 billion cubic metres. This amount comprises six to eight per cent of the total rainfall over the Nile Basin. Much of the rest is lost, some through evapotranspiration — the consumption of plants — yet more by seepage into the ground. “What we use is very little when compared to the potential. Yet to tap this potential there must be far better management of the water in some areas, such as the equatorial lakes where water losses are huge. Weeds consume more than is lost through natural evaporation,” says Abul-Wafa.

“The Nile can provide for all of the countries lying in its basin if properly used,” said Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's African Institute.

“Many Nile Basin countries want to irrigate far more than in the past. But such decisions cannot be taken unilaterally. From now on there must be consultation and mutual agreement,” argues Nasreddin.

Egypt will eventually need to increase its own quota, he says. “Due to population growth an individual Egyptian's share of potable water is less than 750 cubic metres per year, compared to 2,000 in upstream states. Officials must start talking about this and associated issues. The most important principal is that the Nile is for all countries.”

Despite the failure to reach any agreement, Egypt has made it absolutely clear to everyone that it supports and will continue to support any development that does not harm Egypt's water quota. Much of the concern about the equitable distribution of Nile waters seems to stem from the fear that there will be limited resources to share in the very near future, due to the high population growth rates in the basin region.

“For the time being we do not have a real problem with our water as we use our quota two and a half fold by recycling,” says Allam.

<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2339/-/-.aspx>

Appendix 9

An upstream dilemma

Al-Ahram Weekly Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 08 - 05 - 2013

In what can be easily construed as a provocative measure, Ethiopia promised to push ahead with an ambitious programme for hydroelectric projects on the Blue Nile and some of its tributaries. A total of five projects, including the Renaissance Dam, have now obtained an official seal.

The news, in all likelihood, will add to tensions already existing between that country and its downstream neighbours, Egypt and Sudan.

The announcement came during celebrations marking two years since the start of the Renaissance Dam, the massive project that has become a bone of contention between Egypt and Ethiopia. Reports of Israel's involvement in various water projects in Ethiopia are hardly reassuring to the Egyptians.

The history of Ethiopia's hydroelectric ambitions goes back to a non-official American paper submitted to Ethiopia in the mid-20th century. This paper drew a comprehensive plan for several water projects designed to double the Ethiopian share of the Nile water and allow the country more control over the water flowing to Sudan and Egypt.

The essence of the American paper is what the current plans are all about, although the details differ in matters concerning the size of the dams involved. In fact, the locations of the dams are just the same as the Americans suggested many years ago, and the justifications the Ethiopians keep giving for this project match exactly the ones in the said paper.

Recent official statements coming from Addis Ababa are worrying on more than one level. Most importantly, Ethiopia seems to have forgotten that negotiations are underway on this issue. An Egyptian-Sudanese-Ethiopian Committee is still looking into the consequences of such hydrological projects, and the committee is yet to submit its findings to the governments in question.

Now it seems that Addis Ababa has decided to jump the gun and go ahead with its project irrespective of the findings of the committee, which is no way to handle differences of such gravity with one's neighbours.

It would seem, therefore, that Ethiopian participation in the said committee was little more than a tactical gesture, a way to silence its neighbours while having its way.

One has to conclude that the negotiations were more of a cover than a quest to manage an incredibly thorny issue in a manner satisfactory to all those concerned.

Ethiopia, as you may know, maintains that none of its current or future projects will impact adversely on Egypt or Sudan, at least not in a perceptible manner.

Hence, the Ethiopians may argue, the discussions held at the tripartite committee must not interfere with the progress of ongoing projects, since the latter are unlikely to cause any damage to downstream countries anyway.

This is rather contradictory, for the mere act of holding talks is to decide on the outcome of a certain course of action, and thereby agreeing to it or choose another course of action. To go ahead and do something that may contradict the outcome of the talks is to rob the talks of all substance.

Experts looking into the possible outcome of the current Ethiopian hydroelectric projects have offered a wide array of views, not all compatible with what the Ethiopians say.

Unlike the official Ethiopian position, technical studies and expert opinions suggest that the Renaissance Dam and the rest of the project planned for the Blue Nile may reduce significantly the amount of water going downstream.

At present, Egypt receives through the Blue Nile more than 85 per cent of its annual quota of 55 billion cubic metres. Some experts say that once the dams are complete, Egypt will lose more than 30 per cent of its quota and Sudan will lose nearly 20 per cent of Sudan's quota. Others estimates speak of a 10 per cent loss in Egypt's case and five per cent loss in Sudan's case.

The loss of water will lead to a loss in agricultural production, which some say will amount to 50 per cent of the total in Egypt's case.

The extent of the losses can be greater if Ethiopia decides to fill up its newly built reservoirs immediately, rather than over a number of years. One has to keep in mind that the Renaissance Dam will create a reservoir with a storage capacity of 40-60 billion cubic metres, which is close to Egypt's water supply for a whole year.

Let's now turn to another aspect of the issue, which is Israel's involvement.

Israel's activities in Africa are not a secret. But the details of these activities are less than transparent. We have known for many years that Israel was forging friendships with various non-Arab countries in Africa, both on the Nile Valley and the Horn of Africa — especially with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and South Sudan. In fact, relations between Israel and South Sudan started long before the south went independent.

Israel has always been interested in the Nile water. During peace negotiations with Egypt, Israeli officials kept asking president Anwar Al-Sadat to supply Israel with water across Sinai, a request that he turned down.

Now that Israel failed to access Nile water through Egypt, it is trying to make life difficult for both downstream countries: Egypt and Sudan.

Zvi Mazel, a former Israeli ambassador to Cairo, once wrote a study for his Foreign Ministry's Centre for Political Research, in which he suggested that it was in Israel's interest to internationalise the conflict involving Nile Basin countries.

An Israeli periodical, elaborating on the same idea, recently published papers suggesting that countries in the Horn of Africa should be approached differently according to their religion. For

some reason, it seems that Israel believes that a growing polarisation between Christian and Muslim countries in the Horn of Africa may play out in its favour.

When you look at the history of water projects in Ethiopia, you'll see that Israel has always been present, if not officially then through business connections and expertise. Some Israeli companies are involved in land surveying, while others help with feasibility studies. Israeli civilians may also be involved in providing funding for the Renaissance Dam, although the Ethiopians categorically deny any involvement by Israel in the project.

In 2009, Israel and Germany signed an agreement with Ethiopia to develop the latter's agricultural sector. The project is supposed to raise the efficiency of Ethiopia's irrigation and drainage operations in Amhara, Tigray, Oromia, and the South Ethiopia Peoples' States.

Therefore it is hard to look at the projects of Ethiopian dams in isolation from the regional context. The question of water availability is paramount, of course. But let's not forget the question of national security.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102551>

Appendix 10

Morsi discusses Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia

Fady Salah Published in Daily News Egypt on 25 - 05 - 2013

President Mohamed Morsi discussed on Saturday with the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn bilateral relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, in addition to the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, currently under construction.

The meeting took place at the headquarters of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa, as part of Morsi's visit to Ethiopia to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the AU, where he was received by the Ethiopian Mining Minister Sinkinesh Ejigu.

Amid controversy that the Ethiopian dam being built will alter Egypt's share of the Nile water, Prime Minister Desalegn asserted his country's dedication on maintaining the interests of Egypt and Sudan, reported state-run MENA. Desalegn stressed that the dam won't affect the water shares or interests of the two countries, according to Egyptian Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaa Al-Din.

Bahaa Al-Din added that a tripartite committee, comprised of Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian experts, is currently studying the expected outcomes of the dam and its affect on Egypt and Sudan as countries downstream the Nile River.

The meeting followed a speech delivered by Morsi, as part of the 29th round of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), held at the AU headquarters.

"NEPAD has laid the ground for a comprehensive African framework to achieve political, economic, and social development in Africa, which achieved significant progress and economic growth rates that exceeded 5% yearly in many countries, despite all the challenges it faces," said Morsi.

Morsi praised NEPAD's role in agriculture and infrastructure, highlighting the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and asserting that they represent a "push forward" for mutual cooperation, MENA reported.

Morsi also praised an initiative launched by South African President Jacob Zuma to develop infrastructure programmes in Africa, adding that Egypt was keen to join the initiative and adopt several projects aiming to develop river transport between African countries within the initiative's framework.

"Despite the progress NEPAD achieved, we are still facing difficulties in providing the necessary funds for large projects, and accordingly we should adopt the notion of African ownership, rely on our capabilities, and stick to our independent political will in order to meet the aspirations of our people," said Morsi.

Morsi added that African countries should revise their policies and adopt new policies enhancing their future cooperation while focusing on African interests. He also called for more inter-state cooperation between South African countries and benefitting from the successful development models in Asia and Latin America, MENA reported.

The president affirmed that Egypt is keen to exert all efforts to serve the mutual African goals, enhance cooperation, and achieve regional integration. "We are confident of our ability to reach our aims of security, peace, development, and prosperity."

Meanwhile, Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Kamel Amr met with the foreign ministers of Algeria, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Kenya, according to an official statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Saturday.

The negotiations highlighted the bilateral relations between Egypt and each country and the prospects of its enhancements. Additionally, Amr discussed the Nile Basin issue and the relations between Sudan and South Sudan with the Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karty, according to the statement.

<https://www.masress.com/en/dailynews/200607>

Appendix 11

Great expectations, middling results

Reem Leila Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 29 - 05 - 2013

On 24 May President Mohamed Morsi arrived in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa to attend the 21st session of the African Union summit (AU) — Pan Africanism and African Renaissance — as well as celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the AU.

Significantly the AU summit meets less than a month ahead of a planned Nile Basin summit in Juba, South Sudan: hardly surprising, then, that the ongoing crisis over access to Nile water topped Morsi's agenda in meetings with Ethiopian officials. On the summit's margin Morsi met with a host of African leaders. Among the issues addressed by the summit were promoting peace and development and fighting HIV and malaria.

Meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, Morsi raised Egypt's concerns over the construction of the Renaissance Dam. Desalegn told Morsi that Ethiopia “would never harm either Egypt or Sudan or compromise their share of Nile water”.

“Both Ethiopia and Egypt long for mutual cooperation across different fields,” he said.

Morsi also met with US Secretary of State John Kerry who raised concerns about Egypt's economic situation.

“Egypt must adopt better economic and political reform plans if the country is to receive US and global aid. Reform measures which Egypt is trying to adopt are hindered by the continuous state of unrest and lack of security, democracy as well as clear political restructuring plans,” said Kerry.

Kerry underlined that Egypt needs to offer serious evidence of financial reforms to US Congress in order to reach a consensus on aid. Egypt is struggling with dire economic indicators as talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to receive a crucial \$4.8 billion loan package stagger on. Kerry urged Morsi to finalise the IMF deal to counterbalance a widening budget deficit spurred by slow tourism, a devaluing currency and stagnating economy.

Morsi also met with Egyptian expatriates living in Ethiopia. He told them “Egypt is keen on improving African integration and benefiting from the successful experiences of all other countries.”

He offered details about the government's controversial Suez Canal Corridor (SCC) project, claiming it would significantly improve Egypt's economic fortunes.

“The SCC project, operated by a public-private partnership, aims to develop the governorates of Suez, Ismailia and Port Said by the year 2017,” said Morsi. “It will attract local, Arab and foreign investments.”

Morsi struck an optimistic note when he said “Egypt has left behind dictatorships, oppression and corruption.”

“The government,” Morsi insisted, “is exerting every effort to achieve revolutionary goals.”

Morsi met South Sudanese President Salva Kiir on the summit's sidelines and discussed bilateral relations and possible Egyptian contributions to South Sudan's electricity, health and education sectors. Morsi's spokesman Ihab Fahmi said in his meeting with Kiir that the president had expressed his desire for further cooperation with Nile Basin countries and stressed South Sudan's important role in helping move towards a consensus over the contentious issue of Nile water.

“The president also welcomed positive developments between South Sudan and Sudan,” said Fahmi.

The president met with the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir on 24 May to discuss bilateral relations as well as ways to enhance trade and investment.

On 25 May Morsi met with Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hamad Bin-Jassem Al-Thani. They reviewed ongoing Egyptian-Qatari cooperation, particularly in the energy field.

The Syrian crisis was among many other issues discussed with the Qatari prime minister. Both parties warned the crisis could lead to Syria's breakup. Morsi stressed the importance of international and regional agreement to push for a peaceful compromise, end to the bloodshed and preserve Syria's territorial integrity, and once again pushed the idea of a quartet committee composed of Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia to help solve the Syrian crisis.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Kamel Amr met with his Algerian, Sudanese, Sierra Leonean and Kenyan counterparts. According to a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry Amr discussed issues of common interests and ways to enhance existing ties. Amr also discussed Nile Basin issues and the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan with Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Karti.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102787>

Appendix 12

Dampening disputes

Reem Leila Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 29 - 05 - 2013

Immediately following President Mohamed Morsi's meeting with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn Addis Ababa announced that it would begin diverting the course of the Blue Nile. Morsi had met Desalegn on 28 May during the course of the African Union summit to discuss the impact of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam project on Egypt's share of Nile water. The diversion of the Blue Nile is part of the process required to build the Renaissance Dam which many water experts believe will severely reduce Egypt's share of Nile water.

The announcement was described by Ethiopian officials as “historic”. Addis Ababa held a celebration on Tuesday morning at the construction site of the Renaissance Dam, planned to be the 10th largest in the world.

Both Egypt and Sudan were surprised by the news, but while Sudan described the decision as “shocking”, believing it will negatively affect their quota of Nile water, Egypt's presidential spokesman Omar Amer told the press that the decision taken by the Ethiopian government would not impact on Egypt's share. Meanwhile, Egyptian water experts criticised Egypt's official reaction and expressed alarm.

Nasreddin Allam, former water resources and irrigation minister, pointed out that the Renaissance Dam is one of four dams which Ethiopia plans to construct on the Blue Nile, one of two main tributaries that provide Egypt with 60 per cent of its annual share of 55.5 billion cubic metres of water.

“The storage capacity of the Renaissance Dam is 200 billion cubic metres. Add to this the capacity of the Takazi Dam work on which began in 2009 and one can foresee a situation in which Ethiopia will control the amount of water coming to Egypt and Sudan,” argues Allam. The Takazi Dam is on the Stet River, the other tributary of the River Nile.

Ethiopia, says Allam, plans to construct four dams for irrigation purposes that are also capable of generating 2,000 megawatts of electricity, nine times the amount produced by Egypt's High Dam. This is in addition to 25,000 megawatts planned to be produced by other rivers in Ethiopia.

“Ethiopia will be the biggest exporter and controller of energy in East Africa. It will soon be exporting energy to Somalia and Djibouti in the east, Kenya and Uganda in the south, Sudan and South Sudan in the west, and to Egypt and Europe in the north,” said Allam.

Hani Raslan, head of the Sudan and Nile Basin Countries' Studies Programme at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, says that following the Ethiopian announcement, “Egypt can expect to lose at least seven billion cubic metres of its share of water once the Grand Renaissance Dam is finished.”

The River Nile is the confluence of the White Nile, with its source in Lake Victoria, and the Blue Nile which springs in the Ethiopian highlands. It provides 90 per cent of the water needs of Egypt's

90 million inhabitants. Water experts say that even if Egypt's share remains constant population growth will outstrip existing water supplies by 2017.

Ibrahim Nasreddin of Cairo University's Institute for African Studies says alarm is unnecessary. The recent decision taken by Addis Ababa will not affect Egypt and Sudan since “the Nile can provide enough water for all of the countries that depend on it.”

“The depth of the Nile's course in source countries, especially in Ethiopia, is 500 metres deep. This makes it impossible to build anything similar to the High Dam in just 10 months. But without building in such a compressed timetable anything that is constructed will be flushed away by the annual two-month flood.”

Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaaeddin agrees with Nasreddin's assessment. The construction process will take a great deal of time, he says. Meanwhile, the diversion process will not stop water from flowing down river to Egypt.

Bahaaeddin adds that this does not mean that Egypt approves of the construction of the dam.

“We are still waiting for the outcome of the tripartite commission,” he says, adding that the commission, mandated to report on the impact of the dam, is due to report in the next few days. Egypt's position, says Bahaaeddin, is that it opposes the dam's construction if it is shown it will negatively impact on Egypt's water share.

Bahaaeddin also stresses the crisis of water management in Egypt. “We cannot afford to waste a single drop of water,” he says.

Egypt's position, Bahaaeddin reiterated, is that it does not oppose “any development constructed in any Nile Basin country” as long as it does not “damage the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan”.

A report issued by the National Planning Institute (NBI) calculates that Egypt will need an additional 21 billion cubic metres by 2050 in order to meet the water needs of a population of 150 million.

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), signed by most Nile Basin countries and opposed only by Egypt and Sudan, ratified a partnership among Nile states for sharing the river's socio-economic benefits and promoting regional security. The conflict between Sudan and Egypt (downstream states) and the rest of Nile Basin countries (upstream countries) began when Cairo and Khartoum refused to sign the NBI Framework Convention since it did not explicitly guarantee Egypt's right to 55.5 billion cubic square metres of water annually and did not allow Egypt its traditional veto of upstream projects.

Shares of Nile water are based on several principles. According to Raslan, the share of any country must be in proportion to its population and extent of agricultural land. Nile Basin countries should also desist from harming any neighbouring country.

An international dispute will develop between Egypt and other Nile Basin countries should they refuse to alter their position. According to Raslan, there are not many alternatives. “Other than

political and diplomatic negotiations and international arbitration, the only remaining option will be the use of force,” says Raslan.

Egypt has set three conditions before signing the Nile Basin Framework Agreement: water security, being informed in advance of any planned projects on the river banks and making the completion of such projects conditional on Egyptian and Sudanese approval.”

“We have water and won't need to think about securing outside water till five or six years from now. We have an adequate amount of water to fulfil our needs for now,” says Bahaeddin.

Sudanese Ambassador to Cairo Kamal Hassan is far less sanguine. He described Ethiopia's decision to divert the course of Blue Nile as “disastrous”. Egypt and Sudan, he says, might resort to the Arab League to discuss the issue.

“There is continuous communication between Egypt and Sudan over Ethiopia's shocking decision,” says Hassan.

“The decision was abrupt and traumatising. We are currently discussing the possibility of conducting an Arab League emergency meeting in order to discuss the threat to Egypt and Sudan's share of Nile water.”

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102792>

Appendix 13

Diplomacy is the key

Doaa El Bey Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 04 - 06 - 2013

“The official reaction to the crisis is beyond my understanding. They did not even attempt to show a minimum degree of anger,” said Taha, a microbus driver in Cairo, in reaction to Addis Ababa's decision to divert the Blue Nile.

Taha's statement is a reflection of the popular reaction in Egypt that has been surprised by the country's official reaction, which has appeared to be indifferent to the Ethiopian decision.

The angry popular reaction was also reflected in the protests launched in front of the Ethiopian embassy last week, when dozens of Egyptian protesters carrying banners reflecting their rejection of the decision and underlining the Egyptian right to the Nile's water, gathered to protest against the decision.

While people want to see a strong response, a well-calculated one based on keeping up good relations and taking useful diplomatic steps is preferred by some politicians and commentators.

Commenting on the official reaction, Ahmed Abdel-Halim, an expert in military strategy, said it raised question marks. States cannot act intemperately, he said, adding that instead legal experts and ministers ordinarily formed working groups on an internal level and then negotiated with foreign parties.

“Meanwhile, the military threats should not be mixed with political discourse. Journalists should stop talking about a military reaction,” Abdel-Halim told Al-Ahram Weekly.

The initial reaction to the diversion of the Blue Nile was a weak one, with the president's office saying one day after the diversion had been announced that it would not affect Egypt's share of the Nile water.

“Any project on the River Nile requires diverting the course of the water before starting construction. The present project will not affect Egypt's share of the Nile water,” said presidential spokesman Omar Amer at a news conference.

The Ministry of Irrigation stated that it would not accept steps that had negative impacts on the flow of the River Nile, adding that the diversion of the Blue Nile was simply an “engineering procedure” related to the construction of the proposed dam.

However, after issuing the report of the tripartite investigative committee this week, President Mohamed Morsi met with figures from the opposition on Monday to discuss the impact of Ethiopia's controversial Renaissance Dam and the findings of the eagerly-awaited report.

Opposition figures agreed that the Renaissance Dam presented a potential crisis for Egypt, and the meeting was televised, without the knowledge of most of the attendees.

During the meeting, the president called on Ethiopia to commit to a deadline for providing more substantial information on the impact of the dam and to sign an internationally accountable document that guaranteed that the dam would not harm the interests of Egypt and Sudan.

Some party heads, like that of the Salafist Nour Party, Younis Makhoun, called on Ethiopia to “immediately halt” construction of the dam until a conclusive report had been produced, describing the dam as “strategically dangerous”.

Other party heads, like Magdi Hussein of Egypt's Labour Party, pointed out that there was a battle “not only with Ethiopia, but also with the US and Israel as well”.

A number of political figures, including members of the National Salvation Front (NSF), rejected the president's invitation, expressing concerns about the transparency and usefulness of the talks. The Constitution and Free Egyptians Party also declined the invitation.

Prominent politicians like Amr Moussa, head of the Conference Party, and Hamdeen Sabahi, head of the Egyptian Popular Current and a founding member of the NSF, announced they would not join the meeting.

Mustafa Al-Guindi, a member of the NSF, regarded the language used in the meeting to be escalatory and “catastrophic”. Holding a meeting with the president during which threats to use force are used would dash any hope of a peaceful solution, he told the Weekly.

“Confrontational language and talk about a military option show that the current regime has no vision whatsoever for Egypt in general on the one hand and for its future relations with Ethiopia and Africa on the other,” Al-Guindi added.

The timing of the meeting was also regarded as an attempt to distract Egyptians from domestic issues, especially the protests against the president planned for 30 June.

In the search for a way out, voices have been raised calling for military confrontation with Ethiopia and international arbitration. Diplomacy is regarded as the right tool to resolve differences.

According to Khaled Abu Bakr, an international lawyer, international arbitration would not be in Egypt's interest. Ethiopia is very active in the international community, he told the Weekly, whereas Egypt is not, with the result that Cairo would be unable to exert the same pressure as Addis Ababa.

Arbitration in political issues depends on pressure and good relations with other countries and international parties, he said. “Ethiopia has prepared itself with a strong file in favour of its cause. Had it not done so, it would not have been able to convince the international institutions to fund the building of the Dam.”

Arbitration is also a long process and one that involves Ethiopia's consent. Its outcome would be binding on both parties.

Mahmoud Abu Zeid, a former minister of irrigation, said that international arbitration should be the last resort after trying diplomatic means. “I consider it to be the last resort and by no means the best. It takes a long time and its outcome is unknown,” he told the Weekly.

As for the military track, Abu Zeid ruled it out because it would not resolve the problem but rather would complicate it.

Abdel-Halim agreed with Abu Zeid that the military option was not possible and was not even required. However, he did not rule out international arbitration, which had proved useful in the earlier case of Taba.

Improving Egypt's diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, the Nile basin countries and African countries in general is still considered to be the best means to resolve the Nile water conflict and other conflicts in the future.

The Egyptian ambassador to Ethiopia, Mohamed Idriss, said that the coming days would witness high-level communications between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on ways to take action to serve their common interests. However, he did not elaborate on any specific steps that might be taken.

Al-Guindi said the way out of the present problem should start by establishing a development project between Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Egypt, in which the first two countries would contribute by supplying electric power. Sudan would contribute land, and Egypt would contribute manpower and expertise.

He pointed to the active role that popular diplomacy could play in improving relations between Egypt and other Nile Basin and African states in the future. It had been the popular visit to Uganda in 2011 that had succeeded in convincing Ugandan officials to postpone signing the Nile Basin (Entebbe) Treaty for two years, he said.

Another visit to Addis Ababa a month later had succeeded in convincing Ethiopian officials to postpone ratifying the treaty for a year.

“It is popular diplomacy that convinced Ethiopia to establish the tripartite committee two years ago. Initially, Addis Ababa refused to form the committee until Egypt signed the Entebbe Treaty,” he added.

Thus, he concluded, the only tool that Egypt needs is to return the Egyptian presence to Africa as it was during the rule of former president Gamal Abdel-Nasser.

Al-Guindi was an active member of the popular diplomacy delegations that visited Uganda and Ethiopia after the 25 January Revolution in 2011.

Abu Zeid also put forward steps for resolving the current crisis, starting with returning to the negotiating table at the highest level and conducting transparent negotiations to reach an agreement on the effects of the dam and how to deal with them.

This should be followed by a strategy to be pursued during the period when the reservoir behind the dam was filling with water, he said, which would deal with the recommendations in the tripartite report.

Official talks should be supported by popular diplomacy, which had proved useful in the past and had put pressure on donors who would stop the building process until the full effects of the dam had been revealed.

Abdel-Halim suggested a multi-dimensional approach that would start by the exclusion of the military option followed by making the issue known to the international community by forming groups of international lawyers to present it to the African Union, the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.

Egypt should try to establish common interests with Ethiopia and the other Nile Basin states, he said. "Israel managed to create a network of interests with these countries. I see no reason why we shouldn't do the same," he added.

The move to divert the Blue Nile, described in Ethiopia as "historic", was taken last week, one day after Morsi had concluded a visit to Ethiopia.

The Blue Nile provides Egypt with 85 per cent of its annual allotment of 55 billion cubic metres of water. The Renaissance Dam is one of four dams planned to be built on the Blue Nile.

The reservoir behind the proposed dam will contain 74 billion cubic metres of water. Ethiopia plans to fill the reservoir in five years, which could cause Egypt a reduction in water of over 20 per cent, contributing to the country's existing water shortages.

According to Egypt's National Planning Institute, the country will likely need an additional 21 billion cubic metres of water per year by 2050, on top of its current 55 billion cubic metres quota, to meet the water needs of a projected population of 150 million.

Since 1902, there have been over ten agreements regulating the distribution of Nile water, including a 1959 agreement that specified Egypt and Sudan's share at 55 and 18 billion cubic metres, respectively.

Addis Ababa has repeatedly shrugged off these agreements, asserting that they deny other Nile Basin states, apart from Egypt and Sudan, any serious share of the River's water. They also say that the agreements were signed when the African states were under foreign occupation and that they should be revisited by present African rulers.

In 1999, Egypt agreed to join the other Nile Basin countries in a negotiation process specifically aimed at addressing the demands of the upstream countries.

In 2010, both Egypt and Sudan, before the latter country was split in two, suspended their participation in the talks due to a failure to define the terms of an agreement governing the construction of irrigation projects on the Nile.

The final report issued by the tripartite committee earlier this week pointed to existing errors in the present design of the proposed Renaissance Dam and recommended changes to it.

It also asked for a schedule showing the amount of Nile water reaching Egypt over the coming 60 years. Both countries are now in need of improved political and diplomatic relations with Ethiopia, in order that these recommendations will be implemented.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102846>

Appendix 14

Watering economic woes

Sherine Abdel Razek Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 04 - 06 - 2013

Whether Egypt decides to resort to international arbitration, diplomatic manoeuvres or even military action in response to Ethiopia's decision to go ahead with building its so-called Renaissance Dam on the River Nile, any move could still be met by a long list of economic losses.

Ethiopia, the source of one of the two tributaries of the Nile, last week started diverting the river's flow to make way for its \$4.2 billion hydroelectric power project, the Renaissance Dam.

With a safety coefficient as low as 1.5, compared to eight in the case of the Aswan High Dam, one main concern about the new dam is its low safety standards, with some experts believing that it could collapse within 25 years of its inauguration.

The reservoir behind the dam will hold 74 billion cubic metres of water, which means that a collapse of the dam would flood major cities, among them Khartoum in Sudan, and would have drastic effects on Egypt.

However, there are not only safety concerns. Were the new dam to be built as planned, the amount of water Egypt receives from the River Nile would sharply decrease, this despite a series of agreements, one of which dates back to the 1920s, giving Egypt the right to 55 billion cubic metres of Nile water annually, in addition to veto rights over upstream developments that might affect the river's flow.

While other countries are considered to be suffering from water poverty when the per capita share of water is 1,000 cubic metres annually, the figure for Egypt is currently 700 cubic metres, meaning that the country is in a perilous water situation.

According to a report by a committee of water, agriculture and irrigation experts to assess the impact of the Renaissance Dam on Egypt, Egypt's share of Nile water would decrease by 20 per cent and the power it generates from water would decrease by 40 per cent were the dam to be completed.

A main problem would be during the period when the new dam's reservoir was filling, which would take six years starting from 2014. According to the experts' report, Egypt's share of Nile water would decrease by between 20 and 38 per cent annually during this six-year period, depending on the flow of the Nile each year.

This means that in the worst-case scenario water going to Egypt would be reduced by some 19 billion cubic metres.

According to the report, each one billion cubic metres lost would mean transferring one million feddans of fertile land to non-arable uses and would strip the country's agricultural production by 12 per cent of its volume and increase Egypt's food gap by LE5.1 billion a year.

Egypt's overall cultivated land is 8.5 million feddans.

“These assessments are based on the assumption that the dam will be used only for power generation. The losses would be even larger if it were used for irrigation as well,” said Medhat Enebar, a professor of economics at the Centre for Agricultural Studies.

“There has been no agreement governing the use of this dam, so there is nothing that prevents Ethiopia from using its water for any project,” he added. Enebar said that there would be adverse effects of the reduced flow of the Nile on the environment, with increased pollution and increases in salinity threatening fish and plants.

Damming such a huge amount of water behind the dam's reservoir would also increase the amount of evaporated water by 0.5 per cent. “This is not a small problem, since only some five per cent of the river's water is currently utilised, while the rest is wasted,” Enebar said.

“Ethiopia's signing an international agreement guaranteeing Egypt's and Sudan's quotas of Nile water is a must before both countries can approve the building of the new dam,” wrote Ahmed Al-Naggar, head of the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies in Al-Ahram.

“If such an agreement is not signed, giving the go-ahead to this project would be political insanity that would tempt Ethiopia to further violation of the two states' water rights.”

According to Enebar, while Egypt is signatory to the 15 agreements relating to Nile water rights, none of these is specifically related to the new Ethiopian dam. For this reason, Egypt must insist on Addis Ababa's signing an agreement sponsored by the United Nations guaranteeing Egypt's and Sudan's shares in the Nile water, he said.

Al-Naggar said that under international law if the water of any river passes through a country where the lives of people, cattle and plants are dependent on it, this gives that country the right to have this water.

If an agreement can be signed with Ethiopia over the new dam, Al-Naggar said that the three countries should then negotiate the possibility of reducing the capacity of the dam's reservoir to 55 billion cubic metres in order to limit the amount of water needed to fill it.

He also suggested extending the period for filling the reservoir to 10 to 15 years so that the annual withdrawal of Nile water would be more limited.

He also stressed the importance of cooperation between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan in building the dam as a means to limit the involvement of other countries, some of them having possible political differences with Egypt.

Some reports have noted that some of the experts involved in the construction of the dam, as well as a percentage of the investments used, are Israeli.

Looking for ways to maximise the utilisation of its current water resources is now a matter of life or death for Egypt, said Enebar. “We should reactivate the Jongeli Canal project, which would increase the volume of water coming from the southwestern tributaries of the river in Sudan by digging a canal bypassing the swamps where most of this water is being wasted.”

“This project would provide Egypt and Sudan with seven billion cubic metres of irrigation water annually,” he said.

Construction work on the canal started decades ago, but came to a halt due to political instability in Sudan.

Enebar also pointed to a project currently underway in two governorates in the Delta region and another three in Upper Egypt to limit wasted water by developing surface irrigation methods.

The current system, depending on gravity to ensure water flow, is wasteful, Enebar said. “Under the new systems now being used up to 20 per cent of the water can be saved.”

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102843>

Appendix 15

The Renaissance Dam debacle

Al-Ahram Weekly Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 04 - 06 - 2013

Technicalities aside, the crisis surrounding Ethiopia's construction of the Renaissance Dam will go down in Egyptian history as a humiliating example of policy failure. What Ethiopia has done amounts to a declaration of war, for depriving a country of water is no less grave than assaulting its borders. Not that war is the only option, but we must call a spade a spade.

In situations such as this, you'd expect the country to summon all its expertise, its legal arguments, its connections and its diplomatic clout to send a clear and unequivocal message that the Ethiopian move is unacceptable and that no reaction on Egypt's part can be ruled out.

For its disregard for international law, Israel knows how to set boundaries and force others to respect them. In some situations, we too need to draw the line.

But we haven't.

Ethiopia sensed that Egypt, in its current situation, is no longer capable of dealing with a crisis of this magnitude. Watching how poorly we handled the recent abduction of soldiers must have given the Ethiopians ideas. Mind you, Ethiopia decided to divert the Blue Nile just days before the technical committee was to pass its verdict.

In doing so, it has introduced a *fait accompli*. Why negotiate, when you can just have your way? Or when you have the backing of such powerful stakeholders, such as China, Italy, and Israel, all of who have a vested interest in this project.

We have mismanaged the most important crisis regarding our national security. Therefore, we must never accept this *fait accompli*.

Egypt must not sign the Entebbe Agreement, because it is replete with pitfalls that cannot be addressed without the sincere efforts of everyone concerned.

The Entebbe Agreement, you may recall, was signed by Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The government of South Sudan recently decided to join it. Only three of the Nile riparian countries have not signed yet: Egypt, Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The countries that signed the agreement are moving fast towards its ratification, and they intend to create a commission to supervise their joint cooperation. How should Egypt react?

To answer this question, let's consider the following points:

- The agreement is only binding on the signatories, and it represents only a section of the riparian nations. This situation is uncomfortable for all, and the discomfort has to be maintained until a proper solution is found. When differences persist about the use of the River Nile, any projects

involving this river are liable to be faced with financial and technical problems, as they are likely to conflict with international norms and neighbourly actions.

- The signatories are five countries belonging to the equatorial basin plus Ethiopia, which controls the eastern basin. Cooperation between the two basins is not particularly conducive to common benefits. In fact, there is an organisation for cooperation among the Nile equatorial nations that failed to achieve anything of substance for years. When Ethiopia joined the group of late, it was only a political gimmick aimed to reinforce its policies in matters connected with its planned dams on the Blue Nile. The aim was to portray the matter as a collective difference with Egypt, not a bilateral one. Egypt has been unfairly cast in the role of a villain, which is simply untrue.

- There is no danger to Egypt from the equatorial basin for two reasons. One is that whatever water reaches Egypt from this direction is only 15 per cent of its historical rights and current use. The topographical nature of the river, with its multiple tributaries and shallow incline, makes it hard to create major projects in this area. The river doesn't take its final form until it starts emerging from South Sudan to become the White Nile. Even if any projects are created in the equatorial area, it will affect Egypt only marginally, as Egypt only gets about 10 per cent of its water supply from this area. Meanwhile, projects on the Ethiopian plateau influence 90 per cent of Egypt's supply of the river waters.

- To sign the agreement in its current form, and without sorting out the controversial aspects, would amount to Egypt forfeiting its historical rights and negating previous agreement that gave it a measure of nominal protection.

- The current wording of the agreement is replete with ambiguities, especially with regard to terms such as “fair usage” and “non-damaging measures”. Ethiopia keeps saying that the Renaissance Dam will not harm Egypt. But its view is based on the assumption that Egypt's “fair quota” is only 40 billion cubic metres per year, which is far less than what Egypt needs.

To sum up, it is better for Egypt to maintain disagreement for the moment than to seek an untenable accord. We must wait until all the controversial points are settled in an orderly and acceptable fashion.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102852>

Appendix 16

Conflicting reports

Reem Leila Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 04 - 06 - 2013

The international panel of experts commissioned to report on the impact of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has handed its findings to the governments of Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. The tripartite committee is composed of 10 experts, two each from Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, and four from other countries.

Immediately after receiving the report on 1 June President Mohamed Morsi convened a meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohamed Kamel Amr, Minister of Irrigation and Water Resources Mohamed Bahaeddin and the leaders of major political parties.

The full text of the report, which recommends further comprehensive studies be undertaken by the Ethiopian government to assess the negative impacts of the dam on downstream countries, has not been made public. What is clear is that after a year of study and six visits to the dam's location the writers of the report have serious reservations about the project's impact on the flow of the River Nile.

The GERD is planned to be 1,780 metres long and 145 metres high. Behind this massive wall with its central stepped spillway a reservoir will be created covering, at full capacity, an area of 1,680 sq km and holding 74 billion cubic metres of water.

The panel of experts complained that studies commissioned by the Ethiopian government on the dam's impact were either insufficiently broad or else outdated, and assessments of the expected repercussions on both Sudan and Egypt in the case of malfunction of the dam have not been undertaken.

Hani Raslan, an analyst at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, accuses Ethiopia of hiding important documents on the negative impact of the dam on Egypt and Sudan from the committee. He charges that "Ethiopia has deliberately impeded the work of the committee by delaying meetings and providing it with incomplete data."

Addis Ababa, says Raslan, asked Egypt several times to postpone the release of the report of the tripartite committee, the last time was in February. The Egyptian government, he adds, only refused further delays after Ethiopia began diverting the course of the Blue Nile four months before its scheduled date.

The dam, scheduled to be completed in 2017, will be constructed over basalt rocks along the grand African rift. Yet Ethiopia, says Raslan, has yet to offer any comprehensive geological survey of the site. He warns that the area in which it is to be constructed is unstable. Existing instability will be exacerbated by the pressure of the 74 billion cubic metres of water which will collect behind the dam, leading to an increase in the possibility of earth tremors of up to 5.0 on the Richter scale as geological faults widen.

“In the event the dam collapses much of Sudan will be inundated. Egypt's High Dam would be seriously affected if Lake Nasser happened to be full,” warns Raslan. “The Italian company which was awarded the construction contract [without tender] has said it will inject the ground with cement but this will only delay any potential problems.”

Ethiopia, says the report, has failed to undertake any serious studies of the dam's environmental impact. The panel of experts concluded that after GERD is completed Egypt will lose 30 per cent of its annual share of Nile water for the six years it is expected to take for the lake to reach its capacity. After that, they predict Egypt will enter a seven-year cycle of excess water followed by drought.

The ability of Egypt's High Dam to generate electricity is likely to be compromised by the GERD, especially during high and medium flood seasons. Should Ethiopia attempt to continue filling its reservoir during periods of drought the impact on Egypt's ability to generate electricity and irrigate agricultural lands will be devastating.

The tripartite committee focussed on the possible negative environmental cause by the dam on Ethiopia's ecosystem and Egypt's agriculture. The report expressed concern about aspects of the dam's design. Although Ethiopia accepted these concerns and said it would change the designs accordingly no modifications have been made.

Water expert Diaa Al-Qousi stresses that the report recommended Ethiopia build two smaller dams further upstream which between them would have the same storage and generating capacity as GERD.

“Ethiopia has the option to build further upstream and will gain the same benefits without harming Egypt or Sudan's share of the water,” says Al-Qousi. He believes it has ignored this option out of geopolitical calculations. In short Ethiopia, charges Al-Qousi, wants to control the supply of water to its downstream neighbours.

Al-Qousi also warns the dam will result in political conflict between Egypt and Sudan. According to the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and Sudan the two countries share 84 billion cubic metres of water, with Sudan's allocation set at 18 billion.

“Egypt's share was never sufficient to cover its consumption. Egypt has consistently borrowed from Sudan's share and now owes Sudan more than 300 billion cubic metres of water,” says Al-Qousi.

Under circumstances in which the flow decreases as a result of the GERD it is inconceivable, says Al-Qousi, that Sudan will continue to donate part of its own share to cover the Egyptian shortfall.

“Sudan will refuse. Eventually Egypt will cut its own share and start repaying the 300 billion cubic metres of water it has borrowed,” he argues.

Raslan believes Cairo must begin to explore strategic and political solutions to the crisis immediately.

“The government should refer this issue to the Arab League, the African Union and to the UN Security Council. It must express its concerns forcibly to all countries that support the construction of the GERD, stressing the legal point that Ethiopia is violating Egypt's recognised historical rights in the River Nile and that all options will remain open for Cairo to defend those rights.”

On 26 May Ethiopia's Ministry of Water and Power claimed the plans for the GERD complied with all relevant international standards. On the same day Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry insisted the tripartite report had confirmed the dam would “not greatly harm” Egyptian or Sudanese interests.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102844>

Appendix 17

A story of intrigue and hostility

Atiya Essawi Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 04 - 06 - 2013

Two factors loom large over the water dispute between Egypt and the River Nile's upstream countries, especially Ethiopia, from which Egypt gets 85 per cent of its water.

One factor is the Egyptian government's exaggerated attachment to agreements on water-sharing that date back to colonial times. The other is the increasing need of upstream countries to launch development plans for their impoverished nations.

After years of war and domestic disturbances, some of the upstream countries are finally in a position to divert their resources from military expenditure to development projects. And with agriculture and electricity being their obvious choices for development, hydraulic projects involving the Nile are now at the top of their priorities.

Regarding the first factor, successive Egyptian governments have cited the agreements of 1891, 1902, 1906, 1929 and 1959 on the Nile, while insisting that none of the upstream countries can start a hydraulic project that may impede the supply of water to Egypt and Sudan.

However, the above agreements are unfortunately hard to enforce unless all those involved benefit from them, which is obviously not the case. This brings us to the second factor, which is that the upstream countries need to cultivate more land and generate more electricity in order to raise the standards of living of their people.

It is not that Egypt wasn't aware of all that, or that it was averse to reason, as some of the upstream countries now claim. But by the time Cairo finally came up with the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in 1999, things had already got out of hand.

The upstream countries were not in a mood to recognise any of the aforementioned agreements, and they questioned the logic behind Egypt being assigned a quota of 55.5 billion cubic metres of the Nile's water.

The upstream countries were also opposed to two conditions that Egypt saw as essential. One was prior notification concerning water projects, and the other was the manner of making decisions within the Nile riparian countries. Egypt and Sudan, the most vulnerable users of the Nile, wanted decisions to pass by unanimous vote, while the upstream countries maintained that a majority vote would be preferable.

Differences over such matters eventually led to the collapse of the NBI, an otherwise valid and mutually advantageous agreement. Things came to a head when, in May 2010, six upstream nations signed the Entebbe Agreement at a ceremony attended neither by Egypt nor Sudan.

An opportunity was then lost. Over the previous months, the Nile riparian countries had agreed on 43 articles out of the 44 the NBI contained, according to Mahmoud Abu Zeid, Egypt's former minister of water resources and irrigation.

After years of talks, Egypt and Khartoum failed to persuade the upstream countries to respect their quotas. They failed even to find an alternative formula that may have had the same effect while showing some consideration for the sensitivities of the upstream countries, many of which were already making noises about colonialism and the haughtiness of their downstream neighbours.

At this point, two matters of no minor importance were decided upon by the signatories of the Entebbe Agreement. One was to ditch the prior notification upstream countries must give downstream countries before any water project, which, by the way, is a standard feature of all international water agreements. The other was to ignore the unanimous voting procedure that Egypt and Sudan so desperately demanded.

But Egyptian diplomacy failed in more even than that. It failed to take international action and to draw attention to a situation that was about to become intolerable. Egypt could have put pressure on countries not to engage in projects that would have been detrimental to its water supplies. It was entitled under international law to demand sanctions be put on countries taking steps harmful to its national security. But none of this happened.

As it turned out, Ethiopia and other countries began building projects that directly interfered with the flow of water to Egypt, the present Renaissance Dam being a case in point. They did so without waiting for the Nile Tripartite Committee to issue its report on the matter.

One cannot ignore the underlying hostility in such conduct.

It may be recalled that the late Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi, speaking in November 2011, accused Egypt of assisting rebel groups in destabilising his country, while hinting that Egypt could not win a war with Ethiopia if push came to shove.

Sounding no less adamant, the Ethiopian foreign minister at the time spoke of conspiracies made by Egypt to stop donor countries from financing the projects. The paranoid statements by the Ethiopians were rather surprising, considering that Egypt was reassuring all the riparian countries that it supported any development projects they might engage in, so long as these did not reduce the supply of water downstream.

To be fair, the Egyptians could have been blamed for at least some of the paranoia the upstream countries felt at the time. The Egyptian media was far from kind to the Ethiopians, often voicing the opinion that the Renaissance Dam was bound to collapse in the future, or even calling for war to stop it from being built.

Some writers even recalled the threats once made by the late president Anwar Al-Sadat to this effect. But times have changed since then. It is now utterly out of the question to go to war over a matter of this sort. Any benefit from war would be outweighed by the sanctions and isolation Egypt would have to face as a result.

Ethiopia has a lot of powerful friends. The US and Europe rely on it for the protection of shipping in the Indian Ocean, for keeping at bay Islamist extremists and Iran, and for generally looking after their interests in East Africa.

Egypt's support of Khartoum during its conflict with South Sudan is also coming back to haunt it. The government of South Sudan, if only to spite Khartoum and Cairo, decided to join the Entebbe Agreement. In fact, the South Sudan government went a step further by stopping work on the Jonglei Canal, even though the latter is almost 75 per cent finished.

The Canal, if completed, would have saved nearly nine billion square metres of water lost annually in Bahr Al-Jabal in Sudan. This, too, is ironic knowing how much Egypt has spent on helping South Sudan with education, electricity, water, and other aspects of its infrastructure. Indeed, Egypt has spent nearly LE300 million providing clean drinking water for the South Sudanese people, but none of this has been enough to reverse the resentment felt in South Sudan toward Egypt over its ties with Khartoum.

As a matter of fact, Egypt is entitled to some resentment of its own. It had in the past agreed without hesitation to every single hydraulic project that might have benefited the upstream countries.

It made no objection when Uganda announced plans to build the Bujagali Dam, just as many decades ago it consented to the building of the Owen Falls Dam in the same country.

Egypt also approved the building of several small dams to gather rainwater in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. And it financed the digging of dozens of artesian wells in upstream countries suffering from drought.

Moreover, Egypt cleans extensive waterways every year in Uganda and South Sudan from the weed and sediment that block them. Egypt has also offered to fund various projects to improve water usage and agriculture in the upstream countries.

Egyptian experts who helped formulate the NBI say that the water supply to the Nile riparian countries could more than double if measures are taken to channel swamp water and minimise evaporation and seepage.

Politics, however, have got in the way. To be fair, it is difficult for a government such as that of Ethiopia to overlook the fact that nearly 70 per cent of its people have no access to electricity, while 99 per cent of Egyptians have such access.

Since the civil and regional wars ended in East Africa, foreign investors have come up with serious ideas for developing various countries in the region. International investors, including Arab companies, have offered billions of dollars to produce food and grain for export and then share the proceeds with the host nation.

Faced with such offers, the various Nile riparian countries have felt the urge to build dams to set the stage for such projects that are usually dependent on water and an electricity supply. According to experts, each billion cubic metres of water can provide enough food for five million people. One can hardly blame countries in which the per capita income is as low as \$1 a day for wanting to improve the lots of their citizens.

So all the help Egypt was prepared to offer these countries seemed to pale in comparison with the offers they were receiving from various investors. Had our investors matched these offers, could

things have been different? It is hard to tell, considering the immense resentment felt towards Egypt that has been bubbling upstream.

This is unfortunate, for the NBI could have offered these countries at least as much benefit as anything they hoped to get under the current situation. Indeed, if the riparian countries had agreed, in one form or another, to the NBI, considerable amounts of investment would have flown into their economies.

Donors had already set aside \$20 billion for 34 projects if the NBI had gone through. These projects would have improved irrigation in Ethiopia and Egypt, linked electricity grids in the region, and increased food production along the Nile basin.

Still, investors have not given up on East Africa. The Saudis want to invest \$2.6 billion to produce wheat in Ethiopia. Qatari and UAE companies have similar plans. China and South Korea wish to cultivate 20 million acres in Ethiopia for the purpose of producing bio-fuel.

The Israelis, let us not forget, have had their eyes on the Horn of Africa since the 1980s. Eager to encircle Egypt's southern front, the Israelis have been whispering in the ears of upstream countries about the presumed unfairness of their situation.

It was Israel that urged these countries to demand a redistribution of the Nile water according to population and needs. It was Israel that told them that they could rely on Western sympathies if Cairo and Khartoum tried to force their hand. And it was Israel that assured them that there was no lack of funding from donor organisations, especially those controlled by the US.

The aim was to pressure the two Arab countries to stay away from Iran and prevent the latter from helping Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Jihad and other adversaries of Israel.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102842>

Appendix 18

River war

Abdel Moneim Said Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 05 - 06 - 2013

In 1899, Winston Churchill, who would later become Britain's famous prime minister during World War II, published *The River War*. The river in question was the Nile, and this particular war had just ended in 1898 with Lord Kitchener's entry into Om Durman in the course of the campaign to end the Mahdist uprising and restore Sudan to Egyptian rule, albeit in the framework of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium this time. Churchill was a British army officer in this campaign.

There is no trace of the Mahdist War — as it was referred to in British literature — in Egyptian schoolbooks and very little on it in Arab history books in general. If it is mentioned at all, it is generally in the context of resistance and rebellion against colonialism, while the Egyptian role is portrayed as marginal and subordinate to colonialist will since Egypt, too, was under occupation at the time. But, more precisely, this was not entirely the case. The army that fought with Kitchener in Sudan was an Egyptian (and Sudanese) one, even if it was under British command. The campaign was completely financed from the Egyptian treasury, to the tune of £3 million at the outset of the war and additional sums when the initial funds ran out. The Egyptian treasury was not in the healthiest state at the time, but the war was of the highest strategic importance to Egypt. This was less because the recalcitrance of “Egyptian Sudan” than because of Egypt's vital Nilotic artery.

Some Egyptians take exception to Herodotus's famous saying that “Egypt is the gift of the Nile.” They argue — perhaps correctly — that Egypt is the gift of the Egyptian people who succeeded, where others had failed, in generating a splendid civilisation from this river. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Nile made Egypt a consummately riparian nation, one that shared many of the properties of other riparian nations in the world that had given birth to flourishing civilisations. Therefore, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of the Nile had always been a major cornerstone of Egyptian national security. A major factor that had helped Egypt safeguard the continued flow of Nile waters was a balance of powers between the Nile Basin nations that had always been in Egypt's favour, and Egypt actively sought to retain this advantage through its network of African, regional and international relations. Suddenly, however, the status quo that had lasted thousands of years was disrupted by Ethiopia's recent declaration of its intent to divert the waters of the Blue Nile in order to construct the Renaissance Dam.

The Ethiopian move triggered pandemonium in Egypt. Government and opposition exchanged volleys of vehement accusations. Foreign policy on this question was thrown into confusion, perhaps less because of the incident itself than because of the surrounding circumstances and the ambiguity as to whether they are a prelude to something more ominous.

Up to the time of writing this article, Egyptian (and Sudanese) policy has been to accept the Ethiopian move and to set it in the framework of the cooperation of Nile Valley nations, in the hope that this will establish a new approach commensurate to the “historic relations” between

Egypt and Ethiopia. One imagines that the Egyptian leadership had to swallow back a certain amount of bile when it took this stance out of consideration for the potential danger of the situation. Ethiopia announced its decision to divert the Blue Nile before the tripartite Ethiopian, Sudanese and Egyptian committee issued its report on the dam project. It was as though Addis Ababa was bent on notifying Khartoum and Cairo that they had better get used to the policy of *fait accompli*. More significantly, even before this, Ethiopian behaviour in the committee could hardly be described as cooperative, and the aim was clearly to undermine the guarantees that Egypt and Sudan would continue to secure their fair shares of Nile waters.

More significantly, Addis Ababa has not indicated its approval of the new Egyptian approach towards the Nile waters question, which is based on a distinction between the Nile Basin and the “course of the Nile”. More than 1,600 billion cubic metres of precipitation falls on the Nile Basin countries while the Nile carries around 100 billion cubic metres of water per year. The huge quantities of lost rainfall could solve all of Africa's water problems if, instead, it were harnessed to the benefit of vast open tracts of land. Indeed, in the past Egypt offered Sudan, Uganda and Congo considerable assistance in the construction of dams, canals and irrigation systems to draw rainwater into the Nile, to generate electricity and to expand cultivation. As this indicates, the approach is logical and workable, but putting it into effect over an extensive area can only be achieved with the intensive cooperation of Ethiopia, from which emanates 85 per cent of the Nile waters and which, simultaneously, receives relatively abundant rainfall.

The technical specifications and the pros and cons of the Renaissance Dam are not our subject here. What is of concern is that the dam is connected with a variety of issues that are inevitably worrisome for Egypt. Ethiopia is pressing ahead with the project against the backdrop of the ratification process of a framework agreement for cooperation between Nile Basin nations. The text of the agreement failed to live up to Cairo's expectations that it would adopt Egypt's cooperative approach and set conditions consistent with this approach that would enable all parties to obtain more than their water needs. However, six countries have signed, effectively isolating Egypt and Sudan. In this already charged climate, although Cairo and Khartoum were naturally aware of the Ethiopian project, Addis did not give Cairo or Khartoum advance notification on the steps it was about to take, nor did it submit much of the necessary information to the tripartite committee.

Not only has Ethiopia taken a high-handed approach on this issue, it has begun to play the role of regional superpower on the strength of its population of 85 million, its victory over Eritrea and military presence in Somalia, and its noticeable economic growth. Such factors should have made Ethiopia more confident and self-assured, but apparently it felt that it had to claim an exclusive right to determine the fate of the Nile waters and the region, and to insult Egypt and Sudan in the process.

This state of affairs, in general, is inseparable from two important factors. First, the Ethiopian move came at a time of considerable decline in Egypt's strategic position in Africa and the Middle East. The second is that Egypt, which lacks a new strategy commensurate to the changes that have taken place since January 2011, also lacks a “water policy and strategy” to guide it as it confronts

the huge development challenges that lay ahead. Egypt needs to address these factors, and it can do so effectively if it takes them seriously enough.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102879>

Appendix 19

Outflanked by crises

Dina Ezzat Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 05 - 06 - 2013

Ethiopia's weekend announcement that it is diverting the course of the Blue Nile, a preliminary move in the construction of a mega dam that many experts fear will reduce Egypt's share of Nile water, was the beginning of a bad week for President Mohamed Morsi. The issue evolved into a terribly confused situation following the broadcast of a meeting that Morsi hosted at the presidential palace on Monday with a group of Islamist and liberal political figures to discuss the Ethiopian move.

Participants used far from diplomatic language about Ethiopia and Sudan, suggesting improper intervention in both countries' affairs, and in the affairs of other Horn of Africa states. That — as a subsequent debate between participants and presidential advisors made clear — they had not realised the whole world was listening in is unlikely to contain the damage done by their derogatory remarks.

“We are facing serious political, diplomatic and legal difficulties over this meeting,” said one government official.

Hani Raslan, Sudan/Africa expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, says “the possible damage cannot be overestimated.”

“Morsi has long argued that he will remedy the harm done to Egyptian-African relations during the last 15 years of Mubarak's rule when Africa was completely neglected. Yet with that single meeting he has caused far more harm than was done throughout Mubarak's rule. Morsi gave an already apprehensive African public proof of Egyptian chauvinism and condescension.”

In the assessment of one concerned official statements made during the meeting can only undermine Egypt's negotiating position with Ethiopia. “Before the meeting we had a strong legal basis to say that as a Nile Basin country our rights should not be undermined as a result of irrigation schemes by any other Basin state. International law was on our side. Now we are in a position that could be easily qualified by international law as aggressive. We have a very tough diplomatic mission ahead of us to remedy the damage,” said the diplomat.

A court verdict that sentenced 43 human rights activists and NGO employees, 27 of whom were tried in absentia, with one to five years in prison, followed straight after the debacle of the broadcast meeting. Issued on Tuesday, the verdict complicates the already uphill task of the Egyptian diplomatic mission in Geneva as it desperately tries to convince a sceptical UN Human Rights Council that the recently released draft of a new NGO law in Egypt has not been tailored to place civil society in the firm grip of the state.

The Geneva delegation's struggle may be nothing compared to that of Morsi who must now face the ire of the one ally — Washington — on whose support and tolerance he desperately counts. Western diplomatic sources in Cairo say that the verdict has acted to confirm existing apprehensions over the draft law released by the presidency on Thursday.

Government officials argue the verdict is a legal ruling over which the executive has no influence. Nermine Abdel-Bari, presidential coordinator on human rights affairs, even argued that “fears related to the proposed draft law only exist in the heads of some people while the law itself is designed to offer civil society unprecedented freedom... though with fair and necessary regulations that the state is entitled to have.”

It is an argument that lawyer and activist Ahmed Hishmat dismisses as meaningless twaddle. The aim of the draft law, he says, is the complete opposite. Indeed, it is “not just this law but a whole series of presidential decisions that are designed to ensure the executive is in complete control of everything”.

For Hishmat it is hard to separate the draft of the NGO law from that of the judiciary law which has already prompted fury from judicial quarters.

“Here is what we have today: a president who is counting on the legislation of the Shura Council which was announced unconstitutional by the Supreme Constitutional Court. We have a prosecutor-general whose legitimacy is questioned by the administrative court and draft laws that are firmly resisted by civil society and the judiciary. On top of this we have an antagonised media and a firmly provoked cultural community, we have an ailing economy and a highly polarised political scene. We also have appalling management, as demonstrated by the presidential meeting over the Nile.”

All of which leave Hishmat wondering how Morsi can survive the maze of problems that are only going to be compounded on 30 June, the first anniversary of his election likely to be greeted by massive displays of disaffection.

Activists have already been busy calling for nationwide demonstrations. The objective is to mark the day on which Morsi was sworn in last year with a massive show of dissatisfaction with his performance and demands for early presidential elections.

“Say it out loud, don't be afraid to say it, Morsi is a failure,” shouted Nesrine Hamdi, a volunteer activist with the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement that has been collecting signatures to “withdraw confidence from Morsi” and call for early presidential elections.

On Sunday evening she was busy in Heliopolis Square collecting signatures with other activists. Hamdi says she is hopeful that the campaign will be able to collect well over 10 million signatures. She also expects “a really huge demonstration around the presidential palace at Heliopolis to demand an end to the failed administration of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood”.

Ragiya Abdel-Wahab, one of the people who signed the Tamarod petition, believes Morsi has already done “enormous damage to this country in his first year”.

“We cannot sit around and watch him spend another year as president and cause even greater damage,” she says.

A teacher in her early 50s, Abdel-Wahab voted for Hamdeen Sabahi in the first round of presidential elections and abstained in the second round to avoid choosing between “a Muslim Brotherhood candidate and a Mubarak hangover.” She plans to join in demonstrations on 30 June.

“I live nearby and our electricity has been off for two hours now. It has been like this for a month and it can only get worse. We are also facing growing inflation. Traffic is impossible. Everything goes from bad to worse. Morsi has to step down.”

Amir Salem, a lawyer, is busy trying to convince a court that Morsi escaped Wadi Al-Natron prison days after the outbreak of the 25 January Revolution and, having failed to turn himself in, he was ineligible to run for president. Salem is convinced that he is close to “proving before a court of law that Morsi illegitimately joined the presidential race”.

Few of the pundits who join roundtable discussions to discuss Egypt's current dilemmas believe the presidential elections are about to be annulled. Increasingly, though, the argument is being voiced that the current state of affairs is unsustainable. Something has to give. No one knows what it will be.

“The hope was that we were going to move from an autocratic state towards a democracy but we have not seen the steps required to achieve this taken,” says political analyst Mohamed Agati. Two and a half years after the 25 January Revolution the nation is back to an official discourse “that one thought was done away with the day Mubarak stepped down on 11 February 2011”.

“Today we are back to square one. We have a very polarised political scene and a very confused economic and legal set up. It is uncertain where we can move to from here”.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102901>

Appendix 20

Egypt, Ethiopia and the new dam

Adel Amer Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 05 - 06 - 2013

Ethiopia has begun operations to divert a portion of the Blue Nile preparatory to the construction of a major dam. Although this project had been anticipated for many years and in spite of repeated assurances from Addis Ababa that it would not affect Egypt, the Ethiopian decision to commence operations triggered anger and alarm among Egyptian public opinion, reactions reminiscent of the Iraqi and Syrian responses to the Ataturk Dam project many years ago.

The crisis over the diversion of the course of the Nile dates back to May 2010, when six upper riparian countries in the Nile Basin, meeting in Entebbe, signed a new Nile Waters Treaty, giving Cairo and Khartoum a year's grace period to join. The Entebbe Treaty states that cooperation between the countries of the Nile Basin initiative is founded on the principle of fair and reasonable use on the part of the state parties. Recently, the signatory states began ratification procedures through their parliaments. Once the treaty goes into effect, it will bring an end to Egypt and Sudan's historic quotas under the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, in accordance with which Egypt obtained 55.5 billion cubic metres a year and Sudan 18.5 billion. The six countries that have signed the new treaty are Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The Democratic Congo joined Egypt and Sudan's refusal to sign. In March 2013, the newly independent South Sudan announced that it would join the treaty.

Cairo and Khartoum have charged that the Entebbe Treaty “violates all international agreements” and vowed to alert donor nations to the illegality of funding any water projects on the Nile or its tributaries. They added that they would lobby against the Ethiopian dam project, in particular, which will cost an estimated \$4.8 billion, according to the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Ethiopia and the other signatory countries were unfazed by such protests and warnings, and on 1 April 2011, Ethiopia formally inaugurated the Great Millennium Dam project, or the Renaissance Dam, for the production of hydroelectric power for the Benishangul-Gumuz region, which is adjacent to the Sudanese border. The dam, which is due to be completed in 2015, will create a reservoir of approximately 63 billion cubic metres of water.

Following the 25 January 2011 revolution, Egyptian popular leaders pressed the need to address this vital issue, stressing that it had to be handled objectively and in a spirit untainted by the “arrogance that had characterised the approach of the governments of former president Hosni Mubarak”. On 29 April 2011, a “people's delegation”, consisting of representatives of the revolutionary youth, political parties and other public figures, set off to Addis to discuss the Millennium Dam project. Such actions inaugurated a new climate for handling dam initiatives and other issues related to the Nile waters. Perhaps because of this, Egyptians were all the more shocked by the Ethiopian announcement of its decision to press ahead with the diversion of the Blue Nile within hours of President Morsi's visit to Addis Ababa to attend the African Summit. On the sidelines of this summit, Morsi met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and raised Egyptian concerns with respect to the dam. Experts on the joint Egyptian-Ethiopian-Sudanese committee on this project found that “the studies that the Ethiopian side had submitted

with respect to the dam were insufficient to prove that its construction would not be harmful to Egypt.” In light of this, the tripartite committee will ask for additional studies, which will be undertaken by international experts on the committee. The committee is made up of six local members (two each from Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia) and four international experts on dam engineering and hydrology, water resource management and the social, economic and environmental impact of dams.

The construction of the dam on the upper reaches of the Nile poses an enormous challenge to Egyptian agriculture. The consequent water shortage could lead to reduced domestic food production as well as to a reduction by approximately 500 kilowatts per year in the electricity generated by the High Dam and the Aswan Dam. Such a spectre induced the Sudan and Nile Basin Studies Unit of Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies to convene a seminar on this question. It hosted Mohamed Allam, former minister of irrigation and water resources, who had been responsible for this issue during one of the tensest periods in Egyptian-Ethiopian relations over a number of essential differences regarding the dam. Allam presented a paper to the forum discussing the various phases of this question, from the Egyptian perspective in particular.

By way of background, Allam underscored a number of weaknesses on the Egyptian side: the scientific and technological lag, the spread of corruption, the deterioration in public services, and economic, social and cultural underdevelopment. He also mentioned the decline in Egypt's regional and international status and influence. At the same time, important political changes were taking place elsewhere in the Nile Basin. Ethiopia and Uganda were experiencing periods of economic growth and growing international support. In addition, Israeli influence in countries of the upper Nile Basin was increasing, while Egyptian influence remained minimal. Such factors contributed to augmenting the pressures on Egypt on one of its most crucial concerns, namely issues related to the Nile Basin initiative.

Water projects on the Blue Nile, whether in Ethiopian highlands or in Sudan, would have a major impact on Egypt, as the Blue Nile accounts for around 90 per cent of the water that reaches Egypt.

Egypt is heavily dependent on the Nile for its water needs. As Allam pointed out in his paper, the Nile furnishes 55.5 billion cubic metres a year of water (under the current quota), while Egypt receives only a billion cubic metres a year in rainfall, which falls primarily on the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts and parts of the Sinai. There are subterranean water sources, but these are non-renewable. The subterranean reserve in the Western Desert permits for the extraction of no more than three to five billion cubic metres per year over the next 50 to 100 years. Meanwhile, the costs of desalinisation are very high, and the quantities that this method supplies come to only 200 million cubic metres a year.

According to Allam, Egypt's current water needs amount to over 75 billion cubic metres a year, which is about 30 per cent higher than the available resources. The deficit is made up for by recycling. The per capita share of water is only 700 cubic metres a year. However, by 2050, and given current population growth figures, per capita share of water will decline to 350 cubic metres per year.

Water projects on the upper Nile would further imperil the situation. Large tracts of agricultural land would be lost. Hydroelectric power production would drop sharply and compel increasing reliance on gas-powered generators. Water purification plants and a number of other industries along the Nile would be severely affected, and the quality of irrigation water would deteriorate. In addition, there would be greater seepage of sea water into the northern coastal areas and the quality of the water in the northern freshwater lakes would decline.

TOWARDS A ROADMAP: Sudan and South Sudan are Egypt's most important partners in the foreseeable future, said Allam. Both need Egyptian support, expertise and investment. They also have water resources that could increase the yield of the Nile, large tracts of land suitable for cultivation and livestock, and mineral wealth. In addition, they offer promising markets for emergent Egyptian industries and skilled Egyptian labour. Politically, their unification would undermine regional and international designs to set the two countries against each other to the detriment of them both. Clearly, they would be well advised to create a joint technical body to examine the potential effects of the Ethiopian barrages on them both and to review the results of the Egyptian-Sudanese studies that had been conducted on this matter in the interest of formulating a unified vision on the dams on the basis of the bilateral agreement of 1959 that governs the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship with respect to the Nile waters.

In his paper, Allam also discussed why Ethiopia attaches such importance to the dam project. It has long been an Ethiopian dream to control the headwaters of the Blue Nile, he said. Ethiopia would reap huge profits from the export of hydroelectric power to neighbouring countries, generating a major source of national revenue that would stimulate a qualitative leap in economic and social development, and enhance Addis Ababa's influence in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in the continent. The net profit from the production and export of the electricity from the Mandaya Dam alone exceeds \$7 billion a year. The power — and hence income — generating capacity of the Renaissance Dam could be considerably greater. However, Addis also realised that these dams would not have this anticipated economic value unless they received the blessings of Egypt and Sudan, which would translate into the purchase of large quantities of the electricity they produce. Currently, Ethiopia, itself, does not have the domestic infrastructure or market capable of consuming a major portion of the amount of electricity that could be generated, while the only two other major consumers would be Egypt and Sudan. Therefore, Egypt and Sudan's refusal to participate in a network would delay Ethiopia's ability to benefit economically from the dams, at least until it develops a sufficient infrastructure and market locally, which would take several decades.

Egypt's regional and international drives concerning the Renaissance Dam project began in earnest in the middle of last year. Egypt rejected the feasibility studies for their failure to take into consideration the detrimental effects of this project on Sudan and Egypt. It sent its comments in this regard to the secretariat of the Nile Basin Initiative, to the technical bureau of the Eastern Nile Basin Commission, to the World Bank, to the European Market, to the Canadian Advisory Bureau, and to the Norwegian Consultancy Bureau that performed the feasibility and design studies for the project. It has also sustained talks with donor agencies and with China in order to drive home the

severe detrimental repercussions of the dam on both Egypt and Sudan. In the course of these talks, Egyptian officials stressed that they are not opposed to the development drive in Ethiopia, but that they are determined to safeguard Egypt's water rights and their country's future.

The fact remains that Ethiopia suffers a major water shortage. Indeed, it has the greatest deficiency in water of all the Nile Basin countries in spite of the fact that it is the major contributor to the Nile waters. At the same time, the Ethiopian highlands are not naturally suited to the construction of large dams and water reservoirs, regardless of the technology brought to bear, and even less to the transport of reserved water across its rugged terrain. Therefore, there is little need for the excessive alarm that has been stirred by some segments of the media recently. Still, the problem is not insignificant and there is a rift in Egypt's relations with other countries of the Nile Basin. In view of these considerations, Egypt needs to sustain a policy towards those countries based on the spirit of African brotherhood and cooperation, as opposed to confrontation and political blackmail. In this spirit, it must continue to offer aid and assistance to African countries, especially those in the Nile Basin, and not just in the realm of water resource development but also in a range of other fields, from agriculture to trade and industry and education.

The key to resolving the current crisis begins with Ethiopia, which should be given priority among the Nile Basin countries, in the construction of water projects. Ethiopia has the lowest rate of electricity consumption in the world — less than 1,000 megawatts (80 per cent of Ethiopians live without electricity). Nor will it affect Egypt and Sudan's share of Nile water if Ethiopia undertakes small water projects commensurate with its topography, such as electricity generating plants that capitalise on steep inclines or agricultural projects, whether dependent on precipitation or irrigation, which in any case would be relatively limited in view of the ruggedness of the Ethiopian terrain.

However, “Ethiopia can not divert a tributary of an international river shared by nine other nations. This is not just about Egypt and Sudan. International rivers are governed by laws and conventions, in accordance with which any action that affects water quotas requires advanced notice and guarantees against possible harm,” said Allam. Experts predict that by 2050, Egypt will require 21 billion cubic metres of water above its current quota in order meet the needs of its population, which is expected to climb to 150 million by then.

The writer is head of Al-Masryeen Centre for Strategic Studies.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102878>

Appendix 21

Two train tracks

Doaa El Bey Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 12 - 06 - 2013

In the countdown to 30 June, the first anniversary of Mohamed Morsi's presidency, newspapers noted signs of an escalation in tension and violence.

Al-Masry Al-Youm on Tuesday wrote 'Roadmap till 30 June'. Al-Youm Al-Sabei on Monday had 'Scenario of blood and fire between Tamarod, Al-Dameer and MB on 30 June' and Al-Shorouk wrote 'Countdown to 30 June starts with war of rumours and leaks'.

Newspapers also covered other pressing problems like that of the shortage of petrol and the final exams of the high school certificate.

Al-Ahram on Monday wrote 'Government efforts to end the petro crisis in two days' and Al-Akhbar on Sunday had 'Minister of education fails in Arabic exam' in reference to the difficult thanaweya amma Arabic exam on Saturday which caused distress among students.

Writers looked at what may happen up to and on 30 June. Niazi Mustafa said the present days are similar to the days leading up to the 25 January Revolution "which started magnificently but lost track after that".

Now, the youth that initiated the revolution are trying to put it back on track and build a new Egypt that is capable of regaining its influential regional and international role.

Meanwhile, Mustafa added, the MB is adamant in following the track it drew for itself regardless of the facts and major events that have taken place recently.

The writer regarded the meeting held to discuss the Renaissance Dam as an international scandal. Egypt may take years to correct the repercussions of that encounter.

Amid this dreary scene, the young and strong Tamarod, or rebel, movement came to gather signatures from the people who want Egypt to be for all Egyptians rather than for the MB only. "The MB's claim that the petition does not have a constitutional and legal basis reminds me of Mubarak when he said 'leave them to entertain themselves' describing the youth who were gathering signatures to support Al-Baradei," Mustafa wrote in the independent daily Al-Youm Al-Sabei.

The revolutionary youth entertained themselves indeed, Mustafa added, by sacking his regime. He concluded by pinning hope "on the great Egyptian people who will be able to put the revolution back on track and achieve its goals".

Hassan Nafaa wrote in his article entitled 'What will happen on 30/6?' that a sizeable sector of society is calling for early presidential elections as the only way out of the present political crisis. "However, there is no way out unless the president is convinced because he is the only person who can decide to hold early presidential elections."

Given that the president still rejects the idea, the columnist added, youths came with another idea: casting doubt on his legitimacy through the Tamarod campaign.

In an attempt to draw a picture of the present political situation, Nafaa writes that there is a movement that is trying to withdraw confidence from the president through gathering signatures from the people and are calling on them to go down to the streets on 30 June and protest until their demands are met.

In the meantime, Nafaa added, there is another opposing movement called Tagarod which for no clear reason chose the same tools and techniques of Tamarod to spoil what it is trying to do.

“The real problem is not in the establishment of Tagarod, but in the bankruptcy of the ruling regime which is only capable of creating crises and entering into confrontations. It is not capable of protecting us from crises or avoiding them,” he wrote in the independent daily Al-Masry Al-Yom.

Instead of encouraging Tagarod to confront Tamarod, Nafaa called on Morsi to put an end to the polarisation and take the initiative to ask an independent and unbiased political person to consult with both sides and try to reach a deal that appeals to both of them before 30 June. He concluded his article by wondering if that individual is available.

The aftermath of the Ethiopian decision to divert the Blue Nile and build the Renaissance Dam is still a matter of serious concern. Writers looked at the way the authorities are dealing with it.

Mohamed Ali Kheir wrote that without exaggeration, Egypt has entered a dangerous zone because it is the first time that Egypt has been faced with a major threat to its national security.

“Egypt's security is confined to two places: its eastern gate [Sinai-Israel border], and the Nile water. In the military dogma the latter is more important. Throughout Egypt's history, it has never faced threats from the two places at the same time,” Kheir wrote in the independent daily Al-Shorouk.

Although Egypt is still dealing with the Sinai file, he added, “we were forced to deal with the Nile water issue after Ethiopia insisted on building the Renaissance Dam which will be dangerous to our lives. That put the state and the political and media elite in a real crisis.”

While the author hailed the choice of Boutros Ghali as a member of the committee which will monitor the dam issue because he knows Africa and has strong personal relations with many African leaders, he was not happy with other members because they are not experienced enough in that area.

At the end, Kheir described the issue as a real test for Egypt's rulers, institutions and political elite. Unless they unite their ranks and abandon differences, the deluge will swallow everybody. However, the first move needs to come from the presidency.

Makram Mohamed Ahmed asked why the Egyptian government has not revealed the details of the report of the tripartite committee on the Renaissance Dam which drew a picture of the impact of the dam on Egypt.

“Why is our government, which is ranked among the 10 least transparent governments, ignoring the least rules of transparency and concealing the report on the dam? It should reveal the results to the people so that they know the magnitude of the crisis facing the country,” Mohamed Ahmed wrote in the official daily Al-Ahram.

He wondered whether the government thinks that the report would remain a secret forever in a world where there are no barriers in the sharing of information.

The situation is dangerous, he added. Thus dealing with the matter involves wide consensus in which all the political powers should be consulted in order to reach a joint and clear solution.

If it is Ethiopia's right to store water and generate electricity from the Renaissance Dam, Mohamed Ahmed elaborated, it is Egypt's natural right to guarantee its normal water quota and electricity generated from the High Dam. There should be no opposition between the interests of the two states and that involves that Egypt helps Ethiopia in marketing the electricity it produces via Egypt.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102984>

Appendix 22

Testing diplomatic waters

Doaa El Bey Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 12 - 06 - 2013

Egypt and Ethiopia have been engaged in escalating rhetoric over the Grand Renaissance Dam.

President Mohamed Morsi delivered a speech on Monday to an invited audience of Islamists in which he called on the Egyptian people to stand united in the face of threats to Egypt's water supplies. The event was held to discuss responses to Ethiopia's recent decision to divert the course of the Blue Nile. During his speech Morsi repeatedly stressed that Egyptians would not tolerate any encroachment on their historic quota of Nile water.

All options, said Morsi, were on the table.

Amany Al-Taweel, an expert at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, points out that such open meetings are all but redundant when it comes to addressing the real issues. Instead, she argues, Egypt should busy itself by first consulting specialised bodies and then by holding closed meetings at which a coherent position can be hammered out.

“Then the opposition should be consulted in a closed meeting. After forming a final stand, it could be declared in a press conference. Holding televised spontaneous meetings is not going to help,” she told Al-Ahram Weekly.

Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya member Safwat Abdel-Ghani used language similar to Morsi's during Monday's meeting. Egypt, he said, was facing conspiracies as international forces sought to interfere in Africa to diminish Egypt's continental role.

Helmi Shaarawi, director of the Arab and African Research Centre, warns that in the wake of the Ethiopian decision to divert the Blue Nile Egypt is behaving as if it has to start negotiations with Addis Ababa from scratch. Yet the Entebbe Agreement (signed by all Nile Basin states except Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan and Congo), he told Al-Ahram Weekly, is open for negotiation. “We can pursue negotiations to amend the agreement. There is a gap between the Egyptian and the Ethiopian viewpoints, but we can always reach a compromise,” he said.

During his speech Morsi asked opposing political forces to stand united and set aside political rivalries at a time when Egypt faces difficult challenges. There are no signs that the opposition will listen to his demands.

The president's speech not only contained nothing new, complains Mohamed Abul-Ghar, president of the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, it skirted around specifying any single initiative that might help resolve the problem.

Tension mounted between Cairo and Addis Ababa when the latter declared that it would begin diverting the course of the Blue Nile in preparation for work on the Renaissance Dam. In response Egypt called for a halt to all work until further investigations on the impact of the dam are complete. Addis Ababa rejected Egypt's request.

Morsi's adviser Ayman Ali responded that “while all people have a right to pursue their own interests there must be guarantees that the Ethiopian dam will not harm Egypt. Otherwise all options are open.”

Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr said Egypt would not give up “a single drop of water from the Nile” before announcing that he would travel to Addis Ababa to discuss the impact of the dam and the Ethiopian decision not to halt its construction.

At a meeting convened last week by Morsi, several politicians made open threats against Ethiopia. Some suggested backing anti-government rebels while others recommended covert use of force. The Ethiopian government summoned the Egyptian ambassador to demand an explanation after the “hostile remarks” made by politicians during the meeting were broadcast.

In an attempt to defuse the ensuing furore a press conference was held by Popular Diplomacy, an initiative set up by independent politicians to resolve outstanding water disputes between Egypt and Ethiopia. The initiative plans to establish a committee, including experts from Ethiopia and Uganda, to examine ways to contain the crisis.

Former MP Mustafa Al-Guindi, a founding member of the Popular Diplomacy initiative, described the president's meeting with politicians and the broadcast of their comments as a disaster. “It will make any talks with the involved parties extremely difficult,” he warned.

Al-Guindi was a member of the popular delegations that visited Uganda and Ethiopia following the 25 January Revolution in an attempt to improve relations. A visit to Uganda in April 2011 succeeded in convincing Ugandan officials to postpone signing the Nile Basin Entebbe Treaty for two years. A visit to Addis Ababa a month later succeeded in convincing Ethiopian officials to postpone ratifying the treaty for a year.

Popular diplomacy initiatives convinced Ethiopia to establish the tripartite committee two years ago. Addis Ababa had initially refused to form the committee until Egypt signed the Entebbe Treaty.

Now though, says Abul-Ghar, it is time for official diplomacy to take the lead.

“Given that people are already suffering from a shortage of water, and we are completely dependent on the Nile, we can get international support for our case,” says Abul-Ghar. Egypt must petition for international pressure to be brought to bear in support of its position, he argues. Then, Cairo can enter into negotiations with Addis Ababa with the aim of becoming a partner in building the dam and securing an agreement that it will be the last dam built on the Blue Nile and that none of the reservoir created will be for irrigating land in either Ethiopia or Sudan. “Through diplomacy we can reach an understanding on these matters and sign a new agreement,” he says.

“Egypt can argue that Ethiopia started building the project before the report of the tripartite committee and that it refuses to acknowledge Egypt's water quota,” says Al-Taweel.

Shaarawi also argues in favour of negotiations and pressure. “We should realise that the problem is multi levelled,” he says. “There is major Arab investment, especially from Qatar and Saudi

Arabia, in addition to Indian and Chinese investment in the project. The Muslim Brotherhood regime should use its good relations with Qatar to improve our negotiating status with Ethiopia.”

Chinese and Indian interests in the Arab world could also be a negotiating tool, he says. “These interests could be used to help Egypt in its negotiation with Ethiopia.”

The decision by Southern Sudan to sign the Entebbe Agreement later this month could make Egypt's negotiating stand more difficult, warns Al-Taweel. The Entebbe Agreement has already been signed by Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi.

Egypt is basing its position on agreements on the division of Nile water that date from 1929 and 1959 which the six countries that signed the Entebbe Agreement reject on the grounds that they were written and ratified by colonial powers.

The Blue Nile provides Egypt with 85 per cent of its annual quota of 55.5 billion cubic metres of Nile water. The Renaissance Dam is one of four dams planned to be built on the Blue Nile.

The move to divert the Blue Nile, described in Ethiopia as “historic”, was taken last month, a day after Morsi concluded his visit to Ethiopia.

The reservoir behind the proposed dam will contain 74 billion cubic metres of water. Ethiopia plans to fill it in five years, which some experts predict could see a 20 per cent reduction of water flowing to Egypt. Yet, according to Egypt's National Planning Institute, Egypt is likely to need an additional 21 billion cubic metres of water per year by 2050 to meet the water needs of a projected population of 150 million.

Since 1902 there have been over 10 agreements regulating the distribution of Nile water, including the 1959 agreement which specified Egypt and Sudan's shares at 55 and 18 billion cubic metres.

In 1999, Egypt agreed to join other Nile Basin countries in a negotiation process aimed at addressing the demands of the upstream countries. In 2010, Cairo and Khartoum suspended their participation in the talks after failing to reach any agreement covering the construction of irrigation projects on the Nile.

The final report issued by the tripartite committee last week pointed to existing errors in the present design of the proposed Renaissance Dam and recommended changes.

It also asked for a schedule specifying the amount of Nile water reaching Egypt over the next 60 years.

<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102988>

Appendix 23

Behind the Renaissance Dam

Ayman Abdel Wahab Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 12 - 06 - 2013

Most of the discussions on Ethiopia's move to divert the Blue Nile in order to construct the Renaissance Dam have focussed primarily on three dimensions. One is the potential effects on Egypt, which are numerous and dangerous. The dam not only threatens to reduce Egypt's annual quota of Nile waters (55.5 billion cubic metres), it will determine the quantities and dates of their arrival, all of which will have an impact on electricity, agriculture and other sectors important to development in Egypt. The second facet concerns Ethiopia's motives, which are also numerous and which involve both developmental and political objectives. The third rests on a form of conspiracy theory that sees the machinations of certain international or regional powers, foremost among which, Israel. The approach has some valid elements related to the convergence of interests among various international players.

All three facets are integral to a thorough and accurate understanding of the issue. To omit any one of them would fail to portray the full contours of the interplay — whether of a cooperative or an adversarial nature — involved. Unfortunately, this shortcoming has characterised most of the analyses that have sought to produce viable solutions to the problem, or at least to calculate the potential political costs and benefits of available solutions. Clearly a multifaceted approach is called for. It is therefore essential to establish the links between Ethiopian motives as shaped by internal developments and the changes in the regional and international climate surrounding the water question that have driven Ethiopia to undertake measures that violate Egyptian rights (such as the right to advance notification and water quota rights) in a manner, moreover, that appears indifferent to the Egyptian reaction.

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION — COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES: The question of resource management, particularly with respect to transnational rivers, has acquired increasing international strategic significance over the past two decades in tandem with the increasing extent to which this question encroached on areas of the national sovereignty of the countries that shared a particular river. This dimension augmented the sensitivity and potential dangers of the question, especially when it involved matters that fostered competition and conflict, as opposed to cooperation and integration. The change in patterns of international interplay in the post-Cold War era and the growing part that international agencies played in the push for water resource management policies that supported technical and economic programmes had a definite impact on the “linkage between water and development”. This applied particularly to developing nations that had to deal with the scarcity and poor distribution of water resources, or what experts would term “allocation efficiency”.

With respect to the Nile Basin, as balances of power in this region shifted as international parties swarmed into the African Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, a panoply of security related

issues became increasingly intertwined in the question of national development. This factor led to a change in perspective on the natural division of the Basin that was originally founded on the notion that fate allocated agriculture and rainfall to downstream countries and electricity and livestock to upstream countries.

Although it is largely true that the upper riparian countries are only marginally dependent on the Nile as their source of life (unlike Egypt and Sudan, which depend on it for 95 and 15 per cent of their water needs respectively), some countries at the sources have begun to develop agricultural irrigation systems. This trend has fed the ambitions of those governments to possess both water and electricity, regardless of the detrimental effects on Egypt. The trend has been fed by European, Israeli, Saudi, Qatari and other Arabian firms that have been scrambling to purchase land and to stake out shares in the production of vital energy.

NEGOTIATIONS — BETWEEN STAGNATION AND DEAD-ENDS: Negotiations over the Nile waters have given rise to a sharp rift between the six signatories to the Entebbe Agreement (Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda), on the one hand, and Egypt and north Sudan on the other. Nor can Egypt and Sudan put much stock in the remaining countries, that are torn between conflicting pressures. Indeed, it appears that South Sudan has determined to join the signatories soon.

Most countries of the upper Nile Basin have played on the time factor, which works in their favour. This applies in particular to Ethiopia's handling of the Renaissance Dam with respect to which project it stepped up its drive to secure economic and development assistance while, simultaneously, trying to keep its relations with Egypt on an even keel. Therefore, Ethiopia's negotiating approach was to adopt a moderate rhetoric that urged cooperation while, simultaneously, disengaging the water question from other Egyptian-Ethiopian bilateral issues. Its motive for appearing flexible was to ensure the continued support of donor nations while banking that the time factor would pressure Egypt into accepting the new formula embodied in the Entebbe Agreement, or at least reduce Egypt's scope of maneuverability in altering the current equations. Meanwhile, negotiations bogged down over a number of controversial issues (the definition of water security, the question of advanced notification on water-related projects, the voting system) with the result that talks, now, currently revolve over a consensual formula for achieving a minimal level of (technical) cooperation as the most appropriate option for the current phase.

THE INTERNAL DIMENSION — POLITICAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL UTILISATION: Ethiopia's decision to press ahead with the construction of the Renaissance Dam and the bid on the part of the majority of Nile Basin nations to force the Entebbe Agreement on Egypt are consistent with the internal political contexts in those countries where there are significant segments of opinion opposed to, or sceptical about, issues related to cooperation with Egypt in water resource management. For the governments of those countries, the political costs of accommodating Egypt's demands were too high in the face of the pressures on the part of political opposition groups that rejected Egypt's historical rights to Nile waters. It was not just that there were few political forces

to countervail such pressures, such as an effective Egyptian presence in those countries or lobbies with enough weight to press effectively for the preservation of Egyptian rights and welfare. There was strong resistance to any agreement that would perpetuate the efficacy of treaties or agreements that these governments and societies believed impinged on their sovereignty. Since independence, these countries have declared their refusal to recognise all treaties that had been signed during the colonial period.

Staunch opposition to the Egyptian stance on the Nile waters was a winning card in the political contests in most of the Nile Basin countries. This would become tangibly apparent in the results of Ethiopian legislative elections in 2010, during which campaigns, the issue of water cooperation with Egypt was one of the most heated topics. Many international reports attributed the electoral success of former prime minister Meles Zenawi and his party to his populist handling of this question. The trend in opposition to the existing formula of cooperation with Egypt had begun to climb since 2003 when the parliaments of three Nile Basin nations (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) voted to withdraw recognition from the existing water cooperation agreements with Egypt on the grounds that these agreements infringe on their national sovereignty as they render their development plans contingent on Egyptian approval.

CONNECTING THE DOTS: When we connect the dots between the domestic, regional and international situations, it becomes apparent that Ethiopia's escalatory moves towards Egypt at this time are based on a vision in which the Renaissance Dam is only a part. Addis Ababa is capitalising on a moment in which Egypt appears to lack many of the ingredients of a strong and regionally influential state in order to impose a de facto reality conducive to its development plans and its political ambitions to leverage itself as a regional power capable of promoting the interests of international powers and attracting large amounts of foreign investment.

This moment, moreover, marks a critical juncture with respect to future cooperation over water resource management among the countries of the Nile Basin. In going ahead with the diversion of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia has effectively declared the end of the phase of exercising pressure on Egypt (through the interplay surrounding the Entebbe Agreement) and the beginning of a phase of imposing de facto realities on the part of upper riparian countries. This policy is ominous for the future of Egypt's share of Nile waters and the mechanisms of cooperation over water resource management, especially in light of recent reports that Uganda and Kenya are also planning to press ahead with dam construction projects.

When we contemplate this picture as a whole, it becomes clear that the upper riparian countries of the Nile Basin are not just seeking to free themselves of the Egyptian "restriction" on their development projects, they are also determined to retain the support of the donor agencies and sponsors of the Nile Basin Initiative in order to secure funding and attract investments. In other words, they are playing a zero-sum game in which they get everything and Egypt gets nothing.

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<https://www.masress.com/en/ahramweekly/102987>

Appendix 24

In quest of a win-win situation

Doaa El Bey Published in Al-Ahram Weekly on 19 - 06 - 2013

The visit of Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr crowned the diplomatic efforts.

“Any diplomatic efforts are welcomed by all standards,” Mustafa Al-Guindi, a founding member of the Popular Diplomacy initiative, told Al-Ahram Weekly. “The resolution of the present dispute must be through dialogue and not confrontation or war. We will be able to resolve any differences through finding common interests between the two states,” Al-Guindi, who is currently visiting Uganda, added.

The aim of his visit is to discuss with the Ugandan officials the impacts of other dams to be built on the White Nile in Uganda. “Some people say that these dams would not affect Egypt. However, to avoid repeating the same scenario, we have to discuss this issue and make sure that they will not affect Egypt before it is too late,” he said.

Sakina Fouad, a journalist and prominent writer, cast doubt that Amr's visit on its own could ease the tension. “Any diplomatic efforts must be supported by the state. It should be linked to an official vision, plans and suggestions to deal with the crisis,” she told the Weekly.

Ethiopia is not in need of rhetoric at present, she added, it wants plans that match up with the status of Egypt. And that means that our highly respected experts in the fields of irrigation should be part and parcel of these plans.

Amr described the talks with his Ethiopian counterpart Tedros Adhanom as “clear” and “constructive”.

The two ministers issued a joint statement at the end of their meeting on Tuesday in which they reiterated their commitment to boost bilateral relations and coordinate efforts to reach an understanding regarding all pending issues between the two states.

Regarding the Renaissance Dam, the two officials agreed to start immediate consultation with Sudan on how to implement the recommendations of the tripartite committee and prepare the needed studies required in its report.

Adhanom emphasised in the statement that the dam is built in such a way that takes into consideration Egyptian concerns regarding water security. In that respect, the two officials agreed that special consideration would be given to Ethiopian development needs as well as the Egyptian and Sudanese concern about water.

Amr and Adhanom agreed on the importance of continuous dialogue. Thus, Adhanom accepted an invitation to visit Egypt soon. A date has not been set yet.

The last leg of Amr's tour was Sudan during which he met with his counterpart Salah Wansi and the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir and updated them of the outcome of his visit to Ethiopia. Amr's visit was described by a diplomatic source as an exploratory visit that would be followed by several high level visits to discuss the possibility of the implementation of the recommendations of the tripartite report on the Renaissance Dam. “The report is the starting point according to which we can start political dialogue,” he added.

The visit is likely to diffuse the crisis and pave the way for negotiations between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan on how to deal with the repercussions of the Renaissance Dam and the tripartite report.

It is also expected to ease the tension that resulted from the war of words that erupted after Addis Ababa decided to divert the Blue Nile in preparation of building the controversial Renaissance Dam.

In a meeting attended by political figures earlier this month, President Mohamed Morsi warned that “all options are open” regarding the dam.

That was followed by strong statements made by some of the attendees. Unaware that the event was being aired on live television, Egyptian figures suggested taking measures like launching a military attack to stop Ethiopia from building the dam and supporting local rebels to destroy the dam project.

Morsi's speech later added fuel to the fire. During that speech, delivered to an invited audience of Islamists, he repeatedly stressed that Egyptians would not tolerate any encroachment on their historic quota of Nile water and reiterated that all options were on the table.

Fouad regarded the official reaction to a crisis of that size as catastrophic. Officials have left the crisis until it has gone out of control, now they look as if they are trying to take the train after it left the station, she said.

That file had been the responsibility of the present prime minister for six years — when he was minister of irrigation, Fouad added. Even when the president decided to handle it, he held a catastrophic meeting with opposition figures.

“Why did he not invite the highly experienced experts that Egypt has in the field of irrigation and

building dams? Why did he not establish relations built on mutual respect with the African states as Gamal Abdel-Nasser and his predecessors did?" Fouad wondered.

Al-Guindi questioned why the president did not invite the members of the popular diplomacy delegation to that meeting which he also described as catastrophic. "The MB wants to establish their own delegation that, of course, does not represent all the active political trends. If they had invited the popular diplomacy delegation, it would have represented all the active political powers including the MB," he said.

Al-Guindi and Fouad were members of the popular delegation that visited Uganda and Ethiopia in 2011 after the January Revolution and managed to convince the two states to postpone the ratification of the Entebbe agreement.

"We convinced the two countries to adjourn the ratification of the agreement until the political situation in Egypt settles down. However, we can convince them to wait for another six months or even more because Egypt is still in a state of revolution," Al-Guindi said.

Ethiopia declared its decision to divert the Blue Nile last month, paving the way for the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam. The move aroused fear and absolute concern among Egyptians regarding the impacts of the dam on the flow of Nile water to Egypt. Egypt gets 95 per cent of its water needs from the Nile.

Ethiopian officials have attempted to dispel fears regarding the dam's potential impact, stressing the project would ultimately benefit all the Nile Basin states and would not affect Egypt's share of water. However, the report issued by the tripartite committee did not rule out any harm to Egypt as a result of building the Renaissance Dam. It recommended further studies.

Various international bodies have recently interfered to ease the tension between the two states since Addis Ababa decided to divert the Blue Nile.

Catherine Ashton, European Union foreign policy chief, visited Egypt Tuesday to discuss the Ethiopia dam row and Syria crisis with President Morsi, and other figures.

Ashton aimed from the visit to hear the Egyptian perspective in the hope of offering a solution that might ease tensions between the two states.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also asked Morsi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam

Desalegn in a phone conversation late last week to hold dialogue to resolve grievances over the disputed Renaissance Dam.

The African Union urged both sides to hold an open discussion to resolve the row.

“It would be important to... look at how we can have a win-win situation in a new context, not in the context of the colonial powers, but in the context of pan-Africanism and African renaissance,” the AU Chairperson Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma told a news conference earlier this month.

South Sudan also made an initiative earlier this month to mediate between Cairo and Khartoum on the one hand and Addis Ababa and the other Nile Basin countries that signed the Entebbe agreement on the other hand. An initiative was handed to Egypt's minister of irrigation who promised to submit it to the presidency for consideration.

However, the diplomatic track is expected to be long and arduous because there are various issues of difference between the two countries. First, the two states agreed to start consultations on implementing the recommendations of the tripartite committee, but they did not agree on a certain timeframe and whether the building of the dam would stop until the consultations and studies are finished.

Ethiopia's Foreign Ministry clearly said last week the country has no intention of suspending the construction of the dam.

However, the Egyptian stand in that matter was clear as Magdi Amer, deputy of Egypt's foreign minister and coordinator and the Nile water file put it in a news conference held Saturday.

The tripartite report said that Egyptian fears are justified, and recommended further studies to be carried, he said.

“Many factors depend on when the recommended studies will be conducted and finished. And that should be done in a very short time, in order to decide on the next step,” he added in a press conference.

He reiterated concerns regarding the height and storage capacity of the dam, the quantity and quality of water and a possible collapse of the dam because of the nature of the soil in the dam's location and other geological factors.

The two countries also differ over signing the Entebbe agreement. Ethiopia wants Egypt and Sudan to sign it but Egypt emphasised that it would not sign it.

Egypt's Minister of Irrigation Mohamed Bahaeddin clearly stated this week Egypt is not bound by the Entebbe Agreement ratified by Ethiopia.

“Egypt will not sign the agreement unless [certain] points of contention are modified,” Bahaeddin said.

The main point of contention, according to Amer, is prior notification; that is Egypt should be notified before the construction of any project aimed at using River Nile water.

Amer underlined that Egypt is not against developmental projects in Nile Basin countries, citing Egypt's approval of the Tekizi Dam in Ethiopia after verifying that it will not have a major effect on Egypt's share of the Nile.

Amer also emphasised in the press conference that Egypt has a clear stand from the agreement. “We do not regard it as a complete agreement as there is a very important part in it concerning water security that the parties failed to agree on. Thus they put it as an annex to the agreement to be agreed on later,” he explained.

Ethiopia's 547-member parliament unanimously endorsed the Entebbe Agreement last week, to be the first country to ratify the agreement signed in Uganda in 2010.

The Entebbe Agreement is meant to replace the 1929 and 1959 colonial-era agreements that awarded Egypt and Sudan a water share of 55.5 and 18.5 billion cubic metres of the River Nile. Ethiopia is one of five countries that signed the Entebbe agreement. The other countries are Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi; they signed early 2011.

South Sudan will sign it later this month. The Republic of Congo has not expressed a will to sign at present, but it can take that decision anytime.

The Blue Nile provides Egypt with 85 per cent of its annual share of the Nile water. The Renaissance Dam is one of four dams planned to be built on the Blue Nile.

The reservoir behind the proposed dam will contain 74 billion cubic metres of water. Ethiopia plans to fill the reservoir in five years, which could cause Egypt a reduction in water of over 20 per cent, contributing to the country's existing water shortages.

According to Egypt's National Planning Institute, the country will likely need an additional 21 billion cubic metres of water per year by 2050, on top of its current quota, to meet the water needs of a projected population of 150 million.

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